Melissa Dalton and Mara Karlin
If Defense Secretary James Mattis wants to fulfill the National Defense Strategy mandate to focus on mainland People's Republic of China too Russia, the U.S. military’s posture inwards the Middle East must instruct smaller too smarter, write Melissa Dalton too Mara Karlin. This slice originally appeared inwards Defense One. We explored why inwards the get-go article inwards our serial for Defense One, noting challenges with Iran, contest with Russian Federation too China, counterterrorism imperatives, too domestic political too budgetary realities. This assessment has solely been reinforced past times the subsequent release of the Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy, or NDS, with its focus on strategic contest with mainland People's Republic of China too Russia, every bit good every bit the administration’s hard-line approach to Iran.
In our mo article, nosotros examined a attain of Middle East scenarios too identified 4 factors to consider when reshaping regional strength posture. Now, nosotros offering about recommendations close gradually changing that posture to reverberate evolving priorities too challenges.
To last clear, the U.S. armed services volition never exit the Middle East. We are non advocating that it do so. However, if Defense Secretary Mattis wants to fulfill the NDS mandate to focus on mainland People's Republic of China too Russia, the U.S. military’s posture inwards the Middle East must instruct smaller too smarter.
First, the US must increase the emphasis of non-military tools, which volition last vital to enabling regional partners to address long-term challenges of governance, fraying of social contracts, too consolidating counter terrorism too territorial gains into stabilization. Such initiatives volition require sustained too accountable funding from both the Department of State too USAID, whose budgets accept been slashed inwards the get-go ii years of the Trump administration. In addition, the US has soundless to appoint every bit many every bit one-half of its ambassadors to the region. While career foreign, civil, too armed services service officers tin send forrard initiatives quite capably, the absence of the president’s representatives inwards cardinal partner countries limits the political effectiveness of the US at a fourth dimension when geopolitical competitors such every bit Russian Federation too mainland People's Republic of China are deepening their relationships inwards the region—and mightiness to broker the posture adjustments nosotros recommend inwards this article. To this point, the direction must await beyond i usually used tool—U.S.arms sales—to compete with growing Russian influence inwards the Middle East; it must strengthen other U.S. diplomatic, economic, news too strategic communication tools that volition last critical to enabling a competitive strategy inwards the region.
Second, the US should gradually reshape its “furniture” inwards the region—that is, its armed services bases, assets, too armed services personnel inwards the Middle East. This may involve reductions but with an emphasis on smart investments. The finish should last to exit plenty for ongoing operations too probable potential contingencies, soundless assume about run a jeopardy inwards less probable scenarios every bit prescribed past times the NDS, which calls for “calculated risk-taking” 5 times inwards its unclassified summary. For example, CENTCOM could relax its requirements for a continuously introduce carrier nail group. Ground forces too nail assets could also last drawn downwardly somewhat. Finally, the proliferation too growth of service too unified ascendancy headquarters inwards the Gulf part should last rolled dorsum through de-layering too reducing staff numbers. This terminal number volition also strengthen U.S. civilian actors inwards the part past times minimizing the viceroy dynamic that has gained steam over the terminal ii decades.
What U.S. forces should stay to deter Iran, counter terrorism, secure access to strategic waterways, too back upwards allies too partners? Important elements include:
Ballistic missile defense.
Adaptable naval too marine configurations that supply littoral, amphibious, lift, strike, maritime domain awareness, too maritime safety capabilities.
Special operations too counter terrorism capabilities.
Intelligence, surveillance, too reconnaissance capabilities.
Logistics too enablers required to perform these functions.
Third, the US should streamline its armed services bases inwards the region. Research past times the RAND Corporation has upended a nitty-gritty assumption of the role of bases inwards securing access for contingencies; a 2014 study flora that “the presence of large permanent bases does non increase the likelihood of securing contingency access.” The array of U.S. bases, primarily situated inwards the Gulf, that accept been sustained too built upon since the 1991 Gulf War, were critical to conducting successive wars inwards Republic of Iraq too stay therefore for operations inwards Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan too efforts to struggle terrorism too deter Iran. While the latter iii missions volition stay cardinal features of the U.S. regional approach across a attain of possible scenarios, conducting these operations too preparing for the possible crises too contingencies that may emanate from hereafter conflicts do non require keeping all of its electrical flow bases “hot” inwards the region. “Hot” bases are continuously manned, operated, too maintained past times the primary strength user—in this instance the United States—and the host nation. Instead, the US could shift about of its bases from “hot” to “warm,” primarily operated too maintained past times the host province nether an understanding that permits U.S. forces to surge in that place when needed.
The criteria for determining which bases should last hot too warm could last based upon the type of capabilities needed inwards surely parts of the region, where strong security-cooperation relationships already be to burden-share capabilities, too calculations of where the US could assume about risk. One instance to consider is Kuwait, where the U.S. military’s long too deep human relationship could let for a transition to warm bases too where a heavy ground-based posture is less relevant for the region’s challenges. Such transitions could last offset past times farther safety cooperation investments to assure critical Gulf partners of U.S. commitment.
Fourth, the US volition demand to pattern a serial of mitigation measures to absorb whatever risks of adjusting its electrical flow strength posture. These steps should include increasing prepositioned equipment stocks inwards the part too deepening safety partnerships through tailored too targeted advising, establishment building, training, exercises, exchanges, too equipping to enable partners to address mutual safety objectives. Exercises with a number of regional militaries, for example, are useful both strategically—deterring Iran, reassuring Gulf partners, too facilitating cooperation alongside them given frayed political relationships—and operationally inwards ensuring the U.S. armed services maintains readiness for hereafter Middle East conflicts, especially every bit it focuses increasingly on other regions. Working with allies such every bit the United Kingdom of Great Britain too Northern Ireland too French Republic to puddle resources, basing, too synchronizing carrier deployments every bit allied capabilities too regional bases come upwards on line would also aid offset changes inwards U.S. posture. Harnessing opportunities to portion resources across U.S. combatant commands also provides efficiencies; CENTCOM already shares ISR resources with AFRICOM. Future sharing with EUCOM, AFRICOM, too INDOPACOM could include maritime too nail capabilities. And patch nosotros accept focused on posture adjustments, undoubtedly in that place are changes that could last made inwards strength development, too, such every bit investments inwards safety strength assistance brigades too calorie-free assail aircraft.
We do non recommend these adjustments lightly, every bit threats too challenges persist inwards the Middle East region. The administration’s determination to take away the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to curb Iran’s nuclear computer program too attempt a to a greater extent than assertive approach to address Iran’s destabilizing guide may trigger escalations that the US volition demand to last prepared to address—in unopen coordination with allies too partners. However, changing realities of the safety environs too U.S. political too budgetary dynamics accept prompted deep introspection inwards the Defense Department. It’s fourth dimension to brand gradual adjustments inwards the CENTCOM theatre to reverberate it.
Congress should occupation the Pentagon to consider how to reshape its posture, reporting dorsum through both classified too unclassified, publicly available assessments. These assessments should include an explanation of how DoD plans to apply its global operating model too dynamic strength work concepts outlined inwards the NDS inwards the Middle East context too how state of war plans volition necessarily also modify with posture adjustments. The part volition give-up the ghost on to pose considerable too evolving challenges to U.S.national security. U.S. policymakers should aim to shape U.S.posture to last flexible, adaptive, too responsive to encounter requirements inwards the CENTCOM theatre but also inwards the context of global priorities.
Buat lebih berguna, kongsi:
