By Lisa Watanabe for Center for Security Studies (CSS)
Attention has understandably been focused on jihadi actors inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too Tunisia. However, Lisa Watanabe contends that other Islamic actors also deserve greater scrutiny given the role they could play inwards shaping these countries’ future. To aid address this gap, Watanabe hither explores 1) the Muslim Brotherhood inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too Ennahda inwards Tunisia, groups who have got gone the furthest inwards accepting democratic norms too principles; 2) to a greater extent than conservative Salafi actors, such every bit onetime jihadis; 3) quietist Salafis, who to a greater extent than ofttimes than non eschew political engagement too reject armed resistance against Sunni Muslim regimes, too more. This CSS Study was originally published inwards June 2018 yesteryear the Center for Security Studies (CSS). Thumbnail ikon courtesy of Owen McCall.
Executive Summary
While much attending has thus far understandably been focused on jihadi actors inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too Tunisia, other Islamist actors, who are non focused on armed jihad, deserve greater scrutiny. The latter emerged every bit key actors inwards the post-uprising environments of these countries. In the immediate transitional period, mainstream Islamist actors, such every bit the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice too Construction Party (JCP) too Ennahda inwards Tunisia were, along with their allies, able to exert considerable influence, bringing them into conflict with non-Islamist actors. How they at in 1 lawsuit adapt too topographic point themselves inside their national contexts volition live of import for stability inwards a post-conflict Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too for the democratic transition inwards Tunisia, both of which are non alone essential for regional stability, but also for European security, given the myriad of safety challenges that delicate too conflict-afflicted countries tin generate.
Though the environments inwards which Islamists inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too Tunisia operate are considerably different, some similarities may live observed. Mainstream Islamists inwards both countries have got lost the world since 2012, though they remain politically relevant. While the Muslim Brotherhood inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has seen its influence diminish significantly since the outbreak of civil state of war inwards mid-2014, the United Nations political procedure has provided channels of continued, albeit reduced, political influence. Moreover, the movement’s association too potentially shared agendas with powerful brigades that back upward the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may also supply it too its political party with sympathizers inwards Libya’s futurity safety structures. The influence of Ennahda inwards Tunisia has also contracted since the 2013 – fourteen political crisis that shook the country. Its continued importance is largely due to a farther recognition of the secular nature of the Tunisian province too a recognition that its continued political sway depends on its credence yesteryear non-Islamist political parties too societal forces.
If mainstream Islamists may silent live considered pregnant political actors, the same cannot live said of the to a greater extent than conservative Salafi political actors. The latter have got failed to gain whatever existent political relevance inwards their ain right. In Libya, several Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)/Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC) veterans formed Salafi political parties, though their almost consummate absence inwards Libya’s foremost elected parliament, the General National Congress (GNC), radically circumscribed whatever political ambitions they mightiness have got had. Nevertheless, their links to of import brigades create give them influence on the the world inwards several parts of the country. Salafi parties inwards Tunisia have got also fared poorly. Whilst they enjoyed the back upward of Ennahda early inwards the transition, Ennahda has since distanced itself from them, increasing their political isolation. Their lack of political traction appears largely due to a failure to appeal either a to a greater extent than moderate Islamist audience or a large plenty ultra-conservative constituency. In particular, their message has been lost on ultra-conservative youth.
Quietist Salafi actors, who unremarkably shun political engagement, could create gains at the expense of Salafi political parties, especially inwards Libya. Quietist Salafis have got been nether force per unit of measurement area inwards Tunisia since the start of the political crisis inwards 2013, which has limited their capacity to expand too institutionalize their networks. This could resultant inwards to a greater extent than ultra-conservative youth gravitating towards jihadi Salafism. In Libya, yesteryear contrast, nominally quietist Salafism, notably Madkhalism, has been gaining a greater foothold. The GNA inwards the West too General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) inwards the East both rely on Madkhali brigades. This could eventually atomic number 82 to their integration into futurity police force too safety structures, thereby boosting Madkhali influence inwards province structures. Madkhalis have got also increased their presence inside the religious sphere inwards eastern Libya, providing Madkhali clerics with channels through which to expand their back upward base of operations inwards this already to a greater extent than conservative constituent of the province that has traditionally been a hotbed of radicalization.
Introduction
Islamists1 have got emerged every bit key actors inwards the post-uprising environments of Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too Tunisia. Their agendas too relative importance are probable to have got implications for the evolution of the political landscapes too stability of these countries. Tunisia’s democratic transition remains delicate too vulnerable to tensions betwixt Islamist too non-Islamist political forces. Post-Qaddafi Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has yet to fully emerge from the civil state of war that broke out inwards mid-2014, itself partially caused yesteryear polarization betwixt Islamist too non-Islamist actors. How Islamist actors adapt to too topographic point themselves inside their novel too evolving environments volition live vital to the success of the democratic transition inwards Tunisia too stability inwards a post-conflict Libya, both of which are essential for regional stability, every bit good every bit safety inwards Europe. The latter, non to the lowest degree because delicate too conflict-afflicted contexts supply opportunities for the growth of vehement extremism too tin contribute to acuate irregular migratory flows.
Libyan Islamist actors, notably the Muslim Brotherhood too the at in 1 lawsuit fragmented Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC)-formerly the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) – had played a pregnant role inwards the uprising against the Qaddafi regime.2 After Qaddafi, they became involved inwards the political transition process, either through the establishment of political parties-the Muslim Brotherhood established the Justice too Construction Party (JCP) too onetime leaders of the LIFG/LIMC set upward the Salafi parties Al-Watan too Al-Umma Al-Wasat – or through their members’ involvement inwards transitional governance structures.3 When the 2nd civil state of war broke out, the Muslim Brotherhood, the JCP, the Salafi parties too Salafi-leaning independents aligned themselves with the General National Congress (GNC) too its authorities inwards Tripoli, forming the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Dawn coalition. The less organized too supposedly quietist Madkhali Salafis found themselves on both sides of the conflict4, some aligning themselves with the GNC too its authorities too others with the House of Representatives (HoR) too its authorities inwards Bayda/Tobruk. While some of Libya’s Madkhalis are silent aligned with General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), who is unopen to many politicians inwards the HoR, others cooperate with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), headed yesteryear Fayez Al-Sarraj.
While Tunisian Islamists did non play a pregnant role inwards the removal of Ben Ali, they have got played an of import role inwards the transitional process, with the Muslim Brotherhood-derived Islamist political party Ennahda emerging every bit a major political musician too participating inwards successive governments. Ennahda has fifty-fifty attempted to remodel itself inwards monastic tell to live to a greater extent than acceptable to non-Islamist political forces too the population at large. Following the difference of Ben Ali, a little per centum of Salafis also established political parties, notably Jabhat Al-Islah, Hisb Ut-tahrir, Al-Asala too Al-Rahma.5 Quietist Salafis also adapted their demeanour to the altered domestic province of affairs inwards Tunisia, operating to a greater extent than openly, engaging inwards preaching too charitable work, forming associations too fifty-fifty lobbying politically for issues of concern to them6, tough they have got come upward nether force per unit of measurement area since 2013.
The contexts inwards which Libyan too Tunisian Islamists operate is real different, therefore. In Libya, Islamists are struggling to ensure their identify inwards the country’s future, without the parameters of a sustainable political short town having been finalized too inwards a province of affairs inwards which armed groups go on to wield influence inwards the absence of strong governance structures. How they too associated brigades are positioning themselves will, consequently, carry on their futurity influence inwards the country. In Tunisia, yesteryear contrast, Islamists are working inside the established political parameters of a fledgling democracy. How Islamists actors relate to the immature democratic monastic tell volition carry on their survival inside the political scheme too their traction inside lodge every bit a whole.
To date, much attending has understandably been on jihadi Islamist actors inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too Tunisia, who seek to impose their views most the centrality of Islamic exercise for social too political life through vehement means. However, Islamists, who are non focused on armed jihad, deserve greater scrutiny. The latter are probable to aid shape the futurity of Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too Tunisia. This study looks at several types of key Islamist actors. Among the political Islamists,7 it examines mainstream Islamists, such every bit the Muslim Brotherhood inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too Ennahda inwards Tunisia, who have got gone the furthest inwards price of accepting democratic norms too principles, too are the most pragmatic with regards to the application of sharia law. Within the to a greater extent than conservative Salafi current8, it looks at post-Jihadis, some of whom have got embraced political Islam, fifty-fifty though they remain to a greater extent than conservative inwards their approach to politics too religious belief than mainstream Islamists, every bit good every bit quietist Salafis, who to a greater extent than ofttimes than non eschew political engagement too reject armed resistance against Sunni Muslim regimes.
1 Islamism inwards Libya
During too after the uprising, Islamist actors reemerged inwards Libya, playing politically too militarily of import roles. The outbreak of civil state of war inwards the province inwards mid-2014 led most to coalesce inside the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Dawn coalition, with the exception of Madkhalis, who joined competing sides inwards the conflict. The collapse of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Dawn coalition against the backdrop of the United Nations political procedure has seen Islamists fragment further.
1.1 Mainstream Islamists (The Muslim Brotherhood)
Background too Objectives
The Muslim Brotherhood foremost established a presence inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya inwards 1949, when 3 Muslim Brotherhood members fled to Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya from Arab Republic of Egypt after having been defendant of involvement inwards the assassination of onetime Egyptian prime number government minister Mahmoud Al-Nuqrashi Pasha inwards 1948. They were followed yesteryear Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic scholars, too several years later yesteryear members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, who took refuge inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya next the 1952 Free Officers’ coup inwards Egypt. This little constellation of like-minded individuals disseminated Muslim Brotherhood ideas inwards the country. Disillusionment with Arab nationalism after the Arab defeat inwards the 1967 Arab-Israeli War generated plenty involvement inwards Islamism inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to atomic number 82 to atomic number 82 to the establishment inwards 1968 of Muslim Brotherhood branches inwards Tripoli too Benghazi. However, when Qaddafi came to powerfulness inwards 1969, the motion was banned too many of its members fled abroad.9
The Muslim Brotherhood experienced a revival or sorts inwards the 1980s. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Muslim communities inwards the West became increasingly interested inwards Islamism. Libyans living too studying inwards the United States of America established a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, called Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiyya. Some of its members returned to Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya inwards the early 1980s too attempted to revive the motion domestically. However, many amid them were either imprisoned or executed. Despite regime repression against Islamists inwards the 1980s too 90s, the motion did go on to operate clandestinely, with its influence boosted yesteryear Qatar’s advertisement of the Muslim Brotherhood via Al-Jazeera too pop Muslim Brotherhood websites, many of which were connected to the high-profile Qatar-based Muslim cleric Yousef Al-Qaradawi.10
In the mid-2000s, the movement’s mental attitude towards the regime shifted every bit a resultant of the reform initiatives of Qaddafi’s son, Saif Qaddafi, which were aimed at neutralizing opposition forces inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya through cooptation. Reconciliation with Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood, was offered inwards render for its recognition of the regime, renunciation of violence too official revision of its aims. The Muslim Brotherhood took upward Saif Qaddafi’s offer. As a result, it replaced active opposition to the Qaddafi regime with tacit cooperation, which included praise for Saif Qaddafi’s reform efforts. Despite the movement’s reconciliation with the regime, its presence inside Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya remained limited.11
When the revolution began, the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership was dispersed, with some senior figures inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too many abroad. The overseas leadership met inwards an Islamic cultural centre inwards Zurich, Switzerland, on thirty too 31 Jan 2011 to speak over the upcoming “Day of Rage” inwards Libya, which was planned for the 17 Feb too the likelihood that the population would follow the Egyptian too Tunisian examples too telephone phone for the difference of Qaddafi. When momentum behind the protests accelerated, they met in 1 lawsuit to a greater extent than inwards Switzerland on xix February, at which fourth dimension they decided to side with the rebels.12
The Muslim Brotherhood leadership afterwards ordered their cadre based abroad to gear upward to render to Libya. Those already inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya were instructed to participate socially too politically inwards the uprising. The motion was notably supportive of the creation of the National Transitional Council (NTC), the torso that politically represented the revolutionary forces too would later regulation Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya inwards the immediate transitional period. At the same time, it sought to boost its limited domestic presence, yesteryear organizing the distribution of aid too establishing media outlets.13
After Qaddafi was killed inwards Oct 2011, senior figures of the Muslim Brotherhood returned to Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too the motion set most creating an organizational construction with which to expand its domestic presence. The motion elected Bashir Al-Kibti every bit its full general supervisor. Al-Kibti had been inwards exile inwards the United States of America for 33 years too had returned during the uprising inwards Libya. The movement’s shura council (consultative committee) too so appointed ii deputy full general supervisors, a full general secretariat too created an executive commission too a number of departments.14
Several months later, inwards March 2012, the motion announced the creation of the Justice too Construction Party (JCP). Muhammad Sawan, who was imprisoned nether the Qaddafi regime too was previously caput of the Muslim Brotherhood’s shura council (consultative committee) became leader of the party. The motion presented the political party every bit organizationally independent from the motion too opened upward to all those who wished to join. The political party declared its aim to live the establishment of sharia law every bit the chief source of legislation. However, it has also stated that the province should live civic, suggesting a separation betwixt religious belief too the state. Such ambiguity may have got been due to the party’s want to gain domestic too international acceptance, spell at the same fourth dimension appealing to a conservative domestic back upward base.15
Alliances
National
From the foremost of the post-uprising period, the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed the back upward of onetime Brotherhood fellow member too influential cleric, Ali Al-Sallabi. The motion initially participated inwards Al-Sallabi’s National Gathering, which sought to convey together Islamists nether a broad umbrella motion that had a nationalist orientation with an Islamic reference. However, internal differences led the Brotherhood to delineate out of the National Gathering, which also allowed it to publicly distance itself from post-jihadis inside it, notably onetime members of the LIFG, which was perceived every bit of import for the movement’s domestic too international acceptance.16
During the initial transitional period, the Muslim Brotherhood was represented inwards the NTC, which presided over the province before elections were held inwards 2012. Within the NTC, the motion found mutual create with other NTC members, who believed that sharia law should inform legislation. These included individuals such every bit Ali Al-Isawi, Vice Chair of the NTC’s executive committee, Jalal Al-Dghaili, the NTC’s defense minister, too Anwar Fituri, who was inwards accuse of carry too communication.17
In Libya’s foremost parliament, the GNC, the JCP did non concur the largest number of seats. Nevertheless, it was able to wield considerable influence over the legislative procedure yesteryear deftly forming coalitions with independent deputies, especially those inwards the Salafi-leaning Loyalty to the Martyrs Blood bloc, which was led yesteryear the alone onetime LIFG/LIMC deputy inwards the GNC, Abdul Wahhab Al-Qaid of the Al-Umma Al-Wasat party, too Misratans who supported Sawan.18
When a rift emerged inwards the GNC too degenerated into civil state of war inwards mid-2014, the JCP joined forces with the Salafi-leaning Loyalty to the Martyrs Blood bloc too GNC deputies, who represented localities too tribes that had played an of import role during the uprising. Together, they formed the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Dawn coalition. Brigades that backed this loose political coalition included the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Shield Forces inwards the West, comprised largely of Misrata brigades. In monastic tell to counter Haftar’s Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Dignity Operation inwards the East, Brotherhood-allied brigades, including the powerful 17th Feb Martyrs Brigade too the Raffalah Al-Sahati Brigade, established yesteryear LIFG/LIMC veteran too blood brother of Ali Al-Sallabi, Ismail Al-Sallabi, banded together with Ansar Al-Sharia to grade the umbrella armed grouping the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC), of which Wissam bin Hamid, a senior Brotherhood figure, would go a commander.19
International
The JCP appears to have got connections to other Islamist parties, including Tunisia’s Ennahda too the Justice too Development Party (AKP) inwards Turkey.20 The Muslim Brotherhood motion inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya also has ties to Brotherhood branches inwards other countries. Historically, every bit mentioned, it had especially strong links to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Such international linkages, especially those to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, have got generated negative publicity for the JCP, especially during the 2012 parliamentary elections. This has led the motion to downplay its relations with other Muslim Brotherhood movements too to claim that its ties to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood are purely ideological.21 Indeed, at that topographic point is a debate going inside the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood most whether the motion should separate itself from the broader transnational movement.
The motion is also reported to live unopen to actors inwards Qatar too Turkey. Former fellow member of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, Ali Al-Sallabi, is known to have got strong ties with the Qatari violet family, every bit good every bit Yousef Al-Qaradawi, caput of the Qatar-based International Union of Muslim Scholars. Al-Sallabi is reported to have got channeled Qatari assistance to brigades inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya during the uprising, including the Brotherhood-allied Misrata brigades too 17th Feb Martyrs Brigade. Turkey is also reported to have got provided back upward to these brigades. Qatari too Turkish back upward for them is alleged to have got continued during the civil war.22
Vectors of Influence
National
Due to successive regime crackdowns against the movement, the Muslim Brotherhood was unable to build upward a broad back upward base of operations during much of the Qaddafi era. It, therefore, set most doing so throughout the uprising too early transitional catamenia inwards monastic tell to boost its relevance inwards Libya. In 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood established a charitable arrangement called Nida Al-Khayr. The latter organized the delivery of aid from the Gulf inwards coordination with a number of charitable organizations on the the world inwards Libya. It became a key vector for creating a broader back upward base of operations inside Libyan society. The linkages it formed with local charities also helped to increment the movement’s relevance inwards the country. The Muslim Brotherhood also created a number of media outlets, including Sabil Rahid, Shabab Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Lion inwards monastic tell to diffuse its message to the full general public.23
When the NTC became Libya’s transitional governing body, the motion was able to exert considerable influence inside it. Approximately, 1 5th of NTC seats were held yesteryear Muslim Brotherhood members, with several members belongings cabinet seats nether its executive committees, which functioned similar cabinets, foremost nether the leadership of Mahmoud Jibril too and so nether that of Abdul Raheem Al-Keib. These individuals included Abdullah Shamia, a onetime academy professor at Benghazi University, who was imprisoned nether Qaddafi too appointed economic scheme minister, every bit good every bit Salim Al-Shaykhi, who was exiled inwards Great Britain too held the post of government minister of religious affairs.24
Their representation inwards the NTC provided the Muslim Brotherhood with a way of influencing developments inwards ways that would aid to consolidate the movement’s traction inwards Libya’s emerging populace institutions, especially those related to security. The Brotherhood used its presence inwards the NTC to force hard for the creation of parallel safety structures through which it could contain Brotherhood-linked brigades into the country’s safety institutions. Abderrezak Al-Aradi, a leading Brotherhood too NTC member, helped to create the Supreme Security Committee (SSC), originally conceived every bit a parallel police force forcefulness comprised of members of brigades, whose mandate was initially restricted to Tripoli too and so later expanded to other cities. The SSC was nominally nether the potency of the Interior Ministry, where Brotherhood fellow member Omar Al-Khadrawi, was deputy interior minister. Its command construction also included Muslim Brotherhood members, such every bit Fawzi Wanis Al-Qaddafi, deputy caput of the Benghazi SSC.25
Another parallel safety construction that was set upward nether the NTC was the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Shield, conceived every bit a reserve army. It incorporated powerful brigades, many of which were unopen to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood-allied Misratan brigades formed the backbone of the Central Shield Force too commanded the Western Libyan Shield Force. The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Shield Force inwards the East incorporated elements of the 17th Feb Martyrs Brigade, the Raffalah Al-Sahati Brigade, both of which have got strong ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.26
During this period, the Muslim Brotherhood also worked to increment its influence inwards local councils that had been set upward to regulation liberated cities during uprising. The motion came to dominate the Tripoli Military Council (TMC), a grouping of brigades that captured Tripoli from pro-Qaddafi forces, too the Benghazi Local Council. It also had sizable influence inwards the Misrata Local Council.27 The creation of the Dar Al-Ifta (now closed down), the religious potency responsible for interpreting Islamic law, during this fourth dimension also boosted the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence. Prominent cleric too caput of this body, Sadiq Al-Ghariani, is also reported to have got ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.28
Although the JCP did non win a plurality inwards the 2012 parliamentary elections, it, nevertheless, held v cabinet positions inwards the GNC’s foremost authorities nether Ali Zeidan, including those for oil, electricity, housing, economic scheme too sport, every bit good every bit the post of deputy prime number minister. In Jan 2014, these ministers resigned from the authorities inwards an elbow grease to weaken Zeidan, who was an NFA ally. After having successfully forced his departure, the JCP eventually found a to a greater extent than accommodating prime number government minister inwards Ahmed Maiteg, a Muslim Brotherhood ally, who was appointed inwards May 2014.29
The political party was non alone able to wield influence inwards Ahmed Maiteg’s government, but was also able to dominate the GNC every bit a resultant of the alliances it built with independents, which proved to a greater extent than cohesive than those of the non-Islamists inwards the GNC, giving the JCP fifty-fifty greater sway inwards the governing body. In May 2013, the JCP too its allies were able to force through the Political Isolation Law that banned Qaddafi era officials from participating inwards politics for 10 years. This legislation weakened its opponent, the nationalist-leaning National Forces Alliance (NFA), yesteryear forcing a number of the latter’s deputies to resign.30
When the GNC’s mandate ended inwards mid-2014 too novel elections were held to elect its successor, the House of Representatives (HoR), the JCP won fifty-fifty fewer seats than inwards 2012. Fearing a backlash against Islamists, the JCP too its allies, refused to cede powerfulness to the HoR too continued to concur sessions inwards the GNC.31 In the context of the civil state of war that followed, brigades that had connections to the Muslim Brotherhood too JCP politicians, sided with the GNC. These brigades including those from Misrata that formed the mass of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Shield forces, too Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Shield East every bit constituent of an umbrella grouping called the BRSC, which also comprised the Muslim Brotherhood-linked 17th of Feb Martyrs Brigade too the Raffalah Al-Sahati brigade. The LROR, which was created inwards 2013 yesteryear the GNC to perform law too monastic tell functions inwards Tripoli too later inwards Benghazi, in 1 lawsuit to a greater extent than unopen to the Brotherhood, also joined the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Dawn coalition.32
Although the Muslim Brotherhood has since lost a corking bargain of influence, the United Nations political procedure that led to the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) has, nevertheless, provided it with a way of continued influence inwards several governing bodies established nether the Agreement. The High State Council, which acts every bit an advisory torso to the GNA, comprises some JCP politicians, given that it is made upward of a puddle of politicians that were elected to the GNC inwards 2012. The novel president of the High State Council, Khlaid Al-Mishri, is also a JCP member. HoR politicians are, however, uneasy most Islamist influence inwards the High State Council, which has led to discussions most its composition, which could have got futurity implications. The Muslim Brotherhood too the JCP currently have got allies inside the GNA’s Presidency Council (PC), including Ahmed Maitig, who serves every bit vice president of the PC, too Abdessalam Kajman, who is a fellow member of the PC. However, overcoming the electrical current deadlock inwards the United Nations political procedure is probable to atomic number 82 to modifications to the LPA. This is probable to atomic number 82 to a reduction inwards the number of members inwards the PC from nine to three, which, inwards turn, is probable to hateful that inwards the futurity at that topographic point volition live fewer members inside it whose agendas mightiness overlap with the Muslim Brotherhood.33
Although the Muslim Brotherhood does non command whatever brigades every bit such, its influence may also live boosted yesteryear its connections to brigades that have got clout with the GNA. This is especially the instance with regards to Misratan brigades that formed most of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Shield forces. While these brigades may non contain a high number of Muslim Brotherhood members, they are probable to live sympathetic to the motion due to their alliance with it inwards the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Dawn coalition.34 They have got since fought nether the banner of the GNA to drive Islamic State (IS) forces out of the urban marrow of Sirte inwards 2016 too are silent loyal to the GNA. While the construction of futurity safety forces inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya remains to live defined, it is possible that these brigades could live integrated into a futurity unified Libyan army, given their importance too every bit a way of incentivizing them to disband. Should this occur, it could supply the Muslim Brotherhood with back upward from inside Libya’s futurity safety structures. In Tripoli, the Muslim Brotherhood also has traction through its ties to the TMC. In the East, its links to the BRSC give it some influence on the ground35, fifty-fifty though the BRSC has been largely decimated.
International
The JCP’s international profile has benefited from positive coverage on Al-Jazeera. Within the context of the civil war, so every bit good have got brigades with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, such every bit the onetime Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Shield forces too the LROR. Support for the UN-backed GNA, which is backed yesteryear the bulk of the international community, has enabled it to hold its political relevance internationally. Its associates inwards the onetime Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Shield forces have got also gained positive media coverage too international praise for the role they have got played inwards the GNA-led combat against IS.36 This could increment calls for them to live integrated into a futurity Libyan army.
1.2 Post-jihadis (LIFG/LIMC Veterans)
Background too Objectives
The LIFG has its roots inwards a surreptitious jihadist motion led yesteryear Emir Awatha Al-Zuwawi that was formed inwards the 1980s. After it was discovered yesteryear the Qaddafi regime inwards 1989, many of its members fled the province to combat against the Soviets inwards Afghanistan, including key leaders, such every bit Abdel Hakim Belhadj, the overall leader of the group, too his deputy, Saami Al-Saadi. There, its militants, including Belhadj, developed relations with their Al-Qaeda counterparts, though the motion itself is non thought to have got been officially allied with Al-Qaeda. Indeed, its objectives were primarily national, rather than transnational. Some of the Libyan “Afghans”, every bit they became known, returned to Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too officially establishing the LIFG inwards 1990. Its aim was the removal of Qaddafi through vehement way too the establishment of sharia law inwards Libya.37
The LIFG initially operated clandestinely. However, it was discovered yesteryear the authorities inwards 1995, which forced it to publically declare its existence. This had disastrous consequences for the group. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 savage crackdown yesteryear the regime followed, which resulted inwards the LIFG waging a three-year insurgency inwards eastern Libya, where the group’s back upward base of operations was strongest.38 Open conflict with the regime reduced the group’s domestic capacity considerably. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 number of the group’s leaders including Al-Saadi too Belhadj fled abroad, though they were eventually extradited to Libya, with the aid of United States of America too the UK. Those leaders who remained inwards the country, were imprisoned.
In prison, LIFG leaders formed a tight-knit group. They gradually began to rethink the group’s strategy. This procedure of reflection coincided with an amnesty initiative launched yesteryear Qaddafi’s reformist son, Saif Qaddafi, facilitated yesteryear the onetime Brotherhood fellow member too Qatar-based Islamic scholar, Ali Al-Sallabi, who acted every bit intermediary betwixt imprisoned LIFG leaders too the regime. This dialogue procedure led members of the group’s shura council to number a document inwards 2009 inwards which the grouping publicly renounced armed jihad against the regime. As a result, a number of LIFG members, including Belhadj, Al-Saadi too some other of Belhadj’s deputies, Khalid Al-Sharif, were released from prison.39
The reconciliation procedure helped the grouping to introduce itself every bit a credible opposition forcefulness at a fourth dimension when political reform seemed possible inwards Libya, due to Saif Al-Qaddafi’s reformist agenda. Abroad, it gave exiled LIFG members greater room to organize. However, non all LIFG members embraced reconciliation with the regime. LIFG militants inwards the United Kingdom of Great Britain too Northern Ireland too Switzerland, who had yesteryear the mid-2000s go fairly independent from the LIFG leadership inwards Libya, continued to oppose the Qaddafi regime. In 2009, they formed the Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC), which rejected reconciliation with the regime.40
Although LIFG leaders inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya distanced themselves from the LIMC during the reconciliation process, this would alter in 1 lawsuit the uprising began inwards 2011. LIFG members based inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too associated with Belhadj, decided to pick out the non-reconciliatory opinion of the LIMC too to back upward the uprising against Qaddafi. Against the backdrop of potentially momentous change, the LIFG re-incarnated itself every bit the LIMC. The latter elected a shura council comprised of most of the LIFG shura council members, including Belhadj, Al-Saadi, Al-Sharif, every bit good every bit Abdul Wahhab Al-Qaid, Abdel Basit Abu Hliqa too Miftah Al-Dhuwadi. While the LIFG had been opposed to republic throughout most of its existence, the LIMC shura council expressed back upward for the democratic process. The group’s apparent moderation appeared to live informed yesteryear the conviction that Islamism too republic were non necessarily incompatible and, moreover, that democratic mechanisms could serve the objectives of Islamists, every bit appeared to live demonstrated yesteryear the AKP’s sense inwards Turkey.41
Those LIFG/LIMC members, who fought against forces loyal to Qaddafi, brought with them considerable paramilitary experience. Indeed, some would play a pregnant armed services role during the uprising. Belhadj became commander of the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, which was 1 of the foremost brigades to grade during the uprising too played an of import role inwards the liberation of Tripoli. In eastern Libya, Abu Hliqa too several of his associates formed the Umar Al-Mukhtar Battalion, comprised of defectors from the Libyan regular army too LIFG/LIMC members. The Umar Al-Mukhtar Battalion joined the powerful, eastern-based 17th Feb Martyrs Brigade, which was itself led yesteryear Ismail Al-Sallabi, senior figure inwards the LIFG/ LIMC too blood brother of Ali Al-Sallabi. Former LIFG member, Abdul Hakim Al-Hasidi, formed the Derna Brigade, which was later renamed the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade 42
However, the autumn of the regime caused LIFG/ LIMC to fragment. Some LIFG/LIMC veterans retained armed services roles. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 number of the brigades commanded yesteryear LIFG/LIMC members continued to play an of import role inwards Libya’s fractured safety sector, making their commanders influential figures inwards the country. Other to a greater extent than radical onetime LIFG/LIMC members amid the brigade leaders, such every bit Al-Hasidi, joined the jihadi Salafi current.43 Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 number of leading LIFG/LIMC figures entered the political arena, securing roles inwards NTC executive committees. Al-Sharif was appointed deputy defense government minister inwards ii of the interim governments of the NTC. Sadiq Al-Ghaithi Al-Ubaidi, a onetime LIFG prisoner, was also made a deputy defense government minister too Al-Dhuwadi became deputy government minister for the martyrs too the missing. Under the 2nd interim authorities headed yesteryear Ali Zeidan, Abu Hliqa was made deputy interior minister.44
When the foremost parliamentary elections were held inwards 2012, several LIFG/LIMC veterans participated inwards the electoral process. Belhadj left the TMC that yr inwards monastic tell to run every bit a candidate for the political party that he founded, Al-Watan, though the political party failed to win whatever seats. Al-Saadi founded his ain party, Al-Umma Al-Wasat, which a number of onetime LIFG/LIMC leaders joined, including Al-Sharif, Al-Dhuwadl too Al-Qaid. Al-Qaid was allocated Al-Umma Al-Wasat’s alone topographic point inwards the GNC45, which he used to proficient effect.
Alliances
National
In the GNC, Al-Qaid led the Salafist-leaning Loyalty to the Martyrs Blood bloc, which was allied inwards the governing torso with the JCP, too continued to live allied with it inside the context of the civil state of war every bit constituent of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Dawn coalition. Following the collapse of the Dawn coalition too the establishment of the United Nations political process, Belhadj’s Al-Watan political party at in 1 lawsuit supports the GNA, along with its allies the Muslim Brotherhood too the JCP, spell Al-Saadi’s Al-Umma Al-Wasat rejects national reconciliation.46
Against the backdrop of the civil war, brigades comprising LIFG/LIMC veterans formed alliances with armed groups that comprised Muslim Brotherhood too Ansar Al-Sharia members. Following the uprising, Ismail Al-Sallabi had formed a novel grouping with some members of the 17th Feb Martyrs Brigade, called the Raffalah Al-Sahati Brigade. When the civil state of war broke out inwards mid-2014, the Raffalah Al-Sahati Brigade, every bit mentioned inwards the previous subdivision on the Muslim Brotherhood, came together with the Muslim Brotherhood-allied 17th Feb Martyrs Brigade too Ansar al-Sharia to grade the umbrella grouping the BRSC to counter Haftar’s LNA inwards the East. The BRSC counted amid its commanders several high profile figures from both the Muslim Brotherhood too Ansar Al-Sharia, including Wissam ben Hamid (now deceased), a fellow member of the Muslim Brotherhood, too Ali Al-Zahawi, Ansar Al-Sharia’s at in 1 lawsuit deceased leader.47
The BRSC’s links to Ansar Al-Sharia were farther reinforced though its unopen ties to the Benghazi Defence Brigades (BDB), which was formed inwards June 2016 to oppose the LNA inwards the eastern urban marrow of Benghazi.48 Given the fluid nature of Libya’s armed groupings, a number of BDB commanders are also commanders inside the BRSC, including Ismail Al-Sallabi, who was a commander inwards the BRSC, Ahmad Al-Tajuri, who was a BRSC commander inwards West Benghazi, too Faraj Shiku, commander inwards the BRSC’s 17th Feb Martyrs Brigade. Through their membership of the BDB these commanders are associates figures with ties to Ansar Al-Sharia, including Ahmed Al-Shaltani, at in 1 lawsuit deceased, but in 1 lawsuit a leading figure inwards Ansar Al-Sharia.49
LIFG/LIMC veterans also have got links to Ansar Al-Sharia through the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade. Sufyan bin Qumu, a onetime LIFG/LIMC member, who was a fellow member of the Brigade too an associate of Osama bin Laden inwards Sudan, is also reported to have got been a leader inwards Ansar Al-Sharia, for example.50
International
Several LIFG/LIMC veterans have got ties to a number of countries. Qatar, inwards particular, appears to have got been an especially of import organizational hub for the motion during the uprising. Qatari authorities seem to have got developed relations with BRSC commander Ismail Al-Sallabi. The latter is believed to have got been associated with Ghanim Al-Kubais, caput of the Qatari intelligence.51 Qatar also fostered links to Belhadj.
In add-on to ties to Qatar, Belhadj is also thought to have got pregnant linkages to Turkey. In 2013, he was reported to have got reached out to the AKP to seek assistance with laundering money looted during the overthrow of Qaddafi too inwards gaining refuge inwards Turkey. While at that topographic point is no evidence to propose that the AKP provided such assistance, Belhadj does at in 1 lawsuit dissever his fourth dimension betwixt Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too Turkey. He has pregnant fiscal too existent estate investments inwards Turkey, allegedly made possible thank you lot to the looted money.52
As good every bit their links to various countries, onetime members of the LIFG/LIMC have got also been defendant of having ties to jihadi groups inwards other countries, notably inwards Tunisia. Belhadj was defendant inwards 2013 of having been implicated inwards the murder of ii leftist politico inwards Tunisia, which the Tunisian authorities claimed were carried out yesteryear the Salafi arrangement Ansar Al-Sharia Tunisia (AST). In addition, Belhadj was defendant of having sheltered AST leader, Abu Iyad Al-Tunisi, inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya next the assassinations. He is also alleged to have got trained AST militants inwards Libya. However, Belhadj has denied involvement inwards the murders, every bit good every bit whatever connections to AST. Proof of the exact nature of the human relationship betwixt Belhadj too AST is ultimately lacking.53
Ties to transnational jihadi groups, such every bit Al-Qaeda, also appear to exist. Abdul Basit Azuz, who fought against the Soviets inwards Afghanistan, spent several decades inwards the United Kingdom of Great Britain too Northern Ireland before relocating to the Pakistani-Afghan border expanse inwards the tardily 2000s, is reported to have got been associated with the LIFG/LIMC influenced Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade. He was allegedly sent yesteryear Ayman Al-Zawahiri to Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya inwards monastic tell to aid Al-Qaeda gain a foothold inwards the province next the decease of Qaddafi. The BRSC, inwards which Ismail Al-Sallabi was a commander, also contains Al-Qaeda-linked individuals, such every bit Mohammed Ali, who was convicted inwards Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of plotting suicide attacks inwards the hollo of Al-Qaeda against the airdrome inwards Amman inwards 2007. In addition, the BDB, of which Ismail Al-Sallabi is also a commander, is allegedly backed yesteryear Al-Qaeda. The precise nature of BDB’s connectedness to Al-Qaeda remains unclear, though.54
While both the BRSC too BDB have got apparent links to Al-Qaeda, this does non seem to preclude cooperation with fighters loyal to IS. The BRSC has fought with Islamic State (IS) against the LNA inwards Benghazi too the BDB has cooperated with IS militants during an functioning against the LNA inwards tardily June 2016. Indicative of such collaboration, senior fellow member of the BDB, Ahmed Bakir, was arrested yesteryear the Misrata Counter Terrorism Unit for cooperation with IS.55
Vectors of Influence
National
A number of brigades formed or led yesteryear LIFG/LIMC veterans have got retained influence on the the world inwards several areas across the province next the uprising. This includes the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, which, along with a number of other brigades, controls much of the capital.56 In the East, the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade maintains considerable influence inwards Derna, engaging inwards smuggling activities. It was also reported to have got trained would-be unusual fighters for the Syrian conflict.57
Belhadj remains a prominent political figure too silent wields influence inwards Tripoli every bit a resultant of his onetime connections to the TMC. Although he at in 1 lawsuit presents himself every bit a line concern human being – his political career non having been real successful – many Libyans say that he is influential behind the scenes, pulling the strings with LIFG/ LIMC veterans. He is also well-respected yesteryear the Muslim Brotherhood, every bit good every bit inwards other Islamist circles.58
The civil state of war has also enabled Ismail Al-Sallabi to increment his influence inwards the East every bit 1 of the most powerful commanders inwards the BRSC too the BDB. While the BRSC too its element parts have got been decimated inwards clashes with the LNA, at that topographic point is no dubiety that fighters inwards the East go on to back upward the brigades that create upward the BRSC. Ali Al-Sallabi is also an associate of GNA Defence Minister Colonel Mahdi Al-Barghathi. In theory, he would live well-positioned to play a role inwards whatever futurity Libyan army. However, his links to jihadi actors too the decline of both the BRSC could piece of occupation against this.59
The profiles of onetime LIFG/LIMC members, notably Ismail Al-Sallabi too Belhadj, have got also been boosted through command of various media outlets. The BRSC has several media outlets of its own, including Al-Saraya Media Centre, which it uses to publicize its activities too also to diffuse its agenda, too Bushra Media Establishment, a pro-BRSC online media group, which also became that of the BDB. Belhadj, inwards turn, has his ain TV channel, Nada TV, which has been used to promote the operations of the BRSC too the BDB. It also re-diffuses reports featured yesteryear the Al-Saraya Media Centre.60
International
The successes of LIFG/LIMC militants during the uprising were non alone attributed to the movement’s powerfulness to adapt its message too ikon to the changed national context, but also to the movement’s relations with Qatar. The armed services roles of LIFG/LIMC veterans, which translated into political influence for some, was aided yesteryear arms supplies too other forms of back upward from Qatar.61 As commander of the 17th Feb Martyrs Brigade, Ismail Al-Sallabi is believed to have got received aid too arms from Qatar, channeled, every bit noted earlier, through Al-Sallabi’s brother, Ali, who was at that fourth dimension of the uprising based inwards Doha. When Ismail Al-Sallabi formed the Raffalah Al-Sahati Brigade, this back upward is thought to have got continued inwards the grade of funding too arms.62 Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, when led yesteryear Belhadj, received infantry preparation from Qatari Special Operations Forces inwards the Nafusa Mountain area, where it was based during the uprising. Qatari Special Operations Forces were fifty-fifty reported to have got been on the the world during the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade’s onset on Qaddaf’s fortress, the Bab al-Azizya Compound. Qatar’s back upward for Belhadj also appears to have got continued beyond the uprising. The TMC, which Belhadj led next the decease of Qaddafi, is also reported to have got received funds from Qatar. Following Belhadj’s resignation from the TMC, Qatari back upward for him could have got continued. His Al-Watan political party is notably rumoured to have Qatari fiscal support.63 However, his perceived links to Qatar may live a liability for whatever futurity political ambitions he may have.
1.3 Salafi Parties (Al-Watan too Al-Umma Al-Wasat)
Background too Objectives
As indicated, those LIFG/LIMC veterans, who entered the political arena next the autumn of the Qaddafi regime, fractured into ii chief political parties, 1 to a greater extent than moderate than the other. Former LIFG/LIMC leader, Belhadj, every bit mentioned, resigned from the TMC inwards monastic tell to run inwards the parliamentary elections inwards 2012 every bit a candidate for the political party that he had formed, Al-Watan. The latter is comprised of a broad attain of figures, some of which are non Islamist. Among its members are line concern people, members of the Muslim Brotherhood too to a greater extent than liberal-leaning Libyans, who had been implicated inwards civil lodge activities during the course of didactics of the uprising.64 Reflective of its various composition, Al-Watan presents itself every bit a broad-based political political party with an Islamic reference. As such, it claims to pick out the civic nature of the state65 too does non seek to create sharia law the reason of legislation.
The other, to a greater extent than ideologically conservative, political party to emerge inwards 2012 was Al-Umma Al-Wasat. The latter was founded yesteryear Al-Saadi, 1 of Belhadj’s deputies too onetime caput of the LIFG’s religious committee. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 pregnant number of LIFG/LIMC veterans followed Al-Saadi too joined his party, resulting inwards the political party beingness dubbed the “LIFG political wing” inwards local media. Among them were Al-Sharif, some other of Belhadj’s deputies, Al-Qaid, senior fellow member of the LIFG too blood brother of the high-level Al-Qaeda militant Abu Yahya Alibi, too Al-Dhuwadi. In line with its to a greater extent than conservative agenda, Al-Umma Al-Wasat seeks to flora sharia law inwards Libya. Consequently, it does non pick out the thought of a civic state.66
Alliances
National
On the national stage, Al-Watan has links to several prominent actors, including onetime Muslim Brotherhood fellow member too leader of the Hisb Al-Watan (formerly the National Gathering too non to live confused with Belhadj’s Al-Watan party), Ali Al-Sallabi. Belhadj too Ali Al-Sallabi formed especially unopen ties when the latter assisted inwards securing the release of Belhadj too other LIFG members from prison theatre inwards the mid-2000s. During the uprising, this human relationship would evidence crucial to Belhadj’s armed services role, especially during the capture of Tripoli yesteryear rebel forces. Other key figures inwards the political party are also known to have got links to Ali Al-Sallabi, including Ismail Gritli, an Al-Jazeera journalist, who returned to Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya from the United Kingdom of Great Britain too Northern Ireland inwards 2002 too co-authored a volume with him.67 Al-Watan’s composition too ideological orientation has also led the political party to uncovering mutual create with the Muslim Brotherhood, whose members are introduce inwards Al-Watan too with which the latter allied during the Libyan civil state of war every bit constituent of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Dawn coalition. As constituent of this coalition, Al-Watan could rely on the back upward of the Muslim Brotherhood-tied Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Shield forces, which include the Tripoli Revolutionary Brigade, which Behadj in 1 lawsuit commanded.68
Not surprisingly, Al-Umma Al-Wasat has ties with to a greater extent than conservative figures inwards Libya’s political too religious spheres. As a fellow member of the GNC, Al-Qaid was afforded ample chance to forge ties with other conservative members inside the body, especially independent Salafi-leaning GNC deputies inside his Loyalty to the Martyrs Blood bloc. This parliamentary bloc was itself allied with the JCP.69 The party’s leader, Al-Saadi, is also allegedly connected to Sadiq Al-Ghariani, an influential cleric inside Libya’s religious sphere, who was appointed Libya’s foremost manager of Dar Al-Ifta too is reported to have got links to the Muslim Brotherhood70
International
Al-Watan is reported to hold unopen relations with Qatar too is fifty-fifty alleged to live financed yesteryear Qatar.71 Al-Saadi too his Al-Umma Al-Wasat political party may also have got had similar links. Al-Saadi’s hollo appears on a terror listing issued yesteryear the HoR next the publication of the Arab states’ terror dark listing of Qatari or Qatari-allied individuals, which is suggestive of potential links to Qatar.72
Vectors of Influence
National
During the 2012 parliamentary elections, which allowed political parties to run inwards conjunction with independent candidates, both Al-Watan too Al-Umma Al-Wasat faired extremely badly. Al-Watan suffered a stunning defeat. It failed to win whatever seats inwards the GNC, fifty-fifty Belhadj, who was a high profile figure, failed to win a topographic point inwards his constituency of Tripoli’s 13th district. The poor performance of the political party may have got been due to Belhadj’s connections to Ali Al-Sallabi, too the perception that the political party was nether the influence of Qatar.73 Al-Umma Al-Wasat did slightly better, winning 1 seat, which was allocated to Al-Qaid, who used his topographic point well. During his fourth dimension inwards the GNC, Al-Qaid was leader of the Salafi-oriented Loyalty to the Martyrs Blood bloc. This bloc was able, inwards alliance with the JCP, to wield considerable influence inwards the GNC. In addition, Al-Qaid was caput of the GNC’s National Security Committee.74
International
During the 2012 elections, Belhadj too his Al-Watan political party received a corking bargain of attending inwards the international press. El-Watan’s back upward for the UN-led political process, inwards which it has participated, has also led to a to a greater extent than positive international ikon than that of Al-Umma Al-Wasat, which has been a staunch opponent of reconciliation.75
1.4 “Quiestist” Salafis (Madkhalis)
Background too Objectives
The quietist Salafi strain inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is largely composed of followers of the Saudi sheikh Rabi bin Hadi Al-Madkhali. The latter shuns participation inwards parliamentary democracy, every bit good every bit armed resistance, inwards favour of strict loyalty to rulers too observance of Islamic practice. In the 1990s, the Saudi authorities promoted Al-Madkhali’s teachings inwards the Kingdom every bit a way of discrediting the domestic Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Sahwa movement, too jihadi Salafism. While his influence has declined domestically over the years, with the religious establishment distancing itself from him, he is probable silent viewed yesteryear the Saudi authorities every bit useful thank you lot to his unquestioning back upward for the established dominion inwards Saudi Arabia. His topographic point inside a government-funded Islamic academy inwards Medina is indicative of this.76 Al-Madkhali has also developed a next abroad, including inwards Libya. Advocates of Madkhalism were invited to Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya yesteryear Qaddafi inwards the 1990s to counter the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood too the LIFG. Over the years, the motion has gained traction inwards the country.77 Support for Madkhalis inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was channeled through Qaddafi’s son, Saadi Qaddafi, who was the dot human being betwixt Madkhalis too the regime.78 Not alone did Madkhalism pick out root during Qaddafi years; its adherents managed to infiltrate the safety services.79
When the uprising began inwards 2011, Al-Madkhali urged his followers non to bring together the rebels too to remain at home, declaring that participation inwards the uprising would create fitnah (chaos). As a result, many of his followers did non side with the rebels, although some did participate inwards the uprising inwards Tripoli, which began on twenty August 2011. After Qaddafi, Madkhalis formed “anti-vice” squads aimed at enforcing Madkhali moral precepts. They also destroyed Sufi shrines too mosques, due to their opposition to Sufism’s veneration of saints too the dominant Maliki School of jurisprudence. Within the context of the civil war, Madkhalis joined contrary sides inwards the conflict, with some aligning with the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Dawn coalition too others joining the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Dignity coalition.80 Their subsequent alliances with the UN-backed GNA too Haftar’s LNA has increased their influence inwards the country.
Alliances
National
Several armed groups that are influenced yesteryear Madkhalism are allied with the GNA. The powerful RADA Special Deterrence Force, led yesteryear Abdel Raouf Kara, a key Madkhali figure inwards Tripoli too based inwards the capital, is the most prominent of the western-based Madkhali brigades. RADA began life every bit 1 of the anti-vice squads set upward next the uprising. It falls nether the potency of the Ministry of the Interior too operates out of a base of operations at Tripoli’s Mitiga airport, where it runs its ain prison. The forcefulness is thought to count to a greater extent than or less 1,500 inwards its ranks, amongst which are onetime regular army officers opposed to General Haftar. RADA non alone opposed Haftar too the LNA, but also the cleric Sadiq Al-Ghariani, who backs the National Salvation Government inwards Tripoli too is reported to have got ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.81 Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 RADA sub-unit, the Crime Fighting Apparatus (CFA), which is also based inwards Tripoli too has ties to Madkhalis, was believed to live responsible for the 2016 kidnapping of Sheikh Nadir Al-Omrani, a fellow member of Al-Ghariani’s at in 1 lawsuit closed Dar Al-Ifta too critic of Al-Madkhali’s fatwas.82
Another Madkhali-leaning too Tripoli-based brigade is the Abu Salim Central Security Force, led yesteryear Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli. It controls a detention centre inwards the Abu Salim neighbourhood of Tripoli. Like RADA, it is loyal to the GNA. It is also allied to some other powerful Tripoli Brigade, the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, in 1 lawsuit led yesteryear Belhadj too at in 1 lawsuit commanded yesteryear Haitham Al-Tajuri, which also backs the GNA too late expelled El-Ghwell’s National Salvation Government from its headquarters at the Rixos hotel inwards Tripoli.83
The 604th Infantry Battalion is some other Madkhali influenced armed grouping allied with the GNA. It was formed next the murder of a Salafi cleric, Khaled bin Rajab Al-Firjani, who was killed yesteryear IS militants for condemning the group. Al-Firjani’s blood brother fled to Tripoli too established the group, with the back upward (including the provision of arms) of RADA. The grouping is estimated to comprise some 450 fighters (as of the destination of 2015) made upward largely of Misratans, although it also includes fighters from other parts of the country, such every bit Sirte, Bani Walid, Tripoli, Zintan too Sabah. The 604th Infantry Battalion participated inwards Operation Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous, the anti-IS functioning launched inwards 2016 against IS inwards Sirte yesteryear brigades loyal to the GNA. Despite the group’s cooperation with the GNA, its leader does have got ties to Haftar, who hails from the same Firjan tribe84, raising questions most the group’s long-term loyalties.
Following a 2016 fatwa calling on Madkhalis to bring together Haftar’s drive against the BDB, due to its perceived closeness to the Muslim Brotherhood too jihadi Salafis, some Madkhalis have got allied themselves with Haftar too the LNA. Many of the Madkhalis who have got backed Haftar militarily, every bit a resultant of their anti-Muslim Brotherhood too anti-jihadi Salafi stance, are onetime members of the Salafist Tawhid Brigade, initially led yesteryear the at in 1 lawsuit deceased Izz Al-Din Al-Tarhuni. Following the latter’s decease inwards early 2015, the Brigade disintegrated. Its members have got since joined several units of the Haftar’s LNA, including the 302 Special Forces Battalion, the Marine Special Forces too the 210 Mechanized Infantry Battalion.85 Another, less prominent Madkhali leaning armed grouping that is allied with the LNA is the Tariq ibn Ziyad Brigade.86
International
Saudi back upward for Madkhalis has been reported. The powerfulness of the Madkhali brigades to increment their manpower yesteryear offering attractive salaries too to build upward pregnant armed services capacity is alleged to live at to the lowest degree partly due to funding from Saudi sources. However, this remains speculative. Saudi authorities back upward may pick out other forms, though, such every bit back upward for Madkhali preachers. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has sent Madkhali clerics to eastern Libya, with the blessing of General Haftar, for example.87 Madkhali clerics operating inwards the East include Salem Al-Wissari, Hamed ben Issa, Abdel Al-Qwarsha, Faraj Al-Maliki, Al-Mabrouk Al-Qadi, Massoud Al-Nadhuri too Ezzedine Mouhammad.88 Moreover, next the abduction of Al-Omrani, Al-Ghariani claimed that Madkhalis had been directed yesteryear their counterparts inwards Gulf States to murder Libyan clerics. However, the abduction was reported to have got been carried out on the orders of the Egyptian Madkhali Mohammed Said Raslan89, suggesting that Egyptian Madkhali networks may also have got influence with their counterparts inwards Libya.
Vectors of Influence
National
Madkhalis appear to live using their alliance with Haftar to increment their influence inwards the East, where they are reported to live gaining back upward inwards some sections of society. Madkhalis non alone command many mosques inwards the East, but are also reported to command the General Authority of Awfaq too Islamic Affairs, the religious potency set upward of the Bayda government. Indeed, locals have got expressed concern that a province establishment is propagating an extremist ideology.90 Integration of Madkhalis into LNA units may also live serving to extend Madkhali influence inwards eastern Libya, which could have got implications for a futurity Libyan army, should LNA units that comprise Madkhalis live integrated into whatever such unified structure.91
In the West, Madkhalis have got pregnant traction on the the world inwards Tripoli, especially through RADA, every bit good every bit other brigades led yesteryear Madkhalis, including the Abu Salim Central Security Force. Together with the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade, the Madkhali brigades largely command much of Tripoli.92 The Abu Salim Central Security Force’s influence with the GNA may have got been farther boosted inwards March 2017, when it ejected the National Salvation Government from its headquarters at the Rixos hotel inwards Tripoli.93 Indeed, the GNA depends on back upward from these brigades inwards the capital. In Misrata, where the 604th Infantry Batallion is based, Madkhalis are also said to exert influence over the Misrata Muncipal Council.94
Were Madkhalis to come upward together to grade a bloc, they could wield to a greater extent than influence. However, the fact that non all of them followed Al-Madkhali’s fatwa to unite with Haftar’s LNA, every bit good every bit their presence on opposing sides of the civil war, suggests that their local allegiances predominate for the fourth dimension being. Although they are non a united force, their alliances with Haftar too the GNA may serve to strengthen an ultra-conservative Salafi strain inside Libyan safety structures too inside the religious too societal spheres inwards Libya. Madkhalis also have got the wages of beingness able to introduce themselves every bit safety providers, every bit good every bit uncorrupt, which could live appealing to a population inwards dire ask of safety too proficient governance. Their growth is potentially concerning, since Madkhalis are against mainstream Islamists, who are probable to go on to have got an of import role inwards Libyan politics. Madkhalis unquestioning back upward for rulers could also have got implications for stability inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya over the long run,95 should undemocratic forces go pre-eminent inwards the province too seek to gain religious legitimacy yesteryear aligning themselves with Madkhalis.
International
Madkhali back upward for the GNA inwards Tripoli too their participation inwards the combat against IS does aid to boost international credence of Madkhali brigades. In the East, Madkhali back upward for Haftar’s LNA raises Libyan Madkhalis significance inwards Kingdom of Saudi Arabia every bit a potential channel of influence inwards North Africa.
1.5 The Importance of Libya’s Islamists
Political back upward for the uprising, every bit good every bit the role of Islamist-linked revolutionary brigades, helped to grant the Muslim Brotherhood influence inwards post-Qaddafi governance too parallel safety institutions. Although its political weight has waned since 2014, the United Nations political procedure too the institutions created nether the UN-brokered LPA have got provided vectors of continued influence for the movement. This influence is probable to diminish further, if modifications to the LPA are implemented. Brotherhood-associated brigades that are loyal to the GNA, especially those inwards the onetime Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Shield forces, also serve to give the Muslim Brotherhood influence. Should they go incorporated into futurity police force too regular army structures, this would give the motion associates inside these structures, who are sympathetic to its agenda.
LIFG/LIMC veterans never reached the same grade of political relevance every bit the Muslim Brotherhood, though a few did gain political relevance next the uprising, largely due to aligning with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the importance of some onetime LIFG/ LIMC members has been boosted yesteryear the significance of powerful brigades commanded yesteryear LIFG/LIMC veterans, especially inwards Tripoli too eastern Libya. These brigades have got lost some of their weight recently, though. Whether the prominence of LIFG/LIMC veteran commanders volition interpret into influence inside futurity safety structures is probable to depend on how their links to jihadi Salafi actors are perceived.
While Madkhalis, for the most part, did non play a pregnant role inwards the uprising, they have got taken sides inwards the civil war. As such, they have got succeeded inwards making themselves relevant to both the GNA too Haftar’s LNA. This could interpret into a futurity presence inside police force too regular army structures. As a resultant of the political fragmentation of Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too Haftar’s tolerance of Madkhalism, the latter is also gaining a firmer foothold inwards the religious sphere inwards the East, giving its adherents channels through which to go on to increment their next inwards this political party of the country.
In sum, then, the political influence of Islamists, especially that of Muslim Brotherhood, has declined since 2014. However, the United Nations political procedure has provided a channel through which they may remain politically relevant, albeit to a much reduced degree. Moreover, the importance of brigades associated with Islamist actors has provided them with vectors of influence inwards the West too the East, which could interpret into influence inwards Libya’s futurity safety structures. Should such brigades go integrated into a unified regular army structure, their opposing agendas could carry on unity inside it. The growth of Madkhalism inwards the East could also pose challenges to a revived democratic transition inwards Libya, if undemocratic forces are predominant at whatever time. It could also reinforce ultra-conservativism inwards this already to a greater extent than conservative constituent of the country.
2 Islamism inwards Tunisia
After the uprising that removed Ben Ali from powerfulness too enabled a democratic transition to set out inwards Tunisia, a number of Islamist actors entered the political arena, including the mainstream Islamist political party Ennahda too to a greater extent than conservative Salafi parties, such every bit Jabhat Al-Islah too Hisb Ut-tahrir. At the same time, the quietist Salafi electrical current inside lodge grew, represented inwards a higher identify all yesteryear Ansar Al-Sahria Tunisia inwards the early stage of its evolution, although the latter later became a jihadi organization.
2.1 Mainstream Islamists (Ennahda)
Background too Objectives
Ennahda has its roots inwards the Jamaa Al-Islamiyya, which began every bit a educatee motion inwards the 1970s with the aim of bringing Islamist thought linked to the Muslim Brotherhood inwards Arab Republic of Egypt to Tunisia. It sought to create so through preaching at academy campuses too inwards mosques. In a similar way to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, it recruited at the grassroots flat too financed the motion through membership payments. The grouping was banned inwards 1973, though it continued to operate clandestinely.96
A split inside the motion betwixt those members wedded to the intellectual heritage of the Muslim Brotherhood inwards Arab Republic of Egypt too those, similar Rachid Ghannouchi (later the leader of Ennahda), who believed it was non compatible with the Islamic traditions of Tunisia, emerged. This led the latter faction to grade the Mouvement de la tendance islamique (MTI) inwards 1979. The MTI was committed non alone to social activism, but also political activity aimed at challenging the secularization of Tunisia nether onetime president, Habib Boughuiba. Although its creation was an facial expression of the want to develop a type of Islamism that would have got traction inside Tunisia, the MTI is believed to have got maintained links with the Muslim Brotherhood inwards Egypt. The precise nature of their human relationship was unclear, though. Some analysts believe that MTI was initially formally associated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, though intellectually independent. At the real least, private members of MTI are thought to have got sworn allegiance to the Muslim Brotherhood.97
The MTI announced its existence inwards 1981 too applied for a license to operate every bit a political political party inside the context of a political opening initiated yesteryear Bourghuiba prior to parliamentary elections that year. MTI’s political programme included a telephone phone for the revival of Tunisia’s Islamic heritage too a commitment to the democratic process. However, MTI was non granted a license to operate every bit a political political party too the populace annunciation of its existence led the authorities to ban the movement. The ensuing crackdown against the motion saw Ghannouchi imprisoned until he was released inwards 1984 nether a full general amnesty granted to MTI militants. Following the full general amnesty, the motion was able to constituent somewhat openly until attacks inwards Sousse too Monastir inwards 1987, for which MTI was blamed, led to some other catamenia of repression against the motion too Ghannouchi’s imprisonment too decease sentence.98
In 1988, the incoming president, Zine El-Abadine Ben Ali, released Ghannouchi too other MTI members. As Ben Ali moved to flora a multiparty system, Ghannouchi changed the movement’s hollo to the Ennahda (Renaissance) Mouvement inwards monastic tell to take away the reference to Islam inwards its hollo too larn inwards eligible to apply for a license every bit a political party. While Ennahda was non granted a license to operate every bit a party, members of the motion did run every bit independents inwards the 1989 parliamentary elections. Although they won 14.5 per cent of the vote, none were allowed to pick out upward seats inwards parliament too the election results prompted some other crackdown against the movement, this fourth dimension leading to Ghannouchi’s exile too the movement’s disappearance from the populace arena inwards Tunisia. Some of its subway scheme structures did remain, though. During his exile, Ghannouchi’s became convinced that an Islamic grade of republic could live advanced through participation inwards the democratic process.99
When the removal of Ben Ali inwards 2011 enabled Ennahda’s legalization every bit a political party, the ask for societal credence too inclusion inside the political system, especially against the backdrop of the political crisis inwards 2013/14 too the ouster of Morsi inwards Egypt, led to a radical reorientation of Ennahda. Ennahda no longer seeks to flora sharia law, which way that it accepts the civic nature of the Tunisian province and, moreover, tin encompass human rights without those rights beingness circumscribed yesteryear Islamic law.100 In 2016, to farther cut the perception that Ennahda was every bit good unopen to the jihadi Salafi electrical current inwards Tunisia, some other of import milestone was reached towards becoming a civic party. Ennahda sought to distance itself from political Islam yesteryear redefining itself every bit a national democratic political party based on Islamic values, justified yesteryear the separation of its political too religious activities.101
Alliances
National
Ennahada has entered into formal political alliances with non-Islamist parties. Following the 2011 parliamentary elections, Ennahda entered into an alliance with ii non-Islamist parties that had non campaigned on a strong anti-Islamist ticket, notably the social democratic Ettakatol too the centre-left Congress for the Republic (CPR). However, their alliance with Ennhada caused serious ruptures inside them. During the course of didactics of the so-called troika government, almost 50 per cent of Ettakatol too CPR’s parliamentarians resigned from their parties to protestation the alliance with Ennahda.102
Whilst leading the troika government, Ennahda also maintained unopen ties to Salafi parties, especially with Jabhat Al-Islah, which it considered an ally. Relations with Salafi actors at this fourth dimension also extended to AST, whose leaders had spent fourth dimension inwards prison theatre with those of Ennahda. In the early stage of the transition, Ghannouchi met with AST leader, Abu Iyad Al-Tunisi, too provided advice on how AST could increment its influence inwards Tunisia.103
However, Ennahda’s links with AST during its leadership of the troika authorities led to repeated accusations of it beingness every bit good lenient with Salafis, especially members of AST. Its tolerant opinion towards AST was evidently due to a want non to force them farther into the fringes or to lose their potential political support, every bit good every bit a resultant of Ennahda’s ain partially conservative back upward base. However, distance betwixt Ennahda too AST would grow when ties to the latter became a liability, especially after AST was allegedly implicated inwards the 2012 onset on the United States of America Embassy inwards Tunis. The rupture betwixt Ennahda too AST would go fifty-fifty to a greater extent than serious next the assassination of ii leftist politicians inwards 2013 for which AST was deemed responsible.104 At the same time, Ennahda’s political survival increasingly depended on credence yesteryear non-Islamist political parties too lodge at large every bit opposition forces called for the troika authorities to pace downwardly for allegedly having failed to create plenty to curb the growth of Salafi violence inwards the country.
Ennahda was forced to cede powerfulness inwards early 2014 too to larn inwards into a dialogue procedure with opposition parties. The elections that followed that same year, saw Nidaa Tounes, a broad-based non-Islamist party, grade a coalition authorities that included the populist Free Patriotic Union too the liberal Afek Tounis, every bit good every bit Ennahda. Inclusion of the latter was non initially sought, though it proved necessary inwards monastic tell for Nidaa Tounes to secure a parliamentary majority. Ennahda seems to have got understood that compromise with Nidaa Tounes was essential for its long-term survival. Even though Ennahda is at in 1 lawsuit the largest political party inwards parliament, due to the resignations of Nidaa Tounes parliamentarians inwards 2016, Ennahda would non live able to grade a governing bulk without Nidaa Tounes inwards the lawsuit of a vote of no confidence for the Nidaa Tounes government. Both parties, therefore, ask each other for the fourth dimension being105, suggesting that Ennahda volition go on to piece of occupation with Nidaa Tounes.
International
Ennahda maintains ties with a number of other Islamist parties abroad. Relations with Morocco’s Justice too Development Party (JDP) appear to live especially close. Both parties have got shared their experiences with 1 another. The PJD was late a source of inspiration for Ennahda with regards to the separation of the political party from the religious movement. Ennahda seems to have got studied what the PJD did before it announced a similar separation betwixt political too religious activities inwards 2016.106
As mentioned, Ennahda has also been unopen to the Muslim Brotherhood inwards Egypt. Though at that topographic point is no evidence of formal ties betwixt them, Ennahda did persuasion the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood every bit an ally until it became a liability for Ennahda next the 2013 ouster of the Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi, which coincided with the political crisis inwards Tunisia.
Links betwixt Ennahda too the AKP inwards Turkey have got also been strong, although non all of Ennahda’s leadership have got viewed AKP every bit a model for the party, due to the AKP’s organizational construction too the ascendancy of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan inside it. Repression inwards Turkey next the 2016 attempted coup may also live prompting Ennahda to re-evaluate the extent to which it wishes to live publicly associated with the AKP.107
Ennahda’s leadership is also unopen to Qatar, which similar Turkey nether the AKP, has sought to foster strong relations with Islamist parties inwards the region. While leading the troika government, many pregnant projects inwards strategic sectors of the economic scheme were awarded to Qatar, ofttimes inwards the absence of sufficient transparency. Accusations that Ennahda has received funding from Qatar have got also been recurrent since Ennahda entered politics inwards 2011. In the stitch to the 2012 parliamentary elections, for example, Ghannouchi was rumoured to have got received substantial funding from the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hama ben Khalifa al-Thani, inwards monastic tell to finance Ennahda’s electoral campaign. More recently, inwards 2017, the Parti Destourien Libre (PDL) filed a electrical load with the prosecutor of the primary courtroom calling for investigations into the financing of Ennahda, especially inwards relation to allegations it has received fiscal back upward from Qatar.108
Although Ennahda’s leadership enjoys unopen relations with Qatar, it also maintains links with Saudi Arabia. Ennahda began to soften its opinion towards Kingdom of Saudi Arabia next the ouster of Morsi inwards Arab Republic of Egypt too the political crisis inwards Tunisia, enabling a slight realignment of Tunisia’s unusual policy nether the Nidaa Tounes-led coalition. Ennahda’s leaders appear to live attempting to cultivate proficient relations with the Saudi violet courtroom yesteryear reassuring Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that it is non intent on exporting political Islam to the wider region. Ennahda’s modified topographic point vis-à-vis Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was also facilitated yesteryear the latter’s greater forbearance towards mainstream Islamists next the determination of the 2015 Islamic Republic of Iran nuclear deal. The 2017 crisis betwixt Qatar too the GCC could yet come across Ennahda lean to a greater extent than towards Saudi Arabia, though back upward for Qatar inside the context of the crisis is silent strong amid its constituencies.109
Vectors of Influence
National
Ennahda’s participation inwards authorities has translated into a considerable capacity to influence the domestic political scene, although Ennahda has sought compromise with non-Islamist parties when doing so. At the helm of the troika government, Ennahda was also able to usage its topographic point to facilitate the inclusion of its allies, such every bit Salafi political parties, inside the political system, too was thus able to facilitate the growth of an AST back upward base of operations that to some extent overlapped with its own.110 However, its capacity to promote actors whose agendas at to the lowest degree partially overlap with its ain has since diminished every bit the Ennahda has strategically distanced itself from Salafi actors.111
Close relations betwixt Qatar during the troika authorities may have got had the wages of demonstrating to the electorate that it, every bit leader of the governing coalition, had proficient relations with a wealthy province that was willing to invest inwards Tunisia. Ennahda’s lawyers also allegedly received Qatari funds with which to aid fund media outlets sympathetic to Ennahda.112 The extent to which relations with Qatar are favourable to domestic influence is changing, though, every bit remaining neutral inwards the Qatar-GCC crisis has go paramount.
International
Ennahda has several channels through which it tin exert influence internationally. Ghannouchi is reported to live the deputy caput of the international Muslim Brotherhood organization. He is also a high-ranking fellow member of a number of Islamist organisations inwards Europe, including the Dublin-based European Council on Fatwas too Research (ECFR), which is presided over yesteryear Al-Qawadari too aims to supply interpretations of Islamic law to European Muslim minorities, too the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), an association of theologians, which is also presided over yesteryear Al-Qawadari.113
Ennahda has also benefited from positive coverage on Al-Jazeera too the London-based paper that was launched yesteryear a Qatari company, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed. Al-Jazeera inwards detail has been an of import channel for constructing a positive populace ikon for the party, which was perceived every bit especially of import given the negative publicity the political party received inwards Saudi too Emirati media outlets when it was at the helm of the troika government. However, back upward from Qatar’s media outlets is probable to live less of an property inside the context of the Qatar-GCC crisis. Relations that Ennahda is fostering with Kingdom of Saudi Arabia could evidence an of import way of harm limitation for the party.
2.2 Salafi Parties (Hisb Ut-tahrir too Jabhat Al-Islah)
Background too Objectives
Several Salafi parties were established next the 2011 uprising. While all have got a relatively limited next inside the Salafi current, the most influential amid them are Jabhat Al-Islah too Hisb Ut-tahrir. Jabhat Al-Islah was legalized nether the troika authorities led yesteryear Ennahda. It was created yesteryear an older generation of Islamists. Its initial leader, Mohamed Khouja, was a fellow member of the Tunisian Islamic Front, which was formed yesteryear a grouping of hardline members of the MTI inwards the mid-1980s too advocated domestic jihad. Khouja was succeeded inwards 2015 yesteryear Rachid Tarjani.114
The political party advocates the establishment of an Islamic caliphate too believes that sharia law should grade the reason of the constitution too legislation. It has, nevertheless, renounced violence too seeks to piece of occupation inside the democratic scheme to accomplish these ends. It does non pick out a separation betwixt religious belief too politics or the thought of the nation state. However, similar Ennahda, it is attempting to secure its topographic point with the Tunisian democratic system. This has led it to attempt to reconcile Salafi values with the Tunisian political context. To this end, it recognizes that some elements of civil law may live compatible with sharia law. It also advocates some democratic values, such every bit liberty of expression, every bit long every bit they are circumscribed yesteryear Islamic guidelines.115
Hisb Ut-tahrir’s agenda is to a greater extent than conservative than that of Jabhat Al-Islah. It is constituent of a broader pan-Islamic motion that foremost emerged inwards Tunisia inwards the 1980s, operating clandestinely until it was legalized every bit a political political party inwards 2012. Led yesteryear Ridha Belhaj, Hisb Ut-tahrir is also committed to the establishment of sharia law too an Islamic caliphate. However, dissimilar Jabhat Al-Islah, it believes that an Islamic revolution is required to accomplish these ends. As a result, it does non back upward republic or participate inwards elections, mostly focusing instead on preaching.116
Alliances
National
As noted, both Jabhat Al-Islah too Hisb Ut-tahrir have got to varying degrees been allied with Ennahda. Relations betwixt Ennahda too Jabhat Al-Islah, nevertheless, have got been closer than those betwixt Ennahda too Hisb Ut-tahrir. This is probable to live due to the to a greater extent than reformist agenda of Jabhat Al-Islah, every bit good every bit the ties forged betwixt the leaders of both parties inwards the 1980s. From early on, Ghan nouchi demonstrated back upward for Jabhat Al-Islah yesteryear attending its initiative conference. In turn, Jabhat Al-Islah has lent tactical back upward to Ennahda. When Jabhat Al-Islah members ran every bit independents inwards some regions during the 2012 parliamentary elections, it encouraged its supporters to vote for Ennahda inwards the regions inwards which it did non run. Despite their cooperative relations, Jabhat Al-Islah has been critical of the concessions that Ennahda has made to non-Islamist parties.117
Jabhat Al-Islah too Hisb Ut-tahrir also had proficient relations with AST before it was designated a terrorist arrangement yesteryear the Tunisian authorities inwards 2013. Hisb Ut-tahrir co-organized at to the lowest degree 1 demonstration with AST, which called for the establishment of sharia law too an Islamic caliphate. While Jabhat Al-Islah has non co-organized events with AST, it has participated inwards AST-organized demonstrations too promoted the latter’s events on its social media outlets. Neither political party joined the authorities inwards condemning AST every bit a terrorist organization.118
International
Jabhat Al-Islah’s international linkages are fairly limited, partly due to its narrow social base of operations too lack of fiscal resources. It has attempted to connect with Salafi parties inwards Egypt. However, this has go infeasible after the ouster of President Morsi inwards 2013.119 Hisb Ut-tahrir has to a greater extent than substantial international ties. It is alleged to have back upward from Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan too Turkey. It is also constituent of a global organisation that is introduce inwards over xl countries worldwide. It, thus, has unopen relations with other national chapters of Hisb Ut-tahrir, some of which are openly hostile to the West.120
Vectors of Influence
National
Jabhat Al-Islah has sought to appeal to voters situated to the correct of Ennahda. However, it has failed to generate a pregnant back upward base of operations amongst this subdivision of society. Its members ran every bit independents inwards both the 2012 too 2014 elections, though failed to win whatever seats on both occasions, fifty-fifty though it attempted to tap into AST’s back upward base. Many Salafis are scornful of Jabhat Al-Islah, given that they persuasion the electoral procedure every bit a futile way of achieving an Islamic caliphate too the implementation of sharia law. While the political party has managed to attract a little next amongst older Salafis, its association with this older generation of Islamists has tended to cut its appeal amid younger Salafis.121
While Hisb Ut-tahrir’s refusal to promote alter through participation inwards the electoral procedure mightiness have got made it to a greater extent than appealing to ultra-conservatives, it has silent failed to generate a pregnant back upward base of operations with which to expand its influence nationally. Through its activities, including preaching, it does, nevertheless, have got constituencies inwards several areas of Tunisia. It is notably pop inwards some hotbeds of radicalization, such every bit Ettadhamen inwards the greater Tunis area. Its failure to build upward a broader base of operations of back upward may live due to the party’s failure to develop an agenda sufficiently adapted to the Tunisian context, every bit good every bit a comparative lack of funding.122 Its powerfulness to exert influence nationally is also probable to live hindered yesteryear the authorities’ efforts to crackdown on it. The political party was prevented from belongings its annual conference inwards 2016 too its activities have got been temporarily suspended on ii occasions, most late inwards 2017, inwards reply to inciting hatred too undermining populace order.123
International
Jabhat Al-Islah’s limited international linkages hateful that it also has few international vectors of influence. By contrast, Hisb Ut-tahrir’s membership inwards a broader international motion way that it benefits from advertisement through the Hisb Ut-tahrir’s key media office. While the Tunisian chapter of Hisb Ut-tahrir does non have got a corking bargain of influence inside the broader movement, it does have back upward from Hisb Ut-tahrir inwards Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan inwards particular.124
2.3 Quietist Salafis (Salafi Ilmiyya)
Background too Objectives
Many quietist Salafis inwards Tunisia are uninstitutionalized, though attempts have got been made to organize them. The most prominent grouping to create so was AST. The latter does non fit neatly into the quietist category, though. At its inception, it was ostensibly quietist. However, it evolved into a jihadi movement. Nevertheless, it does deserve attention, due to the role that it played inwards expanding Salafism inwards Tunisia through preaching too charity piece of occupation before it became jihadi.
AST was established inwards 2011 yesteryear Abu Iyad Al-Tunisi, a onetime fellow member of MTI, who managed to flee the province during the crackdown against Islamists nether Ben Ali. From exile inwards Afghanistan, he co-founded the jihadi Tunisian Combat Group. His arrest inwards Turkey inwards 2003, resulted inwards his extradition to Tunisia, where he was imprisoned until the full general amnesty inwards 2011 led to his release.125
AST seeks to flora an Islamic province inwards Tunisia governed yesteryear sharia law. However, dissimilar Salafi parties, such every bit Jabhat Al-Islah, it sought to create so from the bottom upward yesteryear promoting Salafi ideology through a multifariousness of activities, including preaching, charity piece of occupation too enforcement of moral behavior. While the latter ofttimes involved vigilante-type demeanour yesteryear AST followers, the arrangement did non initially telephone phone for jihad inwards Tunisia. It did encourage its members to wage jihad abroad, especially inwards Syria, however. Its topographic point regarding domestic jihad changed during 2013, next the organization’s designation yesteryear the Tunisian authorities every bit a terrorist organization, although this shift was never officially announced.126 AST has at in 1 lawsuit fragmented, with some of its members having fled abroad, especially to Syrian Arab Republic too Libya.
Alliances
National
AST initially received strong populace back upward from a highly influential jihadi cleric, Sheikh Khattab Idrisi, who spent several years inwards Kingdom of Saudi Arabia studying nether Wahhabi clerics too gained popularity next the autumn of Ben Ali. There has been some speculation that Idrisi could have got been 1 of AST’s leaders. However, his early ties to the arrangement remain unclear. At the real least, Idrisi seems to have got served every bit a spiritual guide to the organization’s members, who viewed him every bit 1 of the alone credible clerics inwards Tunisia. In add-on to back upward from Idrisi, AST benefited from the back upward of Salafi charities that are believed to have got helped to enhance funds for the organization.127
As mentioned, AST counted amid its allies the Salafi political parties, including Jabhat Al-Islah too Hisb Ut-tahrir too initially Ennahda, every bit noted earlier. Al-Tunisi had unopen ties with key figures inside Ennahda’s leadership, including Ghannouchi too Sadok Chouroue, onetime president of Ennahda. Al-Tunisi is known to have got met with Ghannouchi inwards the early stage of the transition. However, every bit indicated, cooperation betwixt AST too Ennahda dissipated from 2012 onwards.128
International
AST is believed to have got received back upward yesteryear patrons inwards several Gulf States. Much of the organization’s literature is thought to have got been donated from Saudi Arabia, where it was printed. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 Salafi charity inwards State of Kuwait was also reported to have got supplied nutrient too medical supplies to AST. Concrete evidence to back upward such claims is hard to come upward by, though.129
Ties to the at in 1 lawsuit disbanded Ansar al-Sharia inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (ASL), the Libyan jihadi grouping with links to Al-Qaeda, which sought to flora sharia law inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya through preaching, charity, vigilante-style violence too armed struggle, have got also been reported. While AST too ASL are non affiliates, linkages betwixt the ii appear to have got existed. The extent of these ties is, nevertheless, disputed. While some observers claim that the ii organizations maintained operational, fiscal too logistical connections, others believe that they operate independently from 1 another.130
Although AST denied having formal ties with Al-Qaeda, it was loyal to the latter. Al-Tunisi is also reported to have got links with Al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden too Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Additionally, ii other AST leaders, Sami Ben Khemais Essid too Mehdi Kammoun, are known to have got been involved inwards Al-Qaeda operations inwards Italia before returning to Tunisia too joining AST. The arrangement is also believed to have got received guidance from Al-Qaeda inwards the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). According to Tunisian too United States of America governments, funding has also been provided to AST yesteryear AQIM.131
While the AST leadership is closer to Al-Qaeda than IS, AST has expressed back upward for IS too has encouraged its members to go to Syrian Arab Republic to bring together the group. In 2014, an of import AST leader, Kamel Zarrouk, joined IS inwards Syria. The same year, AST spokesman, Seifeddine Rais, pledged allegiance to IS, although it is thought that he did so on an private basis, rather than on behalf of the AST. Nevertheless, his pledge of allegiance appeared to prompt a number of AST militants to depart for Syria, where they afterwards joined IS.132
Vectors of Influence
National
AST was able to gain the world after the uprising partly due to its charity work, especially inwards neglected areas of the country, such every bit the governorates inwards the South, the Interior too the Northwest. Its back upward base of operations was also built through the distribution of printed material, its media outlet, the Qayrawan Media Foundation (QMF), too its Facebook page.133 The crackdown against the arrangement has considerably limited these activities, although it is possible that some of its members go on the organization’s charitable piece of occupation inwards rural areas of the country, away from the watchful oculus of the authorities. Moreover, the arrangement may silent live able to rely on back upward from Salafi sheikhs to remain relevant.
International
AST’s loyalty to Al-Qaeda meant that it could rely on publicity via the Al-Qaeda Forum Ansar Al-Mujahidin Standard Arabic Forum (AMAF).134 Following the outlawing of AST inwards 2013, many AST members are believed to have got redeployed to Libya, where they were reported inwards 2014 to live regrouping nether the hollo of Shabab Al-Tawhid every bit a way of maintaining the AST network without attracting the attending of the Tunisian authorities.135
2.4 The Importance of Tunisia’s Islamists
Tunisian Islamists that have got entered the political arena after Ben Ali have got been successful alone to the extent that they have got adapted their aims to the Tunisian context. Ennahda’s elbow grease to create only that is the production of a long evolution that reached novel heights next the uprising, when the political party no longer insisted on the implementation of sharia law, too to a greater extent than recently, when it sought to farther emphasize the separation of religious belief too politics. While this transition towards a civic political party has undoubtedly helped to secure Ennahda’s identify inside the democratic scheme inwards Tunisia, it has been accompanied with the reduced capacity to promote to a greater extent than conservative Islamists inside the politics too society, who could have got constituted potential allies. Among the latter, Salafi parties have got inwards whatever instance failed to gain much traction inside the political system. They have got failed to appeal to ultra-conservative youth, who have got tended to either gravitate towards the quietist Salafi electrical current or to bring together the Salafi jihadi stream.
Concluding Remarks
While the political influence of Libya’s mainstream Islamists, notably the Muslim Brotherhood too its JCP, was considerable inwards the immediate post-Qaddafi years, largely due to strong alliances with members of Salafi parties too Salafi-leaning independents inwards the GNC, their political influence has declined since the civil state of war began inwards mid-2014. That said, most have got maintained vectors of influence inside the context of the UN-led political process, although their political clout could live farther reduced inside the context of an elbow grease to revive the UN-led reconciliation process. The Muslim Brotherhood’s associations with brigades that dorsum the GNA way that it could have got some sympathizers inside futurity unified too reformed safety structures, should these brigades live integrated into them. In the lawsuit of such a development, the Muslim Brotherhood could have got overlapping agendas with parts of Libya’s futurity “deep state”.
Non-mainstream Islamist actors have got to a greater extent than ofttimes than non failed to gain much political traction inwards Libya. LIFG/LIMC veterans have got garnered limited political support, every bit representatives of Salafi parties. However, brigades with ties to them have got go of import actors on the the world inwards some areas of the country. The powerfulness of these brigades has been reduced recently, though. Nevertheless, it could live possible that LIFG/LIMC veterans mightiness live represented inwards futurity safety structures, though their links to jihadi Salafi actors could good preclude this from transpiring. Madkhali brigades that have got gained inwards prominence every bit a resultant of the civil war, may also grade constituent of police force too regular army structures inwards the future, which could add together an chemical element of instability due to their opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood. Their increased next inwards the East, which is probable to go on to live supported yesteryear external actors, including Saudi Arabia, could also atomic number 82 to the farther growth of ultra-conservativism too perchance radicalization inwards the East, which has historically been a hotbed of vehement extremism too unusual fighter recruitment.
Tunisia’s Islamists have got been struggling to uncovering their identify inside a real different context characterized yesteryear the existence of established governance structures too a secular state. Ensuring continued political influence inside this context has led to the farther moderation of Ennahda, which has go always to a greater extent than mainstream inwards price of its credence of civic law too democratic norms too principles. By contrast, a mismatch betwixt the agendas of the to a greater extent than conservative Salafi parties too the Tunisian context has limited their significance, especially with immature Salafis, who may live to a greater extent than inclined to shun politics or fifty-fifty encompass violence.
Although the environments inwards which Islamists operate inside Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya too Tunisia are different, inwards both countries mainstream Islamists are probable to hold some, albeit reduced, influence. By contrast, to a greater extent than conservative political Islamists, notably Salafi parties, are probable to remain fairly insignificant inwards their ain right. This leaves room for the nominally quietist Salafi current. The latter may, at to the lowest degree inwards the Libyan case, go on to grow, with the potential for some of its adherents to go radicalized.
Notes
1 Although the boundaries betwixt Islam too Islamism are to some extent blurry, it is worth making a distinction betwixt them. Islam may live thought of both a corpus of ideas most religious belief inwards its spiritual grade too a set of ideas most politics, economics, lodge too war. Islamism is a projection of political mobilization of Islam. In broad terms, Islamism may involve the advertisement of beliefs, laws or policies that are considered religious inwards character. Sunni Islamism contains several currents of Islamism. Some Islamists encompass political Islamism, which places greater emphasis on engagement inwards politics than on preaching, too to a greater extent than ofttimes than non advocates obtaining powerfulness yesteryear political rather than armed means. Other Islamists may live quietist too reject involvement inwards politics. Others silent may live jihadi too condone violence every bit a way of achieving their aims. See Ahmad Tufail, “Towards a definition of Islam too Islamism,” MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series, 8 September 2017; Margot Badran, “Understanding Islam, Islamism, too Islamic Feminism,” Journal of Women’s History, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2001), p. 47; International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism,” Middle East / North Africa Report, No. 372, 2 March 2005, pp. 1 – 3.
2 Noman Benotman, Jason Pack too James Brandon, “Islamists,” in: The 2011 Libyan Uprisings too the Struggle for the Post-Qaddafi Future, ed. Jason Pack (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 193.
3 Omar Ashour, “Between ISIS too a Failed State: The Saga of Libyan Islamists,” Brookings Institute Working Paper, August 2015, p. 6
4 Palwsha L-Kakar too Zahra Langhi, “Libya’s Religious Sector too Peacebuilding Efforts,” U.S. Institute for Peace, 2017, p. 13.
5 Stefano M. Torelli, Fabio Merone too Francesco Cavatorta, “Salafism inwards Tunisia: Challenges too Opportunities for Democratization,” Middle East Policy XIX, No. four (2012), pp. 146 – 7; Georges Fahmi, “The Future of Political Salafism inwards Arab Republic of Egypt too Tunisia,” Carnegie Middle East Center, xvi Nov 2015; Monica Marks, “Youth Politics too Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi Current,” Mediterranean Politics 18, No. 1 (2013), p. 109.
6 International Crisis Group, “Tunisia: Violence too the Salafi Challenge,” Middle East / North Africa Report, No. 137, thirteen Feb 2013, pp. fourteen – 15; Anouar Boukhars, “The Politics of North African Salafism,” Orient II (2016), p. 55.
7 Political Islamists identify greater emphasis on engagement inwards politics than on preaching, too to a greater extent than ofttimes than non advocate obtaining powerfulness yesteryear political rather than armed means. See International Crisis Group, “Understanding Islamism,” pp. 1 – 3.
8 Adherents of Salafism seek to model their demeanour on the pious practices of the foremost 3 generations of Muslims after the Prophet Mohammed.
9 B. Chemitsky, “Libyan Muslim Brotherhood on the Rise,” MEMRI Inquiry too Analysis Series, No. 828, 24 Apr 2012
10 Ibid.; Mary Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place: Libya’s Islamists During too After the Revolution,” inwards The Libyan Revolution too Its Aftermath, eds. Peter Cole too Brian McQuinn (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015), p. 178; “Islamist Movements inwards Libya: Chances too Challenges of Political Power,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Office, 2015, p. 5; Ashour, “Between ISIS too a Failed State”; Benotman, Pack too Brandon, “Islamists,” pp. 196 – 7.
11 Robin Wright, The Islamist Are Coming: Who They Really Are (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012), p. 51; Ashour, “Between ISIS too a Failed State,” p. 3; Mehran Kamrava, Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain inwards the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 125.
12 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 181.
13 Benotman, Pack too Brandon, “Islamists,” p. 217.
14 Chemitsky, “Libyan Muslim Brotherhood on the Rise.”
15 B. Chemitsky, “Libya on Eve of General National Congress Elections – Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 Political Review,” MEMRI Inquiry too Analysis Series, No. 853, four July 2012; Omar Ashour, “Libya,” inwards Rethinking Political Islam, eds. Shadi Hamid too William McCants (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 105 – 6.
16 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 195; J. Millard Burr, “Libya – Ali Al-Salabi too the Re-Emerging Muslim Brotherhood,” American Center for Democracy, thirteen Oct 2014, “Partnership inwards Terrorism: Muslim Brotherhood-Qatar Role inwards Libya,” Arab Republic of Egypt Today, four July 2017; Ashour, “Libya,” p. 105.
17 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 195.
18 Mary Fitzgerald, “Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood Struggles to Grow,” Foreign Policy, 1 May 2014; Vijay Prashad, “Libya: The Battlefield of the New Arab Cold War,” Mada Masr, 23 Feb 2015; Ecaterina Cepoi too Marius Lazar, “Democracy vs. Islam,” inwards Democracy too Security inwards the 21st Century: Perspectives on a Changing World, ed. Valentin Naumescu (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), p. 410.
19 “Qatar, Muslim Brotherhood, Libyan AQ-Affiliated Militias,” The Qatar Insider, four July 2017; Tom Stevenson, “Gulf hands inwards Libya,” Middle East Eye, http://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/in-depth/features/gulf-hands-libya-955435705; “Developments of the Libyan Scene betwixt the Internal Crisis too the External Intervention,” Middle East Observer, 2 Nov 2016; Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya: Continuity too Change, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 95.
20 “AKP Hosts Dignitaries from All Over the World,” Hurriyet Daily News, thirty September 2012.
21 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” pp. 196 – 7; Chemitsky, “Libyan Muslim Brotherhood on the Rise.”
22 “Qatar, Muslim Brotherhood, Libyan AQ-Affiliated Militias”; Stevenson, “Gulf hands inwards Libya”; Aaron Stein, “Turkey’s Proxy War inwards Libya,” War on the Rocks, xv Jan 2015; Vijay Prashad, “Libya: The Battlefield of the New Arab Cold War,” Mada Masr, 23 Feb 2015; Marc Lynch, “In Uncharted Waters: Islamist Parties Beyond Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dec 2016, p. 11.
23 Ashour, “Between ISIS too a Failed State,” p. 4; Karim Mezran, Fadel Lamen too Eric Knecht, “Post-revolutionary Politics inwards Libya: Inside the General National Congress,” Atlantic Council Issue Brief, May 2013, p. 2; Benotman, Pack too Brandon, “Islamists,” p. 217.
24 Benotman, Pack too Brandon, “Islamists,” p. 217.
25 Wolfram Lacher, “Fault Lines of the Revolution: Political Actors, Camps too Conflicts inwards the New Libya,” SWP Research Paper, May 2013, p. 16.
26 Amanda Kadlec too Hassan Morajea, “The Dawn Divides: The Islamic State too Libya’s Inter-Islamist War,” War on the Rocks, eleven Feb 2015; Joseph Walker-Cousins, “Security Sector Transformation inwards Arab Transitions: Working for Change,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Beirut, 17 – eighteen Dec 2012, pp. 22 – 3.
27 Sari Arraf, “A Short Guide to the Conflict,” The War Report 2017, Geneva Academy, June 2017, p. 8; “Developments of the Libyan Scene betwixt Internal Crisis too the External Intervention”; Mattia Toalda, “Libya too Egypt: Analogies, Differences too Regional Factors,” Aspen Online, four June 2014; Lacher, “Fault Lines of the Revolution,” p. 16.
28 “Islamist Movements inwards Libya,” pp. nine – 10; “Libya’s National Accord Govt Shuts Down Office of ‘Mufti of Qatar’,” Al-Arabiya English, 1 June 2017.
29 “Muslim Brotherhood Party Quits Libya’s Government,” Al-Arabiya English, 21 Jan 2014; “Libya: Muslim Brotherhood’s Tenuous Hold,” IISS Strategic Comment, Vol. 20, Comment 21, June 2014.
30 Benotman, Pack too Brandon, “Islamists,” p. 218; Cameron Glenn, “Libya’s Islamists: Who They Are-And What They Want,” The Wilson Center, 8 August 2017; “Libya: Muslim Brotherhood’s Tenuous Hold”; Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 200.
31 Glen, “Libya’s Islamists: Who They Are”; “Mohammed Sowan,” Counter Extremism Project, https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/ mohamed-sowan.
32 “Libya Revolutionaries Joint Operations Room (LROR),” Terrorism, Research & Analysis Consortium, https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/libya-revolutionaries-joint-operations-room-lror.
33 “Roundtable: The Crisis of the Muslim Brotherhood,” CSIS, https://www. csis.org/events/roundtable-crisis-muslim-brotherhood; “A Quick Guide to Libya’s Main Players,” ECFR, http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict; Interview with Rhiannon Smith, Managing Director, Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Analysis, Managing Director, Eye on ISIS inwards Libya, seven Dec 2017.
34 Interview with Smith, seven Dec 2017.
35 “Developments of the Libyan Scene betwixt Internal Crisis too the External Intervention”; Moutaz Ali, “Bunyan Marsous Derides Ghwell Coup every bit LROR Declares Support,” Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Herald, eighteen Oct 2016.
36 “Libya: Muslim Brotherhood’s Tenuous Hold; Naji Abou-Khalil too Laurence Hargreaves, “Libyan Television too Its Influence on the Security Sector,” USIP Special Report 364, Apr 2015, p.3; “Justice & Construction Party Condemn Ghariani,” Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Herald, xix August 2017.
37 “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/675#cite; David Witter, “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG),” ISW Fact Sheet, 8 Apr 2011.
38 Ashour, “Between ISIS too a Failed State,” p. 5.
39 Frederic Wehrey, “The Struggle for Security inwards Eastern Libya,” Carnegie Papers, September 2012, p. 9; Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 179.
40 Benotman, Pack too Brandon, “Islamists,” pp. 204 – 6.
41 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” pp. 179, 182 – 3, 198 – 9.
42 Ibid., pp. 190 – 1; Nicholas A. Heras, “On the Front Lines inwards Eastern Libya,” Militant Leadership Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 5, June 2016; Abigail Hauslohner, “With Libya’s Ascendant Islamists: ‘Don’t Get the Wrong Idea’,” Time Magazine, thirty March 2012.
43 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” pp. 188, 202; “Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade,” Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/abu-slim-martyrs-brigade.
44 Walker-Cousins, “Security Sector Transformation inwards Arab Transitions,” p. 23; Andrew McGregor, “Qatar’s Role inwards the Libyan Conflict: Who’s on the Lists of Terrorists too Why,” Aberfoyle Security, fourteen July 2017; Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” pp. 197 – 8.
45 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 200; Jamie Dettmer, “Brother of Al-Qaeda Commander Killed inwards Drone Strike a Major Candidate for Presidency of Libya’s Parliament,” Fox News World, 1 June 2013; Kwasi Kwarteng too Leo Docherty, “Inside Libya: Chaos inwards the Mediterranean,” Conservative Middle East Council, March 2017.
46 Mohamed Eljarh, “After ISIS Defeat inwards Sirte Challenges Remain,” The Atlantic Council, eleven July 2017.
47 Heras, “On the Front Lines inwards Eastern Libya”; “Wissam Ben Hamid Dead Says Arrested Ansar Spokesman; thirteen Militants Reported to Have Blown Themselves Up,” Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Herald, vi Jan 2017; “The Nine Entities Added to the Qatar-backed Terror List,” Al-Jazeera English, 25 July 2017.
48 The BDB has late expressed a readiness to disband.
49 “Saraya Defend Benghazi (BDB),” Terrorism Research too Analysis Consortium, https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/saraya-defend-benghazi; Abdul Kadder Assad, “Benghazi Defense Brigades Explains Its Political Vision inwards Black too White,” The Libyan Observer, 12 March 2017; Nathaniel Barr too Madeleine Blackman, “A New Threat to Libya’s Stability Emerges,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 14, Issue 16; “Benghazi Defence Brigades Admit Deaths of Leading Members,” Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Herald, 12 Dec 2016.
50 Wehrey, “The Struggle for Security inwards Eastern Libya,” p. 11.
51 Lamine Ghanmi, “Qatar-backed Jihadist Group inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Disbands” The Arab Weekly, 2 July 2017; Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Qatar too the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers too Regional Implications,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 24 September 2014; “What You Need to Know About the Five Libyans on the Terror List,” Al-Arabiya English, nine June 2017.
52 “Turkish WikiLeaks Cache Links AKP too Libya’s Al-Qaeda Chief Belhaj,” NSNBC International, twenty July 2016; Sudarsan Raghavan, “These Libyans Were Once Linked to Al-Qaeda. Now They Are Politicians too Businessmen,” The Washington Post, 28 September 2017; “Turkey, Qatar Accused of Delivering Weapons to Libyan Militants, Arab Republic of Egypt Today, 17 June 2017.
53 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross too Kathleen Soucy, “Abdelhakim Belhadj too Ansar al-Sharia inwards Tunisia,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 8 Oct 2013.
54 “The Nine Entities Added to the Qatar-backed Terror List”; Wehrey, “The Struggle for Security inwards Eastern Libya,” p. 10; Barr too Blackman, “A New Threat to Libya’s Stability Emerges.”
55 “A Quick Guide to Libya’s Main Players”; “Other Jihadi Actors,” Eye on ISIS inwards Libya, 5 September 2017; “Saraya Defend Benghazi (BDB).”
56 Dettmer, “Brother of Al Qaeda Commander Killed.”
57 “Abu Slim Martyrs Brigade”; Wehrey, “The Struggle for Security inwards Eastern Libya,” pp. 10 – 11; Christopher S. Chivis too Jeffery Martini, Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya after Qaddafi: Lessons too Implications for the Future (RAND Corporation, 2014), p. 18.
58 Interview with Smith, seven Dec 2017.
59 Raghavan, “These Libyans Were Once Linked to Al-Qaeda.”
60 “The Nine Entities Added to the Qatar-backed Terror List”; Barr too Blackman, “A New Threat to Libya’s Stability Emerges.”
61 Benotman, Pack too Brandon, “Islamists,” p. 226; Alastair MacDonald, “Analysis: As Libyans Wrangle, Qatar inwards Wings,” Reuters, 8 Nov 2011.
62 Lamine Ghanmi, “Qatar-backed Jihadist Group inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Disbands” The Arab Weekly, 2 July 2017; Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Qatar too the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers too Regional Implications,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 24 September 2014; “What You Need to Know About the Five Libyans on the Terror List,” Al-Arabiya English, nine June 2017.
63 Mary Fitzgerald, “The Syrian Rebels’ Libyan Weapon,” Foreign Policy, nine August 2012; Ian Black, “Qatar Admits Sending Hundreds of Troops to Support Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Rebels,” The Guardian, 26 Oct 2011; Stevenson, “Gulf Hands inwards Libya”; Jonathan Schanzer, “Qatar’s Support of The Worst of the Worst In Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Must End,” Newsweek, four June 2017; “Qatar’s Role inwards the Libyan Conflict: Who’s on the Lists of Terrorists too Why,” Jamestown Foundation, fourteen July 2017.
64 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 200.
65 Frederic Wehrey, “The Brave New World of Libya’s Elections,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 26 June 2012.
66 Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 200; Wehrey, “The Struggle for Security inwards Eastern Libya,” p. 10; Wehrey, “The Brave New World of Libya’s Elections”; Omar Ashour, “Libya’s Defeated Islamists,” The Straits Times, xix July 2012.
67 Karim Mezran too Eric Knecht, “Actors too Factors inwards Libya’s Revolution,” inwards Political too Constitutional Transitions inwards North Africa: Actors too Factors, eds. Justin O. Frosini too Francesco Biogi (London & New York: Routledge, 2015), p. 89; “Documents Provided to the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack inwards Benghazi,” United States of America Government Printing Office, 2012, p. 1418.
68 “Is the Balance Changing inwards Libya?” Orsam Foreign Policy Analyses, 31 July 2015.
69 Karim Mezran too Alice Alunni, “Libya: Negotiations for Transition,” inwards Arab Spring: Negotiating inwards the Shadow of the Intifadat, ed. I William Zartman (Athens too London: The University of Georgia Press, 2015), p. 278.
70 McGregor, “Qatar’s Role inwards the Libyan Conflict”; “Documents Provided to the Select Committee,” p. 1420; Lacher, “Fault Lines of the Revolution,” p. 15.
71 Schanzer, “Qatar’s Support of The Worst”; “Qatar’s Role inwards the Libyan Conflict: Who’s on the Lists of Terrorists too Why,” Jamestown Foundation, fourteen July 2017.
72 Interview with Smith, seven Dec 2017.
73 Benotman, Pack too Brandon, “Islamists,” p. 216; “It’s Political Party Time inwards Libya: The Key Players,” French Republic 24, 2 July 2012.
74 “Jihadism’s Foothold inwards Libya,” The Washington Institute, 12 September 2012; Dettmer, “Brother of Al Qaeda Commander Killed.”
75 “It’s Political Party Time inwards Libya: The Key Players”; “Libya’s Abdulhakim Belhadj: ‘We Are Working to Find a Solution to End This Crisis’,” Euronews, fourteen Feb 2015; Andrew Engel, “Libya’s civil War: Rebuilding the Country from the Ground Up,” The Washington Institute Near East Policy Research Notes, No. 25, Apr 2015, p. 5
76 Jamie Dettmer, “Ultraconservative Salafists Destroy Sufi Landmarks inwards Libya,” Daily Beast, nine Apr 2012.
77 Ahmed Salah Ali, “Libya’s Warring Parties Play a Dangerous Game Working with Madkhali Salafists,” Atlantic Council, 3 Nov 2017; Andrew McGregor, “Radical Loyalty too the Libyan Crisis: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 Profile of Salafist Shaykh Rabi’ bin Hadi al-Madkhali,” Aberfoyle Security, xix Jan 2017.
78 Wolfram Lacher, “La fragmentation de la Libye se produit autour de la répartition des ressources,” Le Monde, 22 May 2017.
79 McGregor, “Radical Loyalty too the Libyan Crisis”.
80 Ali, “Libya’s Warring Parties Play a Dangerous Game”; Frederic Wehrey, “Quiet No More?” Carnegie Middle East Center, thirteen Oct 2016; McGregor, “Radical Loyalty too the Libyan Crisis”; Fitzgerald, “Finding Their Place,” p. 187.
81 McGregor, “Radical Loyalty too the Libyan Crisis”; Wehrey, “Quiet No More?”; “A Quick Guide to Libya’s Main Players”; Emily Estelle, “A Strategy for Success inwards Libya,” American Enterprise Institute, Nov 2017, footnote 90, p. 59; McGregor, “Radical Loyalty too the Libyan Crisis.”
82 McGregor, “Radical Loyalty too the Libyan Crisis”.
83 United Nations Security Council, “Letter Dated four March 2016 from the Panel of Experts on Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” nine March 2016, p. 20; Valerie Stocker, “How Armed Groups Are Plundering Libya’s Banks,” Middle East Eye, 10 Apr 2017.
84 Ali, “Libya’s Warring Parties Play a Dangerous Game”; Wehrey, “Quiet No More?”; United Nations Security Council, “Letter Dated 1 June 2017 from the Panel of Experts on Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) Addressed to the President of the Security Council,” 1 July 2017, p. 13.
85 “HoR approves Salamé’s Action Plan,” Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Herald, 21 Nov 2017; McGregor, “Radical Loyalty too the Libyan Crisis.”
86 “Video Circulates of Purported LNA Execution of IS Member,” Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Herald, 25 Feb 2017.
87 Karim Mezran too Arturo Varvelli, “Libyan Crisis: International Actors at Play,” inwards Foreign Actors inwards Libya’s Crisis, eds. Karim Mezran too Arturo Varvelli (Atlantic Council; ISPI, 2017), p. 53.
88 United Nations Security Council, “Letter Dated 1 June 2017,” p. 95.
89 McGregor, “Radical Loyalty too the Libyan Crisis”; “Grand Mufti Accuses Madkhali Followers of Being Foreign Agents too Planning to Kill Libyan Clerics,” Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Herald, 23 Nov 2016.
90 Jamie Prentis, “East Libyans Protest Against Order Curtailing Travel Abroad,” Middle East Eye, 26 Feb 2017; Ahmed Salah Ali, “Haftar too Salafism: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 Dangerous Game,” Atlantic Council, vi June 2017; Abdulkader Assad, “Haftar Makes Way for Saudi Extremist Clerics to Preach inwards Eastern Libya,” The Libyan Observer, fourteen Jan 2017.
91 Estelle, “A Strategy for Success inwards Libya,” p. 44
92 Stocker, “How Armed Groups Are Plundering Libya’s Banks.”
93 Ahmed Alumami, “Tripoli Armed Factions Take over Rival’s Compound inwards Heavy Fighting,” Reuters, xv March 2017.
94 Emadeddin Zahri Muntasser, “Libya’s New Menace: Madkhalism,” International Policy Digest, 3 Feb 2017.
95 Ali, “Libya’s Warring Parties Play a Dangerous Game.”
96 Alaya Allani, “The Islamists inwards Tunisia betwixt Confrontation too Participation: 1980 – 2008,” The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2009), pp. 258, 260; Anne Wolf, Political Islam inwards Tunisia: The History of Ennahda (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), p. 37; Azzam Tamimi, “Rashid Al-Ghannushi,” inwards The Oxford Handbook of Islam too Politics, eds. John L. Esposito too Emad El-Din Shanin (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 214.
97 Wolf, Political Islam inwards Tunisia, pp. 42, 46, 50.
98 Ibid., pp. 55, 57, 61 – 2.
99 Tamimi, “Rashid Al-Ghannushi,” pp. 217 – 8; Wolf, Political Islam inwards Tunisia, pp. 71, 107.
100 Francesco Cavatorta too Fabio Merone, “Moderation through Exclusion? The Journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from Fundamentalist to Conservative Party,” Democratization, Vol. 20, No. 5 (2013), pp. 861 – 2.
101 Wolf, Political Islam inwards Tunisia, pp. 160 – 2; Larbi Sadiki, “Tunisian Ennahda’s ‘Second Founding’,” Afro-Middle East Centre, 3 July 2016; Sayida Ounissi, “Ennahda from Within: Islamists or ‘Muslim Democrats’,” Brookings Rethinking Political Islam Series, Feb 2016, p. 8.
102 Wolf, Political Islam inwards Tunisia, p. 135.
103 Anne Wolf, “An Islamist ‘Renaissance’? Religion too Politics inwards Post-revolutionary Tunisia,” The Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 18, No. four (2013), p. 567; “Rached Ghannouchi,” Counter Extremism Project, https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/rached-ghannouchi; Bill Roggio, “‘Moderate’ Islamist Leader inwards Tunisia Strategizes with Al Qaeda-linked Salafists,” FDD’s Long War Journal, xvi Oct 2012.
104 Camille Tawil, “Ennahda Reconsiders Ties with Tunisian Salafist Groups,” Al-Monitor, thirty May 2013; “’Political Islam’ too the Muslim Brotherhood Review,” Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, Nov 2016; Anne Wolf, “New Tunisian Salafist Party: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 Threat to Democratic Transition?” Open Democracy, fourteen August 2012.
105 Wolf, “An Islamist Renaissance”; Zeinab Marzouk, “Thirty-one Deputies Resign every bit Nidaa Tounes Loses Majority,” Tunisialive, nine Nov 2015.
106 Mohammed Masbah, “North Africa’s Islamist Parties Provide Important Lessons inwards Secularization,” Chatham House, 28 Feb 2017.
107 “Ennahda Party of Tunisia,” The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch, https://www.globalmbwatch.com/ennahda-party-of-tunisia/; Wolf, Political Islam inwards Tunisia, p. 154; Monica Marks, “Tunisia’s Islamists too the ‘Turkish Model’,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2017), pp. 107, 111 – 14.
108 “Tunisia to Investigate Qatari Funding of Ennahdha Party,” Qatarileaks, thirty August 2017; “Comment Ennahdha a vendu la Tunisie au Qatar,” Webdo, xix Nov 2012; Sarah Louden, “Political Islamism inwards Tunisia: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 History of Repression too a Complex Forum for Potential Change,” Mathal, Vol. 4, Issue 1 (2015), p. 13; Kristina Kausch, “‘Foreign Funding’ inwards Post-revolution Tunisia,” AFA/FRIDE/HIVOS, 2013, p. 10; Hanin Ghaddar, “Qatar Bets on Islamists,” The Wilson Center, seven Feb 2013.
109 Ruth Hanau Santini, “Bankrolling Containment: Saudi Linkages with Arab Republic of Egypt too Tunisia,” Memo Prepared for the Workshop, “Transnational Diffusion, Cooperation too Learning inwards the Middle East too North Africa,” 8 – nine June 2016; Hussein Ibish, “Saudi Arabia’s New Sunni Alliance,” New York Times, 31 July 2015; Youssef Cherif, “The Gulf Crisis Threatens Tunisia’s Stability,” Atlantic Council, 8 Nov 2017.
110 “’Political Islam’ too the Muslim Brotherhood Review.”
111 Tawil, “Ennahda Reconsiders Ties with Tunisian Salafist Groups”; Christine Petré, “How Ansar al-Sharia Grew inwards Post-revolutionary Tunisia,” Middle East Monitor, eleven March 2015.
112 Youssef Cherif, “Tunisia’s Elections amid a Middle East Cold War,” Atlantic Council, 22 Oct 2014; Kausch, “‘Foreign Funding’ inwards Post-revolution Tunisia,” p. 7.
113 “Rached Ghannouchi,” Counter Extremism Project, https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/rached-ghannouchi; Kyle Shideler, “U.S. Institute for Peace Hosts High Level Global Muslim Brother… Again,” The Counter Jihad Report, 27 Oct 2015.
114 Heidi Reichinnek, “Jabhat Al-Islah (JI)/ Tunisien,“ Philipps Universität Marburg, March 2015, p. 1; Wolf, “An Islamist ‘Renaissance’?” p. 570.
115 Wolf, “An Islamist Renaissance,” p. 570; Aaron Zelin, “Who Is Jabhat Al-Islah?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, eighteen July 2012.
116 “Tunisia Calls for Ban on Islamist Party Hizb ut-Tahrir,” The New Arab, 8 September 2016; Wolf, “An Islamist ‘Renaissance’?” p. 570; “The Involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism inwards the Support too Supply of Arms to Rebel Groups Around the World,” Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, European Parliament, 2013; “Tunisia Legalizes Second Hardline Islamist Group,” Al Arabiya, eighteen July 2012.
117 Ghassan Ben Khalifah, “Tunisia’s Salafist Emergence Puts New Players on Political Stage,” Al-Monitor, 23 September 2012; Monica Marks, “Who Are Tunisia’s Salafis?” Foreign Policy, 28 September 2012; Zelin, “Who Is Jabhat Al-Islah?”
118 Alaya Allani, “Mouvements religieux radicaux pendant la transition: L’exemple d’Ansar Al-Charia en Tunisie : naissance et expansion. Perspectives 2011 – 2014,” UNDP Tunisie, 12 July 2014, p. 226; Zelin, “Who Is Jabhat Al-Islah?”
119 Correspondence with Anne Wolf, Research Fellow at Girton College, University of Cambridge, UK, 12 Dec 2017.
120 Alaya Allani, “Spécialiste des mouvances Islamistes: ‘Le danger Salafiste menace nos institutions’,” Réalités, 24 July 2014; Roggio, “‘Moderate’ Islamist Leader inwards Tunisia.”
121 Ewan Stein, Frédéric Volpi, Fabio Merone, Kawther Alfasi too Larissa Alles, “Islamism too the Arab Uprisings,” Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 CASAW-AHRC People Power too State Power Report, June 2014, p. 14; Wolf, “New Tunisian Salafist Party”; Reichinnek, “Jabhat Al-Islah (JI)/ Tunisien”; Alaya Allani, “Mouvements religieux radicaux pendant la transition,” p. 226.
122 Stein, Volpi, Merone, Alfasi too Alles, “Islamism too the Arab Uprisings,” pp. fourteen – 5; Allani, “Spécialiste des mouvances Islamistes”; “Hizb ut-tahrir : Le retour du Califat comme solution?” Leaders, fourteen Oct 2012.
123 “Tunisia Radical Islamist Party Banned for One Month,” News 24, seven June 2017; “Tunisie: un parti islamiste radical souhaite ‘enterrer’ la démocratie,” Le Point International, xvi Apr 2017; “Tunisian President Moves Against Party Threatening To ‘Cut Off Heads’,” Middle East Eye, 2 September 2016.
124 See Hisb Ut-tahrir’s key media business office Website: http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.info/en/index.php/leaflet/tunisia.html; Allani, “Spécialiste des mouvances Islamistes.”
125 Stefano Maria Torelli, “A Portrait of Tunisia’s Ansar Al-Shari’a Leader Abu Iyad al-Tunisi: His Strategy of Jihad,” Militant Leadership Monitor: Personalities behind the Insurgency, Vol. VI, Issue 8, 2013, p. 9.
126 “Ansar Al-Sharia Tunisia,” The Mackenzie Institute, 12 Apr 2015; Allani, “Mouvements religieux radicaux pendant la transition,” p. 219; “Ansar Al-Sharia inwards Tunisia,” Counter Extremism Project, https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/ansar-al-sharia-tunisia-ast.
127 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Tunisia Arrests Leading Salafi Cleric,” The Washington Institute Policy Analysis, 25 Oct 2013; “Ansar Al-Sharia inwards Tunisia.”
128 Anne Wolf, “Religious Violence inwards Tunisia Three Years after the Revolution,” Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, 24 Feb 2014; Synda Tajine, “A Jihadist Comes Home And Tunisia Cracks Down,” Al-Monitor, twenty September 2012; Roggio, “‘Moderate’ Islamist Leader inwards Tunisia.”
129 Louden, “Political Islamism inwards Tunisia,” p. 13.
130 “Ansar Al-Sharia (Tunisia),” Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/ groups/view/547; “Ansar Al-Sharia inwards Tunisia.”
131 Thomas Jocelyn, “Ansar Al-Sharia Responds to Tunisian Government,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 3 September 2013; “Ansar Al-Sharia (Tunisia)”; “Ansar Al-Sharia inwards Tunisia.”
132 “Ansar Al-Sharia (Tunisia).”
133 Petré, “How Ansar Al-Sharia Grew inwards Post-revolutionary Tunisia”; Allani, “Mouvements religieux radicaux pendant la transition,” pp. 212, 228; “Ansar Al-Sharia (Tunisia)”; Aaron Y. Zelin, “Shabab Al-Tawhid: The Rebranding of Ansar Al-Sharia inwards Tunisia?” The Washington Institute Policy Watch 2250, nine May 2014.
134 “Ansar Al-Sharia (Tunisia).”
About the Author
Dr. Lisa Watanabe is a senior researcher inwards the Swiss too Euro-Atlantic Security Team of the Think Tank at the Center for Security Studies (CSS). Her areas of involvement include European safety too defence, relations betwixt Europe too the southern Mediterranean, too the dynamics of transitions inwards North Africa.
For to a greater extent than data on issues too events that shape our world, delight see the CSS Blog Network or browse our Digital Library.
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