In its September 1999 Phase I study New World Coming: American Security inward the 21st Century, the U.S.A. Commission on National Security inward the 21st Century (better known as the Hart-Rudman Commission) darkly concluded that “Americans volition probable kicking the bucket on American soil, perhaps inward large numbers.” Two years later, the U.S.A. suffered catastrophic terrorist attacks resulting inward the deaths of nearly 3,000 U.S. citizens. Ultimately, Hart-Rudman was nearly challenging what was together with so contemporary U.S. national safety bias together with convention, forcing U.S. decisionmakers to fundamentally reconsider how inwardness U.S. interests would hold upwards threatened inward the coming decade. Unfortunately, key aspects of their message roughshod on deaf ears or failed to penetrate institutional predispositions nearly consequential threats. The U.S.A. together with its leadership were merely lulled yesteryear post-Cold War primacy into profound vulnerability.
The adjacent moving ridge of unconventional warlike aggression against the U.S.A. together with its allies is well-underway. Elite U.S. leadership has been warned nearly the strategic hazards of effective counter-U.S. gray zone resistance—especially that originating inward Beijing together with Moscow. Among many others, CSIS has undertaken meaningful piece of work on gray zone challenges. All of this ongoing piece of work recognizes that the U.S.A. is clearly suffering setbacks together with losses inward the human face upwards of Russian together with Chinese gray zone campaigning. However, as inward the illustration of Hart-Rudman’s counsel together with the subsequent 9/11 attacks, the U.S.A. appears to hold upwards as flat-footed together with perhaps to a greater extent than fundamentally threatened yesteryear gray zone challenges than it was pre-9/11 from terrorists.
Q1: What are gray zone threats?
A1: In the 2016 piece of work “Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative inward the Gray Zone”, U.S. Army War College colleagues together with I joined the U.S. Special Operations Command, RAND’s Michael Mazarr, together with David Barno together with Nora Bensahel among many others inward separately issuing somewhat unwelcome Hart-Rudman-like warnings to the U.S. national safety establishment nearly the hazards of counter-U.S. gray zone resistance. Our War College piece of work specifically suggested that the most consequential U.S. rivals—paced yesteryear Russian Federation together with China—were employing to swell effect “unique combinations of influence, intimidation, coercion, together with aggression to incrementally crowd out effective (U.S.) resistance, constitute local or regional advantages, together with manipulate demand chances perceptions inward their favor.”
We opted to depict these so-called gray zone challenges instead of defining them. At the time, nosotros believed that the creative “weaponization of everything” would speedily outpace, defy, together with fundamentally undermine precise definition. In short, nosotros worried that a defense strength together with national safety community so enamored with precision of linguistic communication would ‘miss the i that got us’ yesteryear effectively defining away transformational warlike demeanour yesteryear U.S. rivals. Our job concern was that U.S. defense strength together with national safety bias together with convention—still invested inward the speedily dwindling advantages of post-Cold War primacy—would discount as nuisance competition methods that were inward fact potentially fatal to U.S. interests.
In house of a definition, nosotros opted at the fourth dimension for a elementary parsimonious laid upwards of descriptors to guide senior leader identification of hostile gray zone approaches. We suggested all gray zone challenges manifested inward roughly combination of iii distinct characteristics—hybridity, menace to defense strength together with national safety convention, together with demand chances confusion.
Hybridity suggests that all gray zone strategies include unique combinations of hostile methods inside together with across instruments of power, traditional domains (air, land, sea, space, cyber), together with heavily contested competitive spaces (e.g., electro-magnetic spectrum together with strategic influence). We found that gray zone adversaries acquaint a menace to convention inward that the grapheme of their competitive methods promises warlike outcomes yet autumn brusk of armed services provocation. We concluded that competition gray zone strategies together with approaches “lie betwixt ‘classic’ state of war together with peace, legitimate together with illegitimate motives together with methods, universal weather together with norms, lodge together with anarchy; together with traditional, irregular, or unconventional means.”
Finally, demand chances confusion captures the gray zone’s key safety dilemma. Risk confusion sees gray zone hybridity together with menace to convention combine inward strategic decisionmaking to paralyze effective counter-gray zone approaches. In short, demand chances confusion emerges when the hazards associated with activity together with inaction against gray zone rivals seem as unpleasant.
Hyper demand chances witting U.S. decisionmakers—convinced that the long arc of history favors continued U.S. dominance—can encounter aggressive activity against capable gray zone rivals similar Russian Federation together with China as risky flirtation with uncontrolled together with costly escalation. And, inward inaction, they clearly encounter the jeopardy associated with existent or perceived appeasement of the same capable rivals. The highest terms of appeasement, of course, is tacit acknowledgement of competition gains together with give upwards to the same rival’s attendant mightiness to solidify those gains against reversal. In the end, the deferred jeopardy of inaction presents attractive incentives for U.S. decisionmakers to expect out the opposition. Unfortunately, irreversible strategic loss is a natural outcome.
Q2: Why are gray zone threats so challenging for U.S. national safety leaders?
A2: Risk confusion lies at the optic of ineffective U.S. competition with Beijing together with Moscow. Risk confusion is weaponized yesteryear both to swell effect together with employed to stall either offensive or defensive U.S. responses to obvious gray zone provocation. Our Russian together with Chinese gray zone adversaries successfully manipulate demand chances calculus, transferring the preponderance of demand chances onto U.S. together with allied decisionmakers. Each successful Russian or Chinese gray zone maneuver creates novel opportunities for their exploitation. And, each successful competition exploitation farther undermines U.S. credibility together with expands U.S. together with allied vulnerability to continued gray zone assault.
To appointment inward U.S. demand chances calculus, it appears that an outsized fearfulness of futurity hybrid escalation across the political, information, armed services together with paramilitary, together with economical instruments trumps rattling existent near-term losses of U.S. influence, reach, liberty of action, position, together with credibility associated with whatever i incremental hostile gray zone act. One tin only assume that the latter are perceived yesteryear U.S. together with allied leaders as recoverable at roughly futurity date. In reality, however, nosotros straight off know that tangible competition regional gains—Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, South China Sea, etc.—are to a greater extent than probable than non novel inalterable facts on the ground. In short, piece rivals crusade together with win, the U.S.A. cries foul but fails to effectively crusade back.
Going forward, a to a greater extent than troubling together with decidedly to a greater extent than strategic development inward swell mightiness gray zone competition appears inward the offing. Its potential for damage far surpasses anything hence far anticipated yesteryear scholars together with analysts. The U.S. reply to this darker shade of gray is probable to determine the futurity of U.S. swell power.
Q3: What is the darker or darkest shade of gray?
A3: Those of us assessing the grapheme of gray zone challenges over the recent yesteryear probable underestimated their potential jeopardy together with impact. For the most part, nosotros focused on their regional—at range—implications. And, inward so doing, nosotros failed to recognize the effective “lethality” of strategic gray zone maneuvers against the stable performance of the U.S.A. itself. We played “small ball” piece U.S. rivals were inward reality edifice their squad to “hit for power” inward what nosotros at the Army War College telephone band the pivotal “strategic influence” space. As a consequence, U.S. leadership is facing yet roughly other potentially catastrophic “failure of imagination.” However, this failure is potentially much to a greater extent than far-reaching together with crippling than that of 9/11.
In recent Army War College piece of work on hypercompetition inward the Indo-Pacific Command surface area of responsibility, my colleagues together with I opted to examine vulnerability together with the pursuit of payoff across “contested spaces” versus traditional armed services domains. In doing so, nosotros identified “strategic influence” as preeminent with the diverse heavily contested arenas inside which the U.S.A. competed for payoff with its most capable rivals. In rattling elementary terms, the “strategic influence” infinite demarks conceptual territory where elite together with pop perceptions are formed, consequential choices are made, and, ultimately, swell decisions are taken on the pursuit together with defense strength of diverse inwardness national interests.
Winning inward the strategic influence space—dominating or disrupting perceptions, choices, together with decisions or dividing a rival’s consequential constituencies over the same—took on novel pregnant inward lite of recent detailed reports on Russian attempts disrupt the U.S. election. Russian gray zone maneuvers straight against U.S. political institutions, as good as their demonstrated abilities to manipulate pop perceptions, mobilize political activism, and, potentially, touching on political outcomes together with decisionmaking, are game-changing escalations inward gray zone campaigning. Further still, the Russian approach appears to employ a combination of capabilities together with methods that are uniquely—even exclusively—suited to illiberal U.S. rivals.
This darker shade of gray—the prospect that competition powers may accomplish straight into the U.S.A. virtually together with physically to exploit U.S. political fissures together with influence strategic outcomes inward their favor—fundamentally changes the grapheme of contemporary swell mightiness competition together with conflict. Serious U.S. together with allied pursuit of institutional resilience together with powerful offensive remedies are the only possible defenses against this novel darker gray zone hazard. It marks an of import adverse shift inward the existing residue of mightiness betwixt the U.S.A. together with its allies on the i paw together with increasingly assertive competition gray zone actors on the other. Paralyzing demand chances confusion on our component subdivision volition ultimately hold upwards lethal to continued U.S. influence. Creating competition demand chances confusion on the other paw —transferring the preponderance of demand chances dorsum to them—will free-up determination together with maneuver infinite for the U.S.A. to find the initiative. However, as of now, fourth dimension together with volition are non on our side.
Nathan Freier is an associate professor of national safety studies at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute together with a non-resident senior associate with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic together with International Studies (CSIS) inward Washington, D.C. The views expressed inward this piece of work are the views of the writer together with practise non correspond the views of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
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