By CARL MILLER

“If everybody is thinking alike so somebody isn’t thinking,” was written inward foot-high letters across a whiteboard inward ane of the principal atriums of the base. Over to ane side, at that topographic point was a suite total of large, electronic sketch pads together with multi-screened desktops loaded with digital editing software. The men together with women of the 77th knew how to set upwards cameras, tape sound, edit videos. Plucked from across the military, they were proficient inward graphic design, social media advertising, together with information analytics. Some may remove hold taken the army’s course of study inward Defence Media Operations, together with almost half were reservists from civvy street, with total fourth dimension jobs inward marketing or consumer research.
From utilization to office, I found a different constituent of the Brigade busy at work. One room was focussed on agreement audiences: the makeup, demographics together with habits of the people they wanted to reach. Another was to a greater extent than analytical, focussing on creating “attitude together with sentiment awareness” from large sets of social media data. Another was total of officers producing video together with well content. Elsewhere, teams of word specialists were closely analysing how messages were existence received together with discussing how to brand them to a greater extent than resonant.
Explaining their work, the soldiers used phrases I had heard countless times from digital marketers: “key influencers", “reach", “traction". You commonly remove heed such words at viral advertising studios together with digital enquiry labs. But the skinny jeans together with wax moustaches were hither replaced past times the crisply ironed shirts together with lite patterned camouflage of the British Army. Their surroundings were as incongruous – the 77th’s headquarters were a mix of linoleum flooring, long corridors together with swinging burn doors. More Grange Hill than Menlo Park. Next to a digital blueprint studio, soldiers were having a tea break, a package of digestives lying opened upwards on top of a greenish metallic element ammo box. Another sign on the wall declared, “Behavioural modify is our USP [unique selling point]”. What on world was happening?
“If you lot rails where UK manpower is deployed, you lot tin accept a practiced guess at where this form of ‘influence’ activity happens,” an information warfare officeholder (not affiliated with the 77th) told me later, nether status of anonymity. “A document volition come upwards from the Ministry of Defence that volition remove hold broad guidance together with themes to follow.” He explains that each armed services crusade straight off also has – or rather is – a marketing crusade too.
Ever since Nato troops were deployed to the Baltics inward 2017, Russian propaganda has been deployed too, alleging that Nato soldiers at that topographic point are rapists, looters, lilliputian different from a hostile occupation. One of the goals of Nato information warfare was to counter this form of threat: sharply rebutting damaging rumours, together with producing videos of Nato troops happily working with Baltic hosts.
Information campaigns such as these are “white”: openly, avowedly the phonation of the British military. But to narrower audiences, inward conflict situations, together with when it was understood to live proportionate together with necessary to do so, messaging campaigns could become, the officeholder said, “grey” together with “black” too. “Counter-piracy, counter-insurgencies together with counter-terrorism,” he explained. There, the messaging doesn't remove hold to expect similar it came from the armed services together with doesn't remove hold to necessarily tell the truth.
I saw no prove that the 77th do these kinds of operations themselves, but this to a greater extent than aggressive utilization of information is nada new. GCHQ, for instance, also has a unit of measurement dedicated to fighting wars with information. It is called the “Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group” – or JTRIG – an utterly unrevealing name, as it is mutual inward the world of intelligence. Almost all nosotros know most it comes from a serial of slides leaked past times NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden inward 2013. Those documents give us a glimpse of what these kinds of covert information campaigns could expect like.
According to the slides, JTRIG was inward the business concern of discrediting companies, past times passing “confidential information to the press through blogs etc.”, together with past times posting negative information on network forums. They could modify someone’s social media photos (“can accept ‘paranoia’ to a whole novel level”, a slide read.) They could utilization masquerade-type techniques – that is: placing “secret” information on a compromised computer. They could bombard someone’s telephone with text messages or calls.
JTRIG also boasted an arsenal of 200 info-weapons, ranging from in-development to fully operational. H5N1 tool dubbed “Badger” allowed the volume delivery of email. Another, called “Burlesque”, spoofed SMS messages. “Clean Sweep” would impersonate Facebook wall posts for individuals or entire countries. “Gateway” gave the powerfulness to “artificially increment traffic to a website”. “Underpass” was a agency to modify the outcome of online polls.
They had operational targets across the globe: Iran, Africa, North Korea, Russian Federation together with the UK. Sometimes the operations focused on specific individuals together with groups, sometimes the wider regimes or fifty-fifty full general populations. Operation Quito was a campaign, running some fourth dimension after 2009, to preclude Argentine Republic from taking over the Falkland Islands. H5N1 slide explained “this volition hopefully Pb to a long-running, large-scale, pioneering effects operation”. Running from March 2011, some other performance aimed for regime modify inward Republic of Zimbabwe past times discrediting the Zanu PF party.

Propaganda published on Facebook past times Russian PR firms inward an sweat to touching on the 2016 U.S. presidential election
Facebook
Over a decade ago, together with a world away from the 77th Brigade, at that topographic point were people who already knew that the network was a rigid novel tool of influence. They didn’t telephone outcry upwards what they did “information warfare”, media operations, influence activities, online action, or whatsoever of the armed services vernacular that it would become. Members of the simmering online subcultures that clustered around hacker forums, inward IRCs, together with on imageboards similar 4chan, they mightiness remove hold called it “attention hacking”. Or just lulz.
By TOM WARD
In 2008, Oprah Winfrey warned her millions of viewers that a known paedophile network “has over 9,000 penises together with they’re all raping children.” That was a 4chan Dragon Ball-themed in-joke someone had posted on the show’s messageboard. One twelvemonth later, Time periodical ran an online poll for its readers to vote on the world’s 100 most influential people, together with 4chan used scripts to rig the vote so that its founder – then-21-year-old Christopher Poole, commonly known as “moot” – came first. They built bots together with “sockpuppets” – mistaken social media accounts to brand topics tendency together with appear to a greater extent than pop than they were – together with swarmed together to overwhelm their targets. They started to achieve through computers to modify what people saw, together with maybe fifty-fifty what people thought. They celebrated each of their victories with a deluge of memes.
The lulz were speedily seized upon past times others for the money. Throughout the 2000s, small-scale PR firms, political communications consultancies, together with darknet markets all began to peddle the tactics together with techniques pioneered on 4chan. “Digital media-savvy merchants are weaponising their cognition of commercial social media manipulation services,” a cybersecurity researcher who tracks this form of illicit commercial activity tells me on status of anonymity.
“It’s similar an assembly line,” he continues. “They set upwards the campaign, penetrate the target audience, maintain the operation, together with so they strategically disengage. It is only going to teach bigger.”
A hit of websites started selling mistaken accounts, described, categorised together with priced almost similar wine: from inexpensive plonk all the agency to seasoned vintages. The “HUGE MEGA BOT PACK”, available for just $3 on the darknet, allowed you lot to create your ain bot Blue Planet forces across hundreds of social media platforms. There were services for manipulating search engine results. You could purchase Wikipedia edits. You could rent mistaken IP addresses to arrive expect similar your accounts came from all over the world. And at the top of the marketplace were “legend farms”, firms running tens of thousands of unique identities, each ane with multiple accounts on social media, a unique IP address, its ain network address, fifty-fifty its ain personality, interests together with writing style. The lulz had transmogrified into a business concern model.
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By NICOLA DAVISON
Inside the base of operations of the 77th, everything was inward motion. Flooring was existence laid, function units installed; desks – empty of possessions – formed neat lines inward offices silent covered inward plastic, tape together with sawdust. The unit of measurement was formed inward a hurry inward 2015 from diverse older parts of the British Army – a Media Operations Group, a Military Stabilisation Support Group, a Psychological Operations Group. It has been rapidly expanding ever since.
In 2014, a twelvemonth earlier the 77th was established, a memo entitled “Warfare inward the Information Age” flashed across the British military. “We are straight off inward the foothills of the Information Age” the memo announced. It argued that the British Army needed to struggle a novel form of war, ane that “will remove hold information at its core”. The Army needed to live out on social media, on the internet, together with inward the press, engaged, as the memo position it, “in the reciprocal, real-time business concern of existence outset with the truth, countering the narratives of others, together with if necessary manipulating the thought of thousands concurrently inward back upwards of combat operations.”
Then the business concern of lulz turned into geopolitics. Around the world, militaries had come upwards to precisely the same realisation as the British, together with oftentimes to a greater extent than quickly. “There is an increased reliance on, together with wishing for, information,” Nato’s Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, published inward 2009, began. And it reached the same decision as the British armed services memo: wars needed to remove hold an “increased attending on Info Ops”. Simply put, information operations should live used to target an enemy’s will. “For example, past times questioning the legitimacy of leadership together with cause, information activities may undermine their moral powerfulness base, separating leadership from supporters, political, armed services together with public, hence weakening their wishing to travel along together with affecting their actions,” the document explains.
Russia, too, was inward on the act. The Arab Spring, the revolutions inward several post-Soviet states, Nato’s enlargement – each of those had chipped away at the crumbling edifice of Russian power. Russian Federation had a large conventional Blue Planet forces but that seemed to affair less than inward the past. The Chief of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, began to rethink what a armed services needed to do. Warfare, he argued inward an article for Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier (The Military Industry Journal), was straight off “hybrid” – blurring the lines betwixt state of war together with peace, civilian together with military, province together with non-state. And at that topographic point was some other blurring too: betwixt forcefulness together with ideas. “Moral-psychological-cognitive-informational struggle”, as Gerasimov position it, was straight off cardinal to how conflicts should live fought.
We straight off at nowadays what Russian information warfare looks like. Moscow has built an apparatus that stretches from mainstream media to the backwaters of the blogosphere, from the President of the Russian Federation to the humble bot. Just similar the early on attending hackers, their techniques are a mixture of the real visible together with real hugger-mugger – but at a vastly greater scale.
Far less visible to Western eyes, however, were the outbreak of other theatres of information warfare exterior of the English linguistic communication language. Gerasimov was right: each was a instance of blurred boundaries. It was information warfare, but non e'er just carried out past times militaries. It came from the state, but sometimes included enough of non-state actors too. Primarily, it was done past times autocracies, together with was oftentimes directed internally, at the country’s ain inhabitants.
A Harvard paper published inward 2017 estimated that the Chinese regime employs 2 1000000 people to write 448 1000000 social media posts a year. Their primary purpose is to maintain online give-and-take away from sensitive political topics. Marc Owen Jones, a researcher at Exeter University’s Institute of Arab together with Islamic Studies, exposed thousands of mistaken Twitter accounts inward Saudi Arabia, “lionising the Saudi regime or Saudi unusual policy”. In Bahrain, evidence emerged of spam-like operations, aiming to halt dissidents finding each other or debating politically unsafe topics online. In Mexico, an estimated 75,000 automated accounts are known locally as Peñabots, after President Enrique Peña Nieto, flooding protestation hashtags with irrelevant, annoying vibrations burying whatsoever useful information.
Disinformation together with deception remove hold been a constituent of warfare for thousands of years, but across the world, something novel was starting to happen. Information has long been used to back upwards combat operations, but straight off combat was seen to taking house primarily, sometimes exclusively, through it. From existence a tool of warfare, each armed services began to realise that the struggle with, over together with through information was what state of war itself genuinely was about. And it wasn’t confined to Russia, Red People's Republic of China or anyone else. H5N1 global informational struggle has broken out. Dozens of countries are already doing it. And these are just the campaigns that nosotros know about.
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On their shoulders, the soldiers of the 77th Brigade wearable a small, circular while of bluish encircling a snarling golden creature that looks similar a lion. Called an H5N1 Chinthe, it’s a mythical Burmese brute outset worn past times the the Chindits, a British together with Indian guerrilla forcefulness created during the Second World War to protect Burma against the advancing Japanese Army. An Blue Planet forces of irregulars, the Chindits infiltrated deep behind enemy lines inward unpredictable sorties, destroying provide depots together with severing carry links, aiming to spread confusion as much as destruction.
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It’s no accident that the 77th wearable the Chinthe on their shoulder. Like the Chindits, they are a novel form of force. An unorthodox one, but inward the eyes of the British Army also a necessary innovation; just reflecting the world inward which nosotros all straight off alive together with the novel form of warfare that happens within it.
This novel warfare poses a occupation that neither the 77th Brigade, the military, or whatsoever democratic province has come upwards unopen to answering yet. It is tardily to function out how to deceive unusual publics, but far, far harder to know how to protect our own. Whether it is Russia’s involvement inward the U.S. elections, over Brexit, during the novichok poisoning or the dozens of other instances that nosotros already know about, the cases are piling up. In information warfare, offence beats defense almost past times design. It’s far easier to position out lies than convince everyone that they’re lies. Disinformation is cheap; debunking it is expensive together with difficult.
Even worse, this form of warfare benefits authoritarian states to a greater extent than than liberal democratic ones. For states together with militaries, manipulating the network is trivially inexpensive together with tardily to do. The limiting component isn’t technical, it’s legal. And whatever the overreaches of Western intelligence, they silent do operate inward legal environments that tend to to a greater extent than greatly constrain where, together with how widely, information warfare tin live deployed. Red People's Republic of China together with Russian Federation remove hold no such legal hindrances.
Equipping us all with the skills to protect ourselves from information warfare is, perhaps, the only truthful solution to the problem. But it takes time. And what could live taught would never maintain upwards with what tin live done. Technological possibility, as things stand, easily outpaces populace understanding.
The Chinthe was oftentimes built at the entrances of pagodas, temples together with other sacred sites to guard them from the menaces together with dangers lurking outside. Today, that sacred site is the network itself. From the lulz, to spam, to information warfare, the threats against it remove hold teach far amend funded together with to a greater extent than potent. The historic menstruation of information state of war is just getting started.
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