Introduction
Combating insurgencies with conventional forces has long been regarded every bit being, to paraphrase T.E Lawrence’s colorful formulation, comparable to eating soup with a knife (Lawrence, 1922, 53). Indeed, the inutility of forcefulness with regards to combating a phenomenon that primarily exists inwards the minds of a target population has been noted yesteryear figures from General Rupert Smith to General David Petraeus, the latter articulating this regulation every bit a fundamental premise upon which he built his population centric theory of counterinsurgency inwards FM-3-24 (Petraeus, 2006, 60-100) (Smith, 2005, 40). Within the context of this argument, whatever exertion to destroy an insurgent militarily yesteryear a policy of attrition or annihilation ignores the insurgents innate capacity to merchandise infinite for time, avoiding the strengths of a conventional forcefulness as well as eroding both its domestic volition as well as its command over the target public (over which the insurgent as well as counterinsurgent forcefulness are fighting) yesteryear policies of assassination, intimidation of the counterinsurgency’s local supporters as well as dispersed attacks on occupying troops. The powerfulness of an insurgency, fifty-fifty i which has held territory for a pregnant catamenia to revert to what T.X. Hammes dubs stage I of an insurgent strategy (whereby it resorts to asymmetrical warfare) is fundamental to the declaration regarding the inutility of an enemy-centric Clausewitzian approach to combating insurgencies (Hammes, 2006, 50).
Rather, it has been contended, counterinsurgent forces must focus on seizing territory, clearing it temporarily, as well as using the fourth dimension bought to create the institutional structures that offering long term legitimacy to the counterinsurgency (Petraeus, 2006, 6-10, 77). This approach, sometimes coupled with intimidation of the local public (an alternative to winning hearts as well as minds that nonetheless acknowledges the centrality on an insurgencies links to the population) are collectively dubbed indirect counterinsurgency strategies yesteryear scholars such every bit I.A. Toft (Toft, 2005, 12). If a counterinsurgent meets an indirect strategy with a direct i based on either attrition or annihilation, it is doomed to neglect spell efforts to resolve the inherent asymmetry of the conflict yesteryear the adoption of an indirect approach that mirrors that of the insurgent inwards its emphasis on population control. Within this framework, scholars such every bit Toft offering falsifiable predictions regarding the prospects for success or failure inwards iii plausible contingencies- i inwards which a direct strategy yesteryear a counterinsurgent confronts an indirect insurgent strategy as well as i inwards which both parties adopt an indirect approach. While non disputing the importance of these arguments, I struggle that this vein of research, with its implicit supposition regarding the static nature of an insurgent’s strategy, has overlooked a 3rd contingency inwards which insurgents opt to adopt a direct defence forcefulness as well as an attendant empirical puzzle - namely the high occurrence of instances inwards which the insurgent has adopted this approach, despite its clearly suboptimal nature.
While scholars since David Galula have got acknowledged the axiomatic betoken that when an insurgent, invariably the weaker actor, adopts a strategy of conventional defence forcefulness the greater powerfulness of the solid reason tin live brought to comport decisively against it, at that spot has been precious petty enquiry into why those insurgents who have got adopted these strategies have got done so despite the obvious risks (Galula, 1967, 55). Specifically, the inquiry of whether the counterinsurgency’s ain strategy tin incentivize the adoption of a clearly suboptimal policy yesteryear the weaker political party inwards the dyad has non been systematically explored. If indeed a counterinsurgency tin shape the way its opponent fights as well as outcome a strategic interaction betwixt ii direct strategies, it would follow that possibly i tin indeed “eat soup with a knife”. It is just this tilt that this article makes.
Building on Daniel Kahneman as well as Amos Tverskey’s prospect theory, which contends that actors brand hazard acceptant deviations from rationality when placed inwards a frame of losses, I volition struggle that the counterinsurgents actions at the grand strategic as well as operational levels tin arrive at just this framing effect- placing the leadership of the insurgency inwards a frame of losses as well as thereby leveraging the insurgency into fighting on the stronger actors terms. In companionship to examine this thesis, I intend to utilize an in-depth instance study of a state of war which demonstrated the outcome of involvement (the adoption of a conventional defence forcefulness yesteryear an outgunned insurgent force). The instance study I have got chosen is Eelam War IV, which saw the authorities of Sri Lanka arrive at a resounding as well as rapid victory over the LTTE. While a unmarried instance study-based methodology has drawbacks, the study of the procedure yesteryear which an outcome occurred, which involves complex causal mechanisms, requires a depth typically provided yesteryear procedure tracing as well as absent inwards to a greater extent than experimental methods (Davidson, 2011, 20). Additionally, given that the LTTE had enjoyed substantial success against the Sri Lankan regular army yesteryear utilizing an indirect strategy inwards the iii preceding Eelam wars, it had every incentive to adhere to an approach that had served it so well- rendering this a to the lowest degree probable instance for my argument, insofar every bit the LTTE had strong demonstrated incentives to adhere to its existing approach as well as implying that a model applicable to this instance volition live fifty-fifty to a greater extent than readily applicable inwards other circumstances. As such, at that spot seems non to process the Eelam War IV every bit existence sui generis as well as nongeneralizable. Finally, the findings of a unmarried case-oriented study existence used for theory edifice (the emphasis of this paper) tin live treated every bit diagnostic as well as used every bit a reason for farther experimental enquiry (Bennett, George, 2005, 13). In the side yesteryear side section, I volition lay out my theoretical framework as well as hypothesis. Following this, I volition examine the functioning of my hypothesis inside the context of Eelam state of war IV using procedure tracing as well as the congruence method. Finally, the article volition introduce my quantitative analysis of the correlation betwixt sure types of solid reason activity as well as the adoption of suboptimal armed forces strategies yesteryear an insurgency. The terminal component subdivision of the newspaper volition so bargain with the possible conclusions that tin live derived from this research.
Theory as well as Hypothesis
The theoretical underpinnings of this article have got their origins inwards Kahnemann as well as Tverskey’s exposition of hazard aversion as well as credence every bit articulated inwards prospect theory. Prospect theory postulates that the story of hazard that an thespian is willing to have got depends on whether the game is framed to him or her every bit i that entails prospective losses or every bit i entailing prospective gains. Specifically, if the thespian frames the game every bit i of gains (where he or she is mediating betwixt several positive prospects) the thespian tends to live hazard averse, whereas a game framed inwards price of losses tends to have hazard acceptance. The authors illustrate this through an experiment whereby a laid of actors are, inwards i instance offered a certainty of winning a pocket-size amount of money versus the possibility of winning a larger sum, whilst inwards the other they are offered the certainty of losing a pocket-size amount of money versus the probability of losing an fifty-fifty larger sum. What they find, with relative regularity is that actors inwards the commencement experiment pick out the certainty of winning a pocket-size amount (the hazard averse option) whilst inwards the latter they pick out the probability of losing a larger amount (the hazard acceptant option). Risk acceptant deviations from rationality, then, stand upwards for the actions of an thespian who is inwards a frame of prospective losses (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979, 264-273). This may explain, for example, the observed style of hazard averse actors that tin live deterred from conquest to demonstrate a willingness to run enormous risks to retain conquests i time they have got already occurred (Morgan, 2003, 20-22). It is my tilt that conceiving of the adoption of a direct defence forcefulness every bit a hazard acceptant strategy adopted yesteryear an thespian inwards a frame of losses offers us a amount insight into how an insurgent tin live compelled to adopt a conventional defense.
The ancient Chinese strategist Lord's Day Tzu famously stipulated that an onrush on an opponent’s strategy rather than his regular army amounted to the altitude of science inwards warfare (The Art of War, 20). Interpreting this somewhat cryptic statement, M. Handel argues that Lord's Day Tzu effectively argued that the utilisation of grand strategic tools to alter the strategic surround prior to a conflict allows an thespian to shape the psychology of one’s adversary and, yesteryear extension, the nature of the conflict (Handel, 2000, 160).
Success for an insurgent depends, every bit Mao Zedong noted inwards 1937, on publicly visible victories over the solid reason that effectively problematizes the states ascendancy over a contested area. These victories may amount to pocket-size but visible acts (such every bit the assassination of officials) or large tactical victories (such every bit the devastation of a torso of the state’s conventional forces) (Zedong, 2012 ,68-70). Central to this strategy, however, is the contested nature of command over a specific geographical area. Consequently, my hypothesis is that yesteryear establishing a cordon sanitaire over a contested expanse as well as withdrawing the states troops beyond this point, the solid reason reframes the competition inwards the eyes of the insurgency’s leadership shifting them from a frame of gains to i of losses. While counterintuitive, the efficacy of this approach stems from the fact that withdrawing tactically to positions of strength deprives the insurgent of the powerfulness to arrive at visible victories over the solid reason inwards the contested area- an human activity that underpins its powerfulness to create a feel of edifice momentum. Secondly, however, yesteryear transforming the contested zone into i of insurgent control, it ceases to live framed every bit a prospective gain as well as is instead conceived yesteryear the insurgent every bit Blue Planet already held (a prospective loss). Crucially, I do non debate for the acknowledgement of insurgent command but rather a tactical withdrawal leaving the insurgent facing the prospect of time to come authorities incursions. Secondly, I hypothesize that the establishment of a cordon sanitaire at both the operational story as well as the grand strategic story (by cutting off external sources of finance as well as supply) places the insurgent farther into a frame of losses, insofar every bit the insurgent is faced with the prospect of having a diminishing powerfulness to handgrip its territory every bit fourth dimension wears on. Consequently, my commencement hypothesis is that yesteryear a policy of tactical withdrawal as well as containment at the grand strategic level, the counterinsurgent tin steadily shift an insurgency from a frame of gains to i of losses.
Secondly, the contours as well as cohesion of intra-elite ties inside insurgencies are often a component subdivision of distributional politics inside the grouping (Staniland, 2010, 55-60). It follows, then, that a policy of containment imposes scarcities as well as distributional conflicts that exacerbate nascent intra elite friction-allowing the counterinsurgent to leverage away sections of the insurgent’s elite base of operations yesteryear economical as well as political inducements. Simultaneously, the removal of a direct counterinsurgent presence inwards the insurgencies territory removes whatever feel of immediate danger that may have got lent an insurgency cohesion despite distributional disputes. This farther places the insurgent inwards a frame of losses, less because potentially dissatisfied elites are necessarily vital to the insurgencies functioning, than because the specter of defections reinforces the frame of losses through which the insurgencies amount leadership is placed when it is transformed from a challenger to an incumbent. Collectively, I hypothesize that the twin policies of containment as well as wedge politics at the grand strategic story house an insurgent inwards a frame of losses that volition ensure that when the solid reason chooses to terminate its policy of containment as well as onrush insurgent held territory, the insurgent volition answer with a direct defence forcefulness (a hazard acceptant strategy).
The fundamental prediction made yesteryear this declaration is that if a counterinsurgent transitions to the offensive after a catamenia of containment, it volition live confronted yesteryear a hazard acceptant insurgency which volition human face it conventionally. Within this context, contra the predictions of an emphasis on maneuver as well as firepower volition probable to bear witness highly effective against an insurgency that has effectively evolved into a weak conventional force. Despite the demonstrably miserable tape of such forces against insurgencies, their efficacy tin live radically improved if the insurgent leaderships psychological milieu lends itself to the adoption of suboptimal strategies- an outcome that the counterinsurgent tin homecoming to a greater extent than probable yesteryear the adoption of a temporary strategy of containment.
Two plausible counterarguments be regarding this hypothesis. The commencement is that having assumed the role of a governing torso inwards the territory it occupies, an insurgency cannot readily transition dorsum to guerilla tactics. If indeed this is the case, so the utilisation of prospect theory is superfluous to explaining the adoption of suboptimal strategies yesteryear insurgent leaders. This objection powerfulness live countered yesteryear noting a litany of cases inwards which insurgent leaders, having seized territory, reverted to Mao’s “Phase I” strategies when they deemed doing so t live efficacious or necessary. Examples of this include the leadership of the fledgling Indonesian democracy who, during the Dutch Police Action of 1948, abandoned their so working capital alphabetic quality of Yogyakarta, along with other cities that they held to revert to the utilisation of guerilla tactics, the Chechen leadership during the commencement Chechen state of war as well as the Taliban inwards Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan who oftentimes revert to guerilla warfare after periods of de facto governance over an expanse (Vickers, 2005, 111).
A 2nd potential objection is that the utilisation of conventional burn powerfulness centric armed forces strategies is often, though non always, accompanied yesteryear the utilisation of punitive strategies against civilians- as well as that it is the latter strategy that is fundamental to the brevity of conflicts inwards which conventional forces do defeat insurgencies inwards curt order. However, the empirical tape of the success of civilian targeting is mixed at best, with some studies demonstrating its efficacy spell others debate that it is, if anything, counterproductive. Moreover, the plausibility of this potential alternative hypothesis tin live reduced yesteryear selecting a longitudinal instance inwards which the state’s COIN strategy varies fifty-fifty every bit its willingness to engage inwards civilian penalisation is invariant.
Having articulated my hypotheses, I volition at i time displace on to my instance study, where I hope to demonstrate that containment as well as wedge politics at the grand strategic level, coupled with an operational strategy that allowed the GOSL (Government of Sri Lanka) to operate inside its insurgent opponents decision-making loop i time hostilities had been resumed allowed the Sri Lankan Government to effectively predetermine LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran’s fatal determination to adopt a conventional strategy of massing firepower around entrenched positions inwards a scenario where he was hopelessly outgunned- leading to the rare outcome of an insurgency existence militarily defeated.
Case Study-Eelam War IV
The Eelam War IV, which saw the utter rout of the LTTE insurgents who had held the Sri Lankan authorities at bay for iii decades was remarkable for the fact that it seemingly obviated long held nostrums regarding the invincibility of insurgencies inwards the human face of kinetic conventional operations. Indeed, soon prior to the outbreak of hostilities, analysts such every bit N. Manoharan of India’s Centre for Land Warfare Studies were offering dire prognoses of the GOSL’s chances of victory inwards whatever onrush on LTTE held territories inwards the N as well as E of the isle (Manoharan, 2007, 1). Yet the conflict saw the what has been dubbed the world’s premier insurgency, which maintained networks spanning upwards to 44 countries as well as had the distinction of existence the sole insurgency able to wage asymmetrical warfare both at solid reason as well as at bounding main (via its naval wing the bounding main tigers) effectively routed yesteryear what A. S. Khan dubs an “enemy centric COIN strategy (Khan, 2015, 128) (Roseneau, 2007, 12). It is my tilt that the GOSL’s victory tin effectively live explained through the application of prospect theory. Specifically, I offering iii hypotheses
The credence of a ceasefire yesteryear the GOSL inwards 2002, which allowed it to withdraw its forces to areas firmly nether its command deprived the LTTE of a foe inside hitting distance spell forcing it to watch the areas inwards which it operated every bit territories held rather than contested-changing the way Prabhakaran framed the scenario.
The GOSL’s efforts to contain the LTTE, centered around garnering international back upwards inwards slap-up downwardly on the LTTE’s overseas fiscal networks, edifice a navy capable of interdicting the LTTE’s overseas arms render as well as establishing positions along the juncture betwixt the N as well as E of the isle had the effects both of placing Prabhakaran farther inwards a frame of losses as well as making the establishment of ascendancy as well as redistribution of resources to the E of the isle difficult- encouraging factionalism inwards this component subdivision of the isle as well as the eventual defection of Prabhakarans subordinate Colonel Karuna-which inwards plough farther entrenched Prabhakaran inwards a frame of losses
That i time the terminal onrush on the LTTE began, the operational determination to send out simultaneous attacks along a wide front, coupled with the tactical utilisation of 8-12-man SIOT squads allowed the Sri Lankan regular army to operate inside Prabhakaran’s decision-making loop-precluding a reversal of course of study after the LTTE’s initial failures.
Before delving into my theory, however, I volition briefly struggle with the two-alternative hypothesis that powerfulness problematize my argument. The commencement declaration centers around what has been dubbed the Manwaring paradigm. This paradigm, articulated yesteryear the armed forces theorist Max Manwaring contends that the success of a counterinsurgency exertion rests on vi factors that decide whether the counterinsurgent volition substantively weaken the insurgency (Manwaring, Joes, 2000, 100-110). The factors are
Legitimacy
Unity of effort
Discipline as well as capability of the military
Type as well as consistency of unusual back upwards for the counterinsurgent
The counterinsurgents powerfulness to cutting back upwards to the insurgency
The availability of reliable intelligence
My commencement qualm with this image as well as similar approaches is that, every bit W.C. Fuller notes, they conflate the underpinnings of a strategy with the strategy itself. For example, edifice competent forces as well as ensuring the availability of word are for certain axiomatic prerequisites to the execution of a strategy, but they cannot live conflated with the strategy itself (which, measuring Clausewitz, entails the management of these means) (Fuller, 1998, 228) (On War II, 90-99). There is i seeming expanse of overlap betwixt my hypothesis as well as Manwaring’s, however- namely the emphasis placed on securing external back upwards to the host authorities as well as depriving the insurgency of its sources of external support. However, a crucial distinction betwixt my theory as well as Manwaring’s lies inwards our respective assessments of the touching of these actions. As per Manwaring’s thesis, these actions substantively weaken the insurgency to a betoken where its capacity to resist is seriously debilitated. By contrast, my tilt is that these actions do non deprive an insurgency of the capacity to scrap a protracted state of war inwards the nigh to medium term, but rather alter its invention of its long-term prospects as well as yesteryear extension its choice of strategy- a fundamentally psychological effect. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 cursory exam of the Sri Lankan insurgency does seem to lend credence to the declaration that the LTTE was non left substantively bereft of way next the Sri Lankan governments efforts to rally international back upwards to its cause. For example, it is noteworthy that much of the external back upwards lent to the GOSL yesteryear actors such every bit India, the U.S. of America as well as Islamic Republic of Pakistan inwards price of armed forces assistance (either covertly or otherwise) was broadly available during the 3rd Eelam state of war waged at the plough of the millennium- a state of war which had drastically dissimilar outcomes (Mathur, 2013, 128). Admittedly, obtaining the back upwards of actors such every bit the U.S as well as E.U inwards shutting downwardly LTTE fiscal networks was a coup that the GOSL only achieved inwards the interregnum betwixt the ii wars. Crucially, however, B.C. Tan as well as J. Solomon justice that roughly lxx per centum of the LTTE’s arms render consisted of weapons expropriated locally from the Sri Lankan army, spell sections of the LTTE’s state of war exertion (such every bit its seagoing craft) were existence produced inside LTTE held areas of Sri Lanka (Tan Soloman, 2007, 12). Furthermore, a 2006 study yesteryear human rights scout highlighted the fact that the LTTE was at the fourth dimension able to solicit or extract finances from the Tamil diaspora on a pregnant scale inside the E.U despite ongoing sanctions (Human Rights Watch, 2006). While it seems plausible to assume that the cumulative outcome of Sri Lanka’s diverse efforts at containment powerfulness slow emaciate the LTTE’s fiscal capabilities over the long term, it does non appear, measuring Manwaring, that the scheme was precluded from fighting a guerilla state of war inwards the nigh term.
A 2nd hypothesis, raised yesteryear figures such every bit N. Bizouras, postulates that yesteryear Eelam state of war IV, the brutality of the LTTE (particularly evident inwards practices such every bit the impressment of kid soldiers) had lost it the legitimacy that it had i time enjoyed with its Tamil constituents, rendering it an insurgent forcefulness alienated from its constituency –veritable suicide every bit Mao would have got noted (Bizouras, 2014, 80). While it is inherently hard to mensurate the story of popularity enjoyed yesteryear an insurgency accurately, it is worth noting that many of the practices that Bizouras associates with the LTTE’s loss of legitimacy were real much a component subdivision of its policies during the 1990’s- the halcyon catamenia of the LTTE’s legitimacy every bit Bizouras would have got it. Both the impressment of children for the infamous “baby brigades” as well as the utilisation of kid suicide bombers were an integral component subdivision of Eelam state of war III. Indeed, the LTTE’s signal victory of the war, Operation Ceaseless Waves, was achieved inwards no pocket-size component subdivision due to the tactical utilisation of underage suicide bombers (Singer, 2006, 80-90). It is unclear, then, that the LTTE became significantly to a greater extent than roughshod inwards the interregnum, to the betoken that it alienated constituents who seemed willing to tolerate its roughshod dominion inwards the 1990’s.
Having discounted the alternative available hypotheses, then, I volition at i time offering an interpretation of the conflict through the lens of prospect theory.
At the grand strategic level, the debacle of the 3rd Eelam War seems to have got forced the GOSL into inadvertently adopting an optimal counterinsurgency strategy. Specifically, the desperate status of the Sri Lankan armed forces as well as regular army (the latter had been humiliatingly routed at Mullaitivu) led the Sri Lankan authorities to adopt a 2002 ceasefire understanding that effectively saw GOSL forces abstain from entry to de facto LTTE territory (Castellano, 2014, 131). Crucially, however, this determination although non strategic inwards as well as of itself, allowed the GOSL to abstain from providing Prabhakaran as well as the LTTE with a conflict that reified the organizations internal cohesion, whilst giving the SLAF (Sri Lankan Armed Forces) as well as the GOSL fourth dimension to articulate a dual policy of containment as well as reform. At the grand strategic level, the GOSL was able to convey wages of the advent of the state of war on terror to to a greater extent than aggressively anteroom for unusual (particularly western) countries to crevice downwardly on LTTE funding. While a publish of unusual governments had proscribed the LTTE yesteryear the plough of the millennium, the scheme had soundless retained the capacity to garner funding nether the auspices of front end organizations posing as, with other things, NGO’s. However, inwards the wake of Sri Lanka’s to a greater extent than active diplomatic policy, a publish of nations made noun efforts to crevice downwardly on LTTE funding. Notable with these efforts was Canada’s 2005 determination to unopen a publish of NGO’s affiliated with the LTTE as well as the E.U’s 2006 determination to proscribe the grouping every bit a terrorist organization- a determination that precipitated a slew of investigations of LTTE related assets inwards nations such every bit France, where the caput of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization was arrested with xviii 1000000 dollars of illicit money (Clarke, 2012, 45-50) (Ridley, 2012, 28). Similarly, inside Asia, nations such every bit Thailand followed suit inwards proscribing the substantial LTTE affiliate organizations on their soil inwards 2003, spell Bharat agreed to heighten naval supervision of illicit supplies leaving its shores from the coastal solid reason of Tamil Nadu (Bhonsle, 2011, 108). Finally, the Sri Lankan navy was subjected to a tactical as well as operational overhaul to enable it to interdict the LTTE’s bounding main lines of communication as well as supply. At the operational level, the newly appointed commander of the Sri Lankan navy Vice Admiral Karranagoda shifted the emphasis of the navy from interdicting smaller ships carrying arms to the LTTE to a CONOPS centered around tackling the large “floating warehouses” from which these ships received their cargo- a shift that required the navy to operate considerably farther from its shores than had been previously countenanced. Secondly, the navy adopted the “small boats concept” at the tactical level-substituting large numbers of pocket-size indigenously made boats for the high value Dvora arts and crafts that had proven especially vulnerable to LTTE swarming tactics. The cumulative outcome of these reforms was to farther heighten the GOSL’s powerfulness to target the LTTE’s resources base of operations (Mehta, 2010, 128).
Crucially, every bit has been discussed above, none of this substantially compromised the LTTE’s capacity to regulation its territory. Rather, the absence of a armed forces target, coupled with a irksome but nonetheless perceptible tightening of a wide fiscal as well as diplomatic noose had the outcome of problematizing Prabhakarans long term prospects of either moving frontward towards de jure independence or retaining his electrical flow handgrip over the N as well as E of the island. That the LTTE suffered from no stuff deficit per se is evidenced yesteryear its powerfulness to acre a forcefulness comparable to the i it had fielded inwards Eelam War III, combined with the uncovering of large amounts of previously stockpiled armaments-evidence that the noun outcome of containment was irksome to convey outcome (Chadha, 2015, 109). Furthermore, every bit A. Hashim notes, the denial of supplies of heavy weaponry (the LTTE’s main unusual dependence) did non forestall the adoption of a guerilla strategy utilizing to a greater extent than locally available pocket-size arms (Hashim, 2013, 128). The touching on Prabhakaran’s decision-making, however, was disproportionate. The increasing desperation of Prabhakaran is possibly best demonstrated yesteryear his erratic response to the closing fiscal net- a serial of terrorist attacks on both Sri Lankan political as well as armed forces figures as well as (catastrophically) a 2006 onrush on several unusual diplomats- actions which only served to entrench the pop icon of the LTTE every bit a terrorist outfit (Hashim, 2013, 24). In a farther human activity of erratic decision-making, the LTTE chose inwards 2006 to unopen the sluice gates of a vital dam inwards the Mavil Aru district to the agricultural communities below-providing the direction of president Rajapakse , inwards the president’s ain words, with a political “green light” to resume hostilities (Mehta, 2010, 6). Once fighting began, Prabhakaran showed an most obsessive wishing to concentrate his forces at key points such every bit Killonchchi- fifty-fifty going so far every bit to deploy the remnants of the Sea Tigers every bit Blue Planet forces- intimating a lack of work organisation for the long-term maintenance of render lines as well as the supposition that the state of war would live ended speedily as well as decisively. This stands inwards abrupt contrast to Eelam state of war III where the LTTE proved willing to give upwards key bases such every bit Jaffna, whilst resorting to asymmetrical strategies of volume suicide bombing against Sri Lankan forces, coupled with decisive assaults on the exposed bring upwards of the Sri Lankan regular army at Mullaitivu (Pape, Feldman, 2010, 300). Nor was this solely a strategy forced upon Prabhakaran as well as the LTTE. Indeed, prior to the onset of hostilities, a study prepared for the direction of president Rajapakse yesteryear the Sri Lankan articulation chiefs of staff noted pregnant concentrations of forces yesteryear the LTTE-intimating that had Prabhakaran non provoked a response he intended to send out a conventional onrush beyond the confines of his territory- a gambit fifty-fifty to a greater extent than risky than the i he eventually took (Mehta, 2010, 100). It is unclear, then, why Prabhakaran chose to abandon a strategy that, every bit several scholars have got noted, delivered decisive success (DeSilva-Ranasinghe, 2010, 6) (Jackson, 2007 ,67-70).
An insight into the roots of this shift is provided yesteryear the LTTE’s propaganda, however. Specifically, it has been noted that through the decade, the LTTE’s appeals to overseas financiers took the course of study of promising a decisive “final war”. Notably, the occurrence of this rhetoric covaries with the LTTE’s increased isolation. Indeed, inwards his 2006 Heroes Day speech, Prabhakaran explicitly made an appeal to the Tamil diaspora, noting that contributions would move increasingly hard to make, but promising that a lastly force to equip the LTTE would brand possible a decisive terminate to the conflict. Notably, Prabhakaran made specific allusions to the GOSL’s “racist Sinhala elements” misuse of the ceasefire every bit an chance to weaken the LTTE every bit evidence both of the demand for renewed hostilities as well as a decisive victory (Murari, 2012, 100). Effectively, then, Prabhakarans rhetoric direct conforms to that of an thespian inwards a frame of losses, facing what he saw every bit the high probability of debilitation due to containment or the depression possibility of success via a decisive defeat of the SLAF (a hazard acceptant choice which, if it failed, would signal the immediate terminate of his organization). True to the predictions of prospect theory, Prabhakaran chose the hazard acceptant strategy.
However, an explication of the GOSL’s success inwards putting Prabhakaran inwards a frame of losses through the lens of the ceasefire as well as fiscal containment overseas would live incomplete. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 2nd component subdivision of the GOSL’s strategy aimed at the Lord's Day Tzunian policy of attacking Prabhakaran’s intra elite alliances-thereby securing political back upwards from the Tamil community as well as placing Prabhakaran farther inwards a frame of losses. Specifically, every bit noted yesteryear Colonel U. Pareira, the LTTE was naturally divided along geographical lines, insofar every bit the insurgents inwards the E were drawn from backgrounds that were economically vastly dissimilar from the to a greater extent than urbane recruits of Prabhakarans urbane northern back upwards base of operations (the eastern Tamils had largely migrated to the isle every bit plantation workers) (Pareira, 2012, 55). While these divisions had been nascent inside the organization, the consistent conflict with the Sri Lankan regular army that characterized the 1990’s largely induced inwards grouping cohesion out of necessity (DeVotta, 2010, 165). The tactical ceasefire, however, removed this source of inwards grouping cohesion. Furthermore, the Sri Lankan Army contributed to the nascent split yesteryear the articulation of its policy of containment at the operational story inwards the early on years of the decade. Specifically, the Sri Lankan authorities fell dorsum upon a string of fortified bases that it had constructed betwixt the N as well as E inwards the 1990’s. While the kinetic strategy of the 1990’s had rendered these bases liabilities, the to a greater extent than static policy of the commencement one-half of the side yesteryear side decade effectively ensured that the Sri Lankan regular army straddled all the key routes betwixt the N as well as the east- most crucial with which was the A11 highway. Furthermore, the movements of supplies (particularly armed forces supplies) yesteryear bounding main betwixt the E as well as N was problematized yesteryear the price of the ceasefire as well as Sri Lankas patrolling of bounding main lanes (Marks, 2007, 51-54). This had the dual outcome of ensuring that the LTTE could non effectively maintain either centralized command or a steady redistribution of resources to its eastern faction. Consequently, the increasingly pop leader of the eastern faction Colonel Karuna saw his grievances against the N multiply fifty-fifty every bit his prospects for a successful interruption from the LTTE seemed to live enhanced yesteryear the cordon sanitaire betwixt him as well as Prabhakaran’s wrath (Hashim, 2013, 300). This was speedily noted yesteryear the so Sri Lankan authorities of C. Kumaratunga, which seems to have got played a key role inwards offering Karuna the assurances that he needed to defect, which he did inwards 2004. While President Kumaratunga herself strenuously denies this, the fact that Douglas Devananda the leader of the EPDP (which inwards plough was a fellow member of Kumaratunga’s coalition) played a pivotal role inwards integrating Karuna into civilian politics next his defection seems to imply that Kumaratunga’s protestations were calibrated towards the sentiments of her domestic audience (Mukarji, 2005, 29). To live sure, the seeds of the split existed independent of the Sri Lankan governments actions but, every bit Z. Mamphily points out, the centrality of the lack of resources resource allotment to Karuna’s defection (itself a component subdivision of GOSL strategy) is the fundamental qualm cited yesteryear leaders of the defecting faction (Mamphily, 2011, 222). At the real least, the GOSL provided the occasion, if non the cause, for the split.
The policy of attacking intra elite alliances, much similar that of containment writ large, is notable non for its stuff outcome on Prabhakaran but its touching on the way inwards which he framed the conflict. As Rabasa et al, commenting at the fourth dimension noted, Karuna’s forcefulness was non large plenty to stand upwards for a debilitating loss of manpower for the LTTE. This was specially truthful every bit the LTTE’s largest units the Black Tigers as well as the Leopards partition were both based inwards the N as well as extremely loyal to Prabhakaran (Rabasa et al, 2006, 26). Indeed, fifty-fifty inwards the E Prabhakaran retained sufficient numbers of loyal troops to decimate Karuna’s forces inwards a serial of pitched battles (Dissanayaka, 2005, 271). Rather, the touching of the defection seems to have got been overwhelmingly psychological. As Swamy (2010, 253) notes, dissent inwards the E was met with frenetic attempts at centralization, including the assassination of competition leaders inside the LTTE – a policy which only served to weaken Prabhakarans handgrip on the east. Simultaneously, every bit noted yesteryear C. Clarke, the defection of Karuna seems to have got coincided direct with efforts to concentrate forces inwards the E inwards strongholds such every bit Thoppigala as well as Batticoloa to run into the needs of a conventional warfare strategy (Clarke, 2015, 100). This strategy is a far call from the what powerfulness live dubbed a Phase I Maoist strategy that had been followed inwards the east, which centered around pocket-size decentralized guerillas that exerted influence on urban areas only through infiltration as well as informal “taxation” yesteryear plainclothes agents (Gunaratna, 1997, 98). It appears, prima facie, that the Sri Lankan governments success inwards driving a wedge betwixt the ii regional centers of the LTTE placed the LTTE’s leadership inwards a frame of losses-whereby it felt its powerfulness to sustain its displace inwards the long term was eroding. Crucially, this coincides with the adoption of significantly to a greater extent than hazard acceptant strategies yesteryear the LTTE inwards the east- a fatty that meant that when they confronted the Sri Lankan regular army it was every bit a conventional force, with predictable results. Most importantly, however, the touching on the LTTE’s capacity to command the E was to a greater extent than perceptual than existent as well as mattered insofar every bit it served to shape the LTTE’s strategy inwards the forthcoming war.
Finally, nosotros must plough to the operational strategies adopted yesteryear the Sri Lankan army. Even if prospect theory explains why inwards the buildup to Eelam War IV Prabhakaran adopted a suboptimal strategy, it is unclear why he did non recalibrate his strategy after initial armed forces setbacks. At this point, I debate that a useful corrective is Colonel John Boyd’s celebrated theory of the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act loop. Specifically, Boyd argued that whatever actors reaction to a changing scenario during armed forces actions tin live disaggregated into these fairly self-explanatory components. Consequently, Boyd contended that an operational policy that centered around measuring as well as the utilisation of multiple fronts rendered both orientation as well as reaction problematic (Osinga, 2005, 2). This effectively represents the synthesis of principles articulated by, with others, Liddell Hart, who stressed the importance both of calculated dispersion as well as obscuring one’s possible axis of advance (Liddell-Hart, 1991, 94). Consequently, Boyd made a instance for maneuver centric state of war along multiple fronts that effectively paralyzed an opponent’s reaction capacity. Typically, every bit R. Jervis notes, when an actor’s capacity for perception as well as reaction is hobbled yesteryear dubiety as well as the measuring at which a province of affairs changes, it reflexively adheres to its master copy plans (Jervis,1976,195). Consequently, I debate that yesteryear examining Sri Lanka’s operational strategy during Eelam War IV, nosotros tin sympathise how a conventional forcefulness could ensure that the gains of grand strategy (in price of compelling its insurgent foe to scrap with a direct defense) were retained. Below, I volition verbalize over the armed forces reforms that allowed the Sri Lankan regular army to operate inside the LLTE’s decision-making loop, along with the operational strategy that position these reforms to use.
The GOSL utilized the ceasefire catamenia to brand several reforms to its armed forces forcefulness construction as well as doctrine. Firstly, the creation of the paramilitary CDF (Ceylon Defence Force) to secure the army’s bring upwards ensured that the Sri Lankan authorities would non have got to attenuate its armed forces forces due to garrisoning duties or larn out itself vulnerable to attacks on its bring upwards every bit had occurred during Eelam War III (Rajapakse, 2010, 1). Simultaneously, the regular army was increased inwards size, with recruitment inwards 2006 amounting to 36,000 fresh troops (DaSilva, 2009, 1). Most vital, however, were changes to the Sri Lankan army’s forcefulness structure. Noting the difficulties faced yesteryear large bodies of troops inwards clearing the heavily forested terrain of the island, infantry reformers such every bit so Major General Sarath Fonseka pushed for the induction of 12-man SIOT’s (special infantry operating teams) to operate inwards conjunction with regular forces. As Fonseka noted, the powerfulness of the Sri Lankan regular army to insert SIOT’s on the flanks as well as bring upwards of the LTTE’s positions induced a story of dubiety into the LTTE’s commanders- inducing them to adopt the tactical expedient of positioning all of their forces behind fortified bunds (trenches as well as mounds)- leaving themselves vulnerable to the firepower of regular forces (Glenn, 2015, 28). By 2006, the Sri Lankan regular army had 6,000 troops serving inwards SIOTs (almost treble the publish it had a decade earlier). With the engagement of Fonseka every bit Commandant of the Sri Lankan Army yesteryear M. Rajapakse’s authorities midway through the decade, this transformation would intensify. The touching of these efforts was to create a forcefulness that was simultaneously capable of concentrating large levels of volume as well as achieving pregnant tactical as well as operational mobility. Simultaneously, every bit has been noted earlier, the Sri Lankan navy underwent pregnant doctrinal changes nether Vice Admiral Karannagods, coupled with the introduction of indigenous pocket-size boats inwards line with the eponymous pocket-size boats concept which allowed the navy to counter the Sea Tigers swarm tactics. While the significance of this alter at the grand strategic story has already been discussed, it also bore relevance to the Sri Lankan operational strategy. Specifically, command of the bounding main made it possible for the Sri Lankan navy to conduct amphibious landings as well as provide sea-based burn to troops operating on the coast. To this end, several indigenous fiberglass landing arts and crafts were added to the navy’s arsenal inwards the war. The touching of this naval overhaul was, so , to heighten the mobility of Sri Lankan forces which could live landed to the bring upwards or flanks of opposing LTTE formations with a rapidity that has been noted yesteryear bounding main powerfulness theorists since Mahan (Mehta, 2010, 10) (Mahan, 1918 ,100).
Following Fullers injunction, however, these changes represented the foundations of an operational strategy but were non the strategy itself. The operational strategy enabled yesteryear these changes effectively centered around iii tenets. Firstly, the objective of the campaigns of Eelam War IV was the LTTE’s armed forces rather than seizing as well as belongings territory, every bit traditional COIN theory would advise. Secondly, operations inwards dissimilar theaters would live carried out either simultaneously or inwards quick succession. Finally, inside each private theater, the Sri Lankan regular army would advance upon multiple fronts, attempting where possible to pick out axes of advance to the flanks as well as bring upwards of the LTTE’s forces, thereby unbalancing the LTTE’s reaction procedure yesteryear leaving its commanders, every bit William Tecumseh Sherman had it, “on the horns of a dilemma”. Consequently, the eastern exertion began with the Sri Lankan army, which had broken the Tigers siege of mavil aru, turning the flank of the LTTE’s seat inwards the E with an amphibious landing inwards Muttur (which was controlled yesteryear a s mall detachment of SLA forces) supported yesteryear naval gunfire, allowing it to advance to as well as capture the major base of operations at Sampur, inflicting heavy casualties on the LTTE along the way. Simultaneously, SLA forces advanced overland to LTTE bases at Thoppigala as well as Batticoloa. At the tactical level, the utilisation of SIOT’s guided yesteryear word furnished yesteryear Colonel Karuna allowed the SLA to target the lines of communication as well as render to each base. The conjunction of multiple simultaneous advances as well as the utilisation of SIOT’s at the tactical story left the LTTE unclear every bit to the main objective of the SLA as well as induced its commanders to seek silence inwards the strategy that they had pursued thence far-concentrating forces nigh strongpoints inwards the hope of inflicting a decisive defeat on i of the Sri Lankan forces every bit a prelude to negotiations-with predictably fatal results.
The eastern exertion was followed upwards inwards curt companionship yesteryear an advance into the northern theatre of the war-indeed the northern offensive coincided with the autumn of Thoppigala inwards July 2007. Crucially, spell the Sri Lankan authorities had made efforts to stress the demand to send out the operations inwards rapid succession, yesteryear the fourth dimension the offensive on Prabhakaran’s holdings inwards the N had begun, the LTTE had suffered a string of defeats that powerfulness have him to recalibrate his strategy. However, consistent with the predictions of prospect theory, Prabhakaran’s aides solid reason that their leader adhered to the hope that a decisive victory would homecoming the GOSL’s exertion politically unviable (Singh, 2010, 52). Furthermore, consistent with the broader operational principles it had adopted, the GOSL’s northern onrush was geared towards operating inside the LTTE’s decision-making loop as well as paralyzing its capacity for recalibration. Specifically, the regular army advanced across multiple fronts, threatening multiple objectives simultaneously. Consequently, it was non clear until belatedly inwards the exertion that the armys main thrusts were against Mannar to the W as well as Mullaitivu inwards the E (Mehta, 2010, 12). In add-on to the main thrust of the offensive along the A32 highway, which served to link Jaffna to the mainland, the Sri Lankan regular army launched attacks from Jaffna inwards the N along the Kandy Jaffna highway, spell columns moved against Omanthai from the south- advances that pinned the LTTE to Killonchchi yesteryear rendering an onrush on this stronghold plausible. Simultaneously, the 59thinfantry partition moved against Mullaitivu from Wali Oya inwards the S (Mehta, 2010, 8). At the same time, SIOT’s backed yesteryear airpower effected deep penetrations along the route links that served al LTTE lines of communication-effecting the paralysis cited every bit fundamental yesteryear RMA theorists who, inwards no pocket-size part, are inspired yesteryear Boyd. As i analyst position it, the inability of the LTTE to perceive the main axis of advance led the LTTE to concentrate its forces inwards Killonchchi as well as Mullaitivu, fifty-fifty every bit the Sri Lankan authorities dispersed its forces- leading to a unusual inversion of roles where the insurgent was to a greater extent than static than the conventional forcefulness (Mehta,2010,8-12). This demeanour is inwards keeping with organizational theorists who stipulate that groups tend to adhere scrupulously to “plan A” to brand feel of a rapidly changing situation. In Prabhakarans case, this meant adhering to a fatal policy of concentrating large formations of forces at key points. This concentration of forces along with leadership assets left the LTTE vulnerable to rapid disintegration inwards the trial that these forces were destroyed, every bit indeed they were when Mullaitivu as well as Killonchchi, both left surrounded yesteryear the initial SLA thrusts, fell inwards the wake of the dual pincer movements on these strongholds that constituted the terminal human activity of the exertion (Bandarage,2009,50-52). Indeed, Parabhakaran is afterwards said to have got confided inwards his word primary Pottu Amman that over 75 per centum of the LTTE’s strength had been concentrated inwards the hope of defending these assets, as well as that the loss of this forcefulness had effectively doomed the movement. (Mehta, 2010, 12).
Importantly, this approach stands inwards abrupt contrast to the 3rd Eelam war, which saw the LTTE, nether Prabhakarans leadership, abandon its prized Jaffna base of operations to prosecute attacks on the Sri Lankan army’s bring upwards at elephant move yesteryear as well as Mullaitivu (Manage, 2010, 18). If the LTTE adopted a flawed conventional strategy, then, this tin live attributed to the Sri Lankan governments grand strategy of containment, coupled with its operational strategy of operating inside Prabhakaran’s OODA loop yesteryear operating across multiple fronts, with multiple prospective objectives, at a real high tempo.
Conclusion as well as Implications
The successful application of prospect theory to insurgent demeanour demonstrates that the choice of a strategy yesteryear an insurgent is non exogenously given, every bit much counterinsurgency presumes every bit a starting point, but is opened upwards to existence shaped yesteryear the counterinsurgent state. This allows us to add together a progressive hypothesis to the theory of asymmetrical warfare developed yesteryear scholars such every bit Toft (2005) who contends that a same strategy interaction (in which both actors adopt a direct strategy aimed at each other’s forces) is probable to outcome inwards a short, decisive wars spell contrary strategy interactions protract a conflict. Building on the insights offered yesteryear Kahneman as well as Tversky, I hope to have got proven that yesteryear the apposite application of diplomatic as well as political pressure, the counterinsurgent tin have the insurgent to hazard acceptant behavior, leading it to adopt a direct strategy as well as outcome a curt decisive interaction.
A major implication of this would live the implied reversion of the commonplace doctrine of “clear, hold, build” that characterizes territory as well as population-centric theories of counterinsurgency. Indeed, yesteryear eschewing this doctrine (which it had previously practiced) the GOSL caused the insurgency to coagulate into something approximating to a conventional forcefulness fifty-fifty every bit it fractured internally. This was achieved non yesteryear clearing territory but yesteryear temporarily eschewing command over it as well as effecting an increasingly effective policy of containment as well as isolation both locally (by controlling bounding main lanes as well as key highways) as well as internationally (by linking its state of war to the broader state of war on terror). Additionally, the counterinsurgency strategy of Eelam state of war IV explicitly eschewed population centric theories of counterinsurgency, focusing instead on an eminently Clausewitzian enemy-centric approach that threated the insurgents armed forces every bit his middle of gravity.
At the operational level, the key implication is that the theories of Boyd, long incorporated into conventional warfare, are applicable as well as fifty-fifty fundamental to the devastation of an opponent inside an enemy centric context. By attacking on multiple fronts, the GOSL effectively precluded whatever inside conflict recalibration of strategy yesteryear Prabhakaran- ensuring that the strategic gains of placing the LTTE inwards a frame of losses did non wither away. The devastation of the LTTE’s concentrated forces, then, followed a blueprint familiar to whatever conventional engagement betwixt ii mismatched foes- a remarkable achievement for a counterinsurgency.
Collectively, then, the implication of this study would live the potential for “clear, hold, build” to live replaced with a strategy of retrenching, containing as well as so effecting armed forces destruction. In this image the enemy, rather than infinite or population, becomes salient inwards a style familiar to traditional practitioners of war.
Finally, I banking concern notation that at that spot remains room for farther enquiry on the topic inwards companionship to ameliorate the generalizability of my findings. That said, the variation of the LTTE’s strategy betwixt the commencement iii Eelam wars as well as the 4th fifty-fifty every bit Prabhakaran remained at the organizations helm should allow us to eliminate the alternative hypotheses built on grouping as well as leader idiosyncrasies. Furthermore, I hope to have got eliminated alternative hypotheses built around insurgent legitimacy as well as solid reason strength before inwards the paper.
Conclusively, then, the application of prospect theory as well as Boyd’s OODA loop offering rich insights into the existence of alternative ways of prosecuting a COIN strategy.
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