BY JULIAN GEWIRTZ
Rumors were racing everywhere I went inward Beijing this July. Had a undercover coup toppled the government? Was the Chinese economic scheme on the verge of collapse? Had pop discontent, triggered yesteryear U.S. tariffs, reached the indicate of explosion? One deeper enquiry lurked beneath these others: Had Xi Jinping—China’s top leader, who presents himself equally all but omnipotent—overstepped his limits thank yous to overconfidence inward the inevitability of China’s rise? At the middle of this enquiry are non merely the facts that fill upwards headlines almost mainland People's Republic of China nether Xi. The “personality cult” that Xi has built upwards since coming to powerfulness inward 2013 is extraordinarily visible—on posters, on websites, inward competitions to read the president’s travel with the most sincerity—and some observerscriticize it equally reminiscent of the Mao era’s fervid devotion to the “Great Helmsman.” The intensified repression that Xi has overseen across China, peculiarly inward the western province of Xinjiang, which has travel an unprecedented “digital police force state,” has been condemned roughly the world. Nor is the work precisely U.S. President Donald Trump’s erratic merchandise actions, which have got imposed hundreds of billions of dollars inward tariffs on Chinese goods too threatened other economical punishments. The center uncertainties are rooted inward concern arising from Xi’s worldview almost governing China—and how that worldview collides with reality.
For the leader of an opaque political system, Xi is remarkably forthright almost how he sees the globe too has taken actions inward line with this worldview. He too his squad of obedient officials constantly trumpet a laid of ideas almost how mainland People's Republic of China should last governed too how mainland People's Republic of China fits into a changing world. To borrow a phrase from Mao Zedong, Xi believes that politics should last inward command. Xi envisions mainland People's Republic of China becoming a self-reliant superpower with the Chinese Communist Party firmly inward command over all aspects of life. He intends to Pb mainland People's Republic of China to travel the world’s largest economic scheme with a mixed socialist marketplace system, a global leader inward technological innovation with a modernized military, too the major strength inward Asia too beyond. He sees this equally restoring its historic stature, the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” that solely the CCP tin produce.
These sprawling ambitions are carefully arranged into an ideological architecture—one that has been honed to a startling floor at a fourth dimension when hence many other globe leaders appear erratic too unfocused. This ideology was lately written into the Chinese Constitution. It’s called “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” or Xi Jinping thought for short.
This ideology is both backward-looking too forward-looking. It draws most straight on traditional Chinese civilization too Marxist dialectical materialism, presenting Xi equally the heroic avatar who tin unite too deport forrad those lineages. It seeks to adapt them to the 21st century—becoming what the Chinese scholar Jiang Shigong calls a “guide to action” too the ground of a newfound “cultural self-confidence too political maturity.”
Xi has been explicit that policy travel (whether economic policy, foreign policy, or beyond) is meaningful solely if it is built on this ideological foundation. His ideology aims to strengthen his private mandate, position the political party with a laid of principles, guide the evolution of policy, too foster values too beliefs inward political party members too the Chinese people. In other words, it aims to touching on reality.
There are 2 large questions here. One is whether Xi Jinping thought volition really last able to strengthen the political party too Xi himself or volition have got footling to no effect. The other is whether strengthening the political party too Xi will, inward turn, facilitate or undermine the real-world success of the numerous policy goals that are part of China’s “great rejuvenation.”
These challenges are playing out inward technological innovation, 1 of Xi’s key objectives. Innovation is jump upwards inward both the Marxist too cultural lineages that Xi invokes. Xi has called technological innovation “the primary driving force behind development,” a materialist assessment that echoes Marx’s views almost productive technology. Technology itself is, for Xi, an “advanced productive force,” too innovation agency the textile capacity to stand, self-reliant, at “the frontiers of scientific discipline too technology.” But technological innovation is also proudly invoked equally a key character of traditional Chinese culture. Xi often praises ancient China’s “four peachy inventions”—paper, printing, the compass, too gunpowder—when he speaks almost his country’s greatness.
But this agency that Xi’s ideology isn’t precisely an abstraction—it’s supposed to manifest itself inward existent technological innovation.
But this agency that Xi’s ideology isn’t precisely an abstraction—it’s supposed to manifest itself inward existent technological innovation.
If mainland People's Republic of China doesn’t create exercise to travel a globe leader inward innovation, Xi Jinping thought hits a wall. And inside this worldview, that agency the entire projection of rejuvenation mightiness collapse. The tenets of “Mao Zedong thought” were discarded inward a prior era because they didn’t deliver on their promises, too the same fate could befall Xi Jinping thought. So, Xi’s mainland People's Republic of China must innovate.
Of course, innovation arises non precisely from the top-down provision of resources but from private inventiveness too society’s bottom-up ferment. In the existent world, at that topographic point are enough of reasons to innovate—from curiosity too obsession to the pursuit of fame too fortune—that be inward mainland People's Republic of China good beyond the key leadership’s control.
But Xi is aiming to alter the balance. The party-state is similar a shot oriented toward managing innovators, seeing their travel equally adding to the ledger of rejuvenation too attesting to the validity of Xi Jinping thought. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 2017 report inward mainland People's Republic of China Today described the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ 100 Talents Program, which funds overseas Chinese scientists to render to China, equally “an of import strength inward the structure of a novel innovative country.” In 2018, Xi was fifty-fifty to a greater extent than explicit, telling a coming together of scientists too engineers: “Party leadership is the fundamental political guarantee of advances made inward the have of scientific innovation with Chinese characteristics.” In other words, that mightiness be: “What yous exercise is solely possible too meaningful because of what I do.”
Moreover, for Chinese researchers, an enormous amount of fourth dimension must similar a shot last devoted to genuflecting earlier Xi Jinping thought. Centers for the study of Xi Jinping thought are opening on campuses across the country, too research on Xi Jinping thought was the No. 1 “hot research topic” of 2017, according to 1 official report.
More seriously, increasing ideological strictures on Chinese academia too a novel emphasis on “political too ideological performance” hateful that international collaboration too cooperation human face novel impediments, inward what is a clear tightening later on several decades of significant, if limited, infinite for independent inquiry. (Of course, novel barriers to cooperation also be on the U.S. side, including inward the grade of to a greater extent than restrictive visa policies on Chinese scholars.) And a CCP campaign has precisely been launched to growth “patriotism” too “political consciousness” alongside intellectuals, suggesting that these trends volition intensify further.
Whether Xi’s approach volition foster actual breakthroughs or distort the processes of innovation is a powerful bear witness of what happens when Xi Jinping thought hits the existent world.
Then there’s the all-important realm of economics. Xi’s expressed confidence inward the economic scheme is immense, despite serious problems, including debt burdens, demographic challenges, too merchandise conflict with the United States. Xi Jinping thought fifty-fifty suggests that China’s economical model is “blazing a novel trail for other developing countries to accomplish modernization” too “offers Chinese wisdom too a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind.” (Never heed that economists from countries equally far afield equally Hungary, Singapore, Brazil, West Germany, too the USA helped mainland People's Republic of China figure out its economical policies.)
But reality is confronting Xi’s visions for the economy, too: There are numerous troubling indicators of a domestic slowdown, too there’s a merchandise state of war underway with the world’s largest economy. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 important issue of observers believe that the economic scheme is far weaker than political party officials claim. Reality tin apace deflate ideological confidence if it begins to falter.
The centrality of economic science to Xi’s vision has caused intense politicizing of economical debate, producing severe constraints on dissenting opinions there, equally inward other areas of Chinese society. The risks to the economic scheme of this approach are besides infrequently discussed. Ideology cannot solve economical problems yesteryear itself—that requires engaging with complicated too often conflicting information too analysis, too debating policy options.
In July, for example, members of the independent Unirule Institute of Economics were locked inward their offices too told that they were existence evicted. When I interviewed Mao Yushi, the outspoken founder of Unirule, inward 2016, he told me, “The novel leader [Xi] has given upwards Deng Xiaoping’s route too tried to choose his ain road.” This route champaign does non have got room for economists advocating liberal ideas. By contrast, economists who have got praised Xi’s favored policies are finding cook audiences—and others are adapting their views to the novel political reality. This is doesn’t necessarily hateful they’re acting inward bad faith; many may truly back upwards the policies that Xi advocates. But nosotros similar a shot know what happens to economists who don’t.
Indeed, with intensifying political control, individuals too organizations that mightiness 1 time have got provided critical feedback on policy choices, or fifty-fifty precisely participated inward opened upwards discussion, human face much stronger deterrents. The risks of criticizing a policy that has been chosen yesteryear Xi are enormous: Xi Jinping thought is similar a shot written into the constitution. The chilling result on intellectual ground too risk-taking is already apparent. The economist Sheng Hong, Unirule’s director, told reporters final month, “We should last able to facial expression at problems from a issue of dissimilar angles.” But many problems “of peachy importance to guild … aren’t existence discussed inside the system.” It seems almost inevitable that China’s leadership volition brand mistakes that to a greater extent than vigorous too opened upwards ground could have got helped to avoid.
This, too, is part of Xi Jinping thought inward the existent world.
Above all, the uncomfortable enquiry for Xi is whether his signature ideology tin really aid accomplish his destination of China’s “great rejuvenation.” It for sure may last able to aid accomplish elements of that goal—justifying pouring huge sums of coin into technological innovation that volition at a minimum brand mainland People's Republic of China to a greater extent than self-reliant too make short-term economical gains, or bringing novel investment to developing countries along with “Chinese wisdom” almost how to modernize. But these solitary exercise non constitute the broader achievements to which it aspires, including guiding action, serving to “inspire society,” too “ensuring that the party’s peachy vitality too strong powerfulness are forever maintained.”
Xi Jinping thought raises expectations to the loftiest levels. It’s trying to be, inward part, a self-fulfilling prophecy. One payoff of this approach is that it may last able to motivate too unite the political party behind Xi—aided, of course, yesteryear repression too discipline. But it is extremely uncertain whether it volition last able to inspire to a greater extent than broadly.
What’s at stake hither is far to a greater extent than than the vagaries of elite politics or the niceties of ideological debate. mainland People's Republic of China has a population of 1.4 billion people, all of whom have got their ain memories, communities, too dreams for what the hereafter may hold. Far beyond the inventors or economists who brand upwards China’s intellectual elite, Xi’s ideology is designed to shape ordinary people’s lives, too. The CCP makes claims almost non solely their public behaviour but also their values, opportunities, too private imaginations. But volition they believe inward these ideas? Will they tolerate some other decade of “politics inward command”? The hereafter of this ideology inward mainland People's Republic of China may depend most of all on how it volition last received yesteryear a vast too various society.
This volition depend on many factors. Successes may aid legitimate the ideology too the leader who is claimed to last the source of those successes. But greater prosperity for the Chinese people volition also heighten the prospect, long predicted but non withal materialized, that a wealthier Chinese public volition need broader political participation inward ways that could challenge the CCP’s monopoly on political power.
Xi’s ideological hyping of China’s powerfulness may last creating an alarmed reaction from other countries, which volition make novel problems for China—and may also create damaging pushback against this shift away from Deng Xiaoping’s cautionary assertion that mainland People's Republic of China should “keep a depression profile.” And if, instead of grand domestic economical successes at that topographic point are important setbacks for mainland People's Republic of China too its people—even temporary ones—then Xi, his ideology, too his political party volition probable have important blame, fifty-fifty equally they attempt to house blame elsewhere. The potential dynamic of Xi’s “self-fulfilling prophecy” may instead travel harsh feelings of unmet expectations.
For now, it’s clear that observers trying to sympathise mainland People's Republic of China today too tomorrow must last careful non merely to choose Xi’s ideas too utterances at human face value. We must attempt to sympathise how they interact with the existent world. And nosotros must see that for China’s leaders, seeking daily to impose political party ideology on unruly events, reality itself is a peachy source of pressure.
Julian Gewirtz is the writer of “Unlikely Partners: Chinese Reformers, Western Economists, too the Making of Global China” (Harvard University Press, 2017).
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