The Issue
The U.S. mightiness to shape high-level outcomes inwards Syrian Arab Republic is limited; Russian Federation as well as Islamic Republic of Iran get got outmaneuvered the United States. Eastern Syrian Arab Republic however offers leverage to salve a marginally but meaningfully improve result for U.S. interests as well as the Syrian population. The U.S. of America must determine its sources of leverage, articulate its goals, connect those goals to a stabilization framework, as well as operationalize burden sharing nether an eastern Syrian Arab Republic framework. Failing this, the Assad regime volition probable get got over the east, which has proven to endure the ultimate driver of instability as well as extremism inwards the country, with effects that volition inevitably depict the U.S. of America dorsum into the region.
Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 Bleak National Picture
As Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton assemble their ain senior Middle East teams, a release of U.S. interests hang inwards the residual inwards Syria: the enduring defeat of ISIS as well as al-Qaeda inwards the Levant; the vulnerability of neighboring Republic of Iraq to extremist disruption; the render of Syrian refugees; the mitigation of Iranian influence; the demand to both compete as well as cooperate with Russian Federation to goal the civil war; as well as the safety of regional partners as well as allies. U.S. values are equally good at stake: the conflict has precipitated a humanitarian catastrophe of epic proportions, with over 500,000 civilians dead as well as 12 1000000 displaced.
The U.S. mightiness to shape high-level outcomes inwards Syrian Arab Republic is limited. Russian Federation as well as Islamic Republic of Iran get got outmaneuvered the U.S. of America there. With their backing, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is extending his command throughout Syrian territory—most late via an offensive on southwestern Syria, previously the site of a “de-escalation zone” agreed betwixt the United States, Russia, as well as Jordan, precipitating immense civilian displacement. Assad’s consolidation of extremists inwards Idlib amongst civilians raises the specter of some other slaughter similar Aleppo inwards 2016. The UN-backed Geneva procedure is moribund, though however worth supporting, piece the U.S. of America has limited influence inwards the Astana as well as Sochi processes, which are equally good demonstrating limited returns. More broadly, Assad is already equally good brutally shaping the facts on the Earth regarding “reconstruction” through forcible displace of populations, demographic engineering, constricting belongings rights, as well as predatory governance that favors loyalists. In his coming together with President Putin, President Trump reportedly discussed Syria, although in that location was no official articulation summary of the summit. The give-and-take may get got included options for drawing downwards U.S. forces inwards Syrian Arab Republic inwards substitution for Russian Federation convincing Islamic Republic of Iran to minimize its presence inwards Syria. However, Russian Federation lacks the volition as well as leverage over Islamic Republic of Iran to fulfill such a bargain.
The national film is bleak. Zooming into the Syrian map to a greater extent than closely, ane subnational enclave currently exterior of Assad’s command has taken some steps towards stability. Eastern Syrian Arab Republic however offers leverage to salve a marginally but meaningfully improve result for U.S. interests as well as the Syrian population. In the weeks ahead, the U.S. of America should: get got stock of the sources of leverage inwards eastern Syria; articulate its goal for translating these sources of leverage into a defined political endstate; develop this stated goal into a broader stabilization operational framework; as well as and so execute “the fine art of deal” inwards developing a burden-sharing conception to back upwards these objectives.
Eastern Syrian Arab Republic however offers leverage to salve a marginally but meaningfully improve result for U.S. interests as well as the Syrian population.
This is non a little exercise. It volition non require massive amounts of U.S. funding—but it volition require concerted U.S. leadership at all levels, equally good equally commitment to proceed to render a modest safety backbone to our local partners. The high stakes merit this effort. ISIS is already reconstituting in the region. This approach offers the creation of an alternative to Assad’s degree of governance as well as a winner-take-all mentality inwards Syria, key drivers of extremism’s appeal. It equally good would assist mitigate the risks to neighboring Iraq, which would endure highly vulnerable to extremist destabilization if ISIS rebuilds inwards Syria. Further, the “burden-sharing” declaration may appeal to key European allies concerned nigh the war’s destabilizing influence on migration patterns—already, some are providing modest security and civilian back upwards to U.S. efforts inwards eastern Syria. But the hope is highly tenuous—and the window of chance is fleeting.
Sources of Leverage
U.S. leverage inwards eastern Syrian Arab Republic is limited but non negligible. First as well as foremost, the presence of U.S. troops, inwards back upwards of their Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) allies, represents a considerable indicate of influence, provided President Trump does non deal this away. However, the U.S.-SDF human relationship must endure based on a mutual vision as well as dominion set; the report of an alleged SDF shooting of a U.S. Marine inwards February, if true, must endure dealt with swiftly through constructive engagement if the SDF wants to maintain U.S. support. Russian as well as regime forces are keen to avoid straight confrontation with U.S. forces. Syrians (including Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, as well as Turkmen) inwards this expanse get got taken nascent steps towards consolidating local governance, comprising emergent governance as well as administration, safety forces, as well as constabulary units, all supported past times modest international funding as well as high-caliber technical assistance. If successful, this model could render an alternative to prior predatory forms of local governance nether the Assad government, the early on days of the Syrian rebellion, as well as ISIS.
Further, or so 16.9 per centum of the Syrian population as well as 26.7 per centum of the Syrian territory is currently included inwards SDF-controlled areas. Eastern Syrian Arab Republic has historically supported the country’s economical foundations with its agricultural as well as unloosen energy resources. Raqqa, Deir ez-Zour, as well as Hasaka provinces produced nearly all of Syria’s wheat as well as cotton fiber earlier the war. The SDF however command the al-Omar crude field, although refining facilities rest inwards regime-held territory, limiting the potential for independent crude production. Still, the abundant resources inwards this expanse could strengthen the SDF’s manus inwards futurity negotiations.
If successful, this model could render an alternative to predatory forms of local governance nether the Assad regime as well as armed extremist groups.
On the other hand, U.S. efforts to shore upwards this region’s leverage would human face constraints. Unexploded ordnance as well as infrastructure destruction hinder attempts to consolidate stabilization. Civilian expectations for improved safety as well as service delivery are increasingly non beingness met. Moreover, uncertainty nigh U.S. political commitment, the potential of SDF safety strength overstretch, reports of SDF members considering deals with the Assad government, allegations of SDF alienation of local populations, as well as ascent Arab-Kurdish tensions (witness the serial of attacks on local leaders) farther impede efforts. Finally, this SDF-held expanse is surrounded past times adversaries on all sides except for the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government. Turkey is hostile to the project, though it has acquiesced to U.S. oversight of ongoing local governance as well as safety initiatives inwards Manbij.
Articulating Goals
Current overall U.S. Syrian Arab Republic policy goals are murky, especially with the recent musical chairs of senior-level leadership at both the White House as well as the State Department. The clearest facial expression came from Secretary Pompeo’s statement in June that, “President Trump has acknowledged that in that location is to a greater extent than piece of job to endure done to consummate the defeat of ISIS as well as he is committed to … setting the weather condition that volition forestall its return.” Pompeo equally good reiterated commitment to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254, which lays out a political procedure for Syria. In July, nether questioning at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Pompeoinsisted, “There's been no alter inwards U.S. policy with honor to our activities inwards Syria." However, UNSCR 2254 calls for a gradual political transition away from Assad, which is at nowadays unlikely inwards the medium term—as that reality is. The newly-released U.S. Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) calls for the U.S. of America to laid "realistic, analytically-backed political goals" inwards all stabilization endeavors. As such, the U.S. must flesh out how a stabilized, legitimate eastern Syrian Arab Republic volition play into salvaging a improve political end-state aligned with U.S. objectives.
As a recommended path, the U.S. of America should sustain commitment of U.S. diplomatic support, state of war machine engagement, as well as stabilization assistance to reinforce a semiautonomous area. It should encourage other international partners’ continued advisory presence, as well as mobilize an investment past times European, Gulf, as well as East Asian partners to fund targeted, milestone-driven stabilization efforts led past times Syrian local governance actors over the adjacent 5 years. It should retain a little presence of counterterrorism advisers inwards the expanse inwards back upwards of the SDF to forestall the growth of ISIS. This volition sustain leverage toward decentralization inwards the coming negotiations with the Assad government.
The objective of salvaging a improve result for eastern Syrian Arab Republic volition depend upon pushing for greater formal decentralization for the expanse inwards ongoing negotiations, leveraging the fact that the expanse has already, de facto, locomote to a greater extent than autonomous.
If the U.S. of America decides non to reinforce its back upwards inwards eastern Syria, at to the lowest degree ii different pathways exist. We make non recommend pursuing either one. In ane pathway, the U.S.-backed SDF coalition would maintain command inwards the due east to eradicate ISIS’ territory. The U.S. of America would as well as so manus the expanse dorsum completely to the SDF with their fate undetermined. They may broker an understanding with Assad to reintegrate with the state, but their mightiness to secure durable concessions for some flat of decentralization volition endure severely limited without U.S. backing. The U.S. of America volition probable demand to "mow the grass" from American bases inwards Republic of Iraq inwards coming years, given evidence ISIS has burrowed underground as well as is operating at nighttime inwards the region. This is non an optimal approach, equally it fails to address the drivers as well as regeneration potential of the extremist group.
Alternatively, the U.S. of America could piece of job with Turkey to deal the northward as well as east. The U.S.-backed SDF coalition would withdraw ISIS’ territorial control, but it would manus off responsibleness to Turkey. Yet, Arab-Kurd tensions would probable at in ane lawsuit spike, as well as outright conflict betwixt the Turks as well as the Kurds is equally good possible. Turkey would get got to deal an understanding with Assad, inwards substitution for concessions from the regime on the empowerment of local governance actors as well as safety forces, but it is unlikely to press equally hard equally the U.S. of America inwards this regard. Moreover, Turkey’s mightiness to deal this expanse effectively as well as with sufficient capacity rest highly doubtful, especially given reports of Arab-Kurd tensions as well as tenuous civilian safety inwards the areas currently nether Turkish control.
Soldiers from Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) as well as Women's Protection Units (YPJ) attend funeral for Syrian Democratic Forces killed inwards combat. — Delil Souleiman/AFP/Getty Images The U.S. goals for Syrian Arab Republic demand to endure clarified to address realities on the ground. The immediate, or medium-term, difference of Assad is non likely. As such, U.S. efforts at nowadays should seek to advance improve options inwards the future. The objective of salvaging a improve result for eastern Syrian Arab Republic volition depend upon pushing for greater formal decentralization for the expanse inwards ongoing negotiations, leveraging the fact that the expanse has already, de facto, locomote to a greater extent than autonomous. Decentralization is far from a panacea. Syria's Legislative Decree 107 provides a starting indicate inwards principle. But it contains considerable leeway for the Assad regime to exploit inwards practice, including the highly empowered role of the centrally-appointed governor of each governorate. The U.S. of America as well as its partners volition get got to engage robustly inwards the details of whatever national decentralization framework to increase downward accountability as well as banking concern gibe the role of the Assad safety services. Negotiations would demand to convene a wider hit of Syrian representatives than previously, as well as deal with ways inwards which the Assad regime is already reasserting control, such as: housing, land, as well as belongings protections; safety sector reform; as well as confidence edifice dialogue built into national as well as subnational reconciliation talks amid Arabs, Kurds, as well as minorities. On the safety front, in that location would demand to endure options for farther U.S.-Russia deconfliction inwards pursuit of shared counterterrorism objectives. If the Trump direction proposes counterterrorism cooperation with Russia, it volition require congressional alter to U.S. law prohibiting such activities.
Connecting Goals to a Stabilization Framework
In back upwards of these goals, the U.S. of America should as well as so piece of job amongst key allies inwards developing a stabilization framework for how they volition piece of job together to hit them, edifice on electrical current efforts. Incorporating lessons learned from previous stabilization engagements, the framework should include iv key components.
The kickoff priority is reinforced security. Already, safety has deteriorated significantly since the "golden hour" at in ane lawsuit afterwards the liberation of Raqqa final fall. The U.S. of America as well as key allies (such equally France) must render a credible, although modest, political commitment to a continued troop backbone to underpin all other stabilization efforts: our leverage evaporates equally lame ducks when our commitment is pegged to a timeline rather than conditions. Security is the sine qua non ingredient for bolstering a stable, legitimate eastern Syria. Furthermore, ongoing safety advisory engagement is needed to ensure that SDF partners perform their duties inwards a way that is capable as well as legitimate. Our continued engagement with SDF forces is needed to maximize protection of civilians as well as minimize human rights violations. Over time, composition of U.S. civilian as well as state of war machine advisers may alter to reverberate shifting emphasis as well as missions—for example, a reduction of conventional forces piece sustaining special operations forces advisers.
Second, stabilization projects must shift toward greater citizen engagement. Successful stabilization programming, at root, is to a greater extent than nigh procedure than product. The Stabilization Assistance Review advises to “start with small, short-term assistance as well as scale upwards cautiously,” piece empirical academic enquiry demonstrates that “modest, secure, as well as informed” evolution projects are most effective at reducing violence inwards conflict zones. As a consequence, multinational donor civilian presence may demand to expand from its electrical current flat of only a handful—but past times comparison, the flat volition however endure dwarfed past times previous major civilian presence inwards Republic of Iraq as well as Afghanistan. Early stabilization projects get got focused on jump-starting urgently needed electricity, water, sanitation, as well as demining efforts, but inwards the months ahead, ongoing community engagement components volition demand to endure expanded.
Third, donor stabilization engagement must force for to a greater extent than inclusive governance. Analysts get got documented concerns nigh the lack of representativeness in the Kurdish governance structures inwards eastern Syria. Pushing for to a greater extent than inclusive governance serves pragmatic purposes equally good equally normative ones: exclusionary governance as well as forced conscriptions are primary drivers of recruitment to extremism, as well as some Raqqa residents are alreadyprotesting SDF rule. Ensuring a greater Arab enjoin may somewhat mitigate NATO ally Turkey’s concerns nigh Kurdish-dominated structures, as well as therefore decrease their potential to endure a spoiler. Though some SDF structures get got broadened on paper, observers dubiety that this has deepened meaningful inclusion. The U.S. of America as well as its partners volition demand to province verifiable steps the SDF should get got toward greater representativeness and, in ane lawsuit again, volition demand plenty civilian official presence on the Earth to genuinely verify, especially at the lowest flat of neighborhood councils. Finally, donors must proceed to bolster civil guild equally some other way to foster accountability.
Fourth, the stabilization framework must focus especially on communications as well as information. Ultimately, successful stabilization depends upon instating a feel of predictability for the population. Clear communication nigh service availability as well as locations would assist reinforce a feel of functional, reliable governance as well as administration. Robust engagement at the community flat is needed. Above all, it would clarify perceptions of U.S. political commitment.
Operationalizing Burden Sharing
Once this stabilization framework fleshed out, the U.S. of America should accelerate a diplomatic surge to operationalize burden sharing inwards back upwards of it. As the novel Stabilization Assistance Review notes, the U.S. of America must “establish a partition of labor as well as burden sharing amid international donors as well as local actors that optimizes the strengths of each.” Though President Trump as well as Secretary Pompeo get got made repeated calls for others to make more, in that location exists an urgent demand for the U.S. of America to specify how. Demonstrating U.S. leadership isn’t the same equally spending U.S. dollars—it is rallying partners to align their capabilities to these objectives. Already, the Trump direction has requested technical back upwards from European allies as well as implementers, equally good equally key non-NATO partners such equally Nihon as well as South Korea; this volition proceed to endure a key opportunity, equally European allies sympathize the stakes of destabilized Syrian Arab Republic for their ain migration concerns. The direction has equally good signaled its involvement inwards Gulf partners' back upwards for this endeavor; this may equally good endure component of the puzzle, but needs to endure carefully channeled to ensure it aligns with U.S. objectives for a stable, inclusive eastern Syria. Working with local partners, the U.S. of America should equally good coordinate closely with humanitarian implementers.
In developing a burden-sharing arrangement, the direction tin can build upon key mechanisms as well as cooperation venues that already exist. The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS has long been a coordination forum. USAID as well as State Department implementing partners already get got programs as well as offices that get got programmed successfully inwards the challenging context of eastern Syria; inwards Syrian Arab Republic as well as elsewhere, multi-donor trust funds as well as stabilization funding facilities get got been key venues to channel support. Potential to farther leverage these mechanisms exists, but requires considerable refinement. Transferring funds betwixt donor countries is no elementary undertaking. Further, equally the SAR notes, "More of import than dollars spent is having a singular, agreed-upon, strategic approach to unify efforts" -- as well as should ever back upwards progress toward a politically-backed goal state. Moreover, fourth dimension is short: stabilization efforts cannot endure turned on as well as off overnight, as well as the U.S. freeze inwards stabilization funds has jeopardized key relationships, personnel, momentum, as well as mightiness to conception strategically
It could offering a decentralized model connected to a unified Syrian province that could shape coming decisions nigh Syria’s governance as well as constitution.
Without U.S. leadership inwards burden sharing for stabilization, considerable risks would emerge. On the civilian side, incorporating contributions from non-allies (e.g., Saudi Arabia) may evidence hard from a legal as well as organizational perspective. Synchronizing funds as well as expertise on the Earth volition require higher levels of coordination past times the U.S. of America to ensure these investments are reinforcing a mutual purpose; it volition non endure a total “burden shift” on to partners. From a safety standpoint, contributing countries may pursue their ain objectives at cross-purposes absent U.S. leadership. The presence of Saudi or Emirati troops could serve equally a magnet for groups they previously supported—which radicalized—to disrupt the stabilization effort. Some partners may get got improve tribal awareness as well as relationships than others; non all Sunni Arabs get got these attributes. The U.S. of America must oversee an operational framework inwards which partners tin can contribute. It should include a clear mandate as well as rules of engagement (e.g., peacekeeping only, civilian protection, and/or the mightiness to force dorsum against Assad’s forces, or Iranian- or Russian-backed militias). It should flora clear command as well as command relationships via U.S. forces as well as the SDF as well as clarify the duration of the commitment, based on local conditions. Finally, the U.S. of America must sympathize the political expectations as well as transaction costs of partner commitments earlier proceeding.
Conclusion
The U.S. of America faces a critical—yet fleeting—opportunity inwards eastern Syria. It could offering a decentralized model connected to a unified Syrian province that could shape coming decisions nigh Syria’s governance as well as constitution. But a lesson learned from previous stabilization contexts is that local progress as well as stability—even grassroots as well as locally-driven—is non self-enforcing or automatically durable. Considerable U.S. political commitment, high-level leadership, as well as mid-level spadework volition endure needed for this statelet to solidify into a durable success. Moreover, transparency with the American populace nigh the U.S. mission inwards Syrian Arab Republic is paramount, given potential risks to U.S. forces.
Failing this, the Assad regime volition probable get got over the area, which has proven to endure the ultimate driver of instability as well as extremism inwards the country. It volition probable endure entirely a thing of fourth dimension earlier ISIS comes dorsum as well as al-Qaeda affiliates gain a greater foothold. Recognizing both the important constraints as well as possible opportunities, pursuing a strategy to salve a improve result is a worthy goal inwards service of U.S. interests as well as the Syrian people.
Melissa Dalton is a senior swain as well as deputy manager of the International Security Program as well as the manager of the Cooperative Defense Project at the Center for Strategic as well as International Studies inwards Washington D.C. Frances Z. Brown is a swain with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She previously served at the White House National Security Council and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
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