By Michael Dempsey
Nearly 3 years on from the Islamic State’s high H2O grade inwards the summertime of 2015, in that location are several lessons that the U.S. too its allies tin discern from the terrorist group’s meteoric ascension to command large parts of Republic of Iraq too Syrian Arab Republic to the loss of its physical caliphate tardily lastly year. The steady turn down inwards ISIL’s fortunes is striking given the palpable fright its ascension inwards the summertime of 2014 sparked across Washington, when a mutual inquiry circulating inside the policy community was whether Baghdad itself mightiness fall. Many of these takeaways volition live relevant to U.S. policymakers every bit they travail to preclude the grouping from reconstituting itself inwards the coming months. ISIL is Hurting Without a Safe Haven
Since the autumn of Mosul too Raqqa, ISIL’s external operations remove hold been sharply curtailed, too its communications remove hold been greatly reduced (almost 3 quarters of the group’s media outlets remove hold fallen silent since tardily lastly year). Absent its command of territory inwards Republic of Iraq too Syria, the Islamic State is straight off focusing primarily on trying to grow its 8 overseas branches too inspire lone wolf operations abroad. It’s clear that denying the Islamic State its physical caliphate has been deleterious to the group’s operations. As such, denying the Islamic State command of physical terrain anywhere inwards the footing should live undertaking number 1 for those who wish to see this grouping defeated decisively.
The Islamic State Still Gravitates Toward Chaos
The Islamic State loves a vacuum. After rising 1 time again to prominence inwards the wake of the Syrian civil state of war too the political dysfunction of Republic of Iraq nether Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, today the grouping is making its greatest inroads inwards troubled areas from the Sinai too Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to Republic of Yemen too parts of Southeast Asia. In Republic of Yemen alone, the Pentagon estimates that the Islamic State’s presence has doubled over the past times year. Across the globe, the Islamic State has proven itself skilled at exploiting the erosion or collapse of local authorities potency too legitimacy, too at appealing to Sunni populations that experience threatened past times growing Shia political power. The displace is likewise continuing to gain loose energy (and recruits) from the turmoil caused past times the ongoing Iranian-Saudi conflict, which today shows no sign of abating too which is instead fueling the destructive state of war inwards Yemen.
The Islamic State is Hard to Oust from Cities
For most of the past times 2 years, the mass of U.S. too coalition state of war machine efforts against ISIL remove hold been focused on ousting the grouping from cities nether its control. This has oft required block-to-block fighting past times U.S. coalition allies backed past times American airpower inwards scenes reminiscent of World War II combat. For example, inwards Sirte, Libya, progress inwards ousting the Islamic State was, for months, measured past times the number of metropolis blocks seized past times the Misratan militia each day. Similar scenes played out inwards both Mosul too Raqqa.
In these cities, ISIL adopted a mutual tactical playbook, which included trapping too using civilians every bit human shields, cleverly using smoke to mask movements too obscure coalition airpower, destroying key transportation arteries into the cities, using tunnels to displace personal too equipment, deploying suicide auto bombs, too concentrating its forces inwards heavily booby-trapped buildings. Taken together, these tactics contributed to fights that devastated local infrastructure too triggered a moving ridge of refugees—many of whom remove hold yet to supply home. It’s clear the Islamic State recognizes the utility of operating inwards cities, too thus U.S. policymakers too their coalition allies should facial expression to a greater extent than of that inwards the future.
The Islamic State is Adapting its Battlefield Tactics
In lite of recent setbacks, ISIL fighters are increasingly focusing on suicide attacks too hit-and-run operations, too are avoiding large-scale battles amongst coalition forces. On xix February, ISIL fighters ambushed a Shia militia group close Hawija, Iraq, the deadliest such onslaught since Hawija was wrested from ISIL command lastly October. In recent months, ISIL has used drones to target U.S. too coalition forces operating close both Raqqa too Mosul, reflecting the group’s intent to inflict every bit much impairment every bit possible on its enemies patch minimizing its ain casualties. And inwards January, the group’s media fly announced that the grouping lastly yr had conducted nearly 800 suicide attacks inwards Republic of Iraq too Syria, strongly suggesting that its leaders see this tactic every bit their best battlefield alternative for the foreseeable future.
The Islamic State is Also Shifting its Narrative
In recent months, the group’s populace messaging drive has, for obvious reasons, abandoned its emphasis on the physical caliphate too the religious obligation of Muslims to back upward it, Instead, it focuses almost solely on state of war machine conflict. As Charlie Winter wrote tardily lastly yr inwards Wired UK, “92 pct of the group’s propaganda straight off revolves unopen to war, too state of war alone.” The Islamic State’s wish to inspire every bit many lone wolf attacks unopen to the footing every bit possible dramatically increases the burden on governments too the individual sector to seat ways to monitor those susceptible to the jihadist group’s novel pitch, remain ahead of the Islamic State’s shifting online messaging efforts (which are non outflow past times the cyber norms followed past times nation actors), too develop effective counter-radicalization strategies.
Don’t Overlook the Islamic State’s Deep-Rooted Vulnerabilities
Because of the Islamic State’s notoriety, it’s slowly to focus only on the group’s strengths. But, inwards reality, the grouping continues to endure from many of the same shortcomings that remove hold plagued the grouping since its creation inwards Republic of Iraq to a greater extent than than a decade ago. On the battlefield, the Islamic State has never constitute an effective way to counter U.S. too coalition air power, which has undercut its powerfulness to mass forces too concentrate resources. In price of governance, the Islamic State has demonstrated administrative science when inwards command of territory, but it’s primarily skillful at extracting natural resources too exploiting existing businesses too has proven far less capable of really creating anything. In its branding, the Islamic State’s reliance on extreme violence, including inwards its propaganda videos showing bloody footage from attacks claimed past times ISIL, continues to alienate virtually the entire Muslim community. And inwards its leadership approach, the Islamic State’s exercise of entrusting only high-level unusual fighters amongst key leadership positions (a designing practiced past times Abu Musab al-Zarqawi inwards Republic of Iraq to a greater extent than than a decade ago) continues to alienate local communities. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 mutual complaint expressed past times disillusioned recruits is that the Islamic State goes to cracking lengths to protect its leaders patch allowing local residents too ill-trained, low-level unusual volunteers to carry the brunt of the fighting.
Don’t Underestimate Local Security Forces
As ISIL seized command of large parts of Syrian Arab Republic too Republic of Iraq 3 years ago, it became commonplace inwards the West to bemoan a lack of reliable state of war machine partners on the ground. Indeed, I participated inwards numerous White House meetings too congressional hearings at the fourth dimension inwards which the grade of frustration amongst America’s lack of credible state of war machine partners was unmistakable. It’s for sure truthful that inwards the summertime of 2014, the Iraqi state of war machine largely melted away inwards the human face upward of ISIL’s offensive, largely owing to the dysfunctional leadership it had experienced inwards the preceding years nether Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. But it’s likewise truthful that amongst intensive U.S. state of war machine training, including past times frontward based U.S. special operations forces, increased U.S. unopen air support, too vastly improved political too state of war machine leadership inwards Baghdad, the Iraqi armed forces (particularly its special operations forces) performed admirably too played a critical role inwards driving ISIL from the territory it 1 time held inwards Iraq.
Similarly, inwards Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces (the U.S. backed coalition of Kurdish too Arab fighters) deserve cracking credit for driving ISIL out of thousands of foursquare miles of territory it 1 time claimed. The Syrian Democratic Forces likewise played a Pb role inwards assaulting the upper-case alphabetic quality of ISIL’s caliphate, Raqqa. While in that location is no doubtfulness that the U.S. military’s assistance, especially through unopen air support, inwards both Republic of Iraq too Syrian Arab Republic underpinned the success of both the Iraqi state of war machine too the Syrian Democratic Forces, it’s clear that local forces did a lot of the fighting too dying, too that they proved upward to the challenge when properly led too supported.
Competing Interests Abound
While the U.S.-led counter-ISIL coalition is to a greater extent than than seventy nations strong, it’s likewise truthful that from the commencement of the conflict several major countries remove hold pursued divergent agendas. For example, Ankara’s ongoing state of war machine operations against the Kurdish enclave inwards Afrin, inwards northwestern Syria, is threatening to derail Kurdish back upward for the broader counter-ISIL campaign. And patch Russian Federation purportedly entered the Syrian conflict inwards 2015 to target ISIL, it has spent most of its loose energy inwards Syrian Arab Republic inwards combatting other groups who oppose Bashar al-Assad’s regime. So, patch many of the countries fighting inwards Syrian Arab Republic too Iraq, including Iran, are really worried almost the danger ISIL poses too the broader extremist threat, it’s likewise apparent that they are pursuing their ain self-interests inwards such a way that has often trumped cooperation against ISIL when necessary.
The U.S. Needs a Focal Point
From nearly a standing start inwards 2014, the U.S. policy community organized an integrated strategy that seat the groundwork for the successful counter-ISIL drive of the past times 3 years. Central to that travail was the engagement of a special envoy to assist organize this effort, currently veteran diplomat Brett McGurk, who became the government’s focal cry for too main interlocutor amongst the counter-ISIL coalition. In my view, the special envoy’s efforts remove hold been critical inwards focusing the inter-agency on substance state of war machine too diplomatic requirements, too inwards presenting a unified message to America’s coalition partners. There are rumors floating unopen to Washington that this special envoy seat may live eliminated soon, but, inwards my view, it’s vital that in that location remain 1 key entity too official charged amongst coordinating all of the U.S. government’s (and the coalition’s) disparate counter-ISIL efforts. The progress achieved inwards recent years inwards formulating a unified reply to the threat of the Islamic State has been remarkable, too U.S. policymakers may wish to proceed cautiously inwards altering an approach that has worked too thus well.
The Fight Isn’t Over
Given the rapid progress America too its partners remove hold achieved inwards eliminating the Islamic State’s physical caliphate, it would live slowly to believe that this struggle is winding down. Indeed, a determination to shift America’s state of war machine focus from the Islamic State would live understandable given the North Korean standoff too the deteriorating province of affairs inwards Afghanistan. But patch ISIL is clearly on its heels, it remains a wily too determined foe capable of inflicting grievous impairment if given the chance, too of reconstituting itself if the underlying weather condition that fueled its ascension are non addressed. If goose egg else, the past times 3 years should remove hold taught U.S. policymakers that in that location is no unmarried solution to defeating the Islamic State, too that what’s required is a multi-pronged, multi-year drive amongst several key elements. First, to hold steady state of war machine pressure level on ISIL remnants inwards both Republic of Iraq too Syria. Second, to prioritize the struggle against the Islamic State’s most of import nodes, especially inwards the Sinai too Libya. Third, to increment fiscal investment too loans to assist rebuild shattered communities (especially vulnerable Sunni ones) inwards Republic of Iraq too Syria. Fourth, to expand diplomatic efforts to assist trim Iran-Saudi tensions, especially past times reaching an understanding to assist resolve their proxy conflict inwards Yemen. And finally, to increment cooperation betwixt the U.S. authorities too the individual sector to counter online radicalization.
In the end, maybe the most of import lesson of the past times 3 years of this struggle is that patch America too its coalition allies remove hold made remarkable progress against ISIL, in that location is withal considerable piece of job left to do.
About the Author
Michael P Dempsey is the National Intelligence Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a society sponsored past times the U.S. government. He is likewise the old acting U.S. Director of National Intelligence.
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