Larry Kummer
Since the official cease of the Cold War inwards 1991, remarkably, the USA has been at state of war or engaged inwards important armed forces conflicts too interventions for over two-thirds of the intervening years. Tens of thousands of American soldiers, Marines, sailors, too airmen accept been killed or wounded inwards these conflicts. Wars too conflicts inwards Republic of Iraq inwards 1991;
Somalia, 1992–93;
the global state of war on terror,
Afghanistan, 2001–present;
Iraq, 2003–present; and
Syria too Republic of Yemen since 2016
— stand upwards for a total of xix of the past times twenty-six years inwards which this nation’s armed forces accept been engaged inwards combat!
Using the cease of World War II inwards 1945 equally a minute starting indicate too including the Korean (1950–53) too Vietnam Wars (from 1959 – when the kickoff Americans were killed – to withdrawal inwards 1974), Americans accept been inwards battle for thirty-seven of the past times seventy-two years, or good over 50% of the time. The tape has non been impressive.
Korea was a draw.
Vietnam was an ignominious defeat, vividly encapsulated past times the poignant icon of the final Huey helicopter lifting off the roof of the embattled American diplomatic mission inwards Saigon.
The only outright victory of the past times half dozen decades was the kickoff Republic of Iraq War inwards 1991, inwards which President George H. W. Bush had the audio judgment to restrict the objective to ejecting Saddam Hussein too his regular army from State of Kuwait too thus to remove the mass of our forces from the region.
Tragically for the nation, Bush’s son, George Bush, presided over arguably the greatest American strategic catastrophe since the Civil War, the minute Republic of Iraq state of war – a conflict that led to the rising of the Islamic State too is soundless existence waged today, without an cease inwards sight.
The reader tin evaluate the outcomes of the other interventions cited above. Several observations that tin last made most this history of repeated failure are almost equally dismal the tape itself.
First, few Americans are fifty-fifty aware of or concerned over how long this patch has been engaged inwards armed conflict over recent decades. It is quite a staggering length of fourth dimension for a solid seat down that prides itself on its “exceptionalism” too its “peaceful” efforts to spread commonwealth closed to the globe.
Second, few Americans fifty-fifty inquire why, given what nosotros believe is the greatest armed forces inwards the world, our tape inwards state of war too armed forces interventions is thus failure prone. Third, nosotros ourselves must ask: What tin last done, inwards calorie-free of full general world indifference, to ensure success whenever the patch employs armed forces forcefulness inwards major conflicts or interventions?
This volume examines the to a greater extent than important American uses of forcefulness over the past times half dozen decades to empathise why nosotros lose wars (and neglect inwards interventions) that nosotros start. It also argues the absolute demand to adopt a valid framework for making decisions – what I accept termed a “brains-based approach to strategic thinking.” While some may reckon this term equally arrogant, the fact is that besides oftentimes nosotros accept failed to practice fully the grayness affair betwixt our ears, amongst disastrous results.
To succeed, audio strategic thinking must top or minimize the vagaries of politics, ideologies, simplistic crusade slogans, wishful ideas, too the inexperience that accept (as the forthcoming chapters volition argue) handicapped the nation’s final 3 commanders inwards primary too almost sure enough volition send on the electrical current one. From these analyses, the volume derives agency for how to win, how to succeed inwards applying force.
To brand this declaration to a greater extent than vivid, vignettes most major events are interspersed throughout the text. To some, they volition last controversial. To others, these vignettes volition underscore on a personal degree the larger reasons for failure too the damning impact of the absence of audio strategic thinking. Each vignette is an accurate summary of actual events, to the best of my recollection. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 few circumstances accept been altered to protect sensitive data or sources.
As amongst whatsoever work, shortfalls too errors are the responsibleness of the writer alone. The only responsibleness of the reader is to move on an opened upwards heed inwards agreement why nosotros lose the real conflicts nosotros start.
Glowing endorsements from United States policy leaders normally signal a volume that either justifies their folly or offers chaff equally recommendations (i.e., innocuous or specious). This is an exception. The failures of United States armed forces expeditions since WWII has instruct besides obvious too dangerous. Even people who run the organization accept instruct alarmed too opened upwards to discussing novel ideas. Who knows? Perhaps some twenty-four hr flow they volition instruct opened upwards to trying novel ideas.
“This volume should last read past times all practitioners too serious students of national safety equally the guide for avoiding failures too miscalculations inwards using American armed forces power.”
— Colin L. Powell (General, United States Army, retired), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989–93) too 65th Secretary of State (2001-05).
“Ullman’s rigorous intellectual procedure is a meaningful contribution to the national dialogue. Every inquiry he asks is ane that should last asked too answered, all the same imperfectly, earlier our solid seat down jumps inwards or backs inwards to some other armed forces intervention, peculiarly inwards an increasingly complex the world of non-state actors, shifting alliances, too emerging ability centers.”
— John F. Kerry, Senator (1985-2013) too Secretary of State (2013-17).
“Harlan Ullman’s latest volume is ane of the most insightful assessments of modern U.S. armed forces history. I highly recommend this volume to presidents, policymakers, too the world alike equally it recalls the lessons from our nation’s cautionary tales too guides us toward a safer, to a greater extent than peaceful future.”
— James L. Jones Jr. (General, USMC, retired), Commandant of the Marine Corps; Supreme Allied Commander Europe; too National Security Advisor (2009-10).By United States Navy Communication Specialist 1st Class Jaima Fogg.
About the author
Harlan K. Ullman is Chairman of the Killowen Group, CNIGuard Ltd, too CNIGuard Inc. He is a Senior Advisor of the Atlantic Council. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy inwards 1963 too has a MA, MALD, too Ph.D. from The Fletcher School at Tufts University. He commanded destroyers too Swift Boats inwards Vietnam. He forthwith serves equally Distinguished Senior Fellow too Visiting Professor at the United States Naval War College.
Ullman was co-creator of the “shock too awe” doctrine (aka “rapid dominance”): operate of “overwhelming decisive forcefulness to paralyze the foe too destroy his volition to fight. He has written vii books, including …
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