By Alexander Markarov, Farid Guliyev, Ghia Nodia, Laure Delcour as well as Pavel K. Baev for Center for Security Studies (CSS)
This number of the CAD focuses on the international as well as regional implications of Armenia’s 2018 ‘Velvet Revolution’. More specifically, the articles aspect at 1) whether Armenia’s fountain 2018 political transformation led to whatsoever changes inward the country’s unusual policy priorities; 2) how Azerbaijan’s political elite responded to the fountain events; 3) what Georgians recall most the revolution; 4) why Armenia’s political changes could bear witness a litmus bear witness for the EU’s powerfulness influence political modify inward its neighborhood; as well as 5) why Russian Federation remained largely indifferent to the revolution. Introduction yesteryear Special Editor Licínia Simão
Armenian politics are inward flux after years of stagnation as well as accommodation to a perceived constraining regional context. Popular demonstrations, which took identify inward Apr 2018, inward Erevan as well as inward some of the country’s major cities resulted inward the unexpected resignation of Serzh Sargsyan, the country’s then-prime government minister as well as quondam president for the yesteryear decade. Armenia’s velvet revolution was received both regionally as well as internationally equally a major surprise, largely due to the established thought that Armenia’s geopolitical context lacked alternatives. The province remains at state of war with Republic of Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh; has failed to normalise relations with Turkey; depends largely on Russian Federation for political, economical as well as armed services issues; as well as has a real limited political understanding with the European Union nether the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy. In fact, these regional constraints were ordinarily perceived equally a major obstruction to democratisation as well as helped explicate why Armenia had been immune to the revolutionary trends that swept the post-Soviet infinite over the course of study of the finally decade.
Faced with the paradox of explaining how a homegrown revolutionary motion was possible nether these conditions, this special number of the Caucasus Analytical Digest addresses the international dimension to estimate the perceived reactions to these events, equally good equally expected changes inward Armenia’s regional setting. Although the most of import issues raised inward demonstrations as well as yesteryear the novel leadership were essentially domestic, unusual policy remains to live a fundamental dimension of the possibilities opened upward to Armenia.
This special number begins with a slice yesteryear Alexander Markarov, who addresses the main issues that the revolutionary motion at nowadays inward powerfulness faces inward Armenian unusual policy as well as traces the challenges ahead. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as well as the balancing of relations with the European Union as well as Russia—a remnant of the policy of complementarity—stand out equally the most of import issues inward the country’s unusual policy agenda.
The 2nd slice yesteryear Farid Guliyev looks at how Azerbaijani Cluster political elites perceived changes inward Armenian domestic politics as well as seeks to explicate why Republic of Azerbaijan has remained largely immune to these revolutionary trends. His argument—that the initial “wait as well as see” mental attitude yesteryear the Azerbaijani Cluster leaders rapidly shifted towards a to a greater extent than typical nationalistic tone equally a reaction to Nikol Pashinian’s non-conciliatory and, to some extent, revisionist seat on Nagorno-Karabakh—raises of import issues regarding the hereafter of peace talks on Karabakh as well as how the international mediators volition accommodate the novel expectations raised yesteryear the novel Armenian leaders on this issue.
The 3rd contribution yesteryear Ghia Nodia on Georgia argues equally to why events inward Armenia volition take away hold petty impact on Georgia, considering the strong consensus amongst Georgians of their pro-western unusual policy. In fact, for Georgians, Nodia argues that the thought of having a revolution that does non force a “pro-western” unusual policy agenda remains to live largely inexplicable. In that sense, for Georgians, the impact of Armenia’s revolution on the regional residual of powerfulness betwixt Russian Federation as well as western institutions remains the fundamental issue. Moreover, the extent to which both Armenia as well as Georgia volition live able to overcome “street democracy” as well as institutionalize democratic procedures at all levels of regime remains a mutual challenge.
The ii finally contributions address European Union (EU) as well as Russian views—the quondam yesteryear Laure Delcour as well as the latter yesteryear Pavel Baev. For Delcour, the European Union is beingness fundamentally challenged inward its powerfulness to diffuse its normative standards on democracy, human rights, as well as dominion of law inward its vicinity. The Armenian revolution exposes the limitations of the EU’s neighbourhood policy inward achieving political as well as societal transformations despite offering novel possibilities for increased differentiation. Baev’s slice looks at the reasons why the Armenian revolution was largely unnoticed inward Moscow. In his view, the Kremlin’s unusual ease with pro-democratic reforms inward Armenia tin largely live explained yesteryear the over-centralisation of decision-making inward the Russian political scheme as well as its attending to a serial of competing issues inward the agenda—namely, Syria. Overall, the fact that Armenian leaders recurrently articulated a discourse that portrayed the revolution equally a domestic affair with no implications inward the country’s unusual policy orientation may take away hold been successful inward keeping Moscow at ease. However, the implications of this passivity for Russia’s unusual policy of back upward to autocrats needs to live farther gauged.
With these contributions, the special number seeks to contribute to improve understanding the of import as well as inspiring events inward Armenia as well as the shift that they mightiness entail for regional relations.
Armenia’s Foreign Policy Priorities. Are There Any Major Changes Following the Spring 2018 Political Transformation?
Abstract
For decades after independence, Armenia’s unusual policy emphasized complementarity as well as prioritized national interests inward its dealings with external actors. Nikol Pashinyan’s unusual policy volition live bailiwick to the established priorities partially next previous trends inward Armenian unusual policy. That agency that Armenia volition maintain strategic relations with Russia, but volition also move along as well as expand its interactions with the EU, the US, as well as regional players. Security threats associated with the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict as well as complex relations with Turkey volition also remain key challenges for the electrical flow Armenian government. Under an unchanged regional powerfulness configuration as well as remaining challenges, Armenian unusual policy mightiness acquire to a greater extent than pro-active but is in all probability to rather retain its main directions as well as features. However, nether unstable regional safety politics, which is somehow subject on (and sometime easily manipulated by) external actors as well as dynamics, changes may come upward most inward the regional geopolitical environs that mightiness touching on Armenia.
Introduction
The long-time political leadership of Serzh Sargsyan ended after days of volume protests headed yesteryear the leader of the ‘Way Out’ parliamentary faction as well as the Civil Contract party, Nikol Pashinyan. The real fact that Prime Minister Sargsyan had to resign exactly days after the protests began poses many questions regarding the depth of as well as reasons for such massive dissatisfaction, as well as the fragility of a scheme that did non endure increasing instability as well as decreasing legitimacy. In part, the mobilization of protests succeeded yesteryear personalizing it as well as uniting various social groups—youth movements, rural populations, socio-economically disadvantaged as well as dissatisfied groups—all frustrated yesteryear the monopolization of powerfulness as well as the oligarchization of the economy.
Pashinyan, who spent his entire political life inward civil as well as eventually political opposition, articulated a rhetoric that was clear, straightforward as well as predictable—to fighting against a political scheme that was personified yesteryear Serzh Sargsyan, against the powerfulness concentration as well as domination of the Republican Party, for the dominion of law as well as equal opportunity, against corruption as well as monopolies, against the dispensation of privileges, against economical oligarchs, as well as for greater opportunities for little as well as medium enterprises. This rhetoric emphasized the domestic nature of the nonviolent resistance movement, a velvet revolution of honey as well as tolerance. The leaders of the motion claimed that domestic changes aimed at establishing dominion of law, fighting oligarchy as well as monopolies, addressing corruption as well as creating equal opportunities for all economically active actors would live a decisive factor inward Armenia’s hereafter social-economic development, leading to a decrease of the shadow economy, attracting as well as increasing investments into a improve functioning economic scheme as well as increment world wellbeing.
While domestic revolutionary changes were at the top of the political protestation agenda, Pashinyan’s unusual policy faithfully emphasized his determination to move along Armenia’s unusual policy priorities as well as commitments, equally good equally its international obligations. Despite the fact that inward the autumn of 2017, the ‘Way Out’ parliamentary faction initiated a temporary National Assembly committee on the possibility of withdrawing from the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (Avanesov 2017), Pashinyan ever stated during the protests as well as afterward on inward his meetings with various Russian officials that he does non intend to leave of absence either the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organizations (CSTO) or the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as well as is committed to Armenia’s existing international agreements as well as obligations. In a recent article, the Secretary of Armenia’s National Security Council, Armen Grigoryan, also confirmed that Pashinyan, beingness a pragmatist, would non modify the course of study of unusual policy piece the “political dialog with Moscow volition arrive at a fundamentally novel qualitative as well as pragmatic level” (Gazeta.ru 2018).
Keeping Foreign Policy Priorities Intact
For decades after independence, Armenian unusual policy emphasized complementarity as well as prioritized national interests inward its dealings with external actors. In full general in that location has been a sure consensus amongst the bulk of Armenian political parties. They concord that Armenia must implement a balanced as well as complementary policy toward regional players as well as Armenia must guarantee safety for Karabakh. (For a to a greater extent than detailed concern human relationship of the unusual policy approaches of on Armenia’s elite view Gasparyan 2016). While the bulk of political actors would rather concord that Armenia benefits from multifaceted cooperation with Russia, including inward the armed services sphere, some had been advocating “more equal relations” or making cooperation with Russian Federation to a greater extent than efficient. Assumingly in that location would live some infinite for maneuver to maintain strategic relations with Russian Federation but emphasizing equal status of the parties inward those relationships. That is a tendency that Pashinyan’s unusual policy volition seek to follow. That also agency that piece Armenia volition maintain strategic relations with Russia, it volition also move along as well as expand its interactions with the EU, the USA as well as regional players. This volition select identify nether the constraints of the unresolved Karabakh conflict as well as closed borders with Turkey. These are facets of Armenia’s safety cooperation with Russia, rather than with the USA or the EU, since neither currently offers Armenia whatsoever feasible alternatives to its safety challenges or the resolution of regional problems.
Another of import dimension of Armenia’s unusual policy are strategic relations with Georgia as well as Iran. They are also viewed through the prism of electrical flow regional geopolitical realities, as well as those countries are the main shipping routes that connect Armenia with the relaxation of the world. Both Georgia as well as Islamic Republic of Iran are of import to Armenia equally shipping hubs, as well as Islamic Republic of Iran additionally plays a regional balance-of-power role equally a instrumentalist that is considered equally a counterbalance to the expanding influence of Turkey. The roles of both Georgia as well as Islamic Republic of Iran are emphasized inward the regime computer program adopted yesteryear the Armenian parliament inward June 2018. While a province see to Islamic Republic of Iran mightiness silent live inward the planning stage (assuming that it was hard to organize this see during Ramadan), during Pashinyan’s official coming together with the Georgian Prime Minister at the destination of May 2018, he stressed that in that location are no issues inward Armenian–Georgian relations that could non live solved as well as that the farther evolution of the human relationship with Georgia volition move along to live 1 of the priorities of Armenia’s unusual policy. In general, Armenia is interested inward expanding its cooperation with Georgia inward various areas such equally merchandise as well as the economy, energy, transportation, agriculture, tourism as well as civilization (Primeminister.am 2018).
The policy of complementarity presupposes that Armenia is edifice effective as well as cooperative relationships with all actors who are interested inward mutually beneficial cooperation as well as tin contribute non only to the country’s evolution but also to peace as well as stability inward the region. So, based on those priorities, Armenian elites were participating inward international processes considered to live consistent with Armenia’s national interests. The complementarity regulation presumed the continuation of a strategic human relationship with the Russian Federation but also presupposed maintaining positive, cooperative relations with the West as well as a European evolution path. It also considers feasible its membership inward as well as closed cooperation with the CSTO inward parallel with NATO cooperation inward the expanse of political dialog. This was reconfirmed during the NATO Partnerships as well as Cooperative Security Committee + Armenia coming together that took identify inward May inward Brussels. Armenia indicated inward this coming together that it is prepared to move along implementing the IPAP—Individual Partnership Action Plan (NATOinfo.am 2018).
The All-Important Karabakh Conflict
A complicated regional safety architecture, the unstable dynamics of a prolonged ethno-political conflict, as well as the economical as well as political blockade of Armenia yesteryear Turkey as well as Republic of Azerbaijan grade some other layer of unusual policy priorities as well as determinants for the country. Resolution of the Karabakh conflict is 1 of the priorities of Armenia’s unusual as well as safety policies. Armenia’s seat is to solely back upward a peaceful small town based on compromise as well as that must contain the next principles: whatsoever finally understanding on conflict resolution must live approved yesteryear the Artsakh1 authorities; Armenia volition only select “a resolution which would affirm the irreversible reality of the existence of the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh”, so the electrical flow de facto status of an unrecognized but independent province would as well as so live de jure as well as supported yesteryear international guarantees; Artsakh should also live geographically connected to Armenia as well as its safety must live internationally guaranteed (National Security Strategy 2007). In add-on to those principles, the Armenian seat emphasizes that the conflict small town must live based on the recognition of the Artsakh people’s right to self-determination, as well as that Artsakh should take away hold an uninterrupted solid ground connexion with Armenia, nether Armenian jurisdiction (MFA 2018a).
Resolution of this conflict is beingness thwarted yesteryear various factors, but the major disagreement seems to live completely mutually exclusive views on the finally status of Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia wants to obtain de jure status for a currently unrecognized but institutionalized province through a legally binding document that is internationally recognized as well as recognition of the de jure existing province with internationally existing sovereignty guarantees. This approach appears to live unacceptable to Azerbaijan, who volition only concord to autonomy but non independence for Artsakh. The official seat of Baku is that Karabakh’s status should non touching on Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity as well as constantly refuses to negotiate with Karabakh officials. Republic of Azerbaijan farther demands the render of lands surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh that the Armenian side has controlled since the destination of the state of war inward the 1990s. These territories are sometimes viewed equally a possible bargaining chip for Armenia to extract concessions from Azerbaijan. Although after the four-day state of war of Apr 2016 this seat gets much less back upward inward Armenia.
After Pashinyan was elected equally Prime Minister, he presented his seat on the number subsequent to his meetings with Bako Sahakyan during a see to Karabakh inward May 2018. He was adamant that the conflict must live resolved peacefully as well as that negotiations must move along nether the cochaired OSCE Minsk Group process. But he also called for the Artsakh Republic to live included equally a full-fledged participant inward the negotiation process. He also stressed that making progress inward the negotiations is impossible with Azerbaijan’s persistently militant rhetoric. Pashinyan stated that he was ready to negotiate with Azerbaijani Cluster President Ilham Aliev on behalf of Armenia, but Artsakh’s leadership must participate inward negotiations to stand upward for their ain interests (Aslanyan 2018). While Armenia’s previous political leadership had the unexpressed belief as well as wish that Karabakh must live represented at the negotiating table, Armenia’s electrical flow political leadership explicitly wants to include Artsakh inward the negotiation process. According to Masis Mailyan, this would allow Armenia to reject discussing with Republic of Azerbaijan as well as the mediators the key issues that pertain solely to Artsakh authorities (NewsArmenia.am 2018).
The regime computer program presented inward June yesteryear Pashinyan as well as adopted yesteryear the National Assembly also focuses solely on a peaceful resolution negotiated through the co-chaired OSCE Minsk Group physical care for as well as based on the principles of international law, including the nation’s self-determination regulation equally a base of operations for conflict resolution. For Armenia, the safety as well as status of Artsakh are seen equally the top priority. The computer program also emphasized that Artsakh, equally the main constituent of the conflict, must take away hold a vocalisation as well as involvement inward the resolution process. In his speech, Pashinyan in 1 lawsuit to a greater extent than addressed the demand for Karabakh representation inward the negotiations, saying that without their participation, negotiations could non live effective (ArmeniaSputnik 2018a). Such an approach has non been acceptable so far for Azerbaijan, piece the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, stated that Moscow would honour whatsoever conclusion on Karabakh’s participation inward negotiations agreed to yesteryear Erevan as well as Baku (ArmeniaSputnik 2018b). It should live noted that Karabakh was represented inward various negotiation formats until 1997.
With the increased tension at the border as well as growing disagreements inward the negotiations in that location is a danger that all that may termination inward the resumption of hostilities at different levels, which would sure as shooting take away hold real negative effect on the safety of the entire region. Currently, Armenia continues to seek progress inward the negotiation physical care for led yesteryear the OSCE Minsk Group, whose mediation is seen equally fundamental as well as instrumental for introducing as well as implementing effective conflict resolution mechanisms. Negotiations with Republic of Azerbaijan nether the novel Armenian premiership take away hold non taken place, fifty-fifty though during Pashnyan’s June 2018 see to Moscow, President Putin introduced him to Azerbaijani Cluster President Aliev. So far, no talks take away hold taken identify as well as the see yesteryear the Minsk Group co-chairs to Erevan inward June was to a greater extent than of a fact-finding, introductory coming together aimed at learning the novel Armenian leadership’s positions. During these meetings, Armenia in 1 lawsuit once to a greater extent than expressed its back upward for the piece of work of the OSCE Minsk Group as well as its willingness to move along nether its auspices.
Regional Relations: Keeping Russian Federation as well as the European Union Close
In add-on to the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, ii other major unusual policy priorities for Armenia include cooperation with Russian Federation as well as the EU. This cooperation is non seen equally mutually exclusive but rather equally synergetic for Armenia’s development. According to the governmental computer program cooperation with Russian Federation is prioritized beingness considered equally strategic. The armed services as well as safety aspects of this alliance, equally good equally Russia’s role inward the Artsakh negotiations, volition most sure as shooting move along to live an of import determinant of bilateral relations. In addition, the large Armenian community inward Russian Federation is also an of import factor, especially considering that the electrical flow regime emphasizes the role of the diaspora as well as its potential for channeling investment to the Armenian economy. No less of import is Russia’s role equally 1 of Armenia’s principal trading partners as well as equally a major investor inward the Armenian economy. Those investments extend to a broad diversity of sectors including unloosen energy as well as unloosen energy infrastructure, where Armenia is deeply subject on Russian supplies. Armenia is subject on Russia’s gas equally good equally nuclear fuel deliveries for the Metsamor plant. Russian Federation has provided USD 250 1 one m thousand inward credit as well as USD thirty 1 one m thousand inward a grant for the modernization of this nuclear powerfulness plant. Natural gas imports as well as distribution are also monopolized yesteryear Gazprom- Armenia, owned yesteryear Russian Federation since 2014. Energy dependence on Russian Federation also poses safety issues for shipping routes through Georgia’s north–south gas pipeline. Disruptions of this pipeline, equally those which occurred inward August 2008, mightiness get upward serious concerns.
In add-on to the economical aspects of Armenian–Russian relations, in that location is a robust armed services collaboration based on both bilateral as well as multilateral agreements, namely the CSTO. In 2010, Armenia extended for some other 49 years the presence of a Russian armed services base of operations equally good equally the geographical orbit as well as defensive functions of the base of operations located inward the province since 1995. As a CSTO member, Armenia also cooperates inward the arms manufacture as well as is able to buy weapons from Russian Federation at depression prices. This armed services cooperation with Russian Federation is considered to live 1 of the of import elements of Armenia’s national safety equally confirmed yesteryear the governmental computer program (Government of Armenia 2018). In 2015–2016, Armenia received 200 1 one m thousand USD inward a soft loan as well as some other 100 1 one m thousand USD soft loan was provided the adjacent twelvemonth for military/technical cooperation.
The regime computer program adopted yesteryear the Armenian parliament states that the evolution of strategic relations with Russian Federation inward various spheres is amongst the country’s main priorities as well as constitutes an of import component subdivision of the Armenian safety scheme (Government of Armenia 2018). In his interview with RT, Pashinyan stated that in that location volition live no reversals inward bilateral relations with Russian Federation as well as he expects a novel stage that could live characterized equally “more positive, to a greater extent than constructive, to a greater extent than productive, as well as to a greater extent than direct” (Petrenko 2018).
Considering Russian Federation to live an of import ally, Armenia volition move along to closely cooperate with other members of the Eurasian Union as well as the CSTO on both bilateral as well as multilateral tracks, as well as remains ready to address as well as hash out problems inward those relationships. They include various issues such equally arms sales to Republic of Azerbaijan yesteryear Russian Federation as well as Belarus, as well as vague or unvoiced positions yesteryear CSTO fellow member states on the escalation of tensions at the Armenia–Azerbaijani border. Armenia’s complex as well as strategic dependence on Russian Federation sometimes conflicts with its complementarity approach, as well as maintaining equilibrium with other actors seems to live a hard unusual policy job for the Armenian authorities. However, Erevan silent seeks out to a greater extent than meaningful partnerships beyond its strategic alliance with Russia, as well as Armenia continues to develop relationships with the collective West—the USA as well as the EU. The regime computer program presented yesteryear Prime Minister Pashinyan as well as approved yesteryear Armenia’s National Assembly inward June 2018 adheres to the unusual policy priorities of previous administrations. Armenia considers Russian Federation to live a strategic partner as well as equally the Prime Minister stated, the human relationship of the ii countries must live based on friendship, equality as well as readiness to solve problems through dialog.
Nevertheless, Armenia also intends to pursue closer relations with the EU, next the EU-Armenia Comprehensive as well as Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed inward Nov 2017, which was ratified unanimously yesteryear the Armenian Parliament as well as is at nowadays beingness provisionally applied. Cooperation with the European Union is sought inward at to the lowest degree iii major areas. The firstly expanse is cooperation with the European Union to promote democracy, civil society, dominion of law, goodness governance, human rights as well as fundamental freedoms. The 2nd expanse is closed economical cooperation as well as expanding merchandise with European Union countries. It should live noted that inward terms of investment, the European Union is amongst the largest investors inward the Armenian economy. Finally Armenia supports European Union regional initiatives aimed at establishing an environs of lasting stability as well as cooperation inward the South Caucasus part (National Security Strategy 2007).
A recent statement issued after the June 21 Partnership Council coming together betwixt the European Union as well as Armenia nether the EU-Armenia Comprehensive as well as Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), reaffirmed the willingness of both parties to expand as well as strengthen cooperation inside the novel legal framework of the Eastern Partnership as well as the revised European Neighborhood Policy. It also clearly reconfirmed the EU’s promised back upward for democratic reforms, its readiness to assist inward the organisation as well as monitoring of novel elections along with of import amendments to the electoral code, for enhancing “the dominion of law as well as honour of human rights, equally good equally to increment prosperity as well as socioeconomic resilience inward Armenia” (MFA (2018b). Thus, Armenia continues to consider its cooperation with the European Union as well as participation inward the Eastern Partnership equally an of import platform for dialog as well as collaboration, equally the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, mentioned inward an interview piece reiterating that this should non live achieved at somebody else’s expense (Kommersant 2018).
Conclusion
Armenia’s unusual policy is heavily influenced yesteryear the regional geopolitical environs as well as its apparent permanent safety threats arising inward component subdivision from the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict as well as the broad as well as complex historical-political human relationship with Turkey. Those safety threats volition persist for the electrical flow Armenian government. The country’s extensive as well as multifaceted human relationship with Russian Federation inward various strategic areas inward some ways limits Armenia’s powerfulness to maneuver. However, Armenia tries to residual the interests of various regional players inward areas where they take away hold a mutual interests. For now, no major changes are seen inward the unusual policy priorities of Armenia’s novel government, but regional complexities as well as challenges remain as well as addressing them volition silent live a challenging task.
Note
1 Armenians refer to the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic equally Artsakh. The ii terms are used interchangeably inward this paper.
References
ArmeniaSputnik (2018): У Карабаха должен быть свой собственный голос на переговорах – Пашинян 12:11 07.06.2018 (обновлено 12:16 07.06.2018) (Karabakh should take away hold its ain vocalisation at the talks—Pashinyan) Accessed June 22, 2018
ArmeniaSputnik (2018b) Ответ Пашиняна Алиеву: хотите переговоров – будут переговоры… с Карабахом 21:28 07.06.2018 (обновлено 22:43 07.06.2018) (Pashinyan’s respond to Aliyev: y'all wish negotiations—there volition live negotiations … with Karabakh) Accessed June 22, 2018
Aslanya, Karlen (2018) Асланян Карлен, Новоизбранный премьер-министр Армении отметил тройной праздник в Степанакерте Май 09, 2018 (Newly elected prime-minister of Armenia celebrated triple vacation inward Stepanakert May nine 2018) Accessed June 22, 2018
Avanesov, Alexander (2018): Аванесов Александр, Национальное Собрание Армении обсуждает законодательную инициативу о выходе из ЕАЭС Вторник, 3 Октября 2017 14:38 (Armenian National Assembly discusses legislative maiden on withdrawal from the EAEU Oct 3, 2017, (accessed 22.06.2018)
Gasparyan, Abraham (2016) The Armenian Political Elite’s Approaches as well as Beliefs inward Foreign Policy inward Values as well as Identity equally Sources of Foreign Policy inward Armenia as well as Georgia. Editors: Kakachia, Kornely as well as Markarov, Alexander. Tbilisi: Universal, pp. 184 – 232
Gazeta.ru (2018): Усиливать друг друга. Секретарь СБ Армении Армен Григорян о взгляде республики на отношения с Россией Армен Григорян 16.06.2018, 16:13 (Strengthening each other. Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan most the republic’s view on relations with Russian Federation Armen Grigoryan) , (accessed 17.06.2018).
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About the Author
Alexander Markarov is a Professor of Politics, Deputy Vice Rector as well as Head of the International Cooperation Office at Erevan State University. He is also Director of the CIS Institute branch inward Armenia.
Armenia’s Velvet Revolution inward the Discourse of the Azerbaijani Cluster Elite
By Farid Guliyev
Abstract
This article examines the discourse of the Azerbaijani Cluster elite surrounding Armenia’s “velvet revolution” inward the fountain of 2018, focusing on the implications of its potential emulation inward Republic of Azerbaijan equally good equally on the direction of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The article shows that the Armenian revolution has had no impact on protestation activity inward Republic of Azerbaijan due to structural constraints on collective activeness as well as the lack of a mutual frame of reference. In addition, the events inward Armenia were mainly viewed inward Republic of Azerbaijan through the prism of Karabakh. Even though this lawsuit revealed an initial moderate softening of the Azerbaijani Cluster government’s stance, the unexpectedly hardline seat taken yesteryear the novel Armenian leader prompted Republic of Azerbaijan to adopt a to a greater extent than hawkish position. This, inward turn, has led both sides to revert to the commons cycle of the discursive zero-sum game. While this suggests that ethnic discourses are non completely immutable, if a peaceful resolution is valued, it volition require a to a greater extent than fundamental modify inward the ideologies of the electrical flow political actors as well as inward their underlying nationalist master copy frames. Given the nowadays setup of political forces inward both Armenia as well as Azerbaijan, where exclusionary versions of nationalist ideologies prevail, this does non seem to live a possibility inward the close future.
Introduction
What has been the reaction of Azerbaijani Cluster regime officials as well as world figures to the protests inward Armenia? The springtime protests inward Armenia (April 13–May 8, 2018) as well as their interpretation yesteryear Azerbaijani Cluster regime as well as opposition leaders nowadays an interesting chance to aspect at the construction as well as reproduction of perceptions of Armenia inward Republic of Azerbaijan yesteryear key regime officials, opposition leaders, as well as world figures.1 In the analysis that follows, I examine ii aspects of the Azerbaijani Cluster elite’s discourse concerning Armenia’s “velvet revolution”: the possibility of its emulation inward Republic of Azerbaijan (a contagion effect) as well as its influence on the Karabakh discourse.
Regarding the failure of the protestation to spread, Armenia’s protests had no effect on political mobilization inward Republic of Azerbaijan for ii reasons: structural obstacles to collective activeness mobilization (e.g., closed political chance structures, the weakness of civil society, as well as the marginalization of opposition parties) as well as lack of appeal. Empowered yesteryear stone oil wealth, Azerbaijani Cluster province elites established tough institutional barriers for civil society activities. For opposition political groups as well as independent NGOs, operating nether such restrictive atmospheric condition has acquire a daunting challenge. Survey results divulge extremely depression rates of membership inward civic asso ciations, merchandise unions as well as political parties inward Republic of Azerbaijan (Guliyev 2018).
Second, the Armenian velvet revolution lacked the cognitive frame of reference that is crucial to “making events inward some other province seem relevant to events inward one’s ain country” (Hale 2013, 345). Despite sharing slogans criticizing corruption as well as the reign of oligarchs, the opposition leaders inward Republic of Azerbaijan chose to forgo appeals to mutual problems. Instead, their narratives tended to emphasize the subject of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) as well as geopolitical powerfulness games. On the number of Karabakh, both Republic of Azerbaijan as well as Armenia were actively engaged inward framing.2 During the initial stage of the protestation cycle, piece silent inside the nationalist frame of reference, Azerbaijani Cluster regime elites as well as pro-government media seemingly relaxed their traditionally hardline posture, avoided characterizing Nikol Pashinyan inward negative terms, as well as devoted a peachy deal of attending to the deposed quondam president, Serzh Sargsyan. However, equally before long equally the newly elected Prime Minister Pashinyan revealed his extremely nationalistic views regarding Karabakh that revived the “Miatsum” [unification of NK with Armenia] agenda (Abrahamyan 2018), Republic of Azerbaijan hardened its stance equally well. This suggests that both sides failed to escape the trap of symbolic politics, since neither side has demonstrated the capacity to moderate their policy positions toward the contrary side.
Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution”: No Contagion inward Sight
Although the peaceful revolt inward Armenia caught Azerbaijanis yesteryear surprise, it was clear from the attack that it would take away hold no effect on neighboring Azerbaijan. In the pop “color revolutions” model, volume protests tend to cluster across fourth dimension as well as infinite inward “regime modify cascades” (Hale 2013). The Arab uprisings provide ample evidence that protestation spreads through demonstration or contagion effects. The velvet revolution inward Armenia, however, was non contagious as well as did non spread beyond the borders of Armenia. One obvious ground for the lack of appeal is the icon of Armenia inward Republic of Azerbaijan equally an enemy province as well as the lack of a mutual frame of reference despite the occasional lament that some Azerbaijanis were watching the protests inward Armenia “with jealousy as well as hope” (Adilgizi 2018). Because of the depression appeal of the “Armenian revolutionary model” as well as the weak organizational capacities of pro-democracy forces, the Azerbaijani Cluster elite’s discourse has largely been concerned with the implications of the events inward Armenia for the fate of Karabakh.
As volition live discussed further, NK has been the mutual frame of reference for both regime as well as opposition reactions to the events inward Armenia. “Whatever happens inward Armenia inward terms of who comes to powerfulness does non bother me, what does bother me withal is the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh inward the background of political developments there”, commented prominent world figure Aslan Ismayilov (April 23, 2018).
Not expecting whatsoever imminent modify inward leadership, Azerbaijani Cluster opposition leaders, who take away hold found themselves having to operate inward an environs of increasingly unfavorable political chance structures, refrained from attempts to mobilize political party members as well as sympathizers for similar protests inward Baku. The democratizing potential of the Armenian protests for Republic of Azerbaijan was mentioned yesteryear only ii notable world figures. Amid the protests inward Yerevan, Ali Karimli, the chairman of the Popular Front Party of Republic of Azerbaijan (PFPA) commented that the Armenian protests are a measuring toward democratization that volition force Armenia out of the Russian orbit of influence (Karimli, Apr 22, 2018). While Armenia’s democratization gives it an wages over Republic of Azerbaijan inward improving its international image, it nevertheless is compatible with Azerbaijan’s long-term strategic interests since Armenia’s democratic progress volition motivate Republic of Azerbaijan to democratize equally well, the PFPA leader speculated. In his vision, the eventual transition to republic inward both countries is presented equally a historical victory of both peoples over Russian imperialism. On the other hand, Western integration is expected to Pb to the resolution of the Karabakh conflict without armed conflict (Karimli, Apr 22, 2018). However, such a resolution must silent fit “within the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan”. At the same time, Karimli calls Sargsyan the “Khojaly criminal” [“Xocalı canisi”] who “has blood on his hands—and it is a compassion nosotros could non punish him” (Karimli, Apr 22, 2018). On May 8, when Pashinyan was voted inward equally Prime Minister, Karimli remarked that on this hateful solar daytime that symbolically coincides with the capture of Shusha yesteryear Armenian forces, “Armenians scored some other success yesteryear electing a people’s candidate equally their novel prime number government minister as well as improving their country’s democratic image” (Karimli, May 8, 2018). It should live evident that the democratic icon gained yesteryear Armenia, “the invader/aggressor state” [“işğalçı dövlət”], is a much stronger weapon against Azerbaijanis than whatsoever Iskander ballistic missiles [referring to Russia’s render of missiles to Armenia] (Karimli, May 8, 2018).
Similar to Karimli, Ismayilov links the Karabakh resolution to the values of Western liberal democracy— the dominion of law inward this case. The dismissal of Sargsyan shows the basis that dissimilar Azerbaijan, Armenia is governed yesteryear rules that give it an advantage, he claimed (Ismayilov, Apr 23, 2018). If Armenia manages to interruption out of its dependence on Russian Federation as well as succeeds inward implementing reforms, Republic of Azerbaijan may destination upward losing Karabakh since the whole basis volition live on Armenia’s side inward recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh equally an independent state. Armenia’s integration with the West is also positive, equally it volition assist democratize Republic of Azerbaijan equally good (Ismayilov, Apr 26, 2018; Ismayilov, May 8, 2018).
Another opposition leader, Arif Hajili, the chairman of the Musavat Party, took a to a greater extent than hardline seat noting that piece Armenia’s modify inward regime was a positive step, much depends on the nature of a newly elected government. If Armenia’s novel regime complies with liberal-democratic norms as well as international law, this volition do goodness both Armenia as well as the part equally a whole. However, “if 1 Russian puppet [“Rusiya vassalı”] is replaced yesteryear some other Russian puppet” this, of course, volition perpetuate the existing status quo (Hajili, Apr 24, 2018). This sentiment was followed afterward yesteryear an fifty-fifty to a greater extent than negative outlook:
“Pashinyan’s statement to move along Armenia’s business policy as well as seeking protection from Putin…shows that Armenia volition remain equally a ‘slave’ province [of Russia] [‘kölə olaraq qalacaq’] …By continuing to pursue the pitiable [‘miskin’] ‘Great Armenia’ as well as ‘genocide’ ideology it volition lag behind as well as volition live an obstruction to the evolution of the region, as well as firstly as well as foremost, Azerbaijan” (Hajili, May 14, 2018).
Most political actors as well as commentators inward Republic of Azerbaijan view regime modify inward the post-Soviet infinite equally an out come upward of a form of geopolitical maneuvering inward which Russian Federation plays a key role. Simplistically, it is assumed that countries are moving along some assort of unidimensional geopolitical continuum where the democratic West as well as authoritarian Russian Federation are perceived to live polar opposites. This type of discourse is fraught with flaws as well as simplistic assumptions. For example, the causal logic inward Karimli’s geopolitical schemata [More republic ▶ Pro- Western Orientation/Exit Russian Sphere of Influence ▶ More peace] is built on a geopolitical script that does non lend itself easily to empirical testing. “Geopolitics”, equally Hans Morgenthau (1948, 116) in 1 lawsuit noted, is “a pseudoscience erecting the factor of geography into an absolute that is supposed to determine the power, as well as hence the fate of nations”.
The Azerbaijan–Armenia Relationship equally a Symbolic Politics Trap
Azerbaijan as well as Armenia view each other with mutual suspicion, distrust as well as hatred rooted inward extremely nationalist ideologies (Kaufman 1998). Some scholars (e.g., Gamaghelyan 2010) fighting that the protracted ethnic conflict as well as nationalist propaganda on both sides take away hold normalized mutual animosity as well as ethnic stereotypes inward the collective memories of the Azerbaijani Cluster as well as Armenian people at a deep psychological level. According to Gamaghelyan (2010, 39–40), the proliferation of radical nationalist rhetoric on both sides is a major obstruction to reconciliation:
“The electrical flow Armenian as well as Azerbaijani Cluster governments take away hold risen to powerfulness on radical nationalistic slogans with mutually exclusive claims to deliver Nagorno-Karabakh to their respective constituencies. Every politico who takes a moderate stand upward as well as tries to improve relations is inevitably stamped equally a traitor…This state of war of rhetoric, produced mostly for internal consumption, forces the leaders on both sides to adopt an increasingly radical stance vis-à-vis the other side. It widens the gap betwixt the positions of the ii parties as well as leaves petty room for a solution. Even worse, the rhetoric penetrates the media as well as educational institutions, gradually transforming them into propaganda machines. Entire generations take away hold been raised on this propaganda during the 20 years of conflict. It has intensified the feeling of mutual mistrust as well as hatred, piece elevating the mutually exclusive myths of Nagorno-Karabakh to such a bird that no politico tin advise whatsoever concession without producing world outrage.”
The Apr War inward 2016 served equally a catalyst for the intensification of nationalist rhetoric inward both countries (Kucera 2017). This perpetuates the province of affairs inward which both sides view the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict equally a zero-sum game. Since each side “perceive[s] possessing Nagorno- Karabakh equally a cornerstone of their national identity” (Gahramanova 2010, 142), the prevailing conception of national identity inward both countries is largely ethnicized as well as exclusionary. In this conception, outgroups are seen equally a threat to the existence or coherence of their respective communities.
Ethnic symbols as well as myths acquire critical components of the sense of national identity that becomes an obstruction to peace. According to symbolic politics theory (Kaufman 2006, 202), ethnic hostility propagated yesteryear political actors tin create a “symbolic politics trap” inward which “once a leader has aroused chauvinist emotions to gain or maintain power, he as well as his successors may live unable to calm those emotions later”. Based on interviews with Azerbaijani Cluster elite, 1 scholar notes a similar dynamic inward the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict:
“As long equally in that location is mutual distrust as well as hatred betwixt the Azerbaijanis as well as Armenians, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict volition move along to remain equally a clash non only betwixt ii states, but also betwixt ii nations” (Tokluoglu 2011, 1241).
When the protests inward Armenia began, Pashinyan, the leader of the anti-Sargsyan movement, refrained from invoking the Karabakh debate. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani Cluster regime discourse was targeting Sargsyan yesteryear pointing to the sparse back upward for his regime (using negative terms such equally “clan” or “mafia”) as well as to his “misguided” policies toward the Karabakh conflict. For the firstly several weeks, the Azerbaijani Cluster elite’s discourse to a greater extent than oftentimes than non avoided commenting on Pashinyan as well as was rather positive most the changes inward Armenia [“The ouster of Sargsyan was inward itself a positive measuring no thing who comes to supersede him”]. However, exactly weeks after Pashinyan assumed business office (May 8) as well as started incorporating nationalist elements inward his world statements, his hardline stance radicalized the Azerbaijani Cluster elite’s discourse that reverted to its regular framing of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict equally a zero-sum game.
Although the Armenian protests were fueled yesteryear the long-standing pop discontent with President Serzh Sargsyan’s plans to remain inward powerfulness equally prime number government minister as well as the cronyism of the oligarchic scheme he created, they were also partly a reaction to the so-called Four-Day War inward Apr 2016. Ending with serious casualties as well as the Azerbaijani Cluster army’s recapture of Jojug Marjanli hamlet inward the Armenian-occupied Jabrayil region, the Apr state of war has been celebrated inward Republic of Azerbaijan equally a “great victory” that embellished the “glorious history” of Republic of Azerbaijan (Azertac, Apr 18, 2018). In Armenia, the loss of territory to Republic of Azerbaijan was associated with the inadequacy of the existing economical construction as well as leakage of world funds to corruption. According to a New York Times reporter:
“Many protesters [in Armenia] mentioned a watershed minute from ii years ago, after a four-day state of war started yesteryear neighboring Azerbaijan…The oligarchs had sold the population on the thought that poverty as well as poor roads were amongst the sacrifices necessary to build a strong army. Then Armenia lost territory inward the 2016 war, as well as in that location were reports that soldiers lacked basic items similar bullets as well as medical kits” (MacFarquhar, May 19, 2018).
The Karabakh Discourse
At the attack of the volume protests, Nikol Pashinyan’s stance on Nagorno-Karabakh was unclear as well as remained so until his remarks during his cause inward the firstly calendar week of May as well as leading upward to his election equally prime number government minister on May 8. His avoidance of nationalist rhetoric was perceived inward Baku equally a sign that with the novel leader inward Erevan Armenia mightiness soften its seat on Karabakh.
On May 2, Pashinyan made his firstly world statement on NK saying: “Long alive the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which should acquire an inseparable component subdivision of the Republic of Armenia!” (as quoted inward De Waal 2018a; also view Tonoyan, May 2, 2018; Abrahamyan 2018). Pashinyan’s remarks equally prime number government minister indicated continuity inward the Armenian stance on Karabakh. He asserted Nagorno-Karabakh’s right to self-determination as well as international recognition as well as proclaimed that “mutual concessions would live possible only after recognition of the right of the Nagorno-Karabakh people to self-determination” (BBC Monitoring, May 1, 2018; Reuters, May 9, 2018).
The dramatic outcome of the Armenian protests caught Azerbaijani Cluster elites yesteryear surprise. Amid volume protests inward Erevan on Apr 13, the official province paper “Azərbaycan Qəzeti” [hereafter AQ] was silent busy roofing the electoral victory of the incumbent president Ilham Aliyev, with only a few lines mentioning the start of protests inward Erevan (AQ, Apr 13, 2018). One of the firstly reactions that appeared inward media reports was an article published on Apr 17 with the telling championship “Armenian People Do Not Want to See the Sargsyan Clan inward Power” (AQ, Apr 17, 2018a). This was followed yesteryear some other article alarm most the possibility of a civil state of war inward Armenia (AQ, Apr 17, 2018b).
Much of Azerbaijani Cluster media reporting on pro-government websites such equally Trend.az as well as 1News.az portrayed Sargsyan’s dominion equally the regime of the “Karabakh clan”, whose regime ruined the Armenian economy. Sargsyan is also implicated inward his direct role inward armed services actions inward Karabakh as well as was hence viewed yesteryear Azerbaijani Cluster elites equally a especially tough negotiator as well as uncompromising figure. In the wake of Sargsyan’s resignation (April 23), some Azerbaijani Cluster officials suggested that the quondam president of Armenia should live brought to jurist at an international tribunal for his personal criminal responsibleness inward the volume killings of Azerbaijani Cluster civilians inward the town of Khojaly (Trend.az, Apr 25, 2018). Another Russian-language spider web intelligence site 1News. az ran an article with the championship “The End of the Karabakh mafia clan” as well as afterward publishing an interview with an skilful who opined that Armenia faces an “existential problem”: it is landlocked as well as has closed borders to the due east as well as west, as well as it cannot develop if excluded from the regional transportation-logistic networks (1News.az, Apr 23, 2018). Armenia’s only feasible alternative, the skilful suggests, is to come upward to terms with Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity (1News.az, Apr 27, 2018).
After Sargsyan’s resignation on Apr 23, the Azerbaijani Cluster regime continued to carefully arts and crafts its world response. The unusual ministry building issued a statement expressing their readiness to piece of work with “sensible forces” [“sağlam quvvələr”] inside Armenia (AQ, Apr 24, 2018). Again after Pashinyan’s election equally prime number minister, the ministry building restated its hope that the novel Armenian regime “will non repeat the mistakes of the previous government” (AQ, May 9, 2018). This view persisted through mid-May, equally in that location was silent dubiety regarding Armenia’s internal powerfulness play (AQ, May 16, 2018). The firstly sign of a render to the commons opinions was an article published on May 17 that referred to Pashinyan’s May fourteen coming together with Putin inward Sochi, inward which Armenia’s novel leader emphasized “the allied strategic relations betwixt Armenia as well as Russia” (Kremlin.ru, May 14, 2018; also view Asbarez, May 14, 2018). By the fourth dimension Pashinyan got elected equally prime number government minister as well as his Karabakh statements became widely reported inward the intelligence media, Azerbaijan’s cautious, conciliatory seat was replaced yesteryear a to a greater extent than negative outlook inward which Pashinyan is depicted equally a populist as well as a demagogue (1News. az, May 11, 2018). If inward the initial stages, the Azerbaijani Cluster press portrayed Pashinyan equally “the leader of opposition forces”, at nowadays he is referred to equally “a street minister” [“kücə naziri”], his political computer program was dubbed “populist”, as well as Pashinyan’s Karabakh policy was said to live no different from Sargsyan’s policy (AQ, May 17, 2018; Kaspi.az, June 7, 2018). More importantly, Armenia was silent considered an “outpost-satellite of Russia” [“Ermənistan əvvəlki kimi Rusiyanın forpost-vassalıdır”] (AQ, May 17, 2018).
This was inward component subdivision a reaction to Pashinyan’s modify inward position, reviving the thought that Nagorno-Karabakh should live incorporated into Armenia or recognized equally an independent province (Abrahamyan 2018). One skilful noted that equally Pashinyan’s rhetoric got tougher, “the initial optimism faded” (Shiriyev 2018).
Conclusion
This instance suggests that piece leadership changes may temper the bellicose rhetoric, it is real hard to modify the underpinnings of symbolic nationalism equally a dominant master copy frame. As De Waal (2018b) pointed out, Pashinyan is beingness forced to play the nationalist card: “Pashinian as well as his comrades volition non wish to audio conciliatory on this number for fright of having their patriotic credentials questioned.” Pashinyan’s nationalistic rhetoric regarding Karabakh undermined his appeal as well as only served to incite a reciprocal flurry of nationalistic rhetoric yesteryear Azerbaijani Cluster politicians, regime as well as opposition alike. While ethnic conflict is to a greater extent than oftentimes than non viewed equally a symbolic trap with immutable identities, this lawsuit suggests that inward times of crisis, ideological scripts tin live manipulated at to the lowest degree on the margins. On the other hand, it is clear that escaping from the symbolic politics trap would require that political forces on both sides discard extreme nationalism equally the master copy framework for ideological discourse. For example, despite tiddler differences, all major political leaders inward Republic of Azerbaijan were virtually unanimous inward supporting the government’s armed services cause during the Apr 2016 state of war (Aslanov as well as Samedzade 2017). Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 2017 study shows that Armenian political forces pronounced vague designs for NK resolution (e.g., the readiness for “mutual concessions with a reservation”), as well as opposition parties tended to maintain “a tougher stance” than the as well as so ruling Republican Party (HKK) (Galstyan 2017). As has acquire clear, Pashinyan’s rhetoric does non seem to live a radical divergence from previous governments. Given the electrical flow setup of political forces inward both Armenia as well as Azerbaijan, where nationalist ideologies prevail as well as alternative narratives are marginalized inward the ruling as well as opposition parties, this does non seem to live plausible inward the close future.
Notes
1 The actors whose views are included hither stand upward for a fairly various spectrum of Azerbaijani Cluster elite (government officials, key opposition leaders, opinion-shapers, as well as various media sources). The extent to which these views are representative (or not) of the broader Azerbaijani Cluster “public” remains an empirical question.
2 Framing tin live defined equally “the production as well as maintenance of important for constituents, antagonists, as well as bystanders or observers” yesteryear various actors (Snow as well as Benford 1992, 136).
References
Scholarly Articles as well as Expert Commentary:
Abrahamyan, Eduard. (2018) “Pashinyan Stiffens Armenia’s Posture Toward Karabakh”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 10,
Aslanov, Bakhtiyar as well as Sevinj Samedzade. (2017). “The Positions of Political Parties as well as Movements inward Republic of Azerbaijan on the Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Caucasus Edition, Dec 1,
De Waal, Thomas. (2018a). “Armenia’s Revolution as well as the Legacy of 1988”, Carnegie Moscow Center commentary, May 7, 2018,
De Waal, Thomas. (2018b). “Armenia’s Revolution as well as the Karabakh Conflict”, Carnegie Europe Commentary, May 22,
Gahramanova, Aytan. (2010). “Paradigms of Political Mythologies as well as Perspectives of Reconciliation inward the Case of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, International Negotiation 15(1): 133–152.
Gamaghelyan, Phil. (2010). “Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Identity, Politics, Scholarship.” International Negotiation 15(1): 33–56.
Galstyan, David. (2017). “The Positions of Political Parties inward Armenia on the Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict as well as Turkey–Armenia Relations”, Caucasus Edition, Dec 1,
Guliyev, Farid. (2018). “The Enigmatic Connection Between Education as well as Civic Apathy inward Azerbaijan”, PONARS Policy Memo 519, March,
Kaufman, Stuart J. (1998). “Ethnic Fears as well as Ethnic War inward Karabagh”, PONARS Working Paper, Harvard University,
Morgenthau, Hans (1948). Politics Among Nations. New York: A.A. Knopf.
Shiriyev, Zaur. (2018). “For Azerbaijan, Armenia’s Political Upheaval is a Double-edged Sword”, Crisis Group Commentary, May 25
Snow, David A., as well as Robert D. Benford. (1992). “Master Frames as well as Cycles of Protest”, inward A. D. Morris as well as C. M. Mueller, eds. Frontiers inward Social Movement Theory, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 133–155.
Tokluoglu, Ceylan. (2011). “The Political Discourse of the Azerbaijani Cluster Elite on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (1991–2009)”, Europe-Asia Studies 63(7): 1223–1252.
Media Reports
Adilgizi, Lamiya (April 27, 2018). “Azerbaijan watches Armenian rebellion with jealousy as well as hope”, Eurasianet. org,
Asbarez (May 14, 2018). “In Russia, Pashinyan meets with Putin, attends EEU Summit”,
Azərbaycan Qəzeti [AQ], (April 13, 2018). “Yerevanda Serj Sarkisyana qarşı tələbələrin kütləvi aksiyası başlayıb”,
[AQ], (April 17, 2018a). “Ekspert: Ermənistan xalqı Sarkisyan klanını hakimiyyətdə görmək istəmir”,
[AQ], (April 17, 2018b). “Ermənistanda vətəndaş müharibəsi başlayır”,
[AQ], (April 24, 208). “Ermənistandakı sağlam siyasi qüvvələrlə danışıqları davam etdirməyə hazırıq”,
[AQ], (May 9, 2018). “Hikmət Hacıyev: Ümid edirik ki, Ermənistanın yeni siyasi rəhbərliyi sələflərinin səhvlərini təkrar etməyəcək”,
[AQ], (May 16, 208). “Hikmət Hacıyev: Hər hansı qeyri-real yeni elementlərin daxil edilməsi cəhdləri bütün danışıqlar prosesini iflic edə bilər”,
[AQ], (May 17, 208). “Küçə naziri"nin siyasi fərqlilikləri: Paşinyan populizm girdabında”, originally published at:
Azertac, (April 18, 2018). “Jojug Marjanli victory became our revival symbol”,
Karimli, Ali, (April 22, 2018). “Bu hərəkat Ermənistanı demokratikləşdirmək uğrunda hərəkatdır və uğur qazanacağı təqdirdə onu Rusiyanın nüfuz dairəsindən çıxaracaq”, Azadliq.info,
Karimli, Ali (May 8, 2018). “Demokratiya uğrunda mübarizә indi hәm dә Qarabağ uğrunda mübarizәdir”, Azadliq. info,
Kaspi.az, (June 7, 2018). “Paşinyanın populist proqramı”,
Kremlin.ru. (May 14, 2018). “Meeting with Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan”,
Kucera, Joshua (September 19, 2017). “Report: Nationalist rhetoric on the rising inward Armenia as well as Azerbaijan”, Eurasianet.org, ,
MacFarquhar, Neil. (May 19, 2018). “Behind Armenia’s revolt, immature stupor troops from the tech sector”, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/19/world/europe/armenia-revolt-tech-sector.html
Reuters, (May 9, 2018). “Armenia’s novel PM signals continuity on Karabakh, seeks talks with Azerbaijan”,
Trend.az (April 25, 2018). “MP: Sargsyan to respond before tribunal for Khojaly genocide”,
1News.az, (April 23, 2018). “Конец карабахского мафиозного клана: хроника событий последних дней в Армении”,
1News.az, (April 27, 2018). “Досье Никола Пашиняна: что думает лидер армянской революции о Карабахе?”
Social Media
BBC Monitoring (May 1, 2018). “Armenian opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan has backed Azerbaijan’s breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh’s ‘inalienable right’ to self-determination”, on Twitter:
Hajili, Arif (April 24, 2018). “Ermənistanda Sarkisyanın yaratdığı avtoritar rejimin devrilməsi…”, Facebook,
Hajili, Arif (May 14, 2018). “Serj Sarkisyana öz hakimiyyətini saxta yolla uzatmağa imkan verilməməsi…”, Facebook,
Ismayilov, Aslan (April 23, 2018). “Serj Sarkisyanın istefasını qələbə kimi qeyd edənlərə müraciət edirəm…”, Facebook
Ismayilov, Aslan (April 26, 2018). “Ermənistanda baş verənlərlə bağlı ətraflı məlumatım olmasa da…”, Facebook,
Ismayilov, Aslan (May 8, 2018). “1 aydır davam edən etirazların nəticəsində Ermənistanda illərdir kök buraxmış mafioz qruplar xalq qarşısında…”, Facebook,
Tonoyan, Artyom (May 2, 2018). “Pashinyan concludes with Long alive the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, which volition finally acquire an inseparable component subdivision of Armenia.” Twitter:
About the Author
Farid Guliyev is an independent scholar specializing inward the political economic scheme of natural resources as well as post-communist politics.
What Georgians recall most the Armenian Revolution
By Ghia Nodia
Abstract
Armenia’s “velvet revolution” volition hardly take away hold whatsoever direct impact on Georgia or on the province of Georgian–Armenian relations. However, the events that unfolded inward their neighboring province fascinated as well as amazed the Georgians, fifty-fifty though they did non yet understand the significance of the events. The ii countries part of import similarities, as well as both occupation the other equally a dot of reference. Many Georgians compared the unfolding events inward Armenia with their ain “Rose Revolution” inward 2003, equally good equally the ii Ukrainian revolutions—the “Orange” as well as Euromaidan, inward 2004 as well as 2014, respectively. Those revolutions grade critical points inward the histories of these countries, albeit inward different respects. How tin Armenia change, as well as if it does, how volition Georgians view those changes? I volition hash out those questions from ii perspectives: that of regional residual of powerfulness as well as that of the evolution of democratic institutions.
“What’s the Point of a Revolution if the Geopolitical Orientation Doesn’t Change?”
Georgians instinctually examine the unfolding events inward their part through a geopolitical lens. Armenia is a pro-Russian country, as well as it is a fellow member of the Russia-led Eurasian Union as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This contrasts with Georgia, which aspires to European Union as well as NATO membership. When Georgians began to hash out Armenian events, the firstly inquiry was: Will the Armenian Revolution modify the country’s external orientation? Aren’t truthful democratic revolutionaries supposed to live pro-Western? If not, what is the dot of replacing Serzh Sargsyan with someone else?
It took fourth dimension to eliminate that misunderstanding. Indeed, the Euromaidan revolution inward Ukraine was triggered yesteryear opposition to Russian domination, but non all similar events are most geopolitics. Georgia’s Rose Revolution was non most unusual policy, although it propelled a grouping of strongly pro-Western reformers to power. Their predecessor, Eduard Shevardnadze, was pro-Western equally well; indeed, he was the human being who made a formal bid for Georgia to bring together NATO. (Peuch 2002)
Geopolitical alignments are rooted inward fundamental choices made yesteryear societies, as well as such alignments tend to endure fifty-fifty the most dramatic political changes. The Georgians as well as Armenians made such fateful choices inward the twilight of the Soviet Union when broad protestation movements inward both countries picked quite different priorities. Georgians invested everything into the thought of independence, which made Russian Federation their adversary as well as made the West an imagined or existent ally. This province of affairs remains at present. In contrast, Armenia mobilized around an irredentist agenda of unification with Nagorny Karabakh, which made “the Turks” (implying Republic of Azerbaijan equally good equally Turkey) its arch-enemy as well as Russia—its master copy ally (even if non ever reliable). Guarding the results of the victory inward the Karabakh state of war became the master copy objective of the Armenian state, as well as it silent is, but in that location is a cost to pay. Many Armenians would prefer their province grade an alliance with the European rather than Eurasian Union, as well as Nikol Pashinyan, the leader of the Armenian Revolution as well as the novel interim Prime Minister, is in all probability 1 of them. Because such an alliance would live detrimental to Karabakh, it cannot fifty-fifty live discussed.
This does non hateful that relations betwixt Georgia as well as Armenia must live poor. After becoming the prime number minister, Nikol Pashinyan said that “inter-state relations betwixt the ii countries must non live founded on geopolitical factors or influence”. (JAM intelligence 2018) This displays how Georgian–Armenian relations take away hold developed since independence. Both countries understood that they demand each other regardless of their relations with larger powers.
Nonetheless, this does non hateful that the Armenian Revolution has no unusual political dimension. The competitor betwixt Russian Federation as well as the West is fundamental for regional politics of the South Caucasus. It is non only most countries’ involvement with armed services as well as economical blocs, it is also—if non primarily—about the clash betwixt values, norms, as well as models of development; it is most soft powerfulness equally good equally hard power.
From this perspective, the Armenian revolution is a grave defeat for Russia. While the latter’s political leadership remained nonchalant, equally though goose egg of import occurred, (see the contribution yesteryear Pavel Baev inward this issue) the Russian commentariat does non cover its anger as well as frustration. (Shevchenko 2018, Leontyev 2018, Solovyov 2018)
Georgia’s Rose Revolution was non intended to live anti-Russian, but it profoundly changed the province inward ways that brought it closer to the West. Mikheil Saakashvili’s regime failed to plow Georgia into a European-style liberal democracy, partly because this was non its existent priority as well as because such democracies cannot live created with a top-down approach. However, it turned a failing province into a fairly efficacious one, replaced rampant corruption with a regime that was amazingly create clean yesteryear regional standards, strengthened meritocracy at the expense of clientelism, as well as tried to embed an inclusive concept of citizenship. The real fact of the Rose Revolution as well as subsequent reforms pushed the West to select Georgia’s claims to live component subdivision of the Western basis to a greater extent than seriously, fifty-fifty if fundamental reluctance persists. Georgia’s plow mightiness take away hold influenced the EU’s reversal of its before conclusion non to include the South Caucasus inward the European Neighbourhood Policy, which was created inward 2003, but the South Caucasus was added inward 2004. Later, inward its Bucharest summit inward 2008, NATO promised eventual membership to Georgia, despite deep divisions inside the alliance on when (if ever) as well as how this hope may live fulfilled. In 2009, next the 2008 Georgian–Russian war, the European Union created a novel European Partnership musical instrument which made it possible for Georgia to sign the Association Agreement with the EU.
Russian leadership considers the “color revolutions” equally the most deadly weapon the West tin wield against it. Its allegations that such upheavals are financed as well as masterminded yesteryear the West are, of course, absurd, though it is truthful that the real spirit of such revolutions undermines Russian influence inward these countries. It was wise of the Russian leadership non to equate the Armenian revolution with Ukraine’s Euromaidan, as well as it is clear that the Russian handgrip on Armenia may live strong plenty for it to move along wielding strong influence over the country. However, considering the precedent of a Russian ally’s regime departing only because people inward the street demanded it may live real dangerous. In fact, it may take away hold a demonstration effect for the Russian people equally well: why non seek something similar inward their ain country. As a termination of the Armenian Revolution, the residual of soft powerfulness inward the part shifted away from Russia. After this, a lot depends on the finally outcome of the revolution: While it volition sure as shooting supersede the powerfulness elite, nosotros do non yet know whether it volition also modify the model of evolution as well as fundamentally transform Armenia’s institutions.
If it does, the modify volition also live meaningful for Georgia. While the latter has never been a total democracy,1 it has been considered a stable regional leader of democratic freedoms. Moreover, during the finally decade, all of Georgia’s neighbors tended toward increased autocracy. This implied that Western governments exerted less pressure level on it for violating democratic norms, equally it is hard to live tough on the regional beacon of democracy. However, beingness surrounded yesteryear autocratic regimes does non bode good for the prospects of genuine republic inward Georgia. If the velvet revolution succeeds inward making Armenia’s political regime genuinely democratic, Georgia may lose its seat equally the regional leader of democratic freedom, but it may also have a novel stimulus to acquire a freer country.
Revolution as well as Democratic Legitimacy
However, do “color” or “velvet” revolutions really brand countries to a greater extent than democratic? The tape of such is mixed. First, they occur inward so-called “hybrid” regimes rather than outright dictatorships; such regimes allow for opened upward political contestation, as well as their claim to beingness democracies is non purely formal. However, in that location is no bird playing field, as well as incumbents manipulate available resources to skew results inward their favor. There are structural reasons for countries having such regimes, as well as democratic openings such equally “velvet revolutions”, piece exciting, do non ever help.
Distrust of electoral institutions is endemic inward such countries. This distrust tends to persist when novel revolutionary leaders organize elections themselves. How do nosotros know they are fair? Verdicts of unusual or domestic observers are oftentimes inconclusive. If people are non used to trusting electoral procedures, they volition ever live prone to inquiry the results. Hence a fundamental inquiry emerges at nowadays as well as again: inward a democracy, what is an authentic representation of the “will of the people”— elections, or a huge rally inward the streets?
Democratic theory, equally good equally the do of established democracies, suggests an unequivocal answer: street rallies take away hold their function, but the finally verdict should come upward through elections. This does non occur inward countries such equally Georgia or Armenia. Instead, “direct democracy”—defined equally people expressing their volition taking the physical care for to the street—claims moral superiority over an electoral physical care for that is presumed corrupt as well as unfair. However, this mental attitude may eventually piece of work against the novel revolutionary regime equally well.
The success of the 2003 ‘Rose Revolution’ made it a model for the opposition of Saakashvili’s government, as well as their strategy was to emulate the Rose Revolution, non to competitor regime through elections. They failed, but the political physical care for was far from healthy. Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire turned politician, changed that yesteryear bringing his Georgian Dream political party to an electoral victory inward Oct 2012. Has this precedent created a novel normal inward Georgia? Not everyone is convinced. Arguably, Ivanishvili’s enormous personal wealth, yesteryear Georgian standards, makes him an exceptional case. The 2016 parliamentary elections increased Ivanishvili’s “Georgian Dream” political party to to a greater extent than than 75 percentage bulk inward Parliament, as well as he consolidated his command over all branches of power. The thought that elections are irrelevant is gaining traction inward parts of Georgia because no 1 tin jibe Ivanishvili’s resources. It was because of this number that the United National Movement (UNM), the master copy opposition party, carve upward inward Jan 2017: loyalists of Mikheil Saakashvili, quondam president as well as at nowadays émigré opposition leader, believe that they should prepare for some other (hopefully “velvet”) revolution; those who silent believe inward elections, broke away as well as created a novel party, European Georgia. Armenia’s illustration may live used yesteryear Saakashvili as well as his followers to bear witness their dot that modify volition come upward through people rallying inward the streets, non elections. At the moment, in that location is no visible sign that Georgian people are inward the mood to modify the regime through street protests,2 but the Armenian revolution may influence the strategy of the Georgian opposition.
How to interruption the vicious cycle? Will Nikol Pashinyan’s novel regime succeed inward persuading Armenians that they should rely on ballot box from at nowadays on when they create upward one's hear to modify their government? Or volition the success of the 2018 velvet revolution legitimize efforts of hereafter opposition movements to forcefulness the adjacent regime to capitulate to the people inward the streets? This has been a genuinely of import inquiry for the Georgian democracy, as well as it volition live 1 for Armenia equally well.
Notes
1 In Freedom House ratings of the finally 20 years, Georgia has routinely scored betwixt 3 as well as 4 points out of 7—this makes it a “partly gratis country”, or a hybrid regime which is relatively closed to a republic (the score of 2.5 would brand Georgia one). Armenia ordinarily scored betwixt 4.5 as well as 5—a hybrid country, but closer to beingness an autocracy. See Freedom inward the World ratings on freedomhouse.org.
2 Protests against closure of ii Georgian nightclubs inward the context of the government’s anti-narcotics crusade on May 12 as well as xiii equally good fifty-fifty larger rallies caused yesteryear perceived injustice inward the law enforcement scheme inward early on June demonstrated that Georgians are losing patience with the Georgian Dream government; but attempts of the UNM to politicize the motion yesteryear raising the demand for early on elections failed.
References
JAM intelligence (2018), “Armenian PM: Georgia of utmost importance for Armenia”, May 11, 2018, available online at
M. Leontyev, (2018) “V prirode ne bylo yesteryear Armenii, yesli yesteryear ne rossija” (If non for Russia, in that location would live no Armenia) Yotube, published on May 5, 2018,
Jean-Christophe Peuch (2002), “Georgia: Shevardnadze Officially Requests Invitation To Join NATO”, RFE-RL Nov 22, 2002,
Maxim Shevchenko (2018), “Armenija: rossija proigryvayet zapadu” (“Armenia: Russian Federation Is Losing to the West”), Youtube, Published on Apr 25, 2018,
Vladimir Solovyov (2018), “Kurgianian: my teryayem Armeniju! Vecher s Vladimirom Soloviovym ot 29.04.18” (“Kurgianian: We Are Losing Armenia! An eventide with Vladimir Solovyov on 29.04.18”), , published on Apr 30, 2018
About the Author
Ghia Nodia is Professor of Politics as well as Director of the International School of Caucasus Studies at the Ilia State University inward Tbilisi, Georgia. He has published extensively on democratization, state-building, security, as well as conflicts inward Georgia as well as the Caucasus, equally good equally on theories of nationalism as well as democratic transition.
Political Changes inward Armenia: a Litmus Test for the European Union
By Laure Delcour
Abstract
Although they were essentially driven yesteryear domestic factors, the political events that unfolded inward Armenia inward April– May 2018 comport strong implications for external actors, especially for the European Union (EU). This is because the European Union regards itself equally a promoter of human rights, republic as well as the dominion of law worldwide, especially inward its neighbourhood. As component subdivision of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) launched inward 2004, the partner countries’ effective commitment to ‘shared values’ (i.e., democracy, human rights as well as the dominion of law) is a prerequisite to closer relations with the EU. Therefore, whether as well as how the European Union tin diffuse its democratic values are crucial questions to estimate its influence inward its vicinity.
Introduction
This article argues that Armenia’s ‘Velvet Revolution’ represents both a challenge as well as an chance for the EU. In essence, piece it is strongly backed yesteryear a broad constituency deeply dissatisfied with the incumbent elite as well as political regime, the modify of leadership inward Armenia opens an era of uncertainty, both domestically as well as regionally. Domestically, the novel Prime Minister faces both strong pressure level as well as potentially major obstructions to come upward to terms with the ‘old’ scheme of governance as well as deliver on reforms (Giragosian inward World Politics Review, 2018). Regionally, political upheavals inward Armenia (and the dubiety associated with them) may enhance the tensions with Republic of Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh (Vartanyan, 2018), amongst other tensions, yesteryear stiffening Armenia’s seat (Abramyan, 2018). As a multi-layer scheme of governance whose unusual policy involves multiple players, the European Union is non good equipped to react promptly or decisively to unexpected and/or large-scale changes, fifty-fifty when such changes are framed equally aspirations to the values supported yesteryear the EU. This was made abundantly clear on a number of occasions, including inward the EU’s ain neighbourhood with the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ as well as the 2013–14 crisis inward Ukraine (Delcour as well as Wolczuk, 2015a). Nevertheless, the ‘Velvet Revolution’ inward Armenia has also emerged equally an chance for the European Union (in line with the conclusions of the 2015 ENP review) to tailor its policy to the aspirations expressed yesteryear Armenian society as well as accompany home-grown reforms. In fact, it is also a jeopardy for the European Union to brand upward for its yesteryear shortcomings inward supporting domestic modify inward Armenia.
The EU’s Policy inward Armenia: a Low Prioritisation of Political Reforms
Over the yesteryear decade, the EU’s engagement inward favour of Armenia’s democratisation has indeed been inconspicuous. It has mainly taken the grade of declarations as well as assistance as well as has thus lacked the EU’s key leverage inward terms of back upward for democratisation—political conditionality. For instance, the European Union criticised the occupation of violence yesteryear the Armenian authorities inward response to demonstrations, especially inward the wake of the 2008 presidential election. Additionally, the European Union has consistently allocated component subdivision of its assistance to back upward human rights as well as the dominion of law (for instance, yesteryear providing assist for the evolution of civil society as well as the reform of the judiciary). However, the European Union did non brand political modify a precondition for closer ties with Armenia, fifty-fifty though in that location were concerns over the honour for human rights as well as the dominion of law. Admittedly, Armenia was no exception to the EU’s policy; inward other ENP countries, the European Union similarly abstained from requiring far-reaching political reforms that would threaten the survival of their incumbent elites, as well as with the exception of Republic of Belarus as well as Ukraine inward belatedly 2012, it did non occupation political conditionality (Delcour as well as Wolczuk, 2015a).
This occurred because the European Union has prioritised safety as well as stability over democratisation inward its neighbourhood policy (Ghazaryan, 2014). The EU’s hierarchy of objectives became apparent with the Eastern Partnership (EaP) launched inward 2009. With the EaP, the European Union has prioritised regulatory approximation with its ain corpus of rules—the acquis communautaire—especially inward trade-related sectors. It has also made extensive occupation of sector-specific conditionality, amongst other rules, equally a prerequisite to launch negotiations for Deep as well as Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA). This is non to say that European Union functional cooperation is disconnected from democratic principles. Admittedly, European Union sectoral policies include strongly codified provisions for democratic governance (Freyburg et al., 2009). In other words, the European Union may indirectly promote republic yesteryear embedding democratic principles (transparency, accountability, participation) into sectoral cooperation. However, the effects of these provisions on partner countries’ practices may live visible only inward the medium to long term.
In fact, during negotiations for an Association Agreement (AA, 2010–13) as well as a DCFTA (2012–13) with Armenia, the European Union prioritised legal approximation with those standards protecting its marketplace from low-quality as well as unsafe products. Therefore, non only did the European Union select the political status quo inward Armenia when launching the Eastern Partnership, but also, yesteryear placing emphasis on regulatory approximation as well as negotiations for an AA/ DCFTA, it added legitimacy to Armenia’s incumbent authorities, who emerged equally the EU’s main (if non sole) counterpart during the negotiations. The regime was able to effectively implement the EU-demanded trade-related reforms, equally these did non entail loosening the elites’ command over the political scheme (Delcour as well as Wolczuk 2015b: 502). In addition, negotiations were conducted with little groups of experts, which left aside both Armenian civil society as well as the full general public.
Arguably, President Sargysan’s abrupt conclusion to bring together the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) inward September 2013 (thereby backtracking from the AA/ DCFTA) did petty to increment the EU’s leverage over the country’s political reforms. While the Armenian authorities take away hold demonstrated continuous involvement inward closer links with the EU, accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EUEA) as well as Russia’s increasing influence inward the province take away hold constrained the EU’s capacity to shape (even if modestly) the political developments.
This is primarily because Armenia’s integration alternative deprived the European Union of what had been its major leverage inward the grade of AA/DCFTA. The 1996 Partnership as well as Cooperation Agreement (which silent serves equally the contractual framework of relations, for the fourth dimension being) offers only limited possibilities for influence. The PCA includes basic political conditionality inward the grade of a so-called suspension clause, but this provision has never been used as well as hence has petty credibility. In principle, the European Union tin silent exert human rights-related conditionality through its merchandise musical instrument GSP+. However, until recently, the EU’s back upward for democratisation has remained limited, fifty-fifty when bilateral relations shifted away from emphasising trade-related issues.
Admittedly, the European Union has reacted to breaches of republic as well as the dominion of law. For instance, it criticised the parliamentary elections conducted inward Apr 20171 as well as called for an ‘impartial, credible as well as effective investigation’ of all human right violations (including misconduct yesteryear the police) during the 2016 Erebuni Crisis (EU-Armenia Cooperation Council, 2017). However, the EU’s assistance priorities for 2014–2017 highlighted a decrease inward back upward for democratisation, the dominion of law as well as honour for human rights compared to other sectors.2 Therefore, Armenia’s integration alternative seemingly reinforced the EU’s ’profile equally a donor, with limited capacity for political influence’ inward the province (Simão, 2018: 318). This is also because accession to the EAEU buttressed the incumbent authorities’ attempts to ensure their political survival yesteryear proposing a laid of constitutional amendments (adopted yesteryear plebiscite inward Dec 2015) that turned the province into a parliamentary regime as well as hence fuelled the Armenian public’s frustration with the lack of deep political reform (Alieva et al. 2017).
An Opportunity for the European Union to Step Up Its Role inward the Democratisation Process
The events that unfolded inward April–May 2018 may offering an chance for the European Union to measuring upward its role inward Armenia’s reform process. Clearly, equally was the instance inward other neighbouring countries (e.g., Ukraine inward belatedly 2013), the European Union did non emerge equally a major role instrumentalist during the crisis, especially equally the Armenian protests were, inward essence, a home-grown process. Nevertheless, the European Union (at all levels) issued a number of declarations, as well as the High Representative called both then-President Sarkissian as well as the newly appointed Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Importantly, the statements issued at the highest levels after Pashinyan was elected3 identified the consolidation of democracy, the dominion of law as well as the honour of human rights equally key objectives (alongside with economical as well as social development) inward EU–Armenian relations.
In fact, the recent modify of powerfulness came at a crucial minute inward bilateral relations. Though Armenia has non signed an AA, it has consistently sought to retain closed links with the EU. This province of affairs provides the Union with some leverage over the country, whether through the forthcoming dialogue on visa liberalisation or through the novel EU–Armenian understanding signed inward March 2017. The Comprehensive as well as Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) is expected to acquire inward into forcefulness in 1 lawsuit it is ratified yesteryear all sides. Democratic values, goodness governance, honour for fundamental freedoms, human rights as well as the dominion of law are defined equally essential elements of the CEPA, as well as the understanding may live suspended if breaches of these principles are observed. Crucially, the CEPA is also expected to empower civil society, equally an independent civil society platform composed of Armenian as well as European Union organisations volition live laid upward to monitor the implementation of the agreement. The assistance priorities identified for 2018–20 also embrace a wider swath inward democracy-related activities than was the instance inward 2014–17, with the improvement of electoral legislation as well as the fighting against corruption beingness identified equally key priorities, along with back upward for the reform of jurist inward the ‘stronger governance pillar’ of the partnership (EEAS, 2018).
Therefore, Armenia’s ‘Velvet Revolution’ has taken identify at a fourth dimension when the European Union seems prepared to back upward democratisation as well as political reform to a greater extent than actively. The launch of a visa dialogue with Armenia (if it is non farther delayed because of the sensitive context of immigration inward the EU) may also play an of import role inward fostering key reforms inward the province (not to the lowest degree inward the fighting against corruption). This is because the dialogue volition pave the way for increased conditionality equally component subdivision of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan (the adjacent measuring nether the visa liberalisation process, Alieva et al., 2017). More broadly, the EU’s back upward for societal links with Armenia (for instance, through the funding of educatee exchanges) is expected to contribute (even if indirectly as well as inward the longer term) to changing the political environs inward the country.
With the CEPA, the European Union has demonstrated that it tin adapt its offering according to the partner countries’ circumstances (in this case, Armenia’s membership inward the EAEU), inward line with the approach introduced yesteryear the 2015 ENP review. The electrical flow province of affairs inward Armenia is yet some other bear witness of the EU’s capacity to influence domestic developments inward those Eastern Partnership countries that take away hold non signed an Association Agreement but are prone to engaging inward reforms. Ultimately, the EU’s influence inward Armenia volition hinge on both the EU’s engagement as well as powerfulness to adapt to the local context as well as on the regional environs (be it the grade of tension with Republic of Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh or Russia’s continuous low-profile seat vis-à-vis political developments inward the country).
Notes
1 In the wake of the Apr 2017 elections, the European Union Ambassador to Armenia questioned the credibility of the government-controlled Central Electoral Commission. This province of affairs triggered criticism from the regime for meddling inward Armenian internal affairs (Sahakian as well as Bedevian, 2017).
2 In 2011–2013, back upward for democratic structures as well as goodness governance was identified equally the firstly European Union assistance priority as well as accounted for exactly about one-third of the EU’s back upward to Armenia (European Commission 2010). In 2014–2017, the European Union focused on individual sector evolution as well as world direction reform; the reform of the jurist sector was identified equally the 3rd priority, but back upward for other democratic institutions as well as civil society evolution was inconspicuous (EEAS/European Commission 2013).
3 Be it the articulation statement yesteryear the High Representative Federica Mogherini as well as Commissioner Johannes Hahn or the articulation missive of the alphabet yesteryear the President of the European Council Donald Tusk as well as the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker.
References
Abramyan, E. (2018) Pashinyan Stiffens Armenia’s Posture Toward Karabakh, Eurasia Daily Monitor (15) 72, (accessed xi May 2018).
Alieva, L., Delcour, L., Kostanyan, H. (2017). European Union relations with Armenia as well as Azerbaijan, Brussels: European Parliament, AFET Committee, (accessed 3 May 2018)
Delcour, L., as well as Wolczuk, K. (2015a). The EU’s Unexpected ‘Ideal Neighbour’? The Perplexing Case of Armenia’s Europeanisation. Journal of European Integration, 37(4), 491–507.
Delcour, L., as well as Wolczuk, K. (2015b). Spoiler or facilitator of democratization? Russia’s Role inward Georgia as well as Ukraine. Democratization, 22(3), 459–478.
Council of the European Union (2017). EU-Armenia Cooperation Council, Brussels, 23 May, . (accessed five July 2017).
European Commission (2003). Wider Europe—Neighbourhood: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 New Framework for Relations with our Eastern as well as Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final.
European Commission (2010). Armenia. National Indicative Programme 2011–2013, Brussels.
European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign as well as Security Policy (2015). Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, eighteen November.
European External Action Service (2018). European Union as well as Armenia sign cooperation priorities until 2020, Brussels, 21 February.
European External Action Service/European Commission (2013). Single Support Framework Armenia. 2014– 2017, Brussels.
Freyburg, T., Lavenex, S., Skripka, T., Schimmelfennig, F., as well as A. Wetzel. (2011). Democracy advertisement through functional cooperation? The Case of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Democratization, 18(4), 1026–1054.
Ghazaryan, N. (2014). The European Neighbourhood Policy as well as the democratic values of the EU. Oxford as well as Portland: Hart Publishing.
Sahakian, N., Bedevian, A. (2017). “EU Envoys Rejects Criticisms from Armenian government”, RFE/RL, 20 June, (accessed five July 2017).
Simão, L. (2018). The European Neighbourhood Policy as well as the South Caucasus. In: Schumacher, T., Marchetti, A. Demmelhüber, T., The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy, London: Routledge, 312–323.
Vartanyan, O. (2018). ‘Velvet Revolution’ Takes Armenia into the Unknown, International Crisis Group , (accessed vii May 2018).
World Politics Review, Armenia’s New Leaders Face Pressure to Govern, Not Simply Rule, interview with Richard Giragosian. (accessed xi May 2018).
About the Author
Laure Delcour is a researcher (Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris) as well as a visiting professor at the College of Europe (Bruges). She was previously a scientific coordinator of the EU-FP7 projection ‘Exploring the Security-Democracy Nexus inward the Caucasus’ (CASCADE). Her enquiry interests focus on the diffusion as well as reception of European Union norms as well as policies equally component subdivision of the European Neighbourhood Policy as well as on region-building processes inward Eurasia.
What Made Russian Federation Indifferent to the Revolution inward Armenia
By Pavel K. Baev
Abstract
Russia’s reaction to the dramatic collapse of the firmly entrenched regime inward Armenia, which is 1 of its few formal as well as existent allies, was subtle as well as demonstratively neutral. Contact with the opposition was minimal, but the idiosyncratic counter-revolutionary stance was abandoned. This unusual self-restraint may live the termination of Russia’s entrapment inward Syria, as well as it may also live due to a error caused yesteryear the overload of rigidly centralized leadership.
Introduction
The Apr revolution inward Armenia greatly surprised Russian leadership, equally it did most stakeholders inward the multiple conflicts inward the Caucasus. However, 1 would hold off that Moscow should take away hold been to a greater extent than informed as well as improve prepared. Experts had warned most brewing discontent inward this impoverished South Caucasian province (Minchenko, Markedonov & Petrov, 2015), but policy-makers inward the Kremlin are resolutely uninterested inward whatsoever grade of independent expertise. President Vladimir Putin called as well as “warmly congratulated” Serzh Sargsyan on his appointment to Prime Minister, though protocol did non dictate him do so (Putin, 2018). From that minute on, the mainstream media strictly ignored the street protests inward Yerevan. That quiet stimulated tearing debates on the escalating turmoil inside social networks that connect millions of Russian users with thousands of eye-witnesses. Furthermore, the mainstream media quiet reinforced the self-deception inward the proverbial Kremlin corridors that goose egg of import was occurring (Petrovskaya, 2018).
Consequently, Sargsyan’s resignation on Apr 23 came equally a shock, as well as piece the propaganda machine scrambled to explicate it, Putin was politically paralyzed— equally had occurred on several occasions throughout his long administration. Though armed services intervention was sure as shooting out of the question, Moscow had an arsenal of “hybrid” tactics at its disposal, all of which could take away hold been rapidly deployed. In the crucial weeks when Nikol Pashinyan advanced his claim for the seat of prime number minister, Moscow remained indifferent as well as uncharacteristically aloof, marker potential consequences for Russian–Armenian relations and, to a greater extent than importantly, damaging Russia’s “principled” stance against revolutions. This lack of response on events of high importance has, therefore, negatively impacted Russia’s profile on the international stage.
Abandoning the Counter-Revolutionary Crusade
The dominant discourse inward Russian Federation on the bailiwick of contemporary revolutions has been strongly negative, contrasting heavily with the Soviet ideological glorification of this phenomenon equally an “engine of progress”. The proposition that a forceful overthrow of legitimate order, fifty-fifty those of a dictatorial nature, brings only chaos as well as violence is accepted equally a political axiom, thereby reducing discussions on such politically wrong issues equally the “right for rebellion” to the margins of the blogosphere (Volkov, 2014). This tearing condemnation goes beyond the rational stance of an authoritarian regime, which firmly controls elections as well as finds a grave threat inward street protests. Vladimir Putin tends to select such issues personally, hiding but never overcoming the stupor of watching angry crowds protest, equally he did from the windows of KGB headquarters inward Dresden inward Nov 1989 (Hill & Gaddy, 2013). That trauma was reinforced with the shocking images of the gruesome decease of Libyan dictator Muamar al-Qaddafi, which Putin attributed to USA malicious manipulation of the violent chaos (Sestanovich, 2018).
What makes this natural aversion to pop uprisings especially aggressive is the assertion that the so-called “color revolutions” inward Russia’s neighborhood, equally good equally the hopeful “Arab spring” inward the Middle East, are instigated as well as sponsored yesteryear the USA as well as the EU. As conspiracy theories are elevated to the bird of province policy, Russia’s struggle against various attempts at forceful “regime change” fuel a key component subdivision of its rapidly evolving confrontation with the West. President Putin portrays himself equally a champion of the counter-revolutionary cause as well as makes a claim for Russian leadership inward global resistance against the USA policy of preserving its eroding “hegemony”. The “color revolutions” were fifty-fifty defined equally a novel grade of warfare, despite scant enthusiasm amongst the top brass for elaboration on this theoretical conception (Bouchet, 2016).
The lack of response inward Moscow to the explosion of street protests inward Erevan marks a stark contrast with Russia’s ideological stance against revolutions. It was sure as shooting of peachy importance for Russian leadership that no anti-Russian or pro-EU slogans were displayed inward the peaceful rallies across Armenia. Furthermore, equally Pashinyan asserted that the alliance with Russian Federation would remain strong, some opinion-makers inward Moscow ventured the dot that the unfolding crisis was different from other “color revolutions” (Markedonov, 2018a). In the previous serial of street protests inward Armenia during the summertime of 2015, the friendship with Russian Federation was also never inward question, but this did non halt Moscow from inventing Western interference (Andreasyan & Derluguian, 2015). An explanation of the novel Russian passivity is hard to find, but Syrian Arab Republic is in all probability a factor.
The Long Shadow of the Syrian Debacle
Many overlapping ambitions influenced Putin’s risky conclusion to launch a armed services intervention into the Syrian civil state of war inward September 2015, as well as a prominent incentive was the perceived demand to halt as well as force dorsum the moving ridge of revolutions. The explosion of social anger inward the Arab basis as well as the uprising inward Ukraine were caused yesteryear vastly different factors, but according to the perspective of Moscow, the Tahrir as well as the Maidan were parts of the same Western conspiracy. By early on 2018, however, the “Arab spring” had abated, leaving behind ii collapsed states (Libya as well as Yemen), ii forcefully suppressed upheavals (Bahrain as well as Egypt) as well as only 1 success story (Tunisia), piece the Ukrainian breakthrough had deteriorated into political squabbles inward Kiev as well as a armed services deadlock inward Donbass. Syrian Arab Republic is no longer a key battlefield inward the struggle against revolutions but is instead a permanently mutating violent disaster. Putin declared a “victory” inward the state of war against the rebels as well as terrorists, only to discover the Russian expeditionary forces entrapped inward novel spasms of fighting (Baev, 2018).
Moscow is stuck with an ostracized dictator inward Damascus, who tin only sustain his grasp on powerfulness with large-scale armed services back upward from Russian Federation as well as Iran, but the “brotherhood-in-arms” betwixt them involves all sorts of troubles (Grove & Abdulrahim, 2018). The Russian forces remain clear from the escalating conflict betwixt Islamic Republic of Iran as well as State of Israel inward Syria, equally good equally from the fighting betwixt the Turkish regular army as well as the Kurdish forces. The Russian command also tries to save the “de-conflicting” fashion with the USA forces, despite the heavy resonance from the direct clash inward Feb (Gibbons-Neff, 2018). This complicated maneuvering agency that Putin’s monastic enjoin on reducing the Russian grouping inward Syrian Arab Republic cannot live executed because without numerous “boots on the ground”, Russian Federation tin neither influence this novel post-ISIS stage of the Syrian state of war nor tin it ensure the safety of its ii bases (Khmeimin as well as Tartus). This imperative to sustain the intervention signifies a protracted stress for the Russian Navy as well as Air-Space forces—and undercuts Russia’s powerfulness to launch novel armed services interventions.
Mistakes Caused yesteryear a bad Overload
The engagement inward Syrian Arab Republic impacted on the Russian reaction to the Armenian revolution inward several ways, equally it demanded to a greater extent than resources from Moscow (e.g., rebuilding the Syrian air defense forcefulness system) as well as maybe most importantly, equally it prioritized Russian attending to the fast-transforming war. This state of war direction added anxiety to the already precarious human relationship betwixt Russian Federation as well as the U.S., which deteriorated badly after the U.S. Treasury enforced new, heavy-hitting sanctions. Trump’s increased toughness as well as braggadocios statements most the hundreds of Russians killed inward Syrian Arab Republic compelled some mainstream Moscow experts to inquiry whether Washington really aimed to undermine elite back upward for Putin’s regime (Kortunov, 2018). The demand to monitor the developments on the Korean peninsula, where Russia’s exposure is high but its powerfulness to effect modify is low, was some other stressor that heavily overloaded the Kremlin scheme of political decision-making, thus resulting inward miscalculations, procrastinations as well as blunders.
Though the proposal that the lack of Russian response to the Armenian crisis was a error may appear dubious, it builds on the fact that Russia’s political scheme is extremely centralized as well as that the attending bridge of the “decider” is invariably limited. Since the start of the Ukraine crisis, Putin displayed petty involvement inward the conflict transformations inward the Caucasus as well as has really never developed a particular “chemistry” with Sargsyan. Moscow took the quick termination of fighting inward Nagorno Karabakh inward Apr 2016 equally proof of Russia’s capacity to command the status-quo (de Waal, 2018). The Kremlin direction was also quite preoccupied with the peaceful execution of Putin’s presidential inauguration on May 7. It is quite possible that Putin’s courtiers dismissed Pashinyan’s Gandhi-style march across Armenia inward early on Apr equally a exhibit of petty importance yesteryear a marginal trouble-maker (Antonova, 2018).
The Russian armed services base of operations inward Armenia is also isolated to serve equally a springboard for a armed services intervention, which would take away hold required prohibitively heavy sweat as well as risk. However, Moscow has mastered the fine art of applying a broad arrive at of “hybrid” means, many of which could take away hold been effectively deployed inward back upward of the friendly dictator-in-distress inward Yerevan. Corruption, which is the main irritant for Armenian society, has produced many profitable links betwixt Moscow as well as Erevan that are ideally suited to manipulate elites as well as crowds, as well as yet, they remained idle. The infamous Russian “troll factories” did non assault Pashinyan’s high-impact posts on Facebook. The inattentive Kremlin clearly missed the ripe minute to endeavour an indirect powerfulness projection. That Sargsyan said, “I was wrong”, rather than inquire Moscow for emergency back upward is a testimony to the strength of a real particular war-forged Armenian political civilization that remains profoundly incomprehensible to Russian elites. That astounding resignation mightiness take away hold triggered an overreaction from Russia, but Putin could non discover a counterpart to connect with as well as was disinclined to grace the intrigues of the beleaguered Republican political party with his attention.
Conclusions
The next may live reasonably concluded: if Moscow had attempted a “hybrid” intervention inward the Armenian crisis as well as failed, as well as so the harm to its international positions would take away hold been significantly greater. Nevertheless, it was exactly equally possible for the Kremlin to demand a forceful suppression inward the early on stages of the protests inward Erevan equally it was to monastic enjoin a cruel dispersion of peaceful rallies inward Moscow on May 5. Though Putin’s courtroom assumes the stance of “non-interference inward internal affairs” regarding the Armenian revolution, the rationale behind this pose is highly unconvincing as well as remains bailiwick to interpretation (Markedonov, 2018b). This analysis suggests that the unsatisfactory experiences from Syrian Arab Republic informed the self-restraint shown yesteryear Moscow, where resources for proactive unusual policy moves are at nowadays assessed with greater care. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 farther proposition is to apply the ever-useful “Occam’s razor” method, which dictates that Putin as well as his courtroom made the error of ignoring the starting fourth dimension of the explosive crisis, but avoided the to a greater extent than serious blunder of attempting a belated “hybrid” intervention. Russia’s powerfulness to provide assurances of safety to post-Soviet autocrats is at nowadays seriously compromised, but a reproduction inward Moscow of a joyful triumph of street republic inward Erevan silent remains rather improbable.
References
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Markedonov, Sergei, 2018b. “Отзвуки «бархатной революции»: о событиях в Армении из России” [Resonance of the “Velvet revolution”: On the events inward Armenia from Moscow], Analyticon, May .
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Putin, Vladimir, 2018. Телефонный разговор с Премьер-министром Армении Сержем Саргсяном [Telephone conversation with Armenian Prime-Minister Serzh Sargsyan], Kremlin.ru, 17 Apr .
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About the Author
Pavel K. Baev is a Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). He is also a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the Brookings Institutions (Washington DC), a Senior Research Associate at the Institut Francais des Relations Internationales (IFRI, Paris), as well as a Senior Associate Research Fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI, Milan).
Russian Public Opinion on the Protests inward Armenia (as of Late May 2018)
Figure 1: Have You Heard About the Mass Protests inward Late Apr as well as Early May inward Armenia Against the Election of the Former President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan to the Office of Prime Minister? (One Answer) (% of Respondents)
Source: representative thought poll yesteryear Levada Center, 24–30 May 2018, N = 1600, , published on vi June 2018
Figure 2: What Are Your Feelings About the Protesters inward Armenia? (in % of Respondents Who Had Heard About the Protests; Respondents Were Shown a Card; One Answer)
Source: representative thought poll yesteryear Levada Center, 24–30 May 2018, N = 1600, , published on vi June 2018
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