Abdul Rahman Rahmani too Noor Afshan Lawrence
On October 18, 2018, General Abdul Raziq, the Provincial Police Chief of Kandahar Province, along with the Provincial Intelligence Chief, Gen Momin, was killed inward an insider attack. The Taliban chop-chop claimed responsibleness for the attack, stating that it was an, “attack carried [out] past times an infiltrator.” The Taliban’s claim of responsibleness did non surprise many inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan since the onset bore the hallmark brutality too insider betrayal too so mutual with Taliban attacks. What surprised many Afghans was the simultaneous conspiracy theory that circled inward social media mere hours later attack. The narrative of the conspiracy was that, “the onset was ordered past times Gen. Austin Scott Miller the Resolute Support Mission Commander inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan too carried past times his bodyguards.” This surprising counter claim gained such quick momentum that it forced Chief Executive of Afghanistan, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, to take an immediate stand against it.
What withdraw hold nosotros learned from the conspiracy theory, too to a greater extent than importantly, from the social media prowess that buoyed its prevalence?
For starters, that the effective physiological warfare carried out past times the Taliban too their backers inward Islamic Republic of Pakistan prevented a minute inward which all Afghans, authorities officials too the civil public alike, could withdraw hold united inward their sorrow too grief over losing ii national heroes. Instead, people chop-chop overlooked the damning brutality of the attack, giving acceptance to the counter claim, too with it, their implicit back upward to the Taliban. The masterful propaganda excogitation was conducted such that the Taliban through 1 claim maintained a flat of credibility inward the local populace’s eyes too at the same fourth dimension assert a decisive operational victory inward the killing of a prominent avowed foe. This undermined an otherwise successful twelvemonth inward which the Afghan authorities too its coalition partners had made meaning gains inward bringing peace too stability to the province. The conspiratorial claim, too its subsequent fallout (all interface betwixt Afghans too their coalition advisors was halted for several days every bit tensions settled) was mayhap exactly every bit effective every bit the actual lethal attack. Both Afghans too the coalition must immediately pass a bully bargain of attempt to deny, seek false, too re-convince a suspicious public that this wasn’t an onset ordered past times the nation’s trusted American advisors.
As data operations too its environs becomes modern warfare’s front-line, the Afghan authorities too supporting coalition forces must locomote to a greater extent than capable inward companionship to defeat the enemy inward a domain inward which they withdraw hold shown to a greater extent than vulnerability than strength. To overcome such conspiracies inward the future, the state of war inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan must accept a plough towards the criminal offence inward the data warfare spectrum. In the historic menstruation of powerfully enabling applied scientific discipline too social media, this objective volition endure achieved past times implementing ii things simultaneously. First, the Afghan authorities must construct a capable Joint Information Dominance Force, for instance, a control of around 300 personal combined from iii dissimilar safety branches, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, too the Directorate of Intelligence, to counter the the Taliban’s (and other adversaries) social media campaign. Secondly, Afghan safety policy makers must ameliorate restrictive policies that prohibit Afghan officers from speaking upward inward back upward of their government’s policies either inward social media or inward rural areas - a necessary too critical ascendance to enable countering the faux narratives too so effectively spread past times the enemy. Combined, these ii efforts volition allow the Afghan authorities to counter enemy propaganda too win inward the data warfare domain both through physical too social media engagement.
The Taliban, according to the mass Narrating the Exit from Afghanistan, withdraw hold made an appeal inward their data state of war to the iii “primary social identities that most Afghans share: religion, culture, too politics.” The Taliban are spreading their propaganda via Taranas (Holy Chants broadcasted through radio, shops, too armed services vehicles), leaflets (distributed past times ordinary Taliban inward rural areas inward places similar mosques, local gatherings similar Jirgas, too if necessary inward person) too through social media. The social media aspect of this propagation is done past times virtually all Taliban fighters, primarily using Facebook, Twitter, but also reaching into Instagram too Snapchat. These data warfare tactics are used to disrupt Afghan authorities activities inward the areas where the Taliban are operating to destroy the human relationship betwixt ordinary Afghans too safety forces.[i] Afghan safety forces are non educated plenty to counter the Taliban’s efforts inward rural areas too are lacking the speed too wide communication way of the enemy - or they are prohibited from using social media too other aspects of data warfare to counter the Taliban data warfare tactics online or inward local areas.
The reasons why Afghan safety forces are non participating inward countering the propaganda state of war of the Taliban, is a word that is overdue too needs to endure addressed past times senior ministry building leaders too policy makers. For now, the reasons are simple: first, most of the policies too laws that trammel Afghan safety forces from participating inward counterpropaganda campaigns are either outdated (most of them holdovers from the era of the communist occupation) or withdraw hold been written past times officers who withdraw hold studied nether the Russians. Regrettably, the primacy of beingness taught past times the Russian armed services serves counter to the electrical flow situation. Arguably, the sometime communist regime worked with a complicit too corrupt Afghan authorities to quiet too suppress the population, starkly inward contrast to spreading democratic policies beingness introduced past times the electrical flow coalition too espoused past times the electrical flow political regime. Many of the older generation of Russian sympathizers don’t immature adult woman an chance to convey to their subordinates that they are exactly combat forces, too to stay good clear from whatsoever word of the Afghan authorities too coalition forces’ narratives inward rural areas, piece they themselves waste matter no chance to vocalize their commentary, echoing the Taliban narrative too degrading the the States too its allies’ efforts to gain public support. To pose it inward perspective, according to old Russian armed services doctrine, soldiers are state of war machines who are non allowed to participate inward political aspects of war. They are non allowed to verbalise politics, accept component inward political reforms, nor human activeness every bit political agents. “Their views are far [too] permissive toward the utilization of forcefulness every bit a policy instrument.” In contrast, Western commonwealth too armed services doctrine learn the opposite, officers are 1 of the main drivers of political discourse during war, they are non state of war machines, but rational thinking humans whose reasoning too reasonableness allow them to necktie political needs to battlefield success, hence their willingness to participate inward the political discourse too enact alter past times their votes inward elections. Within for certain guidelines too with operational safety considerations, they tin give the axe utilization all aspects of state of war including social media to defeat their adversaries.
This begs the question, why is western armed services doctrine taking too so long to run inward Afghanistan? H5N1 RAND Corporation study flora that from 2005-2010, the the States data warfare receive inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan did non “produce positive results for its makers too was fifty-fifty counterproductive,” inward some aspects. “The most-notable shortcoming had been the inability to effectively counter the Taliban propaganda receive against U.S. too NATO forces on the subject of civilian casualties, both domestically too internationally.” This is to a greater extent than frequently than non because the data warfare inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan was conducted past times the the States too other coalition forces without Afghans backing their counterparts. For example, if Google too Facebook are the most visited search engines inward every aspect of this war, they volition neglect to exhibit Afghan officers’ writings too ideas inward countering the Taliban narratives. Add to this the previously discussed restrictions on Afghan officers beingness allowed to counter Taliban propaganda inward rural areas or cities - or online - too y'all acquire what looks similar a really one-sided propaganda environment. What y'all acquire is factual representations of statistics – piece truthful - that inward no way relate to the people, too are non inward whatsoever way echoed or reinforced past times Afghan officers.
The grapheme of the war, according to Clausewitz, is changeable too and so are its politics. If nosotros include modern mesh data applied scientific discipline every bit a changing grapheme of war, it is imperative that the Afghan Security Forces conform accordingly. It has been proven that the enemy is taking wages of this technology, inclusive of social media, thus nosotros must accept the create out to the enemy inward this front end too. According to the cited RAND study,information warfare is “low cost, inward areas without traditional boundaries, where classic intelligence collection too analysis methods are easily diminished.”
For the Afghans - nosotros must understand how to create out too win inward the data rich environment. The Afghan authorities must allow its officers to participate inward counterpropaganda - but carefully - inward a way that does non interfere with armed services discipline, maintains operational security, within the dominion of law, too paying detail attending to the fine line betwixt truth too propaganda.
Considering this need, the Afghan authorities must construct a narrative available to all Afghans. That narrative must counter the Taliban’s data gear upward on on the religious, cultural, too political identities of Afghans. It must endure frequent too dispersed from trusted sources. The Afghan safety forces are the most trusted tribe alongside all Afghans from all ethnic groups. This is an wages that the Afghan authorities must utilization against its enemies. Therefore, the Afghan authorities must construct a articulation force; let’s telephone telephone it the Joint Information Dominance Force (JIDF). This forcefulness should endure created from all iii safety sections, an goodness full general officeholder every bit the commander, with several deputies, too several hundred data ascendance experts. This forcefulness should endure capable to craft, maintain, too distribute the national narrative across all fronts; the primary tenet: centralized, streamlined, too effective strategic communication of the national message. The JIDF messages must endure distributed inward parallel past times ii groups - Afghan safety forces too influential authorities civilians. The forcefulness must withdraw hold connections with the Ministry of Hajj too Islamic Affairs to distribute its message through Mullah Imams, who are paid past times the government, inward mosques, too other Islamic schools too madrassas. It must endure paired with The Ministry of Education to distribute its messages to authorities too nongovernment schools. The Ministry of Higher Education tin give the axe aid theJIDF to distribute its narratives inward public too individual universities. There must endure no dubiety that the Ministry of Women’s Affairs too the Civil Society would aid this narrative to circle about Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan – too it must run closely with public too individual media to influence the remaining populations inward Afghanistan. Finally, edifice a solid narrative through the JIDF volition allow the Afghan authorities to rebrand the Afghan safety forces inward the eyes of all Afghans every bit a forcefulness that is trusted too capable of securing the people’s interests.
In conclusion, because Afghan safety forces are trusted sources inward the eyes of local populations, the Afghan policy makers must ameliorate laws too regulations that ban Afghan safety forces from speaking upward inward back upward of their authorities policies. These changes would rebuild trust betwixt ordinary Afghans too their safety forces too they would aid win the data ascendance state of war nosotros are waging with our enemies.
Major Abdul Rahman Rahmani too Noor Afshan Lawrence are the founders of Noshaq: The showtime Afghan Security Strategic Studies Center, based inward Kabul, Afghanistan.
End Note
[i] Corman Steven R. Editor. Narrating the Exit From Afghanistan. Center for Strategic Communications. Tempe, Arizona, USA. 2013.
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