By Stephan J. Pikner*
After 17 years of the state of war on terror, the USA in addition to its allies stand upwardly today at a grand strategic inflection point. As America concentrated on Iraq, Afghanistan, in addition to countering tearing extremism across the globe, regional powers such equally China, Russia, in addition to Islamic Republic of Iran dramatically expanded their ambitions in addition to capabilities. Starting with the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, in addition to accelerated past times the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, this resurgence of non bad might assertiveness has been met with a certainly weariness past times the West. While American allies in addition to supporters of the rules-based international fellowship have—in many cases belatedly—woken upwardly to the threat of systemic upheaval, the lack of a shared organizing regulation has express the gratis world’s response. Emerging rivals take away hold historically focused minds in addition to opened wallets, but today America’s state of war machine is hamstrung past times competing visions in addition to priorities. In this emerging global safety environment, the USA should modify its state of war machine construction in addition to global posture to counter the total array of rising regional rivals in addition to ensure the continued security, freedom, in addition to prosperity of its allies in addition to like-minded partners throughout the world. Through a procedure of deliberate safety partnership in addition to capacity-building—an approach this article dubs “complementary engagement”—the USA tin can keep global leadership, conform to today’s threats, in addition to rebalance the burden in addition to take away a opportunity of safety to reverberate modern economical realities.
The deviation request for this article is G. John Ikenberry’s sentiment of the post–Cold War era equally an “American-led liberal hegemonic globe order,” where unrivaled U.S. strength underwrites economical growth in addition to political liberalization through a widely accepted, voluntary, rules-based, but increasingly atrophying system. While the inherent stability of unipolarity has been debated past times international relations scholars, the failure of a cohesive counterbalancing coalition to emerge equally a challenge to the American-led organisation supports Ikenberry’s benign sentiment of U.S. dominance.1 This does non hateful that the USA in addition to its allies create non confront an array of increasingly assertive in addition to capable threats that seek to undermine this order—as the 2018 National Defense Strategy clearly states, nosotros are facing “increased global disorder, characterized past times turn down inwards the longstanding rules-based international order.”2 Rather, it sees these rivals equally probing for weakness along the periphery, in addition to seeking relative gains from the resultant anarchy.3 While in that location are many elements to the American-led, rules-based international order, this article argues the largest in addition to most critical slice of the construction that undergirds it is U.S. state of war machine power.4 Given a hit of rising regional rivals who are engaging inwards interstate competition, along with the continued state of war on terror in addition to increasingly independent in addition to well-armed allies, how tin can the USA best ensure continued safety in addition to prosperity?
To reply this question, this article begins past times tracing the development of strategy from the terminate of the Cold War to the lately published National Security Strategy (NSS). Examining proposed alternatives to America’s grand strategy in addition to the events that shaped its development frames the 2nd section, which explores the electrical flow dilemma in addition to helps differentiate today’s challenge from the previous contexts that silent grade the foundation for many electrical flow proposals. In the finally section, this article proposes a comprehensive state of war machine construction in addition to posture shift—complementary engagement—that ameliorate addresses the dilemma of rising regional rivals.
The Evolution of Post–Cold War Grand Strategy
The collapse of the Soviet Union prompted a broad reassessment of American grand strategy. Deep engagement, the prevailing American strategy during the Cold War, tin can live on defined equally the enduring diplomatic, informational, military, in addition to economical partnerships with a broad hit of allies in addition to partners across the globe that underwrote sustained economical growth in addition to regional stability inwards the confront of communism. It enabled the West German linguistic communication in addition to Austrian postwar Wirtschaftswunder in addition to the phenomenal growth of the “Asian Tigers” inwards the shadow of Soviet in addition to Chinese communism, in addition to nurtured liberal commonwealth inwards Europe in addition to Asia.5 Deep engagement’s critics, though, cited the high terms of maintaining this state of war machine footprint, the trap of allies shirking their defense strength responsibilities, in addition to the take away a opportunity of beingness drawn into peripheral conflicts equally reasons to reassess this grand strategy inwards the wake of the Soviet demise.6 Several alternatives to the Cold War approach of deep engagement were posited inwards the 1990s. These ranged from a render to pre–World War II reclusiveness to a continuation of the expansive (and expensive) Cold War posture. This debate considered several options, broadly categorized equally neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, in addition to primacy.7
Neo-isolationists advocated disentangling from the spider web of alliances in addition to commitments across the globe that was woven during the Cold War. The geographic advantages of the United States, coupled with its lack of historical rivals in addition to overwhelming state of war machine in addition to economical power, could allow America to safely stair dorsum from the world. Even if a threat to the USA did emerge, geography would provide a buffer to allow for rearmament, equally it did inwards the opening years of World War II. Left unanswered past times proponents of neo-isolationism, however, was the threat of nuclear proliferation with states that could no longer rely on the American posture of extended deterrence for their ain security.8
Advocates for selective engagement sought to focus American might exclusively on geopolitically critical areas, rather than spreading it ineffectually across the globe. By prioritizing strategic regions, selective engagement “steers a middle course of report betwixt isolationism . . . in addition to globe policeman.”9 The underlying safety human relationship betwixt the USA in addition to its allies would stay similar to the Cold War dynamic, but instead of seeking to incorporate the Soviet threat, American forces would stabilize in addition to secure key political in addition to economical allies.
While selective engagement supports a relatively narrow in addition to cloth Definition of American national interest, the selection of collective safety considered peace a populace skillful that must live on provided past times the shared efforts of like-minded nations. Through collective activity to uphold norms in addition to punish rogue actors who undermine peace in addition to stability, states would human activity inwards concert to deter conflict in addition to bound its effects. Regional collective safety focused on edifice such systems inwards discrete areas of the world, spell the global version of the concept viewed safety equally a world-spanning ecosystem where no 1 part could live on isolated. Liberal institutions would live on key to overcoming the inherent collective activity problems.10
Primacy—the most ambitious selection considered—is a global extension of hegemonic stability theory: “Only a preponderance of U.S. might ensures peace.”11 Primacy sought to capitalize on America’s post–Cold War unipolarity through sustained investment inwards in addition to utilisation of all elements—diplomatic, informational, military, in addition to economic—of national power. This approach would mitigate the collective activity problems inherent inwards collective safety spell extending the values of commonwealth in addition to gratis merchandise across the globe inwards a agency that the to a greater extent than express strategy of selective engagement could not.
The debate over the fundamental nature of American unusual policy continued through the 1990s in addition to was reflected inwards academic articles, policy documents, in addition to unusual policy decisions. The finally Clinton direction NSS integrated the ideas of primacy in addition to cooperative safety into initiatives that expanded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), promoted gratis trade, in addition to strengthened international cooperation against terror in addition to weapons of majority destruction. Cooperative security’s focus on controlling illicit arms in addition to rogue states was evident inwards nonproliferation cooperation with Russia, in addition to inwards a nod to global collective security’s requirement for resolving in addition to containing conflict across the world, a diversity of peace-building successes inwards 5 continents were cited inwards the 1998 NSS equally evidence of the value of sustained engagement.12
The stupor of September 11, 2001, reframed the debate over American unusual policy equally the defense strength of the homeland clearly took priority. Threads of cooperative safety remained inwards the 2002 NSS, though at in 1 lawsuit woven into the global counterterrorism effort: “Today, the world’s greatest powers observe [themselves] on the same side—united past times mutual dangers of terrorist violence in addition to chaos.”13 The 2006 NSS continued this subject past times starkly opening with the announcement that “this is a wartime national safety strategy.” Moving beyond the immediate demands of counterterrorism in addition to missile defense, though, the 2006 strategy sought to address the causes of worldwide instability past times “promoting freedom, justice, in addition to human dignity” spell also “leading a growing community of democracies.”14
By the middle of the 2000s, however, the post-Soviet “third wave” of democratization was cresting. Increasingly, states that were previously categorized equally “democratizing” began backsliding toward a mix of illiberal institutions in addition to fragmented politics.15 The 2008–2009 financial crisis, compounded past times a serial of bailouts of spendthrift members of the Euro currency zone, exposed economical weaknesses in addition to political divisions with the members of the European Union. In the United States, economical distress compounded existing war-weariness. This mood was reflected inwards the 2010 NSS, which emphasized that America’s “strength in addition to influence abroad begins with the steps nosotros select at home.”16
During this inwardly focused period, though, rivals of the U.S.-led fellowship began asserting might to a greater extent than openly inwards their respective regions. Chinese economical growth generated a feel of national confidence that was matched with sustained investment inwards its military. Developments inwards antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) weapons systems designed to foreclose an unimpeded, low-risk American deployment into theatre proceeded rapidly. An incremental programme of the world reclamation in addition to island-building inwards the South Cathay Sea sought to create the (newly minted) the world that would extend Chinese state of war machine in addition to economical might in addition to de facto sovereignty into international waters shared past times an array of nations.17 Iran, capitalizing on the might vacuum created past times Iraq’s continued instability, involved itself to a greater extent than openly in addition to assertively inwards Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, in addition to Iraq. Russian Federation flexed its muscles equally good past times creating in addition to and then capitalizing on a serial of “frozen conflicts” inwards regions along its periphery. Some of these manufactured conflicts erupted into opened upwardly war, such equally inwards 2008 against Georgia in addition to 2014 against Ukraine. Others, namely Transnistria inwards Moldova in addition to Nagorno-Karabakh inwards Republic of Azerbaijan locomote on to linger unresolved.18
Viewed inwards the global might balance, the growth of regional rivals could prompt several possible actions past times American allies. Some scholars consider a unipolar organisation inherently unstable, in addition to that in 1 lawsuit a credible alternative to the USA rises, states volition align with it to repose out overweening American power.19 Others combat that unipolarity is to a greater extent than stable in addition to durable, especially given the shared gains from economical interdependence in addition to the mutual threat of nonstate actors in addition to rogue states that seek to undermine a rules-based international fellowship that is to a greater extent than democratic, liberal, in addition to prosperous than previous ones. These shared benefits drive states to bandwagon with the American liberal leviathan, rather than counter it.20 Finally, balance-of-threat theory claims that a power’s intent, to a greater extent than than strength, drive inwards nation alliance calculations.21 Given the historical animosities betwixt the rising regional powers in addition to their neighboring American allies, coupled with the pattern of expansion mutual to Iran, China, in addition to Russia, it follows that leaders inwards nearby states would encounter them equally a threat in addition to seek to counter them past times strengthening their ties with Washington, regardless of the raw repose of global power.
Balance of threat is increasingly supported empirically. In recent years, many American allies take away hold “hard balanced” against their to a greater extent than assertive neighbors past times edifice their state of war machine capacities. Western Farsi Gulf states, which take away hold long lavished petrodollars on state of war machine hardware, take away hold continued their investments despite lower stone oil revenues. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, in addition to the United Arab Emirates take away hold all increased their spending on sophisticated American-built antimissile systems to defend against Iran, a tendency highlighted past times the $110 billion weapons bargain struck during President Donald Trump’s 2017 see to Riyadh.22 Asian states such equally Vietnam in addition to Singapore take away hold dramatically increased their spending on naval in addition to air weapons to repose against China. Even Japan, constrained past times its pacifist postwar constitution, is investing heavily inwards expeditionary weapons platforms such equally helicopter carriers.23 While Europe has been wracked past times economical in addition to political instability, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine inspired action. Sweden, though non a NATO member, has reintroduced conscription in addition to is remilitarizing islands inwards the Baltic Sea to counter Russian probing.24 Poland is also investing inwards territorial defenses in addition to at in 1 lawsuit fields the largest tank strength inwards Europe, apart from Russia. NATO members inwards the Baltics, the likeliest targets of Russian aggression, are developing their forces to counter the subversive greyness zone tactics of unmarked soldiers in addition to ethnonationalistic instigation employed before against Georgia in addition to the Ukraine.25
While these allied state of war machine investments, especially from NATO members whose forces take away hold atrophied dramatically since the terminate of the Cold War, are welcomed inwards Washington, reckless driving—the inverse occupation to gratis riding—can also emerge.26 Reinvigorated American allies facing regional rivals may live on overly emboldened past times their ties to Washington in addition to rashly launch ambitious state of war machine strikes inwards the belief that the USA volition dorsum them up. Georgia’s actions inwards the summertime of 2008, prior to the brief in addition to calamitous state of war with Russia, were explained inwards component past times overconfidence inwards its growing ties with NATO.27 Israel’s plans for strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites were widely judged equally contingent on American leadership support, which was, inwards turn, non keen on beingness drawn hastily into war. The French in addition to British–led air crusade against Muamar Qaddafi’s government inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya also hinged on American support, in addition to when the European state of war machine efforts stalled, the USA was obliged to select the lead.28
Not all states take away hold pursued difficult balancing against the rising threats inwards their neighborhoods, though. Most NATO countries silent autumn curt of their pledge of spending 2 per centum of gross domestic production on defense. The German linguistic communication military, for example, has seen its once-vaunted tank strength that numbered over 7,000 inwards 1991 dwindle to precisely 237, of which only 100 are combat-ready.29 Given the large economies of many NATO Allies, these levels are less dramatic inwards absolute terms, but redundant structures, parochial procurement, in addition to competing priorities create NATO less than a total of its parts.30 Some of America’s to a greater extent than peripheral allies inwards the Gulf such equally Sultanate of Oman in addition to Qatar take away hold hedged their diplomatic alignment with Washington with outreach to Tehran. The Philippines, a longstanding U.S. ally, has pursued engagement with Cathay nether President Rodrigo Duterte’s regime. These strategies of accommodation echo the Cold War alignment of Republic of Finland in addition to grant legitimacy in addition to momentum to a rising rival.31
In short, a novel safety dynamic has emerged with the United States, its allies, in addition to their mutual rivals who seek to upend the American-led, rules-based international fellowship inwards their respective corners of the world. Accordingly, the debate nearly the breadth in addition to intensity of American unusual engagement, which paused next September 11, has also reemerged. The 2015 NSS recognized the rising threat of regional powers, most notably from Russian Federation in addition to China, countries that had previously been described largely equally partners against terror. The Trump administration’s lately published NSS solidifies this prioritization of revisionist states equally the primary threat to American safety in addition to prosperity: “China in addition to Russian Federation desire to shape a globe antithetical to U.S. values in addition to interests.”32 While the challenges to the American-led international fellowship are increasingly clear, the reply is less so, especially with the Trump administration’s frustration with parsimonious allies who expression to Washington for continued support. In policy debates, advocates for neo-isolationism or retrenchment, rebranded equally “offshore balancing” in addition to billed equally a agency to trim down free-riding with allies in addition to ease the pressure level on an overextend American military, squared off against defenders of continued global engagement.33
The difference betwixt these schools largely hinges on ii distinct issues: the expected terms savings from retrenchment in addition to whether nuclear proliferation, fifty-fifty with allies, is tolerable. Supporters of a neo-isolationist policy of offshore balancing or retrenchment oft cite the terms savings of a reduced strength structure, spell their opponents counter that previous withdrawals take away hold ended upwardly costing America more, inwards both blood in addition to treasure.34 Similarly, advocates of neo-isolationism largely select a grade of nuclear proliferation with U.S. allies who seek to ensure their safety equally American might recedes, spell those with a to a greater extent than pessimistic sentiment of proliferation combat that extended deterrence is credible only with the continued forwards presence of U.S. forces, in addition to so continued engagement is critical to containing the spread of nuclear weapons.35
These re-warmed arguments, however, create non capture the fractured threats some the globe or consider the meaning changes inwards both American in addition to allied state of war machine construction in addition to capabilities. The contender powers that are edifice their state of war machine strength in addition to probing American might in addition to resolve are regional, non global ones. Often their tactics involve rapidly manufacturing a small-scale fait accompli, rather than a large-scale invasion through the Fulda Gap or across the Taiwan Strait. Furthermore, in that location is no universal ideology, such equally Soviet communism, that binds America’s rivals together. Similarly, in that location is no non bad project, such equally edifice liberal democracy, to focus U.S. allies. Probes past times an adversary inwards 1 theatre are non component of a coordinated, global scheme to examine U.S. resolve, equally was oft the illustration inwards the Cold War. This lack of broader cohesion on both sides of the separate results inwards a fractured array of independent, regional rivalries that are oft colored to a greater extent than past times historical animosity than past times a global struggle betwixt Washington in addition to a unmarried unusual capital.
Caught betwixt the domestic pressure level to incorporate state of war machine spending, restraining some rearmed allies from reckless driving spell nudging others to deport their fair portion of the safety burden, in addition to countering a various array of regional rivals, a novel American approach to edifice in addition to deploying its state of war machine inwards concert with its allies across the globe is inwards order.
Complementary Engagement
Buttressing America’s network of allies in addition to securing its national interests require acknowledging this novel safety dynamic in addition to reshaping the state of war machine accordingly. While grand strategy tin can include a broad seat of elements, ranging from financial prowess to scientific progress to cultural programs, the rebalancing of America’s global safety role presented hither centers on state of war machine construction in addition to posture. The U.S. military’s outsize importance inwards American unusual policy is a business office of its unmatched size, flexibility, in addition to reach. Changes inwards construction in addition to posture are expensive, lengthy, in addition to are dependent patch to path-dependent forces in addition to sunk costs. These qualities also create shifts inwards the American state of war machine an unambiguous signal to both allies in addition to adversaries across the world: utter is cheap, but aircraft carriers are expensive.
The unifying logic of this novel state of war machine strategy is complementary engagement. Complementary engagement hinges on allied investments inwards their territorial defense, matched with forward-deployed American forces that tin can live on rapidly reinforced past times globally projected U.S. state of war machine power. Forward-deployed U.S. troops would serve 3 purposes: integrate host-nation defensive forces in addition to American state of war machine power, defend infrastructure from A2/AD threats spell receiving U.S.-based forces deployed from the homeland during a crisis, in addition to serve equally a signal of American commitment. Rather than mirror the construction in addition to capacity of allies, the U.S. state of war machine would complement their defenses with its unique capabilities in addition to reach.
While complementary engagement builds on post–Cold War debates with cooperative security, selective engagement, in addition to primacy, it would non take away hold been possible to implement ii decades ago. Without reinvigorated allies, some of whom take away hold only lately realized that they must pursue a greater stair out of state of war machine self-help rather than precisely free-ride on the USA for security, a complementary engagement strength posture would precisely live on an overextended version of primacy, shorn of the forward-deployed American combat formations needed to slowly an enemy invasion of allied soil. In this sense, complementary engagement builds on, but moves beyond, hybrid strategies proposed inwards 2012, such equally “forward partnership,” equally a to a greater extent than cost-effective agency for the USA to retain its worldwide footprint than the traditional notion of deep engagement.36 Similarly, without the focused investment inwards in addition to deployment of high-end strike capabilities in addition to logistics infrastructure detailed later, complementary engagement would essentially live on offshore balancing. The unique payoff of complementary engagement, lacking inwards previous proposals, is the meshing together of American in addition to allied capabilities, a repose that at in 1 lawsuit dissuades reckless driving in addition to limits gratis riding.
Complementary engagement hinges on the USA in addition to its partners each bringing critical forces to a conflict, thereby binding their safety interests together closely in addition to allowing the political in addition to economical benefits of partnership to flow inwards both directions. Unlike the deep engagement of the Cold War, where the USA exported safety to regions on the Soviet periphery, allowing them to grow economically in addition to develop into liberal democracies, complementary engagement rests on a to a greater extent than equitable seat of relationships. While Cold War safety engagements were oft regional manifestations of the global U.S.-Soviet dichotomy, electrical flow tensions are to a greater extent than local in addition to historical, such equally Germany-Russia, Saudi Arabia–Iran, in addition to Japan-China. These renewed regional threats take away hold stimulated allied state of war machine spending, especially inwards Eastern Asia in addition to the Western Farsi Gulf, which complementary engagement uses both for burden-sharing in addition to equally a hedge against unilateral activity past times an ally against a regional adversary.
U.S. state of war machine operations are already taking on some characteristics of complementary engagement. The American role inwards Operation Odyssey Dawn, where intelligence, aerial refueling, in addition to munitions were provided to European air forces flight strike missions over Libya, is a template for complementary engagement. In South Korea, the American footprint is transitioning from frontline warfighter to guarantor for the South’s army, with the unique capabilities in addition to capacity of the U.S. state of war machine deterring large-scale aggression past times Pyongyang. In the Middle East, the USA provides intelligence, logistics, precision fires, in addition to special operations back upwardly to the international coalition fighting the so-called Islamic State (IS). This back upwardly allows for the coordinated application of allied assets spell enabling regional partners to Pb the unopen fight, a critical chemical element for the ideological defeat of IS.
In summary, complementary engagement is an organizing regulation that brings coherence to much of what the state of war machine has been doing since the terminate of the Surge inwards Iraq. In a sense, it proposes a strength that matches both electrical flow demands in addition to tin can ameliorate frame allied investments. What is lagging the operational requirements in addition to shifting international context are the strength posture in addition to construction of the American military, the concept to which this article turns to next.
Force Structure nether Complementary Engagement
This article does non suggest whatever inherently political unusual policy shift past times the United States—such a recommendation is beyond the range of the military. Neither is it a budget-driven scaling of the existing military, with the expected capabilities in addition to accomplish of a smaller version of Armed Forces driving how ambitious a strategy is possible. Rather, the next proposal outlines a futurity strength construction in addition to posture ameliorate suited to combat in addition to win the conflicts that America has lately been engaged inwards spell deterring escalation driven past times the to a greater extent than bellicose designs of regional rivals inwards the context of the existing U.S. alliance structure.
First, the U.S. state of war machine must retain in addition to modernize its nuclear forces. Continued extended nuclear deterrence over technologically advanced allies such equally Germany, South Korea, in addition to Nippon non only protects those states but also dissuades them from developing nuclear weapons themselves inwards response to a regional threat in addition to possible American neo-isolationism. The sharing of Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile applied scientific discipline with the U.K. in addition to the forward-basing of B61 tactical nuclear bombs, deliverable past times allied dual-capable fighter aircraft inwards NATO countries, supports complementary engagement in addition to should live on continued.37 While several widely proposed strategic alternatives discount the threat of nuclear proliferation with established allies, complementary engagement is rooted inwards nuclear pessimism: a greater number of nuclear armed states, fifty-fifty American allies, is inherently destabilizing.
Second, the USA should heighten its long-range strike capabilities. These include the Air Force’s long-range strike bomber (LRSB), long-range standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, ground-based rockets such equally the Army Tactical Missile System replacement, in addition to submarine-launched, conventionally armed missile platforms such equally the Virginia Payload Module (VPM). Outsize investment past times the USA inwards these systems has several benefits for both America in addition to its allies. First, these weapons tin can live on rapidly deployed across the globe, allowing for efficient centralized direction of limited, expensive platforms. Second, their might to strike deep into enemy territory with conventional munitions holds an adversary’s forces at risk, much similar Chinese A2/AD capabilities threaten American warships inwards the western Pacific. Third, these platforms are less threatened past times A2/AD systems than aircraft carriers or forwards tactical air bases. Finally, in addition to most critically, American command of such weapons reduces the take away a opportunity of reckless driving past times allies, equally Washington would take away hold a clear veto over whatever escalation.
Third, complementary engagement should include air in addition to missile defense. Forward-stationed ballistic missile defenses (BMD) are critical to reassuring allies in addition to enabling the rapid deployment of American reinforcements. Terminal defenses such equally the Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense, sea-based Aegis, in addition to shorter hit Patriot tin can reliably protect an ally’s cities, bases, in addition to key infrastructure from ballistic missiles. The success of Israel’s Iron Dome organisation inwards countering Hamas rockets during the 2014 state of war shows how effective missile defense strength systems tin can live on against conventionally armed rockets. Beyond the benefits of protecting Israeli civilians in addition to property, Iron Dome’s success relieved the political pressure level on Israel’s leadership to launch a premature the world offensive into Gaza, pressure level that led to mistakes inwards the 2006 state of war against Hizballah.38 BMD systems tin can defend non only allied cities but also the ports where reinforcements would disembark. Terminal defense strength systems are a reliable agency to defend against an enemy’s deadliest weapons spell non undermining the repose of nuclear deterrence that exists with the legitimate nuclear powers.
The 4th chemical element of U.S. state of war machine strength construction to live on strengthened nether complementary engagement is the backbone of the articulation force: expeditionary enablers such equally logistics, intelligence, in addition to communications. Air Force tanker, transport, in addition to electronic warfare aircraft; Navy back upwardly in addition to auxiliary vessels; in addition to Army logistics distribution, network systems, in addition to prepositioned stocks are the unglamorous connexion tissue of America’s state of war machine capability. Space platforms that provide secure communications in addition to reconnaissance capabilities are similarly critical. These capabilities tin can integrate in addition to sustain smaller allied combat elements inwards an expeditionary campaign, spell acting equally a brake on overeager reckless driving past times an aggrieved ally that is acting beyond America’s interests. They tin can also enable the rapid deployment of American combat forces based inwards the continental USA into a crisis theater, allowing for these formations to keep a high bird of readiness in addition to modernization stateside.
A clear illustration of American utilisation of logistics inwards back upwardly of allied activity is the delivery of munitions during a crisis. Many countries rely on the USA for state of war machine equipment, in addition to munitions stockpiles are oft a lower priority than weapons such equally airplanes, tanks, in addition to ships. The emergency delivery of munitions to State of Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War helped plough some the dire province of affairs next the surprise assault past times Arab Republic of Egypt in addition to Syria. During the 2011 air crusade over Libya, British in addition to French air forces rapidly depleted their stocks in addition to were forced to rely on American resupply to sustain the operations against Qaddafi.
In today’s domestic financial environment, complementary engagement must live on terms neutral. The tradeoffs that allow for increased investment inwards the 4 categories listed before volition deport on all Services but volition increment the overall efficiency in addition to effectiveness of the state of war machine to deter in addition to defeat rising regional rivals. U.S. state of war machine strength construction changes traditionally focuses on tradeoffs with key strength elements such equally Navy aircraft carrier strike groups (CSGs), Air Force tactical air wings, Marine divisions, or Army brigade combat teams. Many recent studies of possible futurity forces construction revolve some these same key strength elements in addition to recommend scaled versions of today’s military, which inwards plough reflects the Cold War construction that formed the footing for the drawdown debates of the 1990s.39 While in that location are marginal changes to special operations in addition to cyberwarfare capabilities, the mix of key strength elements that drive the lion’s portion of American state of war machine construction are taken for granted.
With complementary engagement’s additional emphasis on nuclear recapitalization, ballistic missile defense, in addition to theatre enablers, some of the traditional key strength elements volition confront downward budgetary pressures. Emerging capabilities such equally the LRSB, LRSO, in addition to VPM duplicate the strike capabilities of the CSG at lower terms in addition to higher survivability, reducing the requirement for carriers in addition to freeing their escorts to combat equally independent squadrons of surface combatants. The capabilities of smaller, less capable vessels such equally the littoral combat ship (LCS) are easily duplicated past times our allies, who routinely deploy similarly sized corvettes with greater combat might in addition to reliability than the LCS. Increased A2/AD threats create large-scale airborne or amphibious operations unacceptably risky, in addition to the units tailored for these missions should live on reduced inwards a futurity strength construction to numbers capable of large-scale raids, rather than attempted invasions. Both the Army in addition to Marine Corps would retain much of their electrical flow combat strength but would increasingly focus on interoperability with allies through rotational strength deployments in addition to exercises. Active constituent theatre enablers, forwards deployed in addition to continuously used, would supersede some Reserve constituent units. Air Force tactical fighter aircraft—platforms mutual with American allies—would decrease inwards number but increment inwards effectiveness through improved tankers, networked sensors, in addition to allied interoperability.
Complementary engagement does carry some risks. First, it assumes sustained state of war machine spending past times allies, a continuation of the electrical flow trend. American allies, especially inwards Europe, are beingness pressured to increment defense strength spending past times both Washington in addition to a newly assertive Russia, in addition to complementary engagement gives them a framework to prioritize this spending. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 larger occupation concern is that the states closest to the rising regional rivals—countries whose state of war machine expenditures are mostly growing—will opt to equip their forces with a total hit of offensive in addition to technically ambitious weapons systems, much similar French Republic did with its independent nuclear strength de frappe nether Charles de Gaulle inwards the 1960s. This risks duplicating American capabilities at high costs, limiting to a greater extent than sensible investments inwards territorial defense, spell also enabling reckless driving inwards a crisis. Complementary engagement mitigates this take away a opportunity past times giving America’s allies a clear programme of state of war machine investment that maximizes their national defense.
Second, although it retains the capacity for unilateral American action, complementary engagement reduces the quantity of forces available for such action. Sustained, large-scale, out-of-area missions, fifty-fifty with a coalition of American allies, would live on less feasible equally these forces focus on territorial defense. While this tendency away from large contributions to nation-building missions is already nether way, complementary engagement volition exacerbate it. While in that location is a take away a opportunity that an emerging crisis volition telephone yell upwardly for such a deployment, policy guidance since 2012 has already assumed this risk: equally the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance states, “U.S. forces volition no longer live on sized to behavior large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”40
Geopolitically, a shift toward complementary engagement may live on interpreted equally retrenchment without sustained, in addition to public, rotations of American combat units to forwards bases inwards concert with allied forces. Clear, visible, on-the-ground demonstrations of continued American presence, will, in addition to capability are critical to ensuring that neither America’s adversaries nor wavering allies perceive the USA equally attempting to repose from a distance. While such exercises volition live on conducted past times the U.S. military, nesting them with the Department of State’s populace diplomacy capabilities multiplies their effect. U.S. Army Europe’s synchronization of Operation Dragoon Ride with a hit of NATO Allies in addition to with the U.S. State Department is an illustrative illustration of this approach.41
Complementary engagement builds on the grand strategic options start seat out inwards the 1990s. Rather than precisely updating the arguments from ii decades ago, complementary engagement integrates the electrical flow strategic context of emerging regional powers, reinvigorated allies, ballistic missile threats, in addition to nuclear proliferation to suggest a novel state of war machine construction in addition to posture. By rebalancing relationships with allies in addition to partners across the globe for to a greater extent than equitable state of war machine burden-sharing spell investing heavily inwards ballistic missile defense, long-range strike, logistics, communications, in addition to nuclear weapons capabilities, the USA tin can locomote on to underwrite a rules-based international organisation that creates the weather condition for economical growth, liberal democracy, in addition to regional stability. Importantly, complementary engagement lays the groundwork non only to enable allied defense strength but also to bound whatever reckless driving that could delineate the USA into an unnecessary state of war with a rising contender on behalf of an overeager ally.
The resulting state of war machine strength construction would construct the aforementioned capabilities spell reducing other key strength elements, all spell retaining the capacity to combat in addition to win a unilateral war. While in that location are some risks to this grand strategy of complementary engagement, the benefits of closely binding our allies in addition to partners to our state of war machine arrive the best agency to farther a to a greater extent than peaceful, prosperous, in addition to gratis world.
About the author:
*Major Stephan J. Pikner, USA, is the Army Strategist Association Secretary for the 2017–2019 board term in addition to is studying at Georgetown University equally component of the Army’s Advanced Strategic Planning in addition to Policy Program.
Source:
This article was published inwards the Joint Force Quarterly 91, which is published past times the National Defense University.
Notes
1 John G. Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, in addition to Transformation of the American World Order(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
2 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018).
3 Jakub J. Grygiel in addition to Mitchell A. Wess, The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, in addition to the Crisis of American Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).
4 Barry Posen, Restraint: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). In add-on to Posen, encounter Joseph Collins, “Toward a Future National Strategy: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 Review Essay,” Joint Force Quarterly 84 (1st Quarter 2017), 93–98; in addition to Eliot A. Cohen, The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power in addition to the Necessity of Military Force (Boulder, CO: Basic Books, 2017).
5 Joseph S. Nye, “The Case for Deep Engagement,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 4 (1995), 90–102.
6 John Mearsheimer, “America Unhinged,” The National Interest, no. 129 (January 2014).
7 Barry R. Posen in addition to Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security 21, no. 3 (1996), 5–53.
8 John G. Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, in addition to William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, in addition to Systemic Consequences,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009), 1–27.
9 Robert J. Art, “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” International Security 23, no. 3 (1998), 80–113.
10 Posen in addition to Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy.”
11 Posen, Restraint.
12 Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: The White House, 1998).
13 The National Security Strategy of the USA of America (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002).
14 The National Security Strategy of the USA of America (Washington, DC: The White House, 2006).
15 Steven Levitsky in addition to Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
16 National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010).
17 Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested Primacy inwards the Western Pacific: China’s Rise in addition to the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” International Security 38, no. 4 (April 2014), 115–149.
18 Theodor Tudoroiu, “The European Union, Russia, in addition to the Future of the Transnistrian Frozen Conflict,” East European Politics & Societies 26, no. 1 (February 2012), 135–161.
19 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).
20 William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, no. 1 (1999), 5–41; in addition to Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances inwards a Unipolar World,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009), 86–120.
21 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
22 Helene Cooper, “Senate Narrowly Backs Trump Weapons Sale to Saudi Arabia,” New York Times, June 13, 2017.
23 Grygiel in addition to Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier.
24 Martin Sorensen, “Sweden Reinstates Conscription, with an Eye on Russia,” New York Times, March 2, 2017.
25 Janis Berzins, Russia’s New Generation Warfare inwards Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy, Policy Paper No. 2 (Riga, Latvia: National Defense Academy of Latvia, Center for Security in addition to Strategic Research, 2014).
26 Barry R. Posen, “Pull Back: The Case of a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 (2013), 116–128.
27 Vicken Cheterian, “The August 2008 War inwards Georgia: From Ethnic Conflict to Border Wars,” Central Asian Survey 28, no. 2 (June 2009), 155–170.
28 Christian F. Anrig, “Allied Air Power over Libya: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 Preliminary Assessment,” Air & Space Power Journal 25, no. 4 (2011), 89–110.
29 Anthony Cordesman, NATO in addition to the Delicate Balance of Deterrence: Strategy versus Burden Sharing(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic in addition to International Studies, 2017).
30 Scott Boston et al., Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance inwards Europe: Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority (Washington, DC: RAND, 2018).
31 Grygiel in addition to Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier.
32 National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 2017).
33 John Mearsheimer in addition to Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2016.
34 Henry R. Nau, Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy nether Jefferson, Polk, Truman, in addition to Reagan(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).
35 Stephen G. Brooks in addition to William Wohlforth, America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role inwards the 21stCentury (New York: Oxford, 2016).
36 F.G. Hoffman, “Forward Partnership: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 Sustainable American Strategy,” Orbis 57, no. 1 (December 2013), 20–40.
37 Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018).
38 Emily B. Landau in addition to Azriel Bermant, “Iron Dome Protection: Missile Defense inwards Israel’s Security Concept,” inThe Lessons of Operation Protective Edge, ed. Anat Kurz in addition to Schlomo Brom (Tel Aviv: Institute of National Security Studies, 2015), 37–42.
39 John McCain, Restoring American Power: Recommendations for the FY 2018–FY 2022 Defense Budget(Washington, DC: Senate Armed Services Committee, 2017).
40 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st-Century Defense (Washington, DC: The White House, 2012).
41 John Vandiver, “Dragoon Ride Will Send U.S. Troops Through Eastern Europe inwards Show of Support,” Stars in addition to Stripes, March 12, 2015.
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