In CWIHP Working Paper #76, "Not at the Cost of China: New Evidence Regarding US Proposals to Nehru for Joining the United Nations Security Council," writer Anton Harder examines the contention surrounding India's role inward the United Nations Security Council inward the 1950s. Using Indian archival cloth from the Nehru Memorial Museum together with Library, this newspaper shows that America's involvement inward seeing Republic of Republic of India bring together the Security Council was motivated yesteryear the emergence of the People's Republic of Cathay every bit a regional power, together with that this episode was an early on representative of the U.S.A. attempting to utilization the United Nations to farther its ain Cold War interests.
Anton Harder is a PhD candidate inward the International History Department of the London School of Economics. His dissertation is on Sino-Indian relations from 1949-1962.
Not at the Cost of China: New Evidence Regarding US Proposals to Nehru for Joining the United Nations Security Council
Introduction
The number of India’s right to a spot on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is a controversial i inward Republic of Republic of India today, but it is non new. The historical contention has centered on the culpability of independent India’s first of all Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, inward non seizing several alleged opportunities for Republic of Republic of India to bring together the United Nations Security Council every bit a permanent fellow member inward the 1950s. Nehru’s critics, so together with now, bill him of sacrificing India’s national involvement on dubious grounds of international morality. The question, however, goes beyond Nehru’s reputation, every bit it provides rare insights into India’s relations amongst the U.S.A. together with the People’s Republic of Cathay (PRC) at the start of the Cold War.
A peculiar atmosphere of rumor surrounds India’s history every bit a possible permanent fellow member of the Security Council. An online search volition Pb i to heated debates on the existence, or not, of an early on offering to Republic of Republic of India of a permanent spot on that august body. In 2005, “This Day That Age,” a column inward The Hindu, featured a reprint of a 1955 story on Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s denial inward Parliament of the rumors of a recent offering of a United Nations Security Council spot yesteryear the Soviet Union, showing both the involvement inward the topic inward 1955 together with 2005.[1] Despite Nehru’s denial then, together with online debates now, the 1955 offering from the Soviets is inward fact well-documented, although perhaps non widely known. The angst over these rumors merges history together with contemporary politics, amongst those arguing that such offers existed, together with were refused, keen to ram what they consider to live some other boom into the coffin of Jawaharlal Nehru’s reputation, India’s sometime socialist together with avowedly secular first of all Prime Minister, who it is argued, inward his idealism, failed to secure India’s national interest.[2]
That the 1955 incident was publicly discussed inward 2002 inward impress yesteryear AG Noorani, a major scholar of modern Indian history together with politics, has non ended the rumor-mongering.[3] However, novel evidence of an fifty-fifty before offer—by the US inward August 1950—to assist Republic of Republic of India inward assuming a permanent spot at the United Nations Security Council has lately emerged, adding substantially to what Noorani before wrote. Nehru’s rejection of the US offering underlined the consistency of his conviction that the PRC’s legitimate interests must live acknowledged inward fellowship to trim back international tensions. Integrating the PRC into the international community yesteryear conceding its right to the Chinese spot at the Security Council was inward fact a primal pillar of Nehru’s unusual policy. Nehru’s skepticism close accepting this offer, together with thereby disrupting the dynamics of the UN, revealed the reverence he had for the international organization, despite its flaws. Furthermore, his principled rejection of the US’s proffer indicates Indian agency inward its hard relations amongst the US at this time. Finally, Nehru’s sense that Republic of Republic of India deserved recognition every bit a peachy set down was made plain, although this was qualified yesteryear his refusal to compromise nitty-gritty principles to gain such recognition. That the US made such an approach to Republic of Republic of India also suggests that the traditional emphasis on the US’s early on effort to pursue an even-handed approach to the subcontinent’s major powers together with defer to the UK’s greater experience inward the share ought to live reconsidered. Furthermore, this episode enriches our understanding of the US government’s internal wrangling over how to curvature the United Nations to its interests inward this early on phase of the Cold War.
Integrating the PRC into the international community yesteryear conceding its right to the Chinese spot at the Security Council was inward fact a primal pillar of Nehru’s unusual policy.
The documents critical to answering these questions are stowed away inward the Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit papers held at the Nehru Memorial Museum together with Library (NMML), New Delhi, India. The importance of Pandit’s papers lies inward her human relationship to her brother, the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, together with her high-profile diplomatic posts inward the 1940s together with 1950s, which included the Soviet Union, the United States, together with the United Nations. Furthermore, spell the published Nehru papers contained inward his voluminous Selected Works together with Letters to Chief Ministers are a rich together with under-utilized resources for studying the Nehru period, unfortunately they are silent only a partial tape together with they cannot live supplemented yesteryear reference to his papers at the NMML, which are restricted. The status of Nehru’s personal collections amplifies the significance of the Pandit papers for understanding Nehru’s thinking on unusual affairs inward the 1940s together with 1950s. The Pandit papers have got of course of study been used before for full general histories of independent Republic of Republic of India together with broad examinations of Indian unusual policy, but they have got non been deployed thus far inward studies focused on India’s human relationship amongst China.[4]
The 1955 Soviet Offer
In 2002, AG Noorani wrote a defense forcefulness of Nehru’s determination to reject Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin’s offering of a permanent spot on the United Nations Security Council inward 1955. He wrote Nehru was right to exercise so, every bit really the offering was just a “feeler to evidence India.” Noorani was reviewing the new, together with so most recent, book of the 2nd serial of the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru.[5]
Mr. Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs together with Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations, inward Apr 1954. Source: United Nations Photo #123878.
He was also taking aim at those political figures who had attacked Nehru’s determination to reject this offering based on a reference inward the well-known Sarvepalli Gopal biography of Nehru (1979) inward which Gopal wrote: “He [Jawaharlal Nehru] rejected the Soviet offering to suggest Republic of Republic of India every bit the 6th permanent fellow member of the Security Council together with insisted that priority live given to China’s admission to the United Nations.”[6] Utilizing the novel evidence available inward the Selected Works, Noorani argued that Nehru was right inward making piffling of this offer, every bit the offering was inward fact unlikely to materialize inward reality; together with fifty-fifty if the Soviets were sincere close facilitating India’s accession to the Security Council every bit a permanent member, this would have got caused major problems for India’s overall unusual policy strategy yesteryear complicating its relations amongst Cathay together with the major powers. Noorani quoted the next substitution offered inward the Selected Works to bolster his claims:
[Nikolai] Bulganin: Regarding your proffer close the 4 powerfulness conference nosotros would remove appropriate action. While nosotros are discussing the full general international province of affairs together with reducing tension, nosotros suggest suggesting at a later phase India’s inclusion every bit the 6th fellow member of the Security Council.
JN [Jawaharlal Nehru]: Perhaps Bulganin knows that some people inward USA have got suggested that Republic of Republic of India should supervene upon Cathay inward the Security Council. This is to create problem betwixt us together with China. We are, of course, wholly opposed to it. Further, nosotros are opposed to pushing ourselves forrard to occupy sure positions because that may itself create difficulties together with Republic of Republic of India mightiness itself move a bailiwick to controversy. If Republic of Republic of India is to live admitted to the Security Council, it raises the enquiry of the revision of the Charter of the UN. We experience that this should non live done till the enquiry of China’s admission together with perchance of others is first of all solved. I experience that nosotros should first of all concentrate on getting Cathay admitted. What is Bulganin’s thought close the revision of the Charter? In our thought this does non seem to live an appropriate fourth dimension for it.
Bulganin: We proposed the enquiry of India’s membership of the Security Council to larn your views, but concur that this is non the fourth dimension for it together with it volition have got to expression for the right 2nd later on. We also concur that things should live taken i yesteryear one.[7]
Noorani suggested that Bulganin’s response to Nehru’s reservations indicated that the “offer” was non a existent one, but to a greater extent than a way of sounding out India’s views, every bit Bulganin agreed amongst Nehru that the fourth dimension was non right for pushing a novel permanent fellow member into the Security Council. Furthermore, the substitution shows that Republic of Republic of India had already rejected a similar proffer made yesteryear the US. Nehru ascribed the American offering to its want to disturb Sino-Indian relations. The status of the People’s Republic of Cathay inward the UN, Nehru argued, should remove priority, before whatever consideration live given to the necessary revision of the United Nations Charter required for the admittance of whatever novel permanent members. What just Nehru meant inward price of “others” whose admission perchance also should live settled prior to Republic of Republic of India is unclear, but he in all probability had inward remove heed the newly independent nations non yet admitted every bit members of the UN.
The status of the People’s Republic of Cathay inward the UN, Nehru argued, should remove priority, before whatever consideration live given to the necessary revision of the United Nations Charter required for the admittance of whatever novel permanent members.
Noorani later on wrote close a regime annotation penned yesteryear Nehru spell silent touring the USSR inward June 1955, which provided to a greater extent than exceptional on the before offering from the US:
Informally, suggestions have got been made yesteryear the U.S.A. that Cathay should live taken into the United Nations but non inward the Security Council together with that Republic of Republic of India should remove her identify inward the Security Council. We cannot of course of study have got this every bit it way falling out amongst Cathay together with it would live real unfair for a peachy set down similar Cathay non to live inward the Security Council. We have, therefore, made it clear to those who suggested this that nosotros cannot concur to this suggestion. We have got fifty-fifty gone a piffling farther together with said that Republic of Republic of India is non anxious to larn inward the Security Council at this stage, fifty-fifty though every bit a peachy set down she ought to live there. The first of all stride to live taken is for Cathay to remove her rightful identify together with so the enquiry of Republic of Republic of India mightiness live considered separately.[8]
Noorani drew attending to the fact that book 29 of the Selected Works non only clarified the nature of the Soviet offering of 1955, but unearthed tantalizing evidence of a previously piffling known before offering yesteryear the Americans to similarly assist Republic of Republic of India assume a permanent spot at the UNSC.
The 1950 American Offer
What was the context of the US offering for Republic of Republic of India to bring together the United Nations Security Council? Nehru’s reference to the USA’s offering is frustratingly vague amongst no hint of the circumstances or timing inward which it was made. However, enquiry done inward the correspondence of Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Nehru’s sister, together with holder of diverse major diplomatic positions inward the slow 1940s together with early on 1950s, illuminates the subject. In slow August 1950, Pandit wrote to her blood brother from Washington, DC, where she was so posted every bit India’s Ambassador to the United States:
One affair that is beingness cooked upwards inward the State Department should live known to you. This is the unseating of Cathay every bit a Permanent Member inward the Security Council together with of Republic of Republic of India beingness lay inward her place. I have got just seen Reuter’s study of your reply to the same question. Last calendar week I had interviews amongst [John Foster] Dulles together with [Philip] Jessup, reports of which I have got sent to Bajpai. Both brought upwards this enquiry together with Dulles seemed specially anxious that a displace inward this management should live started. Last nighttime I heard from Marquis Childs, an influential columnist of Washington, that Dulles has asked him on behalf of the State Department to build upwards populace thought along these lines. I told him our mental attitude together with advised him to move ho-hum inward the affair every bit it would non live received amongst whatever warmth inward India.[9]
Nehru’s response inside the calendar week was unequivocal:
In your missive of the alphabet you lot shout out that the State Department is trying to unseat Cathay every bit a Permanent Member of the Security Council together with to lay Republic of Republic of India inward her place. So far every bit nosotros are concerned, nosotros are non going to countenance it. That would live bad from every dot of view. It would live a clear affront to Cathay together with it would hateful some sort of a pause betwixt us together with China. I suppose the province subdivision would non similar that, but nosotros have got no intention of next that course. We shall move on pressing for China’s admission inward the United Nations together with the Security Council. I suppose that a crisis volition come upwards during the adjacent sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations on this issue. The people’s regime of Cathay is sending a total delegation there. If they neglect to larn inward in that location volition live problem which mightiness fifty-fifty resultant inward the USSR together with some other countries lastly quitting the UN. That may delight the State Department, but it would hateful the goal of the United Nations every bit nosotros have got known it. That would also hateful a farther drift towards war.
India because of many factors, is sure as shooting entitled to a permanent spot inward the safety council. But nosotros are non going inward at the cost of China.[10]
The context for this discreet displace yesteryear the US State Department towards Republic of Republic of India needs to live emphasized. The tensions of the Cold War were spreading to East Asia, spell Europe appeared to live inward deadlock. Specifically, the emergence of an plainly communist regime inward command of Cathay had created a novel fault-line. The other mega-state of Asia, democratic India, was burnishing its independence from the democratic army camp yesteryear refusing to acknowledge this fault-line together with had gone every bit far every bit transferring its diplomatic recognition of Cathay from the defeated nationalists on Taiwan to the unknown revolutionary guerrillas inward Beijing. In mid-January 1950, the USSR had walked out of the United Nations inward protestation of the People’s Republic of Cathay beingness blocked from taking the Chinese spot at the UN. Therefore, when the Korean crisis exploded on 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council, unimpeded yesteryear the threat of a Soviet veto, passed a US sponsored resolution to condemn the aggression. Republic of Republic of India willingly supported this resolution, every bit it naturally opposed North Korea’s determination to utilization forcefulness to unify the peninsula.
India because of many factors, is sure as shooting entitled to a permanent spot inward the safety council. But nosotros are non going inward at the cost of China.
US leaders would have got been pleased that India, having so ofttimes talked close the value of non-alignment, was inward fact lining upwards amongst Washington to thwart communist aggression. For the Americans in that location was also other evidence that Nehru was starting to remove a to a greater extent than reasonable approach towards communism. The State Department had watched amongst blessing the Indian Prime Minister’s June 1950 tour of Southeast Asia together with concluded:
Nehru’s statements are to live interpreted every bit an extension into the international acre of his domestic effort against Communist tactics. If Communism does non alter its tactics inward South together with South-east Asia he may maintain to remove the offensive against it, non only inward Republic of Republic of India but elsewhere. In speaking so frankly Nehru served our interests admirably. Following Nehru’s see to Republic of Indonesia our representatives were informed that Republic of Indonesia had no intention of recognizing Viet Minh or of convoking an Asian conference on Indonesia.[11]
However, this was only a temporary convergence of interests betwixt Republic of Republic of India together with the United States. The 2nd US-sponsored resolution at the Security Council, which proposed to offering whatever assist was necessary to Republic of Korea to resist the north, was backed only real reluctantly yesteryear India, together with nether peachy pressure level from the UK. Soon after, on vii July, Republic of Republic of India refused to vote inward favor of a 3rd resolution which gave US total command over United Nations forces inward Korea.[12] India’s commitment to America’s prized theory of international collective safety was thus thrown into doubt.
Thereafter, the differences betwixt the US together with Republic of Republic of India developed fifty-fifty further, every bit is revealed yesteryear the correspondence betwixt Pandit together with Nehru. Another missive of the alphabet from Pandit, dated 29 June 1950, captured competing Indian together with American concerns at this time. She had told the Americans that the Korean conflict should non have got been linked upwards amongst other Asian issues such every bit Taiwan, Indochina, together with the Philippines, together with that this widening of the number made it hard for Asian governments to back upwards the US. Meanwhile, she noted that the US President regretted that Republic of Republic of India was “holding aloof from the democratic nations together with silent desired to save an independent together with neutral unusual policy.”[13] July saw farther departure betwixt Republic of Republic of India together with the US, every bit Indian diplomacy focused on persuading all parties that international tensions could best live diffused—and the Korean crisis localized—if the PRC were to remove the Chinese spot inward the UN. Indeed, India’s Ambassador inward Beijing optimistically briefed Zhou Enlai that they believed the U.K. together with Arab Republic of Egypt would back upwards the PRC’s supposition of China’s Security Council seat, giving it bulk support. Republic of Republic of India only needed Beijing together with Moscow’s back upwards for this effort to solve the occupation of Korea yesteryear pushing for Beijing’s admission to the UN.[14] Furthermore, US belligerence unnerved the Indians, every bit tin live seen from Pandit’s missive of the alphabet to Nehru on thirteen July 1950, inward which she complained close US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s references to possible utilization of the atom bomb.[15] Nehru’s conviction that the best solution was to have got the PRC larn inward the United Nations would only have got been strengthened yesteryear Pandit’s communication inward slow July amongst rogue elements of the Chinese Nationalist displace who, having severed links amongst Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), wanted to assist Republic of Republic of India accomplish PRC entry to the United Nations every bit a way of containing the Korean conflict.[16] Meanwhile, Acheson made it clear to Pandit that though he appreciated the “moral tone” which Republic of Republic of India brought to the UN’s resolutions, his policy was constrained, he pleaded, yesteryear US populace opinion.[17] Then, on 1 August the USSR returned to its spot inward the UN, ending the US payoff inward the Security Council.[18]
India’s Ambassador inward Beijing optimistically briefed Zhou Enlai that they believed the U.K. together with Arab Republic of Egypt would back upwards the PRC’s supposition of China’s Security Council seat, giving it bulk support.
So it was inward the context of Washington’s continuing regard for India’s moral stature, together with despite the still-born hopes for Indian diplomatic back upwards together with anti-communist solidarity (and also the Soviet render to the Security Council), that Pandit was approached yesteryear the State Department close the UNSC. While she did non say when the conversations amongst Dulles together with Jessop took place, nosotros tin infer that it was sometime inward early on or mid-August, every bit she wrote to Nehru on 24 August. This approach to Republic of Republic of India yesteryear the US State Department, though informal together with non quite at the highest level, should nevertheless live regarded every bit quite sincere. Mrs. Pandit was good respected inward the US together with amongst skillful ground was seen every bit a reliable channel to her brother. Even if, every bit amongst the Soviet “offer” a few years later, the prospects of this offering really coming to fruition were unlikely, it could silent live seen every bit a pregnant display of a want inward the US for a to a greater extent than trusting human relationship amongst India. Republic of Republic of India had backed the US resolutions at the United Nations calling for collective activity to thwart North Korea’s aggression. This back upwards had, to some extent, restored hope inward the US that Republic of Republic of India would align amongst it inward the emerging Cold War, despite Indian insistence before inward 1950 that it would recognize the novel communist regime of China, which the US regime could non remove itself to do.
The US was undoubtedly disappointed that India’s initial back upwards for it at the United Nations diminished over time, together with that Washington together with Delhi’s prescriptions for resolving the Korean crisis had diverged so much. However, Dulles’ August 1950 démarche suggests at this dot that at to the lowest degree the US State Department silent saw the potential for closer Indo-US relations together with genuinely desired to demonstrate this amongst a gesture, together with perhaps describe Republic of Republic of India to a greater extent than closely to it. Andrew Rotter’s declaration that US-Indian relations inward the early on Cold War era lacked a culturally sensitive “gesture” of goodwill from America to Republic of Republic of India is thus challenged yesteryear this episode.[19] However, the substitution betwixt blood brother together with sis Nehru showed that this gesture was non good received inward India, leaving i to wonder what sort out of gesture mightiness have got been to a greater extent than successful. Besides demonstrating a continuing hope that Republic of Republic of India could yet live prevailed upon to to a greater extent than firmly link hands amongst the US-led army camp inward the Cold War, this inaugural also challenges the supposition that the US was committed to a strategy of equidistance from Islamic Republic of Pakistan together with Republic of Republic of India every bit suggested yesteryear some.[20]Clearly, Islamic Republic of Pakistan would have got felt somewhat alienated from the US if it had found out that Washington was assisting India’s supposition of a permanent spot at the Security Council, giving it pregnant advantages inward the Kashmir issue.
This inaugural also challenges the supposition that the US was committed to a strategy of equidistance from Islamic Republic of Pakistan together with Republic of Republic of India every bit suggested yesteryear some.
This communication betwixt Pandit together with Nehru also sharpens what nosotros know close US thinking regarding the United Nations inward the aftermath of that body’s determination to intervene inward the reignited Korean civil war. The early on activity at the United Nations to counter North Korea’s state of war machine displace into the South, including the ii resolutions of 25 together with 27 June 1950, were regarded yesteryear the US together with others at the United Nations every bit a positive representative of collective activity to thwart communist aggression.[21] However, although Republic of Republic of India had voted amongst the US on these resolutions, appearing thus to remove sides inward the Cold War, it had so continued to follow its policy of supporting the PRC’s right to the Chinese spot at the UN. Then, inward August, the Soviets returned to the UN, ending the US’s payoff there. In the months prior to together with next this approach to India, in that location were diverse discussions occurring inside the US close how the United Nations could best serve US interests, inward exceptional regarding the bailiwick of China’s spot at the United Nations Security Council together with inward the United Nations to a greater extent than generally.[22]
US officials debate how the United Nations could best serve American interests. Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume II, The United Nations; the Western Hemisphere (Washington, DC: U.S.A. Government Printing Office, 1976), 8-9.
The thought was sure as shooting beingness proposed yesteryear some that the US displace to have got the Chinese Nationalists excluded but silent maintain the Communists from taking the vacant seat.[23] The Pandit-Nehru substitution of slow August suggests how far these sorts of discussions had gone. Rather than reorganize the United Nations entirely, Indian admission to the UNSC mightiness brand it a trunk to a greater extent than amenable to US interests. Alternatively, the US could have got been trying to merchandise back upwards for Republic of Republic of India joining the UNSC amongst an goal to India’s policy of proposing the PRC’s rights inward the UN. However the displace is to live interpreted—and to a greater extent than evidence of specific US discussions on this topic is needed—it sure as shooting adds to an overall moving painting of the US wrestling amongst the challenges of maintaining together with extending the UN’s powerfulness to serve its interests every bit it had inward the immediate response to North Korea’s assail on the South. Hence, the approach to Republic of Republic of India could live seen every bit business office of on-going diplomacy at the United Nations to mold that arrangement to US interests of which the September “Uniting for Peace” resolution proposed at the General Assembly also formed a part.[24]
Nehru’s Rejection of the US Offer
Nehru’s determined rejection of the US computer programme to identify Republic of Republic of India inward China’s spot at the United Nations Security Council reflected the exceptional reverence together with centrality placed on the United Nations yesteryear what i mightiness telephone telephone a “Nehruvian” unusual policy. The United Nations was of import to Nehru because he regarded it every bit the venue for the resolution of international conflict on the set down of sustained dialogue together with attempts at internationalism; to maintain this effort upwards was to forestall war.[25] So the audio evolution of the United Nations was an essential element to his unusual policy emphasis on dialogue together with inclusiveness.[26]One demand non move every bit far every bit Mithi Mukherjee to have got that the United Nations was viewed every bit critical yesteryear Indian policy-makers inward the 1950s.[27]
Representatives of the People's Republic of Cathay move far at the United Nations inward Nov 1950. Source: United Nations Photo #67352.
Nehru’s declaration for rejecting the State Department’s computer programme was strongly influenced yesteryear his occupation organisation that it would undermine the integrity of the United Nations to the extent it would cease to be “as nosotros have got known it” together with mark thus a “further drift towards war.”[28] Nehru had strong hopes that the United Nations would evidence to live a trunk that would, through dialogue, render a forum for peaceful resolution of conflict together with mitigate the growing tensions of the world. One cannot underestimate how imminent Nehru together with others felt a conflict of at to the lowest degree an equal grade to the Second World War was. He also valued the United Nations every bit an arena to condemn together with fifty-fifty constrain immoral activity yesteryear states, together with this hope had inward fact been partly realized through Indian activity over nascent apartheid legislation concerning citizens of Indian rootage inward South Africa.[29] What is interesting is that Nehru’s hopes for the United Nations had non suffered overly at this stage, despite Indian frustration of seeing what was considered India’s just have over Kashmir beingness obstructed yesteryear US together with U.K. meddling inward the UN.[30] Pandit had fifty-fifty wondered inward 1949 if Kashmir would live the cost of a spot inward the Security Council.[31]
Nehru’s determined rejection of the US computer programme to identify Republic of Republic of India inward China’s spot at the United Nations Security Council reflected the exceptional reverence together with centrality placed on the United Nations yesteryear what i mightiness telephone telephone a “Nehruvian” unusual policy.
The crucial role Nehru believed the United Nations could play inward international affairs meant he was loath to destabilize this venue amongst moves which would fundamentally alter its charter, every bit would live necessary for Republic of Republic of India to remove China’s seat. He pointed out to his sis that the forthcoming General Assembly session, to get inward September 1950, could good consider a final crisis at the United Nations amongst divisions over Cathay splintering the arrangement beyond repair together with leading to an always increased jeopardy of war. He would exercise zippo to exacerbate those dangers.[32]
To Nehru’s remove heed the audio evolution of the United Nations required that it was genuinely representative of the world’s land states. Hence it was logical that Chinese representation was held yesteryear the PRC together with this was a key element of Nehru’s United Nations policy.[33] This was, however, business office of a wider priority placed on Cathay yesteryear Nehru. Nehru did non want Republic of Republic of India to come upwards into conflict amongst China, together with felt China’s international “socialization” together with integration would assist forestall whatever turmoil. Nehru believed that international divisions could live solved non yesteryear drawing upwards armed camps to guarantee the residuum of power, but rather yesteryear displays of trust that brought everyone into the international community together with reduced the prevailing sense of paranoia. The West had erred, according to Nehru, yesteryear encircling the Soviet Union inward its early on history to the detriment of that state’s sense of security, together with inward many ways had created the bipolar confrontation.[34] This Nehruvian reading of history drove the Indian Prime Minister to seek accommodation amongst Cathay on behalf of Republic of Republic of India together with the world.
That Nehru so adamantly made clear that Republic of Republic of India did non want to supervene upon Cathay inward the United Nations Security Council, together with furthermore, that the number of China’s representation inward the United Nations must remove priority over whatever possible consideration of Republic of Republic of India gaining a permanent spot inward that trunk underlines the centrality of Cathay to Nehru’s unusual policy. If in that location was an identifiable nitty-gritty to Nehru’s unusual policy it was that China, whether it was communist or not, was going to live primal to the post-war international world. This was a fact that could non live ignored whether i welcomed it or non because it was an aspect of the full general resurgence of Asia that Nehru welcomed together with hoped to spur forward. Any effort to confine China, merely because of its allegiance to whatever exceptional political ideology, was misguided together with saltation to incite resistance together with Pb to international instability.
That Nehru so adamantly made clear that Republic of Republic of India did non want to supervene upon Cathay inward the United Nations Security Council, together with furthermore, that the number of China’s representation inward the United Nations must remove priority over whatever possible consideration of Republic of Republic of India gaining a permanent spot inward that trunk underlines the centrality of Cathay to Nehru’s unusual policy.
Nehru’s spot was clear fifty-fifty before the PRC was founded. In July 1949, he had written to Pandit inward Washington instructing her to decline an invitation to bring together a “Pacific Pact” amongst anti-Communists inward Asia: “As a realist, i has to recognize that Communists command the greater business office of Cathay together with may, before long, command the whole of that country. In broader involvement of international peace, it is non desirable that nosotros should exercise anything that would brand tillage of normal friendly relations amongst the novel Cathay difficult, if non impossible.”[35] In August 1950, Republic of Republic of India had only lately recognized the PRC together with was real anxious to improve relations. Nehru’s whole unusual policy was based on demonstrating to the world that Cathay could live an international partner together with thus trim back Cold War tensions, just every bit Nehru argued that if the West had non been so paranoid close the Soviet Union when it was first of all established they mightiness good have got developed a less confrontational relationship.
Conclusion
Before concluding, i could add together that the exchanges amongst Pandit silent demonstrated Nehru’s unambiguous view that Republic of Republic of India was a peachy powerfulness together with should have the designation of a permanent spot on the Security Council. He added, almost every bit an afterthought to his xxx August 1950 missive of the alphabet to his sister, that in that location were “many factors” that meant Republic of Republic of India was “certainly entitled to a permanent spot inward the safety council.”[36] India’s centrality to Asian together with fifty-fifty international affairs was a constant refrain of Nehru’s together with he pointed to historical, geographical, together with fifty-fifty moral justifications for this. Nehru’s detractors, so together with now, tend to concur amongst his assessment of India’s greatness, but it was his principled weather condition that drew their ire: the occupation organisation that Republic of Republic of India would non remove a identify inward the UNSC “at the cost of China.” Therefore it would live interesting to examine farther evidence, if it exists, of discussions on the Indian side close this offer. It would also live valuable to know the origins of this gambit on the American side, or if in that location was to a greater extent than communication close this amongst the Indians. Nevertheless, every bit confirmation that some give-and-take was initiated yesteryear the US together with was rejected yesteryear India, it is real welcome.
Prime Minister of India, Jawarhalal Nehru, at the United Nations Headquarters on 21 Dec 1956. Source: United Nations Photo #85575.
Knowledge of this episode adds to our understanding of diverse aspects of US together with Indian attitudes together with unusual policies inward the middle of 1950. It is evidence of the US making a major effort to describe Republic of Republic of India closer to it at a crucial phase of the emerging Cold War. This challenges both the notion of the US taking a balanced subcontinental approach prior to the state of war machine understanding amongst Islamic Republic of Pakistan that emerged inward slow 1953, together with also suggests the initial policy of leaving Cold War management of subcontinent affairs to the old-hand, Great Britain, was beingness reconsidered prior to China’s intervention inward the Korean War.[37] This offering should also live seen every bit an of import trial inward the US’s struggle to curvature the United Nations to the purposes of fighting the Cold War. The US fearfulness of communist Cathay was so peachy that Washington considered the risky displace of expelling its spent ally Jiang Jieshi together with instead anointing Republic of Republic of India at the highest tabular array of global politics, thereby inoculating it against farther troublemaking together with tilting the Security Council, to which the Soviets had just returned, irreparably beyond Communist influence.
Nehru’s response to the US’s offering underlined Indian agency inward its hard relations amongst the US.
Nehru’s response to the US’s offering underlined Indian agency inward its hard relations amongst the US. He rejected what mightiness have got been perceived every bit a real generous US proposal to back upwards India’s national interests on grounds of principle, indicating the difficulty the US would have got inward finding a mutual diplomatic linguistic communication amongst Republic of Republic of India through the 1950s. The substitution revealed Nehru’s continuing honor for the establishment of the United Nations every bit a critical aspect of his unusual policy, fifty-fifty next the perceived disadvantage that Republic of Republic of India felt it had been lay to inward the United Nations forum on the enquiry of Kashmir. More than anything else however, Nehru’s missive of the alphabet to Pandit confirmed the centrality of Cathay to a “Nehruvian” unusual policy, seen over again later inward the 1955 substitution inward Moscow, but shown to live firmly inward identify also inward 1950. Nehru was neither a fearful nor blindly infatuated “panda hugger,” but pursued a unusual policy constructed approximately the responsible view that the PRC was likewise large for the international scheme to ignore.[38] Finally this demonstrated Nehru’s conviction that Republic of Republic of India did deserve a spot on the Security Council, but this was non to live gained at the cost of theatre principle.
The ultimate isolation of the PRC from the world, India, together with fifty-fifty its closest ally, the USSR, yesteryear the fourth dimension of Nehru’s expiry inward 1964 suggests his policy of engagement together with socialization had failed. Indeed, it has been said that the 1962 state of war amongst Cathay “killed” Nehru.[39] However, to combat that Nehru’s reputation must live assessed inward lite of this failure it to ignore that he was powerless to handgrip pregnant influence over Beijing, where the leadership was nether the sway of a powerfully radical ideology. The PRC’s continued distance from the West together with the growing disputes amongst Republic of Republic of India inward the slow 1950s, followed yesteryear the Sino-Indian War inward 1962, all seemed to prefigure the eventual dissever amongst Moscow, an trial riddled amongst the esoteric imperatives of the socialist bloc’s competitive interpretations of ideology. On the contrary, Nehru must remove some credit for the before menstruum when Beijing pursued a broad engagement amongst the world, despite the US’s attitude. It is quite possible that, without Nehru’s accommodating approach to the PRC, Beijing mightiness have got turned its dorsum on a suspicious world far before than it did inward the end.
Anton Harder is a PhD candidate inward the International History Department of the London School of Economics. His dissertation is on Sino-Indian relations from 1949-1962.
[1] “This Day That Age,” The Hindu, September 28, 2005, http://www.hindu.com/2005/09/28/stories/2005092800270900.htm
[2] AG Noorani, “The Nehruvian Approach,” review of Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 2nd series, vol. 29, edited yesteryear H. Y. Sharada Prasad together with A. K. Damodaran, Frontline 19, no. 2 (January-February 2002), http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1902/19020810.htm. Noorani refers to the Hindu nationalist Sangh Parivar’s assail on Nehru for failing to secure India’s national interest
[3] Noorani, “The Nehruvian Approach.”
[4] One occupation remains: the NMML allows only a quarter of whatever file to live photocopied, so researchers must transcribe many documents they wishing to obtain inward full.
[5] Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 2nd series, vol. 29 (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund 2001).
[6] Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: H5N1 Biography, vol. 2 (London: Cape, 1979), 248
[7] Noorani, “The Nehruvian Approach;” the quote comes from Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 2nd series, vol. 29, 231
[8] See Noorani, “The Nehruvian Approach;” the quote comes from Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 2nd series, vol. 29, 303.
[9] Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, 24 August 1950, inward Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit Papers 1stInstallment (Pandit I), Subject File No. 59, Subject: 1949-51, Letters to Jawaharlal Nehru from VL Pandit sent during her tenure every bit Indian Ambassador to the U.S.A. of America, 132, Nehru Memorial Museum together with Library, New Delhi (NMML).
[10] Jawaharlal Nehru to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, xxx August, 1950, inward Pandit I, Subject File No. 60, Subject: 1949, 1950-51, Letters received yesteryear V.L. Pandit every bit Ambassador to Washington from Jawaharlal Nehru concerning India’s relations amongst US, Islamic Republic of Pakistan together with other countries together with developments at home, 137, NMML
[11] Memorandum yesteryear the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, together with African Affairs (Hare) to the Secretary of State, 3July 1950, inward Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume V, The Near East, South Asia, together with Africa (Washington, DC: United Stastes Government Printing Office, 1978), 1466
[12] Robert Barnes, “Branding an Aggressor: The Commonwealth, the United Nations together with Chinese intervention inward the Korean War, Nov 1950-January 1951,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 2 (2010): 235; See also, “16th October, 1950,” inward Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964, vol. 2, ed. G. Parthasarathi (Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1986), 227, footnote 8
[13] Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, 29 June, 1950, inward Pandit I, Subject File 59, 109, NMML
[14] “Record of Conversation amongst Indian Ambassador Panikkar of Premier Zhou Enlai together with Vice-Minister Zhang Hanfu close the Korean Problem together with the Problem of Restoring China’s Seat at the United Nations,” 1 July 1950, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of Cathay 105-00009-01(1), 1.
[15] Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, thirteen July, 1950, inward Pandit I, Subject file 59, 112, NMML
[16] Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, 27 July, 1950, inward Pandit I, Subject file 59, 122, NMML
[17] Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, twenty July, 1950, inward Pandit I, Subject file 59, 122, NMML
[18] William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 59. On 4 August 1950, the USSR’s newly returned representative at the Security Council Jacob Malik sought to plow debate in that location from the Korean War to the bailiwick of the PRC’s representation at the UN; he also attacked the US’s bombing of North Korea
[19] Andrew Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The U.S.A. together with India, 1947-1964 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 249-280.
[20] In particular, on the topic of US policy to Southern Asia inward the early on Cold War, consider H.W. Brands, The Cold Peace: Republic of Republic of India together with the U.S.A. (Boston: Twayne, 1999).
[21] Stueck, The Korean War, 12, 56, 368
[22] Various opinions were expressed inward official circles inward the US every bit to whether the United Nations mightiness live reorganized to amend serve the US. For representative quondam President Hoover advocated a novel United Nations organized without whatever Communist national representation. See inward Draft Statement for Possible Use yesteryear President Truman, three May 1950, inward Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume II, The United Nations; the Western Hemisphere (Washington, DC: U.S.A. Government Printing Office, 1976), 8-9.
[23] FRUS 1950, Vol. II. The thought that China’s United Nations General Assembly spot should live allowed to live vacant was lay forrard inward several discussions inward September inward training for the forthcoming session, for representative see, Minutes of Briefing Session of the U.S.A. Delegation to the General Assembly, Washington, Department of State, vii September 1950, inward Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume II, The United Nations; the Western Hemisphere, 273. However, official spot was maintained that Chinese Nationalist representation at the Security Council must live continued for the indispensable voting back upwards this gave the US. See, Minutes of the First Meeting of the U.S.A. Delegation to the General Assembly, New York, xviii September 1950, inward Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume II, The United Nations; the Western Hemisphere, 294.
[24] “Position Paper Prepared inward the Department of State,” 1 September 1950, inward Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume II, The United Nations; the Western Hemisphere, 327. The spot newspaper read, “The forthcoming General Assembly session volition opened upwards at a critical 2nd inward the history of the United Nations. Through the accident of Soviet absence from the Security Council, together with amongst an impetus stemming principally from the United States, the Organization, amongst the unanimous back upwards of the costless world, has faced upwards to aggression inward a mode hardly believed possible yesteryear its strongest supporters. In September, for the first of all fourth dimension since hostilities began inward Korea, the entire membership of the United Nations volition run across to consider its hereafter policy. The Assembly may seize the chance to capitalize on recent developments yesteryear strengthening the United Nations’ capacity together with reaffirming its determination to grapple amongst aggression; or it may sink from this occupation together with lose a unique adventure to consolidate its newly found strength. As it was at the outset of the Korean affair, the mental attitude of the U.S.A. tin live decisive.” So nosotros tin consider hither the US starting to consider other ways to maintain its payoff at the UN, yesteryear September turning to the United Nations General Assembly every bit to a greater extent than malleable forum than the United Nations Security Council amongst a returned Soviet delegate.
[25] “However hard the path, it has to live pursued yesteryear repeated attempts at co-operation on the business office of all nations. Once that effort is given up, the number tin only live a training for conflict on a world-wide scale together with ultimately, the conflict itself.” See “A Problem for the United Nations, Message broadcast yesteryear the United Nations Radio network from Lake Success, New York,” v May 1950, inward Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, vol. 2 (Delhi: The Publications Division, Ministry of Information together with Broadcasting, Government of India), 130.
[26] For an impressive explanation of Nehru’s organized religious belief inward diplomacy, together with specially his together with India’s ain diplomatic skills, see, Andrew Bingham Kennedy, The International Ambitions of Mao together with Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs together with the Making of Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
[27] Mithi Mukherjee, “‘A World of Illusion’: The Legacy of Empire inward India’s Foreign Relations, 1947-1962,” The International History Review 32, no 2 (2010): 253-271. Mukherjee argues that the leaders of Independent Republic of Republic of India transferred the pre-Gandhi era Congress loyalty to the regal metropolis to the United Nations every bit the ultimate source of jurist inward international affairs.
[28] See regime annotation ix above
[29] Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire together with the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). Mazower’s history of the UN’s origins includes a focus on how Nehru challenged together with destroyed the regal internationalism of Jan Smuts betwixt 1946 together with 1950, though he failed to forestall the evolution of apartheid inward South Africa
[30] Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, 2 September, 1949, inward Pandit I, Subject File No. 59, 47, NMML. Pandit complained to Nehru of an effort yesteryear the US to lay Republic of Republic of India “on a par” amongst Islamic Republic of Pakistan at the United Nations over Kashmir. For Nehru’s early on frustration amongst the US together with U.K. for their backing of Islamic Republic of Pakistan at the United Nations over Kashmir see, Ramachandra Guha, Republic of Republic of India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy (London: Macmillan, 2007), 72; Stueck, The Korean War, 81; Benjamin Zachariah, Nehru (London: Routledge, 2004), 180
[31] Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, 2 September, 1949, inward Pandit I, Subject File No. 59, 47, NMML.
[32] “14th September, 1950,” inward Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964, vol. 2, ed. G. Parthasarathi (Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1986), 194. Nehru reiterated that the most of import number at the United Nations was that the PRC remove China’s seat
[33] “14th September, 1950,” inward Jawaharlal Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964, vol. 2, ed. G. Parthasarathi (Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1986), 194
[34] See Brands, The Cold Peace, 51, 63, on Nehru’s assessment that world must avoid making same error of isolating Cathay every bit West did inward early on history of Soviet Union
[35] Cable to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, New Delhi, xix July, 1949, inward Selected Works of Jawharlal Nehru, vol. 12, (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1991), 389
[36] Jawaharlal Nehru to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, xxx August, 1950, inward Pandit I, Subject File No. 60, Subject: 1949, 1950-51, Letters received yesteryear V.L. Pandit every bit Ambassador to Washington from Jawaharlal Nehru concerning India’s relations amongst US, Islamic Republic of Pakistan together with other countries together with developments at home, 137, NMML
[37] See Brands, The Cold Peace, 40-41, on the US’s initial “Commonwealth” policy of delegating safety issues on the sub-continent to Great Britain, together with the effort to maintain out of Indo-Pak quarrels. For Brands’ proffer that this strategy was only reconsidered next China’s intervention inward the Korean War, consider Brands, The Cold Peace, 60.
[38] Brahma Chellaney quoted inward Tsering Topgyal, “Charting the Tibet Issue inward the Sino-Indian Border Dispute,” Cathay Report 47 (May 2011): 115-113.
[39] Ramachandra Guha, “The War That Killed Nehru,” essay based on the Ingalls Lecture delivered at the Harvard-Yenching Institute on 29 March 2011.
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