José de Arimatéia da Cruz too Travis Howard
The U.S.A. invented the Internet. Andrew Blum’s chronicle of the Internet’s vast inner workings inward Tubes: H5N1 journeying to the Center of the Internet (2012) describes the moments the ARPANET went alive on Oct 29th, 1969, digitally hand-shaking with some other university’s SDS Sigma seven host estimator inward a cramped room on the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) campus. U.S.’s academic ingenuity too engineering scientific discipline expertise brought life to what is today “cyberspace.” The nativity of the Internet would launch the globe into the Information Age, with the U.S. leading the charge. Cyberspace too the Internet are American inventions, reflecting American values, which are used inward all nations past times all generations (Healey, 2016: 17). As the globe becomes to a greater extent than interconnected too complex, warfare theorists forthwith went to operate inward discovering how the Internet could survive harnessed for defense-purposes (it was, after all, started equally a projection supporting the U.S. Department of Defense). Cyberwarfare becomes a forcefulness multiplier inward whatever kinetic conflict betwixt nation-states. As Courtney Weinbaum, a management scientist at the RAND Corporation, too John N.T. Shanahan, retired Air Force Lieutenant General currently the Director for Defense Intelligence (Warfighter Support) inward the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, argue, “the futurity battlespace is constructed of non only ships, tanks, missiles, too satellites, but also algorithms, networks, too sensor grids...future wars volition survive fought on civilian too military machine infrastructures of satellite systems, electrical powerfulness grids, communications networks, too shipping systems, too inside human networks” (Weinbaum too Shanahan, 2016:4).
With such a head-start, why are nosotros losing the cyber state of war today? Alexander Klimburg, inward his 2017 volume The Darkening Web: The War for Cyberspace, describes how land states have got drastically dissimilar views on what “information warfare” agency – patch the U.S. has been happily using the Internet for what it was intended, sharing ideas too generating wealth, her adversaries were finding ways to exploit it next the timeless fine art of warfare, but adapted for a digital age. In short, patch nosotros were contemplating how cyberspace has changed human interaction, mainland People's Republic of China too Russia, perhaps Democratic People's South Korea too Iran, were contemplating how to exercise the global reach of the Internet equally a novel tool for centuries-old warfare practices.
What lessons could strategic warfare masters tell us almost 21st century insurgent cyber warfare, where superpowers could survive brought depression past times pocket-size cells of cyber warriors with limited funding but lots of time? This article distills the wisdom of 2 military machine strategists: Chinese General too sixth century Taoist military machine philosopher Sun-tzu, too Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz, Prussian full general too theorist of psychological too political aspects of warfare equally good equally revolutionary thinkers such equally Mao Tse-tung, Carlos Marighella, too Ernesto “Che” Guevara. This article seeks to convey the insurgency viewpoint: equally an insurgent, which is inward a weaker powerfulness seat vis-a-vis a stronger land state; how does cyber warfare plays an integral component inward the irregular cyber conflicts inward the twenty-first century betwixt nation-states too trigger-happy non-state actors or insurgencies.
Sun-tzu: Harnessing the Tao of Cyber Warfare
Most modern military machine officers too scholars familiar, if non well-versed, inward the teachings of the ancient Chinese military machine strategist Sun-tzu: i of the Seven Military Classics thought to have got been originally compiled inward the 2nd century B.C., after over a K years of warfare, violence, too conflict inward the Far East dynasties. Multiple works have got been written too translated over the final 2 K years, interpreting Sun-tzu’s texts for increasingly-modern military machine strategies too technology. While notable operate such equally Geers’ (2011) Sun Tzu too Cyberwar have got been written to decipher Sun-tzu’s teachings for cyber too information warfare, nosotros volition focus on how Sun-tzu, equally an insurgent forcefulness with fewer resources, would wage cyber state of war against a larger, to a greater extent than powerful land province (See Table 1).
Much of Sun-tzu’s writing inward his get-go text, Initial Estimations, discusses how unpredictability too paradigm-shifts Pb to military machine victory. The emphasis on deception, feints, subterfuge, too illusions betoken that Sun-tzu would experience comfortable employing all mode of non-kinetic cyber effects if it meant gaining an wages over his adversaries. In particular, sowing discord amongst the enemy ranks through propaganda too majority misinformation would survive the most favored approaches. Social media, equally a platform, excels at doing precisely that. Additionally, cyberspace is the near-perfect platform to sow confusion amongst adversaries using a few hacked social media accounts. For example, after the Boston Marathon bombing inward Apr 2013, the Associated Press’ Twitter line of piece of occupation organisation human relationship was hacked past times a grouping identifying itself equally the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA). The grouping released a imitation headline titled “Breaking: Two Explosions inward the White House too Barack Obama is injured.” The SEA’s activity resulted inward a abrupt turn down inward the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). However, i time the intelligence of the explosion was discovered to survive false, to the relief of investors, NYSE returned to normalcy (Kan, 2013: 1). The dot was made: misinformation tin have got existent effects.
Insurgent groups looking to convey wages of a to a greater extent than powerful nation’s computerized critical infrastructure too its reliance on a digital economic scheme tin easily catch the wages gained through a to a greater extent than prolonged cyber-deception campaign, peculiarly if they shifted to to a greater extent than subtle, coercive agency than an obviously-fake headline. The recent societal create out against “fake news” is an illustration of such a campaign, potentially waged (at to the lowest degree inward part) past times land states opposed to the U.S.A. too the allied Western democracies. H5N1 drawn-out travail inside cyberspace, however, powerfulness non survive what Sun-tzu would recommend; he cautioned against “protracted warfare” too “prolonged campaigns” (Sun-tzu, 1994: 173). In Sun-tzu’s case, he was discussing the logistic challenges involved inward supplying an regular army for a long duration, too perhaps domestic challenges associated with “war fatigue,” a challenge that the U.S.A. knows equally good well. In cyberspace, however, a prolonged crusade past times covert insurgents, inward which non-attribution is key, tin show hazardous equally the targeted nation’s cyber defense forcefulness adapts too maneuvers to respond. For a less powerful insurgent group, this could hateful the stronger, bigger land could response with kinetic, traditional military machine force.
Sun-tzu’s thought of irregular warfare advocates for converting the enemy’s resources, such equally manpower, equipment too supplies, rather that destroying them; this is what he describes equally “conquering the enemy too growing stronger” (Sun-tzu, 1994: 174). Geers noted that Sun-tzu’s recommendation could have got positive effects on warfare equally a whole, with fewer physical casualties too positioned for access post-war recovery too diplomacy (Geers, 2011: 6). This does non brand cyber-effects whatever to a greater extent than devastating to the target nation's citizenry, however, since inward the 21st century most major powers’ economies too critical infrastructure rely almost alone on digital information; a cyber laid on would constitute an human activity of state of war too have major disruption to the nation.
Perhaps Sun-tzu’s strongest blessing for information too cyber warfare equally a audio insurgency strategy tin survive found inward his 3rd text, Planning Offensives, inward which he proclaims that “the highest realization of warfare is to laid on the enemy's plans; side past times side is to laid on their alliances” (Sun-tzu, 1994: 177). In this instance, an established too to a greater extent than powerful land state, conforming to conventional warfare strategy too laws, is at a disadvantage against a to a greater extent than agile cyber-insurgent force. Today’s Sun-tzu would survive apt to exercise cyber-effects to disrupt planning tools too the mutual operational moving-picture exhibit (COP); he would exercise cyber warfare problematic attribution to sow seeds of confusion too misinformation amongst allied nations too coalition forces thus creating a “fog of war.” The penchant for hacking groups (state sponsored or otherwise) to leak privileged or classified information to undermine alliances too tarnish reputations is a primal illustration of such a tactic.
Sun-tzu would ultimately exercise cyber-insurgency to “play the long game” using cyber-effects to diminish a to a greater extent than powerful land state’s economical too political powerfulness on the globe stage. He would do this through carefully-planned attacks on the information assurance of military machine planning too COP tools, rendering their exercise unreliable too their information suspect. He would steal sensitive intelligence too brand politically-damaging information populace at strategic times, fanning the flames of civil discourse too economical down-turn with sensationalized “fake news” stories that have majority confusion too outrage. The latter effects would also demoralize the enemy’s military machine too sour the citizenry towards the commitment of physical military machine forcefulness for whatever extended duration. Ultimately, inward a 21st century global economic scheme powered past times information technology, what Sun-tzu would consider the “strategic configuration of power” would most surely involve mastery of cyberspace too the tenants of irregular, insurgent-style information warfare (Whitham, 2012).
How tin a large nation-state, with vast resources but unwieldy policy too fiscal controls, apply the lessons of Sun-tzu to irregular cyber-warfare? There are several primal themes from Sun-tzu’s writing that, when applied to 21stcentury irregular cyber-warfare, allows i to brand several observations. First, create out confusion too deception with clear strategic vision, concise orders, too an elementary too unified chain of command. Second, fighting irregular warfare requires an irregular battle plan: our forces must survive agile too unpredictable, too nosotros must manipulate the battle infinite inward our favor. Third, if inward a prolonged campaign, survive prepared for insurgent cyber effects, too facial expression them to survive to a greater extent than devastating too desperate the longer the crusade progresses. Finally, conduct extensive wargame-like exercises with a crimson squad (voice of the adversary), too ever “give the enemy a vote” inward your planning.
Carl von Clausewitz too Cyber Insurgency: Absolute or Limited Cyber-Warfare to Achieve Political Goals
To contextualize the operate of the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz inward the modern era of cyber-warfare, it is of import to empathize the historical context inside which he based his ideas. Michael Howard too Peter Paret translation of Clausewitz’s On War offers essays that give us some context: “The most of import chore that faced Prussian soldiers inward the opening years of the nineteenth century was to come upward to price intellectually too institutionally with the novel French way of warfare” (Clausewitz, 1976: 9). Thus, inward von Clausewitz’s time, Napoleonic strategic too military machine tactics were largely seen equally radical, fluid, too (quite literally) revolutionary, inward much the same way cyber warfare is existence employed today (See Table 2).
One powerfulness survive forgiven for mistaking von Clausewitz equally a to a greater extent than “traditional” military machine strategist too intellectual with a goodness percentage of his operate describing the “nuts too bolts” of military machine matters such equally logistics, command too control, rules, regulations, too routines. Deeper study reveals him instead to have got an agreement of the ever-changing, accelerated nature of warfare. In fact, the Prussian General came to empathize that “there was no unmarried measure of excellence inward war” nor could strategy survive broken downward into a universal formula; warfare was nebulous, it was unpredictable, too “dead theories” could non survive relied upon to win the hateful solar daytime (Clausewitz, 1976).
Clausewitz’s work, although unfinished before his death, centered roughly 2 themes when analyzed with his other writings too notes. First, the “dual nature of war, equally an musical instrument which could survive used either to overthrow the enemy [absolute war] or 2 exact from him a limited concession [limited war].” Second, “war is but the continuation of policy past times other means” (Clausewitz, 1976: 28). Clausewitz, equally a cyber-insurgent, would have got probable used cyber-attacks to slap-up upshot inward a limited war, perchance equally i of the primary elements inward a crusade to undermine political interests of the targeted state. Lacking truthful military machine strength to create out asymmetrically inward traditional, kinetic warfare roles, conducting cyber-attacks to attain kinetic effects could survive a favored Clausewitz strategy. An illustration of achieving kinetic effects through cyberspace includes targeting Industrial Control Systems (ICS) to harm moving mechanism inside an infrastructure, otherwise known equally SCADA attacks. Such attacks have got been proven to harm centrifuges, turbine engines, too other fast-moving machines past times sending improper command signals.
Clausewitz’s thought of an absolute state of war would involve all elements of warfare. In a war, from the perspective of a lesser powerfulness against a greater power, he would surely convey wages of ICS/SCADA cyber-attacks inward monastic tell to harm an enemy’s critical infrastructure too forcefulness them into an unfavorable strategic position. Damaging the enemy’s civilian too governmental infrastructure limits its powerfulness to brand war, too for Western countries with democratic too opened upward social club these attacks tin pressurize political bodies to discovery ways to destination the conflict. This seems to satisfy both of Clausewitz’s tenants regarding the dual nature too political characteristics of war.
Consider this scenario: a U.S. Carrier Strike Group makes way northbound through the Red Sea, having precisely passed through the Gulf of Aden too Bab-el-Mandab Strait. The guided missile destroyer escorts shield the uppercase ship from pocket-size arts and crafts off of the coast of Yemen, using intelligence, surveillance, too reconnaissance (ISR) assets to seat too rails surface targets. Suddenly, jammers inward a few of the pocket-size boats inside a angling grouping travel active, creating a localized electromagnetic jamming acre that partially blocks satellite communications too disrupts global positioning signals. Simultaneously, malicious code successfully planted inside the combat systems of 2 of the surface combatant escorts releases its payload, causing disruptions too latency that dull the threat response times of those units’ combat information centers. Thirty seconds later, a flow raid of C802 anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) are fired from truck-mounted coastal batteries along the Yemeni coast, saturating the battlespace with 6 missiles simultaneously.
While the combat systems suites aboard the modern naval combatants are to a greater extent than than a check for older, outdated anti-ship cruise missiles, a simultaneous cyber-attack too ASCM stream-raid against those combat systems tin disrupt self-defense actions. Of course, this is a hypothetical scenario too is presented without many details too surely with many assumptions; however, it serves to illustrate how a weaker powerfulness could exercise a cyber-attack combined with low-cost too prolific kinetic weapons to target a to a greater extent than powerful state's oculus of gravity. Clausewitz would probable survive a proponent of such tactics, evoking his rattling Definition of war: “the human activity of forcefulness to compel our enemy to do our will” (p. 75). To wit, Clausewitz explains that military machine forcefulness “equips itself with the inventions of fine art too science” too that the truthful aim is to “render the enemy powerless” (Clausewitz, et al., 1976, p.75). The proliferation of information engineering too always-connected command too command (C2) makes precursor cyber-attacks a nigh certainty inward 21stcentury warfare, too of particular involvement to cyber-insurgents who have got everything to gain but piffling to lose inward relation to its larger adversary.
Like Sun-tzu, nosotros tin also discovery Clausewitz’s ideas existence applied to cyber defense forcefulness too strategy. The Prussian General’s Definition of the “dual nature of war” (absolute state of war vs. limited war) too his acknowledgement of extreme violence equally a victory status begets an “all-in” approach to counter trigger-happy attacks that exercise cyber-effects equally a precursor to kinetic strikes. This requires large nations that are at risk from smaller insurgencies to survive prepared to exercise forcefulness if necessary to exterminate the threat decisively. Warfare is ultimately a political agency to an end; cyber-war is strictly a military machine affair, but an affair of the province too tin survive affected past times the proper exercise of diplomacy too political leverage. Finally, that warfare does non fit a mold or rulebook, but is adaptable too ever changing, agency that the defending land cannot halt innovating or investing inward interrogation too evolution related to war, lest the enemy attain the get-go breakthrough that volition alter the dynamic. In no surface area of warfare is this truer than inward the cyber domain, only much, much faster.
Carlos Marighella too the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla
Carlos Marighella (December 5th, 1911-November 4th, 1969) was a Brazilian Marxist revolutionary too writer. While Marighella’s guerrilla rendezvous occurred prior to urban guerrilla exercise of the Internet, nonetheless his views on the exercise of the agency of populace communication are equally relevant today equally they were inward the 1960s at the zenith of Marighella’s guerrilla activities (See Table 3). In fact, the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla published inward June 1969 past times the Ação Libertadora Nacional (National Liberation Action, ALN) defends the exercise of the agency of populace communication to demoralize the legitimate authorities inward power. As Bruno Paes Manso too Camila Nunes Dias report, inward August 15, 1969, twelve guerrilla fighters associated with the ALN invaded the radio station, Rádio Nacional, to transmit a tilt on behalf of Marighella against the Brazilian dictatorship which came to powerfulness inward 1964 too inward favor of a pop authorities (Manso too Dias, 2018, 145). In 1920, T.E. Lawrence stated that, “the printing press is the greatest weapon inward the armory of the modern command” (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007: 7). In the 20 get-go century interconnected too globalized world, with the evolution of novel technologies too the Internet, trigger-happy non-state actors, terrorist groups, criminal organizations “using the Internet, insurgents tin at nowadays link virtually with allied groups throughout a state, a region, too fifty-fifty the entire world” (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007: 8). As Marighella i time dot out, “the accusation of violence or terrorism no longer has the negative pregnant it used to have...Today, to survive trigger-happy or a terrorist is a character that ennobles whatever honorable person, because it is an human activity worthy of a revolutionary engaged inward armed struggle against the shameful military machine dictatorship too its atrocities” (Marighella, 2011: 8). The duty of a revolutionary is to brand revolution past times whatever agency necessary.
Marighella, inward his essay entitled “Technical Preparation of the Urban Guerrilla,” argues that “no i tin larn an urban guerrilla without paying special attending to technical preparation” (Marighella, 2011: 17). For Marighella, the revolutionary should survive an skillful on anything too everything nether the Sun inward monastic tell to advance the revolutionary cause. According to him, a revolutionary should survive able to “drive a car, airplane pilot a airplane, grip a motor boat too a sailboat, empathize mechanics, radio, telephone, electricity, too have got some cognition of electronics techniques” (Marighella, 2011: 17). Marighella’s revolutionaries inward today’s interconnected technological globe would have got to have got the expertise inward ransomware, cryptographic, man-in-the-middle attacks, steganography, and, perhaps most importantly, social engineering. Marighella would in all likelihood emphasize today the importance of social engineering scientific discipline which is “essentially the fine art of gaining access to buildings, systems or information past times exploiting human psychology, rather than past times breaking inward or using technical hacking techniques” (Hume too Goodchild, 2017). Once inward possession of critical too sensitive information obtained via social engineering scientific discipline Marighella’s revolutionaries today would disseminate mistaken information inward monastic tell to undermine the government’s legitimacy. As the U.S. Army too Marine Corps Field Manual states, “insurgents convey wages of existing too populace media companies through press releases too interviews. These efforts, inward add-on to using the Internet, broadcast insurgent messages worldwide” (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007: 107).
For Marighella, information represents extraordinary potential inward the hands of the urban guerrilla. Marighella endorses the thought that the urban guerrilla must “never neglect to install a cloak-and-dagger press too must survive able to plough out mimeographed copies using alcohol or electrical plates too other duplicating apparatus, expropriating what he cannot purchase inward monastic tell to make pocket-size cloak-and-dagger newspapers, pamphlets, flyers too stamps for propaganda too agitation against the dictatorship” (Marighella, 2011: 79). Marighella’s urban guerrillas today would exercise spam techniques, Denial of Service (DoS), Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), the total spectrum of phishing-type attacks, Structured Query Language (SQL) which is a linguistic communication designed to manipulate too handle information inward a database, malware attacks, creature forcefulness too lexicon access command attacks precisely to call a few of the techniques that would survive available. Information inward the hands of the urban guerrilla would allow the guerrilla to spread misinformation too mobilize the masses into political protests. Misinformation too political mobilization would Pb to the “urban guerrilla demonstrator” (Marighella, 2011: 62).
Ernesto “Che” Guevara too Guerrilla Warfare
Ernesto “Che” Guevara was an Argentine Marxist revolutionary, physician, author, guerrilla leader, too military machine theorist inward the Cuban revolution with Fidel Castro. According to I.F. Stone, a reporter who interviewed “Che” during the aftermath of the Cuban revolution, “Che” Guevara had “curly reddish beard, he looked similar a cross betwixt a faun too a Sunday-school impress of Jesus. Mischief, zest, pity too a feel of mission flashed across his features” (Stone, pg. viii). “Che” Guevara was a charismatic leader par excellence. The Counterinsurgency Field Manual defines a charismatic leader who educate allegiance amongst their followers because of their unique, private charismatic appeal, whether ideological, religious, or social” (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, pg. 97). Reading “Che” Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare too attempting to house it inside the context of irregular cyberwarfare manifestly is an overstretch. However, “Che” Guevara’s discussions of lines of communication, propaganda, too indoctrination would survive heavily influenced past times the evolution of the Internet. The Internet would survive a forcefulness multiplier inward its advancement of a revolutionary have inward the twenty-first century (See Table 4.). As a strategy, “Che” Guevara would recognize the maximizing utility of incorporating electronic warfare into irregular warfare. As he states inward Guerrilla Warfare, “strategy is understood equally the analysis of the objectives to survive achieved inward the low-cal of the total military machine province of affairs too the overall ways of reaching these objectives” (Guevara, 2012: 8).
“Che” Guevara, equally a revolutionary strategist, pays unopen attending to the enemy’s lines of communication. As he argued, “...surprise laid on along the lines of communication of the enemy yields notable dividends” (Guevara, 2012: 18). “Che” Guevara distinguishes betwixt internal too external lines of communication. According to him, “the lines of communication with the outside should include a serial of intermediate points manned past times people of consummate reliability...the internal lines of communication tin also survive created. Their extension volition survive determined past times the phase of evolution reached past times the guerrilla band” (Guevara, 2012: 23). Both sources of communication are of import for the advancement of the revolutionary ideals but extremely unsafe on the enemy’s manus thus sabotage should survive aimed primarily against the enemy’s communication apparatus. Therefore, “Che” Guevara advocates that “sabotage on a national scale should survive aimed principally at destroying communications. Each type of communication tin survive destroyed inward a dissimilar way; all of them are vulnerable” (Guevara, 2012: 94). The importance of the enemy’s line of communication is of paramount concern for “Che” Guevara. The line of communications is the blood supplier to the enemy’s mission, strategy, too tactics. Destruction of it becomes an of import revolutionary goal. As “Che” Guevara points out, “the slap-up strength of the enemy regular army against the rebels inward the flatter zones is rapid communication; nosotros must, then, constantly undermine the strength past times knocking out railroad bridges, culverts, electrical lights, telephones; also aqueducts too inward full general everything that is necessary for a normal too modern life” (Guevara, 2012: 95).
Another of import aspect of “Che” Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare that would resonate with the urban guerrillas of the historic catamenia of the Internet is importance of propaganda. As “Che” Guevara acknowledges, “every human activity of the guerrilla regular army ought ever to survive accompanied past times the propaganda necessary to explicate the reasons for it” (Guevara, 2012: 81). Propaganda is an of import tool inward the arsenal of the urban guerrilla inward the historic catamenia of the Internet. As David Galula inward hisCounterinsurgency Warfare: Theory too Practice pointed out, “the asymmetrical province of affairs has of import effects on propaganda. The insurgent, having no responsibility, is costless to exercise every trick; if necessary, he tin lie, cheat, exaggerate. He is non obliged to prove; he is judged past times what he promises, non past times what he does. Consequently, propaganda is a powerful weapon for him” (Galula, 2006: 9). Propaganda provides context, fifty-fifty if deceptive; but most importantly, it creates a cultural narrative for action. H5N1 cultural narrative “is a floor recounted inward the shape of a causality linked laid of events that explains an trial inward a group’s history too expresses the values, character, or self-identity of the group” (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007: 93). “Che” Guevara’s guerrilla rebels inward the historic catamenia of the Internet would survive experts inward the areas of encryption, steganography, too cryptography inward monastic tell to disseminate their ideology too values past times creating a “virtual sanctuaries.” Sanctuaries were physical security havens, but inward the historic catamenia of the Internet, terrorists too guerrilla rebels tin mobilize, organize, too recruit from security havens half-away roughly the globe without fright of existence captured or prosecuted. These “virtual sanctuaries tin survive used to attempt to brand insurgent actions seem acceptable or laudable to internal too external audiences” (Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 2007: 29).
Mao Tse-tung too On Guerrilla Warfare
Mao Tse-tung’s Yu Chi Chan or On Guerrilla Warfare was published inward 1937 too it has been widely distributed too translated into several languages. Mao’s ideas on guerrilla warfare were influenced past times ancient military machine philosopher Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. As Samuel B. Griffith points out, “Sun Tzu wrote that speed, surprise, too deception were the primary essentials of the laid on too his succinct advice, “Sheng Tung, Chi Hsi” (“Uproar [in the] East, Strike [in the] West”), is no less valid today than it was when he wrote it 2,400 years ago” (Griffith, 2007:37). In 1938, Mao Tse-tung wrote that “political powerfulness comes out of the barrel of a gun.” Today, inward a globalized too interconnected globe of the twenty-first century, political powerfulness also come upward non precisely from bullets but also bytes (See Table 5.). Information too media activities, according to the Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2007), tin survive an insurgency or trigger-happy non-state musician main effort, with violence used inward support. Conflicts inward the futurity volition closely resemble a “mosaic war.” According to Conrad C. Crane inward his volume Cassandra inward Oz: Counterinsurgency too Future War (2016), a mosaic state of war is i inward which each slice of the conflict is dissimilar from each other. You may survive fighting several elements inside a country. Mosaic state of war tin survive either accidental or intentional. In an accidental mosaic conflict “a patchwork of pieces with i good pacified, side past times side to it some other i non so pacified or perhaps fifty-fifty nether the effective insurgent’s control,” whereas an intentional mosaic conflict “is created past times necessity when the counterinsurgent concentrates his efforts inward a selected surface area is inward itself a slap-up plenty source of difficulties without adding to it inward the selected area” (Galula, 2006: 60).
Mao Tse-tung was also good aware of the importance of propaganda equally a forcefulness multiplier to advance a guerrilla displace ideology. As he stated, “propaganda materials are rattling important. Every large guerrilla unit of measurement should have got a printing press too a mimeograph stone” (Tse-tung, 2007:85). Obviously, the days of printing press too mimeograph rock are long gone; today, information is disseminated worldwide past times the click of a mouse. In the globalized globe of the twenty-first century, nation-states too trigger-happy non-state actors volition brand exercise of the powerfulness of engineering to advance their nefarious activities without fright of retaliation, prosecution, or concerns from geographical boundaries. In the “brave novel world,” a novel criminality is emerging inward cyberspace. Mao Tse-tung also discusses the importance of organized computer program to advance the cause(s) of a guerrilla movement. As he states, “the onetime men organized themselves into propaganda groups known equally silver-haired units” (Tse-tung, 2007: 60). In the interconnected globe of the Internet today, the “silver-haired units” would encounter on cyberspace regardless of geographical location inward a virtual safe-haven. They would organize cyber sit-ins past times using Denial-of-Service or Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks against the enemy. They would also organize virtual protests to incite outrageous too mobilize the masses into an “urban guerrilla demonstration” (Marighella, 2011: 62).
Conclusions
There is a mutual topic amongst all of the strategic masters discussed here: innovative, irregular warfare meets its enemy where it is to the lowest degree prepared to have its effects. To counter it, the defender must accommodate too acquaint at a rapid pace, too survive prepared to leverage considerable resources to do so (See Table 1-5. provided before regarding Lessons on Irregular Cyber Warfare). In today’s interconnected too globalized globe of the twenty-first century, operational commanders must recognize dissimilar near-simultaneous cyber-attacks inward a theatre could survive component of a coordinated strategy. Furthermore, leaders must protect critical command too command nodes that have got connectivity through cyberspace, including wireless signals. U.S. Navy Admiral Mike Rogers, who retired equally the dual-hatted commander of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) too the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), inward a 2017 congressional cyber-posture hearing, underscored the difficulties inward coming together irregular warfare inward cyberspace past times stating: “I would survive the get-go to acknowledge that [information warfare] is non what our workforce is optimized for… nosotros are surely non where nosotros ask to be” (Bing, 2017, para 2).
Admiral Rogers also argues that the traditional signals intelligence-collecting mission of the NSA too externally-focused offensive too defensive missions of USCYBERCOM do non lend themselves to effectively combating adversarial information operations such equally digital propaganda, “fake news,” too actions that piggyback off of internal U.S. critical infrastructure. Just equally friends reconnect through virtual relationships, the Internet leads to political alliances too enmities extending into cyberspace, thereby adding a novel too intriguing dimension to traditional state-craft (da Cruz & Alvarez, 2015: 58). Welcome to the “brave novel world” of irregular cyber conflict.
The views expressed inward this article are those of the authors too do non necessarily reverberate the official policy or seat of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, Pentagon, or the U.S. Government.
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