The sort of accident whatsoever organisation should worry close is the i that seems impossible. In 2017, the U.S. Navy was rocked alongside 2 collisions at sea, showtime the USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) on June 17, in addition to so the USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) on August 21. These tragedies resulted inwards the combined deaths of 17 sailors. Both collisions occurred alongside vessels managed inwards the Seventh Fleet operating area—the Pacific in addition to Indian Oceans—causing the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson to forcefulness an operational intermission for the entire surface fleet. Their goal was to expeditiously discovery whatsoever potential systemic problems on how Seventh Fleet manages its surface naval force. While both collisions were nether dissimilar circumstances, in addition to in-depth investigations rest ongoing, these events have got triggered a service-wide review of the demands placed on surface warfare officers, including manning, slumber deprivation, in addition to rise operational tempos. This article examines the way inwards which the Navy assigns officers to its surface vessels, in addition to suggests improvements that could mitigate hereafter collisions at sea.
The USS John S. McCain afterwards a collision, inwards Singapore waters, Aug. 21, 2017. (Reuters)
HOW THE U.S. NAVY ASSIGNS SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS TO SHIPS
The mission of the personnel ascendance for surface warfare officers, called PERS-41, is to check the talent from the puddle of available officers to the needs of the fleet.[1] There are 5 to vi major fourth dimension frames when officers are assigned to ships inwards their 20-year career period: 2 sectionalization officeholder tours, 2 subdivision caput tours, in addition to i to 2 executive officeholder in addition to command-at-sea tours. Every fourth dimension an officeholder advances inwards the ship alternative process, he or she gains to a greater extent than responsibility. Officers start their careers alongside responsibleness for a sectionalization inside a department, in addition to so progress to Pb a major subdivision on a ship. An officer’s career volition oft culminate inwards serving every bit a commanding officeholder responsible for overseeing the entirety of a ship's departments in addition to crew. The exclusively fourth dimension officers larn the chance to pick out their ship is earlier their showtime tour every bit a newly graduated officer. The ranking scheme for this showtime tour ship alternative is based on the officer’s overall social club of merit of academic, military, in addition to physical standings.[2] After this indicate inwards a surface officer’s career, Navy Personnel Command makes all other ship selections.
Navy Personnel Command detailers await at 3 major factors when selecting ships for their officers throughout their career: personal preferences, career needs, in addition to the needs of the Navy, so every bit to, “deliver the correct skills, at the correct ship, for the correct time.”[3] For personal preferences, Navy Personnel Command takes into consideration the officer’s preference every bit to homeport, ship type, identify unit of measurement needs, in addition to graduate instruction opportunities.[4] For career needs, detailers volition have got into consideration major surface naval qualifications—like engineering officeholder of the sentinel in addition to tactical activeness officer—assignment diversity, career progression, in addition to timing for screening inwards social club for advancement to the adjacent major officeholder pay grade, or rank.[5] Currently, detailers don’t monitor experiential metrics similar fourth dimension in addition to sense at sea, in addition to it is non given sufficient priority during the ship assignment process.
Good surface warfare officers mightiness pass all their careers edifice upwards to command-at-sea on ships that do non brand major deployments, or pass the bulk of their ocean fourth dimension on ships inwards major maintenance phases. Consequently these officers do non have sufficient sense getting a ship underway, anchoring, conducting replenishments at sea, or navigating through heavy merchant traffic. This deficiency inwards sense tin exit proficient officers unprepared to ascendance a naval warship, through no error of their own, furthering the risk of the sort of tragic mishaps that have got occurred inwards recent months that killed 17 sailors on 2 naval warships.
RMS Titanic departing Southampton on Apr 10, 1912. (F.G.O. Stuart/Wikimedia)
The Navy is an adaptive organization, but due to the recent events of the USS Fitzgerald in addition to USS John S. McCain collisions it is reactive inwards setting standards. To purpose a famous maritime example, on Apr 15, 1912, the RMS Titanic, hubristically called unsinkable, collided alongside an iceberg during her showtime underway voyage from Southampton, United Kingdom, to New York City.[6] The vessel departed without a sufficient number of lifeboats in addition to life jackets for the crew in addition to passengers, resulting inwards to a greater extent than than 1,500 deaths.[7] The international community responded accordingly, in addition to every bit a outcome at that spot are mandated safety, lifeboat, in addition to life-jacket requirements to mitigate the consequences when such events occur. This sense has relevance for surface warfare officers’ ship alternative in addition to their sense levels at sea. The Navy is sending unopen to subdivision heads, executive, in addition to commanding officers into experiences at ocean they are non adequately prepared for, piece enabling the prideful overestimation of their science in addition to competence. This practice—call it the Titanic Syndrome—endangers all aboard.[9] Another intermission inwards fleet service operations could travel a difficult pill to swallow inwards the trial at that spot is unopen to other string of collisions at ocean in addition to lives lost.
PROPOSITIONS ON HOW TO MONITOR EXPERIENCE AND TIME-AT-SEA
For the Navy to avoid the Titanic Syndrome, a number of cost-effective options could travel seat inwards identify to laid upwards every surface warfare officeholder to travel an adequate ship driver. One recommendation made yesteryear retired navy Captain Robert Bodvake is that all surface naval officers run on personal logbooks of all their experiences at sea. Bodvake claims, “We should mensurate things that matter, in addition to purpose the information appropriately. The numbers of unreps [underway replenishments] or pier landings should…help quantify a SWO’s relevant experience.”[10] Each surface naval officeholder would keep a logbook, therefore allowing commanding officers to evaluate each officeholder for ship driving sense in addition to exceptional evolutions.[11] The surface community attempted a similar programme inwards 2009, “SWO Pro Book,” that distributed handbooks to officers, but the programme ultimately failed due to a lack of accountability. When maintaining logbooks, fifty-fifty when required nether the SWO Pro Book Program inwards 2009, commanding officers were non required examine them every bit a agency to create upwards one's hear watchbills (the method for determining who stands sentinel in addition to when) for underway steaming in addition to exceptional evolutions. This solution also does non address the employment of ship alternative in addition to the off jeopardy of an officeholder spending 3 to 4 years on back-to-back ships that do non acquit whatsoever meaning operational deployments or ocean time.
A to a greater extent than pragmatic recommendation would travel for Navy Personnel Command to consider each surface warfare officers’ sense at ocean when determining his or her adjacent ship selection. If an officeholder spent i ocean tour on a ship that neither deployed nor experienced much fourth dimension at sea, this should play a constituent inwards the adjacent ocean tour in addition to the officeholder should become to a ship that volition deploy. However, an officeholder who spent i ocean tour deployed operationally for over nine months could gain sense on the other side yesteryear going to a ship that volition non exit port because of maintenance requirements. Similar to Captain Bodvake’s recommendation, fourth dimension at ocean should non travel a constituent inwards promotion, but it could assist improve each surface officer’s sense every bit a mariner.[12]
The Navy tin implement this recommendation yesteryear electronically monitoring each officer’s fourth dimension yesteryear i of the watchstanders inwards the pilothouse, the enclosed construction from which a ship tin travel navigated. In the pilothouse, the quartermaster is a seat that is constantly manned piece at sea, in addition to specializes inwards navigation. One extra duty that could travel added for the quartermaster is to electronically compile the hours for every surface warfare watchstander. At the goal of a sentinel or exceptional evolution, the off-going officeholder would have got to electronically sign information compiled yesteryear the quartermaster for his or her watch, e.g. Lieutenant Smith stood officeholder of the deck for 5 hours, or Ensign Patel stood conning officeholder during a replenishment at ocean for two-and-one-half hours. The accumulation of time, watchstanding seat stood, in addition to exceptional evolutions conducted would travel compiled inwards a database. Navy Personnel Command could purpose this information when considering an officer’s adjacent ship selection.
Each officer’s flat of sense at ocean could also travel sent to the Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS), which trains all surface warfare officers inwards diverse aspects of navigation in addition to shiphandling to ensure the Navy’s mission to keep surface naval superiority.[13] The Surface Warfare Officer School has a blanket programme that every officeholder must accomplish inwards social club to graduate throughout their careers. With access to every officer’s sense at ocean on-hand, instructors could tailor the classroom session to address lack of sense in addition to develop in addition to refine the pith competencies required of a surface warfare officer. More targeted training, though simulated, could assist improve laid upwards each officeholder inwards the existent world.
CONCLUSIONS
When Admiral Richardson addressed Congress inwards Nov 2017 every bit Chief of Naval Operations, he took responsibleness for what he called “systemic issues” that contributed to the fatal collisions of USS Fitzgerald in addition to USS John S. McCain.[14] Since this address, the surface community has made numerous changes to brand ships to a greater extent than prepared for operations at sea. These incremental improvements are a mensuration inwards the correct direction to cut down collisions at sea. However, a greater mensuration towards improving the affair to a greater extent than would travel to ensure that each officeholder is prepared, qualified, in addition to sufficiently experienced to navigate a warship. The best way to attain this goal is for U.S. Navy detailers to have got an accurate tape of every officer’s sense at sea, so every bit to seat the correct officer, inwards the correct ship, at the correct time.
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