By: Roger McDermott
Since initiating the reform of the Russian Armed Forces inwards 2008, Moscow has paid unopen attending to the evolution of its ain network-centric warfare capability. Elements of this version of network-centric approaches to fighting operations bring involved strengthening electronic warfare (EW) capacity, modernizing infrastructure, reforming structures, equally good equally boosting as well as streamlining command as well as control, amidst other features. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 related emphasis has been placed upon forcefulness enablers as well as forcefulness multipliers. As the integration of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance as well as reconnaissance (C4ISR) has advanced, Moscow has besides experimented amongst network-centric operations during its interest inwards the complex conflict inwards Syrian Arab Republic (Versia.ru, Oct 1). Facilitating its network-centric operations inwards Syrian Arab Republic involves unifying reconnaissance as well as intelligence along amongst command-and-control (C2) structures inwards the key hub of the National Defense Management Center (Natsionalnomu Tsentru Upravleniya Oboronoy—NTsUO), inwards Moscow. The NTsUO was created inwards Dec 2014 as well as lies at the pump of Russia’s burgeoning network-centric capability (see EDM, April 19, 2016; November 4, 2014).
In the procurement as well as evolution of hardware as well as platforms ranging from artillery systems to tanks, these are integrated into the overall construction of the modernized automated C2 organization to facilitate the speed as well as efficiency of operational conclusion making (Versia.ru, Oct 1). While several senior Russian officers as well as specialists bring written nearly the experiments amongst network-centric warfare inwards the mag of the General Staff, Voyennaya Mysl, wider media references bring besides move commonplace.
Indeed, inwards an interview inwards August 2017, Frants Klintsevich, the deputy chairperson of the Federation Council (upper bedchamber of the Russian parliament) Committee on Defense as well as Security, stated that Russia’s operations inwards Syrian Arab Republic were conducted according to the principles of network-centric warfare. He noted how Russian commandos on the battlefield were using Ratnik personnel fighting gear equipment to comport reconnaissance as well as target designation, inwards social club to assist the Aerospace Forces (Vozdushno Kosmicheskikh Sil—VKS) inwards conducting airstrikes (Tvzvezda.ru, August 26, 2017). More recently, Colonel General Vladimir Zarudnitsky, the original of the General Staff Academy, confirmed that commanders at the university are beingness taught network-centric warfare. He added that the role of the conflict inwards Syrian Arab Republic is important, along amongst non-contact operations as well as cyberwarfare (Tvzvezda.ru, June 27).
Other Russian military machine analysts bring noted that experimentation amongst C4ISR inwards conducting operations inwards Syrian Arab Republic extends good beyond VKS airstrikes. They besides signal to the Armed Forces exploiting multiple platforms such equally naval assets as well as high-precision boom systems functioning inwards a network-enabled operational environment. These operations, according to Russian specialists, depend heavily upon accessing space, gathering reconnaissance via unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), exploiting modernized communications, greatly improving C4ISR, as well as applying greater EW capacity (Vpk-news.ru, Oct 22).
As noted, the NTsUO inwards Moscow acts equally an information hub, facilitating such operations inwards existent time. The nature of its construction as well as role inwards these operations was late detailed inwards an of import article published past times Zvezda Weekly. The NTsUO is a unified organization for managing “all military machine subunits inwards the Russian Armed Forces,” as well as includes the nuclear triad. Since thence much information passes through it daily, a computerized “expert system” is used, for “monitoring as well as analyzing the military-political, socioeconomic, as well as sociopolitical province of affairs inwards Russian Federation as well as the world.” The NTsUO unites the diverse automated C2 systems functioning across the Armed Forces. These include the Unified System for Command as well as Control at the Tactical Level (Yedinaya avtomatizirovannaya sistema upravleniya takticheskim zvenom—YeSU TZ), designed for the Ground Forces, amongst its diverse specific upgrades for the Military-Maritime Fleet (Voyenno-Мorskoy Flot—VMF) as well as the VKS. Additionally, the Andromeda-D organization was created to conform the needs of the Airborne Forces. This overall unification of systems extends downwards to tactical-level communication systems. These automated C2 systems bring been tested during operational-strategic exercises, most late inwards Vostok 2018, as well as inwards fighting operations inwards Syrian Arab Republic (Zvezdaweekly.ru, Oct 16)
Consequently, the NTsUO includes 3 command-and-control centers uniting the diverse automated C2 systems: the Strategic Nuclear Forces Command as well as Control Center, the Battle Management Center as well as a Center for Management of Day-to-Day Activities. The Battle Management Center monitors the global military-political situation, assesses as well as forecasts the emergence of threats to Russian Federation as well as its allies, as well as supports C2 over all military machine forcefulness elements, including the non–defense ministry building troops. According to the writer of the Zvezda Weekly piece, “[S]pace as well as aerial reconnaissance complexes are information sources for the Strategic Nuclear Forces Command as well as Control Center, as well as tactical reconnaissance as well as subunits of the SSO [Special Operations Forces] collect information for the TsBU [Battle Management Center] during fighting operations.” Admittedly, Russian Federation silent lags good behind the the States inwards the utilisation of military machine communications as well as reconnaissance satellites. This is an expanse inwards which Moscow sees a involve for farther development. But inwards the meantime, or thence of these deficiencies are addressed past times enhanced battlefield utilisation of reconnaissance UAVs (Zvezdaweekly.ru, Oct 16).
Moreover, the Zvezda Weekly writer noted that, “Wide utilisation of reconnaissance UAVs, as well as the introduction of Ratnik-2 fighting gear as well as equipment, which includes the Strelets reconnaissance, command, command as well as communications (KRUS) complex, helped the effectiveness of operations past times our plain reconnaissance personnel.” In operations inwards Syria, however, “Strelets KRUS ensured performance of missions of battle management, communications, information transmission, as well as private as well as grouping navigation; detection, coordinate measurement, as well as recognition of targets; equally good equally guidance to a target. Information beingness transmitted from the KRUS interfaces amongst all Russian reconnaissance, surveillance, as well as target-designation complexes; [as good as] radars; rangefinders; clinometers; as well as UAVs” (Zvezdaweekly.ru, Oct 16).
This unified organization was tested, refined as well as institute to role good during fighting operations inwards Syria. Everything seen past times the reconnaissance satellite, reconnaissance UAV, or private soldier was besides simultaneously fed to the NTsUO. The NTsUO has been used extensively inwards overseeing the logistical furnish for Russian forces inwards Syrian Arab Republic as well as reducing the costs involved. Consequently, the experimental utilisation of forcefulness enablers as well as forcefulness multipliers, such equally EW as well as network-centric approaches to fighting operations, bring allowed Moscow to avoid sending much larger numbers of troops to Syria. Moreover, equally the writer observes inwards Zvezda Weekly, this capability tin give the axe move applied across a broad spectrum of conflict types, including asymmetrically against a near-peer adversary. Thus, it appears that Russia’s Armed Forces bring transitioned away from relying on overwhelming numbers of personnel inwards operations, instead seeking to expand as well as deepen their character through network-enabled approaches.
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