By Mark Gilchrist
Military theorists should live circumspect when asserting that revolutionary changes inwards state of war are afoot based on the potential of emergent engineering scientific discipline alone. Change is sure component subdivision of the enduring nature of armed forces competition, too it is hard to dispute that technological advancements are reshaping what powerfulness live possible inwards the deport of warfare. However, advanced militaries are yet to master copy the integration complexities offered past times the last generation of informational change, allow lone existence positioned to exploit the profound challenges offered past times the adjacent wave.[1] Existing integration challenges are probable to live magnified inwards the time to come due to the absence of cohesive strategy too nested operational concepts designed to guide the armed forces application of emergent engineering scientific discipline for the time to come fight. As this article seeks to highlight, absent a clear agreement of which armed forces problems emergent technologies are required to solve, at that spot is, perhaps, too much confidence inwards their powerfulness to reshape the graphic symbol of the adjacent state of war past times enabling decisive battlefield advantage. More troublingly, predictions virtually machine-dominated warfare risk obscuring the human terms implicit inwards the work of violence to attain a political objective.
This article examines the integration challenge that continues to bound the armed forces potential of available technology. It volition so aspect specifically at why militaries should live cautious virtually the role artificial intelligence too autonomous systems are expected to play inwards time to come warfare. Artificial Intelligence has many potential applications; however, this article focuses on the areas that volition ultimately create upward one's psyche how a armed forces reply is generated. The delivery of the correct information, to the correct decision-maker, at the correct time, too the powerfulness for all elements of the forcefulness to react to that determination is primal to success inwards battle. Therefore, command too command systems too the implications of artificial intelligence for the already stressed network architectures that enable them should live of paramount importance when considering how to generate lethal outcome inwards the information age.
At the optic of this article is the notion that technological modify must live understood from a historical perspective.[2] This ensures that the allure of technology’s potential does non distract from the crafting of policy, strategy, too operational concepts required to navigate the real human challenges facing the national safety community.
THE CHALLENGE
Much contemporary professional person discourse is dedicated to how artificial intelligence, big data, advanced robotic too autonomous systems, amidst others, volition define the graphic symbol of the adjacent war: to an extent this suggestion is true. Missing, however, is a clear conception of precisely how these advances volition interact inwards whatever meaningful way –– peculiarly with regard to the challenges of effective integration with existing systems too network architectures, equally good equally the touching on on armed forces command too control. As Franz-Stefan Gady argues:
In today’s tech-crazed world, where many of us come across technological solutions equally a panacea to precisely virtually anything, defence analysts cause got a vogue to overestimate the touching on of technological changes too novel innovations on warfare.
The graphic symbol of state of war is emergent, too best understood through the crucible of combat.[3] As Lawrence Freedman has late reminded us, rarely cause got fifty-fifty the most bright analysts accurately predicted what the graphic symbol of the adjacent state of war volition aspect similar –– peculiarly when the interaction of novel technologies genuinely nullified anticipated advantages. Military futurists should hollo upward the complex too largely unpredictable interplay betwixt belligerents ensures war’s graphic symbol is subtly adjusted based on the adaptation of each side to the objectives, actions, too capabilities of the other. As such, the electrical flow focus on technical capabilities must non detract from developing policy, strategy, too operational concepts that guide how an evolving armed forces musical instrument tin give the axe live used equally an effective tool.
THE CRITICAL CHALLENGE ADVANCED MILITARIES FACE IS NOT PREDICTING HOW EMERGENT TECHNOLOGY WILL DELIVER DECISIVE ADVANTAGE. RATHER, information technology IS THE RESHAPING OF LARGE MILITARY BUREAUCRACIES SO THAT THEY ARE BEST POSTURED TO INTEGRATE THE CURRENTLY UNKNOWABLE TECHNOLOGICAL POTENTIAL.
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Bob Work, stated on several occasions: “The Third-Offset is non virtually engineering scientific discipline equally much equally the operational concepts too arrangement constructs that volition shape the way nosotros integrate too work the technology.”
This disputation highlights the vogue to focus on engineering scientific discipline (means) rather than the strategy, concepts (ways) too political objectives (ends) it must enable. The critical challenge advanced militaries confront is non predicting how emergent engineering scientific discipline volition deliver decisive advantage. Rather, it is the reshaping of large armed forces bureaucracies so that they are best postured to integrate the currently unknowable technological potential to bring upward what the time to come fighting forcefulness tin give the axe deliver inwards back upward of policy aims too objectives.
HOW CAN ARTIFICIALLY INTELLIGENT, DEEP LEARNING, AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS WORK WITH (OR WITHOUT) HUMANS TO ACHIEVE THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES THAT CREATE THE CONDITIONS ULTIMATELY REQUIRED FOR H5N1 POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT?
Rather than focusing on advances to discrete capabilities, the organizational focus must live on how these technologies powerfulness piece of work together inwards a coherent fashion across a arrive at of possible time to come warfare scenarios. Instead of blithely accepting that certain emerging technologies volition come upward to dominate time to come war, advanced militaries must question: how tin give the axe artificially intelligent, deep learning, autonomous systems piece of work with (or without) humans to attain the armed forces objectives that create the weather condition ultimately required for a political resolution of conflict? This enquiry should Pb to an agreement of possible strategic options too the evolution of supporting operational concepts. These inwards plough should displace agile capability development, avoiding the stove-piped procurement that has previously created unforeseen integration challenges.
Integration must live understood equally the way past times which the diverse combat systems inside a articulation forcefulness are linked together to accelerate the delivery of armed forces effects. The greatest challenge to an integrated articulation forcefulness is the focus on platforms that deliver effects, rather than the information too communications architecture that links these capabilities inwards a meaningful way. While integration betwixt platforms too across systems remains a secondary focus for capability acquisition — rather than the nitty-gritty upon which all capability decisions are based — network architectures volition struggle to maximise each platform’s contribution to a articulation force’s combat power.
Of item trace of piece of work organisation is the lack of an appropriate information/data backbone to enable a federated, cross-domain solution that prioritises the information exchanges required for effective command too control. Reliable too resilient network architectures are the critical requirement of a digitised, artificial intelligence-enabled time to come forcefulness tasked to coordinate the actions of autonomous systems. Yet, they are also probable to live its most vulnerable element. Indeed, inwards the congested too contestedinformation surroundings inwards which it is assumed modern militaries volition operate, the pervasive, seamless network solution required to link technological advances inwards whatever meaningful way is highly unlikely to persist.[4]
SUN TZU WARNED, “TACTICS WITHOUT STRATEGY IS THE NOISE BEFORE DEFEAT.” IN H5N1 SIMILAR VEIN, TECHNOLOGY WITHOUT INTEGRATION, OR H5N1 CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNING, IS THE HYPE BEFORE THE LETDOWN.
This is not, however, a challenge unique to Western militaries. Russian Federation too Red People's Republic of China cause got invested billions inwards upgrading existing capabilities, yet real few of these platforms were designed to seamlessly integrate artificial intelligence or partner with autonomous robotic systems. This way retro-fitting is required, making emergent engineering scientific discipline an integration job of similar magnitude to that faced past times their Western competitors. Accordingly, it is mayhap overly pessimistic to believe Russia too Red People's Republic of China cause got the advantage inwards militarizing emergent technologies. Culturally, it is also probable to convey important fourth dimension too exertion for Red People's Republic of China too Russian Federation to adapt entrenched command too command approaches to absorb the daze generated past times the introduction of artificial intelligence too autonomous systems. To expect, therefore, that Russian Federation too Red People's Republic of China volition live to a greater extent than successful with the introduction of artificial intelligence too autonomous systems than the U.S. of America is mayhap to underestimate the touching on of entrenched armed forces civilization the basis over, too inwards plough to overestimate available capability.
Advanced militaries must live careful to avoid a province of affairs where military technical determinism guides strategic thinking. Indeed, if the sense of the finally xx years has taught us goose egg else, it is that technological superiority does non guarantee armed forces success. Dominicus Tzu warned, “tactics without strategy is the dissonance earlier defeat.” In a similar vein, engineering scientific discipline without integration, or a conceptual underpinning, is the hype earlier the letdown. Technology enables tactical actions to advance a strategy — but engineering scientific discipline cannot supervene upon tactics. Militaries cannot mitigate a lack of strategy nor back upward operational concepts purely through a reliance on the hope of technology, especially equally engineering scientific discipline is unlikely to live either fully integrated across the forcefulness or available at the critical time.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MAY NOT BE THE ANSWER
As Michael Horowitz notes: “The hope of [artificial intelligence] — including its powerfulness to amend the speed too accuracy of everything from logistics too battlefield planning to human determination making — is driving militaries approximately the basis to accelerate inquiry too development.”[5] This has led some to suggest that artificial intelligence could potentially trim down the human terms of war. Artificial intelligence is, however, unlikely to arts and crafts strategy or pattern the operational concepts to guide its ain employment. Artificial intelligence could, too probable will, influence the crafting of strategy too almost sure the subordinate operational concepts that guide its execution. However, at that spot is no a priori ground why whatever strategy or operational concept should succeed if applied inwards an incongruent context. Artificial intelligence could live an assistance for strategic success similar whatever other way might, but at that spot is no ground to believe it a panacea for specific problems of time to come warfare. Artificial intelligence could, also, live a hindrance too.
Rather than solving contemporary integration challenges, artificially intelligent, autonomous machines are almost sure to create novel ones. Integration is a constant challenge inwards a perpetually changing technological context, too thus nosotros should aspect to a greater extent than rather than less integration challenges on the far side of attempts at integrating artificial intelligence into our forcefulness structures. In fact, artificial intelligence is probable to live amidst the greatest armed forces integration challenges due to the additional complexities it creates for network architectures (particularly at the tactical level) which are already behind manufacture best practice. Researchers are also immediately recognising that it is non simply the artificially intelligent systems that affair inwards this bold novel era of armed forces competition. Rather, the critical nexus is the way past times which artificially intelligent capabilities are integrated inside armed forces command too command structures, processes, too systems to maximise their latent potential. Command too command volition live forced to adapt to maximise the potential of technological advances. However, at that spot is currently neither the proven engineering scientific discipline nor the organisational impetus to do so.
Furthermore, earlier seeking to manus over responsibilities to artificially intelligent machines, it is essential to sympathize the potential risks associated with the technology. Artificial intelligence relies on humans to aid inwards the procedure of becoming intelligent: from writing algorithms to labelling data, such tasks are equally fallible to human mistakes, biases, too oversights equally whatever other inherently human interaction. However, mayhap of greatest trace of piece of work organisation is the inability of machine-learning systems to explicate the logic behind the conclusions they reach. Critically, the potential inability of humans to sympathize machine decision-making criteria for the work of forcefulness offers ethical challenges unique inwards the history of warfare.
MILITARY PROFESSIONALS SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF UNPROVEN TECHNOLOGY ON WAR’S POSSIBLE CHARACTER IN THE DIM FUZZINESS OF FIFTY YEARS HENCE, WHEN H5N1 FOCUS ON THE CONCEIVABLE CHARACTER OF THE NEXT WAR IS PERHAPS H5N1 MORE PRESSING CONCERN.
The risk of machine bias too the consequent errors inwards judgement resulting from overreliance on artificial intelligence should live much to a greater extent than concerning to us than their human cognitive equivalents. At to the lowest degree nosotros are capable of recognising human frailty, of agreement private too collective bias. It is much to a greater extent than hard to attain the same with machines whose deep learning may cause got been distorted from the outset. To assume that machines are inwards a higher house bias too misjudgement, or to presume that nosotros tin give the axe ever alleviate the touching on of it, is to invite surprise too potentially disaster. Indeed, evolving technologies may brand the deport of time to come battles more hard to predict rather than less.
As a dual-use technology facing rapid commercial equally good equally armed forces development, for every advance inwards artificial intelligence at that spot is probable to live a corresponding defence or counter inwards the cyber domain which volition undermine whatever “decisive” touching on it tin give the axe have. By necessity, artificial intelligence is driven too sustained past times advanced computing powerfulness too network connectivity. Therefore, its influence is probable to live precisely equally circumscribed past times targeted cyber actions (particularly estimator network attack, but also estimator network exploitation) equally whatever other networked capability. Given its reliance on connectivity too power, this vulnerability to cyber disruption has potential to critically undermine whatever command too command or combat scheme built on artificial intelligence’s persistent availability.
Similar to the flawed predictions of early on 20th century airpower theorists at that spot is a growing vogue to come across time to come warfare dominated past times item technologies. This reinforces the importance of separating science fiction from scientific discipline fact. Despite some break-through advances inwards artificial intelligence development, Michael Anissimov estimates that it could convey until 2060-2070 for it to arrive at the marker of maturity required to satisfy many imagined armed forces purposes. While this should non preclude militaries from taking psyche of artificial intelligence’s potential applications, it also should non distract from resolving urgent force modernization challenges similar network capacity too combat scheme integration.
UNTIL SYSTEMS, CONCEPTS, AND CAPABILITIES ARE TESTED IN COMBAT OVER H5N1 SUSTAINED PERIOD OF TIME AGAINST AN ACTUAL ADVERSARY THE CHARACTER OF FUTURE WARFARE IS MERELY H5N1 BEST GUESS. H5N1 FOCUS ON THE PROMISE OF UNPROVEN TECHNOLOGY ABSENT H5N1 CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW information technology WILL EVENTUALLY ACHIEVE STATED POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IS FOLLY.
If at that spot is to live another dandy powerfulness conflict so it is precisely equally probable to occur inwards the adjacent few decades equally it would live to occur inwards the latter one-half of the 21st century. Military professionals should, therefore, live cautious virtually the touching on of unproven engineering scientific discipline on war’s possible graphic symbol inwards the dim fuzziness of 50 years hence, when a focus on the conceivable graphic symbol of the adjacent war is mayhap a to a greater extent than pressing concern.
CONCLUSION
Advanced militaries are only precisely inaugural of all to perceive some of the different factors that may, inwards time, come upward to shape the character of time to come wars. Despite their best efforts, no nation-state tin give the axe ever live fully prepared for the graphic symbol of the adjacent war. As such, the potential armed forces applications of emergent engineering scientific discipline should non live viewed equally a panacea for the chaos, friction, too adventure that volition proceed to define state of war inwards the future. Regardless of the possibilities offered past times technological advances, success inwards the adjacent conflict is probable to live precisely equally reliant on human genius (though no uncertainty supported past times increasing human-machine teaming) equally whatever conflict on which humanity has previously embarked.[6]
Until systems, concepts, too capabilities are tested inwards combat over a sustained menses of fourth dimension against an actual adversary the graphic symbol of time to come warfare is simply a best guess. It is of import that advanced militaries seek to harness conceivable technological advantages. This must, however, live component subdivision of a balanced approach that recognises the primacy of policy too strategy, too the criticality of concepts that address integration inaugural of all rather than last. Indeed, a focus on the hope of unproven engineering scientific discipline absent a clear agreement of how it volition eventually attain stated political objectives is folly. Worse soundless is to believe that such engineering scientific discipline promises decisive battlefield advantage, whereas, inwards fact, it offers important vulnerabilities to exploit.
Mark Gilchrist is a serving Australian Army Officer. The views offered hither are his ain too do non reverberate whatever official positions.
This article appeared originally at Strategy Bridge.
NOTES:
[1] In the context of this article “advanced militaries” is taken to hateful the United States, China, too Russia. However, the issues identified are precisely equally relevant to all militaries grappling with the challenges of integrating emergent engineering scientific discipline amongst legacy equipment too capabilities.
[2] As the American economist Robert Gordon argues, the menses from 1870 – 1970 saw the greatest cumulative technological advances inwards human history, spurred inwards large component subdivision past times the influence of the internal combustion engine. Since 1970, Gordon contends that the charge per unit of measurement of modify at a macro marker has decelerated too been “channelled into a narrow sphere… having to do with entertainment, communications too the processing of information.” While these latter areas are of critical importance to armed forces forces they do non modify the nature of war, nor do they play the most critical component subdivision inwards defining its character. This is non the inaugural of all fourth dimension that rapid advances inwards communications cause got forced reconsideration of how information tin give the axe too should live processed for greatest armed forces advantage. The work of the telegraph inwards the U.S. Civil War too the emergence of wireless telephony inwards the First World War are but 2 examples of informational changes that continued to build on the speed of information passage pioneered past times their predecessors inwards the armies of Rome or the Mongol Empire.
[3] Combat is tangible. Theorists tin give the axe verbalise virtually the possible graphic symbol of war, but the physical interaction –– combat –– is where the prophylactic hits the route where 1 tin give the axe come across how different approaches, capabilities etc genuinely come upward together to define a graphic symbol of the conflict. The graphic symbol of state of war changing is also best understood through the combat involved equally it should reverberate changes inwards policy, ethical considerations, strategy, etc. Everything is theoretical until combat occurs, only so it becomes reality.
[4] Militaries operate inwards austere environments where increasingly they volition rely on, or compete with, civilian information infrastructure that is vulnerable to disruption. In corporation to attain the high bandwidth coverage required to brand the most of modern (let lone future) combat systems, armed forces forces volition live increasingly reliant on airborne or satellite (rather than terrestrial) communications links for redundancy to terrestrial systems. The straight targeting of terrestrial, airborne too satellite links (which must live assumed volition occur) volition probable unhinge the exquisite network architectures upon which most armed forces engineering scientific discipline relies, greatly diminishing potential lethality.
[5] Professor Genevieve Bell articulates inwards her lecture to the Royal Australian Air Force’s 2018 Air Power Conference – Air Power inwards a Disruptive World, an apt description of artificial intelligence. She states: “AI is a constellation of technologies that runs from information to machine learning too sensing too algorithms, to include I would genuinely struggle both ethics too the information that fuels that whole cycle. And artificially intelligent technologies are with us immediately too functioning, but they are the inaugural of all of a much longer transformation that nosotros demand to live paying attending to. So, every fourth dimension I say AI imagine that it is shorthand for something much to a greater extent than complicated.”
[6] This continues the journeying started past times man’s partnership with horses so refined over the ages with soldiers operating mechanised vehicles too immediately manned vehicles partnered with unmanned systems. All, however, are reliant on the human powerfulness to brand sense of chaos, exploit the fog of war, too create determination from disorder.
Buat lebih berguna, kongsi:
