LT GEN H southward PANAG
The politico-strategic aim of the state of war was to ‘teach Republic of Republic of India a lesson’, as well as foreclose it from challenging the Chinese borders as well as sovereignty over Tibet. War is non an act of senseless passion, but is controlled yesteryear political objective,” said military machine theorist Carl von Clausewitz. Chinese maps had started showing Aksai Chin as well as the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) as purpose of PRC inwards the early on 1950s. In 1954, Republic of Republic of India too issued novel maps to demonstrate our boundary along the Kunlun Mountains inwards Ladakh as well as the McMahon Line inwards the east. Both sides began to ‘flag’ the frontier portion as per their claims, amongst the Chinese preempting us inwards Aksai Chin, as well as Republic of Republic of India preempting them inwards NEFA. In 1959, Zhou Enlai had clearly stated that the entire boundary was nether dispute as well as had never been delimited. He subtly proposed that status quo should live maintained until concluding resolution. This implied a trade-off betwixt Aksai Chin as well as credence of the McMahon business inwards the Northeast as the boundary. This proposal was rejected yesteryear India, which insisted that the Chinese must withdraw from Aksai Chin earlier negotiations could begin. Until now, the Chinese had shown no inclination to utilization force, though given the favourable terrain as well as their military machine capability, they were inwards a seat to create so.
What so led to the war? What were the political as well as military machine aims of China? To say that the edge dispute as well as India’s aggressive “frontier flagging” policy – “forward movement” of troops after 1959 – was the primary receive of the state of war would live rewriting the theory of war.
Wars imply severe economical as well as human cost, as well as thus are the musical instrument of lastly resort. The ultimate political objective of state of war is to impose peace on one’s ain terms. To attain this, i has to compel the opponent to submit to one’s will. Apart from diplomacy as well as economical coercion, ultimately, the volition of the enemy is broken yesteryear imposing a military machine defeat. Military aims thus menstruum out from political aims, as well as are non an goal unto themselves.
While the boundary dispute was the immediate casus belli inwards 1962, the key causes are rooted inwards the competitive conflict for relative seat of preeminence inwards Asia as well as the world, as well as the Indian threat to the Chinese vulnerability inwards Tibet.
From the real onset, PRC had allow the footing know that it is ordained to live a dandy power. Republic of Republic of India was seen as a contender mightiness middle as well as the international personality of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was an anathema to the Chinese leadership. Thus, at that topographic point was an undeclared aim to cutting Nehru downward to size as well as neutralise Republic of Republic of India as rival.
Tibet is China’s Achilles heel. Tibet is a civilization yesteryear itself as well as had never accepted the sovereignty of China. At that time, PRC believed Republic of Republic of India was assisting the insurrection inwards Tibet inwards conjunction amongst the CIA to restore status quo ante pre-1950. The asylum to the Dalai Lama inwards March 1959 confirmed this Chinese belief. The route through Aksai Chin was essential for PRC to keep its command over Tibet. Thus, India’s rejection of a reasonable Chinese proposal to central Aksai Chin for credence of the McMahon Line was seen as purpose of India’s designs inwards Tibet.
Over the side yesteryear side 3 years, Republic of Republic of India aggressively pursued the frontward policy to found its writ over the territory it considered legitimately belonging to it. PRC responded inwards a quid pro quo mode amongst its policy of “peaceful coexistence”, but continued to do restraint to avoid precipitating the situation. Republic of Republic of India was farther emboldened, as well as its belief that PRC would non become to state of war spell it secured its legitimate territory was farther reinforced.
The Galwan River as well as Dhola Post incidents convinced the Chinese that state of war was inevitable.
Chinese leadership was well-versed inwards the fine art of state of war as well as was intimately involved amongst the decision-making as well as had deliberated its strategy over a serial of meetings. By early on October, it gave formal directions to the PLA to execute the plans for the war.
The politico-strategic aim of the state of war was to “teach Republic of Republic of India a lesson”, neutralise it as a contender for seat of preeminence inwards Asia as well as the world, as well as foreclose it from challenging the Chinese borders as well as sovereignty over Tibet.
The military machine objective was to impose an absolute defeat on Indian forces operating inwards NEFA as well as Ladakh, as well as inwards so doing, completely annihilate the forces inwards NEFA, seize territory upward to the plains (in NEFA) as well as the 1959 claim business inwards Ladakh.
The departure inwards the approach betwixt Ladakh as well as NEFA was due to the logistics problems faced yesteryear the PLA inwards Ladakh, as well as the devastation of solely i brigade that Republic of Republic of India deployed was non considered a worthwhile objective. Moreover, PRC had already secured the territory it had claimed.
The ideal fourth dimension for the travail inwards the high-altitude areas of Ladakh as well as NEFA is from June to October. Due to the initial policy of restraint followed until the Dhola incident, the decision-making for the state of war had got delayed as well as the concluding conclusion was taken solely inwards the starting fourth dimension calendar week of October. This effectively gave the PLA solely i calendar month to attain its military machine objectives. This delay too led PRC to unilaterally withdraw upon completion of the annihilation as well as achievement of other objectives.
It would receive got been extremely hard to keep the PLA forces via the snowbound passes over real hapless motorable tracks. The forces would too receive got been vulnerable to counter assail inwards the lower reaches.
China did non desire the USA to physically intervene to help India. Also, the Chinese claims inwards NEFA were simply a ploy to justify the seizure of Aksai Chin. The compulsion forced yesteryear conditions conditions was eventually used to heighten China’s prestige inwards the world.
The politico-strategic aims evolved yesteryear a political leadership amongst an sense of xxx years of continuous state of war were achieved inwards totality yesteryear an as experienced as well as battle-hardened PLA through a clinically-conducted state of war that lasted i month. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 classic representative of how a nation must do forcefulness inwards pursuit of its national interests.
The writer served inwards the Indian Army for xl years. He was GOC-in-C Northern Command as well as Central Command. Post-retirement, he was a fellow member of the Armed Forces Tribunal.
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