By Derek Chollet
1. Introduction: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 Timely Assessment of U.S. Counterterrorism Partnerships
With many Americans — led yesteryear the electrical flow occupant of the White House — questioning the value of global partnerships in addition to talking as though the United States of America of America would hold upwards ameliorate off going it alone, at that topographic point is no ameliorate fourth dimension to assess the role other countries play inwards achieving U.S. counterterrorism objectives. Anyone who has been involved inwards crafting U.S. counterterrorism policy within the authorities knows the essential importance of these relationships. But they also are soberly aware of how troubling they tin be.
America’s combat against terror has been the dependent acre of a mount of books over the nearly 2 decades since 9/11. Most receive got been inside-accounts of policymaking from Washington’s bureaucratic trenches or dramatic tales of counterterrorism missions. Yet few receive got made a systematic assessment, benefitting from the latest scholarship, of the ways counterterrorism cooperation really works, showing how in addition to why success is frequently so elusive. That’s what makes Stephen Tankel’s latest book, With Us in addition to Against Us, so timely. It combines his company grounding inwards the academic literature on alliances in addition to international cooperation with his first-hand sense inwards sausage-making policy at the Pentagon to give readers a comprehensive in addition to thought-provoking tour through some of the toughest — in addition to certainly most frustrating — counterterrorism relationships inwards recent U.S. history.
The combat against terrorism is commonly discussed simplistically as ane inwards which at that topographic point are only friends in addition to enemies, best summarized yesteryear the “with us or against us” declaration of President George W. Bush just a calendar week after the September eleven attacks. Yet the reality is far to a greater extent than complex, in addition to the countries that take away upwards the most fourth dimension for policymakers are those that autumn inwards betwixt the categories of ally or foe — peculiarly Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Mali, in addition to Pakistan. In many ways, when it comes to tackling terrorist threats, these countries are both firefighters in addition to arsonists. And piece cooperation with them is crucial, it has been exceedingly difficult, whether because of province weakness, conflicting interests, or outright duplicity.
Tankel takes a deep-dive into the toughest cases, detailing the recent history of Washington’s approach toward these “frenemies” in addition to providing a useful analytical framework for understanding when in addition to why success is possible or not. It is an unflinching concern human relationship of how hard these partners tin be. He also reveals the difficulties that the United States of America of America itself brings to the table, whether it is unrealistic expectations that cooperation volition hold upwards easier or leverage to a greater extent than effective, over-reliance on armed forces tools, sending mixed messages, or misunderstanding threat perceptions. Any aspiring policymaker volition do goodness from this book, as good as yesteryear next the debate in addition to give-and-take it provokes, illustrated yesteryear the 3 insightful contributions to this roundtable.
In a comprehensive overview of Tankel’s book, Stanford’s Martha Crenshaw supports his marrow arguments, highlighting the value of his conceptualization of the challenge in addition to his clear in addition to informative illustration studies. At the same time, she also proposes several interesting avenues of inquiry that are worth farther exploration. For example, Crenshaw highlights the fact that, despite trillions of dollars spent on a multifariousness of counterterrorism activities during the yesteryear xv years, the United States of America of America soundless has difficulty accounting for where the coin goes in addition to what exactly the impact has been. She also makes the intriguing proposition that at that topographic point is something to larn from U.S. efforts to cooperate with other countries inwards other safety areas, such as with United Mexican States inwards counter-narcotics efforts in addition to police force enforcement.
Finally, Crenshaw echoes a request Tankel stresses: The United States of America of America volition never hold upwards able to acquire to a greater extent than out of its partnerships with these hard states unless it develops a comprehensive, clearly articulated counterterrorism policy with improved integration of policy tools. Tankel’s final chapter offers some pragmatic suggestions, but the dependent acre is so knotted it warrants a volume of its own.
Jacob Shapiro, professor of politics in addition to international affairs at Princeton, seems to concur with many of Tankel’s in addition to Crenshaw’s assessments in addition to policy recommendations, but focuses mainly on the theoretical foundations of Tankel’s work, offering an alternative academic literature, which he argues provides a to a greater extent than compelling way to empathize the problem. (Crenshaw makes a similar point, but spends far less fourth dimension on the subject.) Instead of seeing these counterterrorism partnerships as interstate safety relationships relying on the logic of alliances, Shapiro contends that they are ameliorate described as interdependent relationships with only partially-aligned interests, and, therefore, are ameliorate understood through the frameworks of way theory in addition to organizational economics.
To brand his case, Shapiro highlights the run of other scholars working inwards these traditions, going into item nigh theoretical arguments that volition hold upwards unfamiliar to many non-academic readers, including this one. His explanation of competing conceptual arguments is informative in addition to adds some nuance to Tankel’s analysis. But despite the differences inwards theoretical approach, the bottom-line remains essentially the same: If interests diverge in addition to threats to punish partner states — such as curtailing appointment or withholding assistance — don’t generate meaningful costs, in addition to so cooperation volition hold upwards limited.
Policymakers fully empathize this point, as Christine Abizaid’s thoughtful in addition to revealing answer to Tankel makes clear. Abizaid spent several years during the Obama direction shaping the Pentagon’s approach toward Pakistan. Her concern human relationship reinforces Tankel’s narrative nigh the difficulties inwards dealing with that deeply troubled but essential counterterrorism partner. She reviews the tangled recent history of Washington’s attempts to influence Islamabad’s conduct to acquire inwards a to a greater extent than “strategic partner,” from pouring inwards civilian in addition to safety assistance to threatening to withhold it. These efforts achieved narrow results where interests overlapped — such as the disruption of al-Qaeda in addition to Tehrik-e-Taliban — but non the form of strategic shift anyone hoped for. Creating in addition to using leverage has proven to hold upwards much easier inwards theory than it is inwards practice.
So where does this leave of absence things? Taken together, Tankel’s volume in addition to the responses to it inwards this roundtable explicate the limits of American power, fifty-fifty when it comes to addressing an number that is at the marrow of U.S. national security. All these authors suggest ways the United States of America of America could hold upwards to a greater extent than effective inwards getting what it wants — such as yesteryear ameliorate understanding America’s partners, adjusting expectations, sending a consistent message nigh goals in addition to redlines, in addition to having greater residual amid U.S. military, diplomatic, in addition to evolution tools. These are hard to accomplish fifty-fifty inwards the best of times. With the electrical flow administration, progress inwards whatever of these areas seems unlikely.
Although none of these authors offering a silvery bullet — or assert that whatever are available — policymakers in addition to citizens alike volition do goodness from thinking nigh the post-9/11 counterterrorism challenge, shortly entering its tertiary decade, with a clearer analytical framework in addition to a dispassionate understanding of recent history. And inwards this respect, Tankel’s With Us or Against Us, in addition to the essays it inspired inwards this roundtable, are a terrific topographic point to start.
Derek Chollet is Executive Vice President of The High German Marshall Fund of the United States. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, his latest volume is The Long Game: How Obama Defied Washington in addition to Redefined America’s Role inwards the World.
2. The Imperfect Truth Behind Counterterrorism Partnerships: Reality Bites
By Christine Abizaid
Seventeen years after al-Qaeda’s devastating gear upwards on on the U.S. homeland, the U.S. combat against terrorism goes on amidst questions of how best to wage that fight, inwards what geographic boundaries to engage, against what permutation of the enemy, in addition to toward what ultimate halt the United States of America of America is fighting. In April, Congress attempted to energize the national debate on these questions when Senators Bob Corker in addition to Tim Kaine reached across the aisle to collaborate on a novel Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) aimed at ameliorate situating the Executive’s powerfulness to wage state of war against terrorists within a clarified constitutional framework.1 While the give-and-take continues nigh whether their particular mouth improves the electrical flow authorities structure, ane aspect of the debate must non hold upwards overlooked: The United States of America of America cannot combat terrorism alone.
This is where Stephen Tankel’s novel book, With Us in addition to Against Us,2makes an of import contribution. Tankel provides counterterrorism professionals, U.S. policymakers, in addition to the academy a serious in addition to thoughtful exam of ane the most complex aspects of the United States’ counterterrorism strategy: working by, with, in addition to through partners to protect the United States. By focusing on Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Mali, Algeria, in addition to Pakistan, Tankel chooses to tackle the most challenging of these partnerships, in addition to inwards so doing, provides insight into the necessary tradeoffs in addition to many limitations the United States of America of America must navigate inwards trying to consider its counterterrorism objectives.
Counterterrorism (CT) partnerships are non frequently given their due credit for the role they play inwards enabling the United States’ CT successes. However, as Tankel demonstrates, partnerships — yes, fifty-fifty the hard ones — are the essential ingredient to whatever successful exertion to protect U.S. citizens, U.S. interests, in addition to the U.S. homeland. Maintaining them requires a steady hand. The electrical flow direction would do good to recognize just how many of America’s CT achievements inwards the yesteryear 17 years receive got relied on other countries, as good as how the United States’ powerfulness to cast these partnerships has been underpinned yesteryear its leadership in addition to credibility inwards the world. That credibility allowed America to create the form of counterterrorism coalition that has, so far, protected it from some other gear upwards on on the scale of 9/11. Preserving it is no little task. It requires hard run in addition to wisdom from civil servants in addition to political leaders, alike, who must articulate to both the American populace in addition to partners abroad what the U.S. strategy is in addition to how it volition advance everyone’s goals against terrorist violence. The Trump direction has yet to coherently communicate its CT vision or explicate why America’s overseas engagements, armed forces in addition to non-military alike, are worth the risks they entail. The longer the U.S. CT strategy remains unnecessarily shrouded inwards mystery, the higher the costs volition hold upwards to the execution of CT operations in addition to to the U.S. coalition against terrorism. Credibility in addition to strategic communication, therefore, must move hand-in-hand.
Burden-Sharing inwards the Fight Against Terrorists
As a former practitioner, I am grateful for Tankel’s recognition of the United States’ partner-dependency as a key aspect of its CT approach. Indeed, over the years, the United States of America of America has built “patterns of cooperation with partner nations [as] a way to increment burden sharing in addition to brand U.S. counterterrorism efforts to a greater extent than sustainable.”3 Although many books receive got been published nigh CT inwards the post-9/11 era, few receive got dealt as straight with the complex province of affairs inwards which the United States, working with its partners, has sought to prosecute its CT objectives. Direct activity operations — including the deployment of U.S. armed forces boots-on-the-ground in addition to the work of unmanned aerial vehicles (commonly referred to as drone strikes) — receive got been the dependent acre of much recent study inwards so far as they pertain to the efficacy of U.S. counterterrorism strategy.4Interest inwards the topic grew as the Obama direction expanded its predecessor’s work of these tactics, including inwards areas exterior of Republic of Iraq in addition to Afghanistan, where the nature of the metastasizing terrorist threat demanded American action.5 However, fifty-fifty U.S. direct activity is non accomplished inwards a vacuum. It is the halt termination of a complex gear upwards of access agreements, overflight approvals, strategic property positioning, in addition to bilateral negotiations, all of which must hold upwards pursued inwards concert with partners earlier the United States of America of America is able to human activity against threats internationally in addition to exterior of declared state of war zones.
Moreover, direct activity is just ane aspect of the U.S. CT exertion that is reliant on America’s relationships with other states. Tankel rightly observes that, “[b]ecause the United States of America of America cannot in addition to should non set combat troops on the Earth inwards every province where terrorists operate, it has looked to partner nations to human activity as the tip of the spear…” The U.S. powerfulness to disrupt specific threats to the homeland has required a complex array of intelligence relationships. It has been able to dismantle some terrorist networks overseas only through robust police force enforcement cooperation. And fifty-fifty its powerfulness to essay unusual terrorists inwards U.S. criminal courts has rested on the United States’ science inwards working with its partners across the globe. Cooperation with unusual partners has important bearing on the United States’ powerfulness to pursue its national interests abroad. In the illustration of CT, that cooperation requires deft maneuvering, frequently on small timelines in addition to with lives at stake, only adding to the pressures of getting things right.
There is no one-size-fits all approach to counterterrorism partnerships. Tankel demonstrates this fact inwards great item inwards his illustration study exam of different U.S. partnerships. Each partner has its ain safety paradigm, unique history with the United States, capacity limitations, in addition to individualized approach to dealing with both domestic in addition to regional developments. All of these influence partner perceptions of local CT dynamics in addition to the value of working with the United States of America of America to accomplish CT goals. In no illustration is it to a greater extent than apparent how these dynamics tin Pb to hard tradeoffs than inwards the illustration of Pakistan.
Satisficing with Islamic Republic of Pakistan …
Tankel is an goodness on Pakistan’s history with terrorism in addition to his chapter on this human relationship is good worth the cost of admission. He rightly characterizes the U.S.-Pakistan human relationship as riddled yesteryear divergent threat perceptions, a history of mistrust, in addition to different approaches to threat mitigation. Both as a former counterterrorism intelligence officeholder in addition to former U.S. defence official with policy oversight of U.S. safety assistance to Pakistan, I regularly wrestled with the complexity of this relationship. Whether having to do with the United States’ CT imperatives inwards Afghanistan, concerns over a volatile human relationship betwixt nuclear-armed Bharat in addition to Pakistan, specific threats to the United States of America of America in addition to U.S. forces emerging from a vibrant militant safehaven inwards Pakistan’s tribal areas, or mourning with Pakistani counterparts over losses their province has experienced at the hands of terrorists, America’s appointment with Islamic Republic of Pakistan has ever been filled with contradictions. Despite the nuances in addition to frustrations of working with a partner that has so many safety priorities out-of-step with those of the United States, the human relationship with Islamic Republic of Pakistan has ever been critical to the U.S. powerfulness to pursue its vital national safety interests inwards the region. How best to run with Islamic Republic of Pakistan to accomplish the United States’ CT goals has been a hotly debated topic, total of criticism, optimism, skepticism, in addition to fifty-fifty naïveté. And yet, piece America’s tape of cooperation with Islamic Republic of Pakistan is non straightforward or clear-cut, that cooperation has been essential to the protection of the United States.
On the ane hand, Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been ane of the United States’ most prolific partners inwards the combat against al-Qaeda. For several years after its ouster from Afghanistan, al-Qaeda’s network inwards Islamic Republic of Pakistan presented the most important threat to the U.S. homeland in addition to the West — a reality America’s British partners experienced firsthand when operatives guided yesteryear al-Qaeda’s Pakistan-based leadership attacked the London subway scheme in addition to buses on July 7, 2005. America’s Pakistani partners understood U.S. in addition to Western concerns, in addition to over time, cooperated with the United States of America of America to neutralize operatives, disrupt plots, in addition to pressure level those parts of al-Qaeda’s network residing inwards the country. This CT cooperation resulted inwards some of the most of import disruptions to al-Qaeda’s network over the course of study of its existence (this, despite Pakistan’s non-cooperation during the raid on which U.S. forces killed Osama bin Laden inwards Abottabad, Pakistan, inwards May 2011).
On the other hand, some of the fundamental enablers of al-Qaeda’s network inwards Islamic Republic of Pakistan receive got been viewed yesteryear Pakistan’s armed forces as besides precious, or besides dangerous, to brand a displace against. As Tankel describes it, “No amount of [financial] assistance or threats to withhold it would Pb the Pakistani safety establishment to plough on the Taliban, Haqqani network, or other state-allied organizations.”6 These groups’ Pakistan-based infrastructure has supported, fifty-fifty if indirectly, the efforts of groups similar al-Qaeda in addition to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistani (TTP) against the United States of America of America in addition to the West, creating a persistent threat inwards in addition to from the part inwards a way Islamic Republic of Pakistan has yet to fully acknowledge through deed or word.7
Of course, every land acts inwards its ain self-interest in addition to Islamic Republic of Pakistan is no different. It just has yet to calculate that its approach to terrorism really accrues to its ain detriment. The United States’ challenge remains how to convince Islamic Republic of Pakistan that what Tankel rightly describes as Islamabad’s “segmented” approach to terrorists in addition to militants is, inwards the long run, the primary threat to its ain existence, in addition to is non just a job for U.S. safety interests inwards the region.8 It is non clear why this has been such a hard illustration for America to make. Over time, the threat from Pakistan’s tribal areas has morphed from ane that was largely externally focused to ane that increasingly has included Pakistan’s settled regions. At no request has Pakistan’s tillage of non-state actors really improved its ain safety outlook over the long term. And yet, fifty-fifty today, as Islamabad struggles with terrorist threats to civilians inwards its most populous cities,9 the Pakistani armed forces refuses to take away a consistent topographic point that fundamentally challenges terrorist in addition to militant exploitation of Pakistani soil.
Tankel is right that, over the course of study of America’s post-9/11 human relationship with Pakistan, the infinite for CT cooperation gradually narrowed.10 By the halt of the Obama administration, patience with Islamic Republic of Pakistan had run thin, both inwards the Executive branch in addition to inwards Congress. Despite regularly engaging on the importance of dealing once-and-for-all with those whom the United States of America of America perceived as serious threat actors, Islamic Republic of Pakistan continued to hedge. Meanwhile, the U.S. safety dynamics were changing. Al-Qaeda’s network was on the ropes in addition to America’s presence across the border inwards Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan was shrinking, pregnant at that topographic point were fewer U.S. safety imperatives on which to create with Pakistan. The United States of America of America began signaling that, with its reduced regional presence, Islamic Republic of Pakistan should hold back gradual reductions inwards U.S. safety assistance. Islamic Republic of Pakistan complained, but did non modify the form of conduct that Washington had made clear was problematic. So, inwards 2015, when Department of Defense policymakers recommended for the firstly fourth dimension that the secretarial assistant of defence effectively withhold $300 1000000 inwards safety assistance intended for Pakistan,11 Islamabad was non pleased. Unfortunately, they were also unmoved. While Islamic Republic of Pakistan counted on U.S. safety assistance to fund of import armed forces in addition to non-military initiatives that helped the province stay financially solvent, it was clearly non reliant plenty on U.S. funding — nor appreciative plenty of or confident plenty inwards the human relationship with the United States of America of America — to meaningfully modify its strategic approach to terrorist in addition to militant groups.
Pakistan has been playing a unsafe game for years, supporting terrorist in addition to militant proxies that it found useful in addition to neat downward on elements that posed a important threat to the West in addition to to Pakistan. Some of those proxies evolved to move non instruments of the state, but instead unpredictable allies, liabilities to control, in addition to eventually, inwards some cases, threats to Islamic Republic of Pakistan itself. By segmenting their approach to this evolving threat landscape, Pakistani generals receive got established for themselves an surround that volition fuel the country’s ain insecurity for years to come. As long as this policy continues, Islamabad volition hold upwards trading a good for yous human relationship with the international community with ane that besides frequently caters to hostage-takers inwards the region.
So What Do We Do?
It is unlikely the United States of America of America volition hold upwards able to mouth Islamic Republic of Pakistan out of viewing sure non-state actors as critical unusual policy tools. Between this, Pakistan’s prioritization of a perceived threat from India, in addition to its unwillingness to strategically cooperate on Afghanistan, the U.S.-Pakistan human relationship is fated to stay transactional. Progress volition midpoint on those narrow issues on which the 2 countries tin agree. And paradoxically, given their articulation disruption over the finally 17 years of terrorist groups similar al-Qaeda or TTP, at that topographic point are fewer in addition to fewer issues on which they tin easily, transactionally cooperate. America’s CT successes receive got changed the U.S. safety epitome inwards the part in addition to Pakistan’s calculation of what is inwards its ain self-interest militates against expansive cooperation with the United States. Conversations with Islamic Republic of Pakistan nigh regional safety volition only acquire less satisfactory from hither on out. And yet, the United States of America of America must non disengage. America’s powerfulness to care this human relationship in addition to extract cooperation volition hold upwards critical to achieving its destination of never ane time again allowing this part to move a platform from which terrorists tin threaten the U.S. homeland.
The Trump direction has upped the ante for Pakistan, threatening to withdraw all safety cooperation, including back upwards for Pakistan’s counterterrorism in addition to counterinsurgency efforts inwards the tribal region.12 It is hard non to take away some satisfaction inwards signaling to Islamic Republic of Pakistan that its incremental approach to coming together U.S. counterterrorism in addition to safety needs is no longer acceptable. But that doesn’t hateful the tactic volition work. If Islamic Republic of Pakistan cared that much nigh U.S. largesse, it would receive got changed its conduct when the U.S. authorities firstly signaled a reduction inwards funding levels inwards 2014. Additionally, the U.S. armed forces soundless has over 10,000 troops inwards Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan helping Afghan forces combat a resilient insurgency, over which Islamic Republic of Pakistan has important influence.13 The United States of America of America needs to leverage what partnership it does receive got with Islamic Republic of Pakistan to acquire the Taliban to the negotiating tabular array in addition to deter insurgent violence inwards the region. Islamic Republic of Pakistan is the key to shrinking the size of the Afghan insurgency, thus enabling Afghan forces to genuinely ain safety inwards their country, in addition to giving the United States of America of America the powerfulness to pull downward inwards the part with the confidence that its local safety partners tin comprise the terrorist in addition to militant threat. Disengagement volition non assist brand that argument, nor volition it set the United States of America of America inwards a topographic point to steer Islamic Republic of Pakistan away from strategic miscalculation or mismanagement inwards the part that could Pb to a nuclear exchange.
This is where neither Tankel’s work, nor whatever run inwards the finally 17 years (including this volume review) has offered a existent solution to how America tin displace to a genuinely strategic partnership with Pakistan. As Tankel’s other illustration studies also show, no CT combat abroad tin hold upwards narrowly waged. Effective CT campaigns cannot halt at targeting terrorists. They receive got to address the underlying causes that create the weather that terrorists exploit. Dealing with those underlying causes is a long in addition to costly affair, peculiarly inwards a part as multi-layered as South Asia. Fundamentally, to brand progress against such an enormous challenge, America must broadly part with its partners the same basic interests. That is just non the illustration with Pakistan.
The United States of America of America is at nowadays at a phase inwards its CT crusade where it tin in addition to should displace away from counterterrorism as the orienting regulation for its appointment inwards the world. To do that, a partnered approach, peculiarly inwards the Middle East in addition to South Asia, is to a greater extent than of import than ever. But how much America must invest — or sacrifice — to brand those partnerships run for both sides remains a hard equation to solve, peculiarly because every province of affairs requires a unique solution tailored to the circumstances of the part inwards question.
This dilemma is good captured through Tankel’s exploration of America’s most complex counterterrorism relationships. He exposes with great clarity in addition to a sense of history in addition to proportion the difficulty associated with maneuvering through intractable job sets with multifaceted partners. In so doing, Tankel provides an objective perspective on why these relationships tin hold upwards so problematic, fifty-fifty when dealing with a threat that, from the U.S. perspective, appears so straightforward. As policymakers move along to evaluate how best to navigate these relationships to protect the United States, they would do good to read With Us in addition to Against Us, absorb what it has to say nigh the difficulties ahead, in addition to come inwards into counterterrorism partnerships clear-eyed in addition to purposeful, knowing at that topographic point is much history — in addition to folly — to larn from.
Christine Abizaid served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, in addition to Central Asia from July 2014 to August 2016.
3. Counterterrorism Partnerships: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 Two-Way Street
By Martha Crenshaw
Stephen Tankel’s latest book, With Us in addition to Against Us: How America’s Partners Help in addition to Hinder the War on Terror,14 makes a valuable contribution to ameliorate understanding the complicated film of postal service 9/11 counterterrorism, a topic that is peculiarly relevant at nowadays that the global state of war on terrorism seems both endless in addition to inconclusive. His thorough inquiry delves into the understudied domain of the role of America’s partners inwards the state of war on terror, highlighting the fact that effective counterterrorism is hard inwards both its conceptualization in addition to its implementation. American leaders, outset with Donald Rumsfeld, receive got struggled to stair out or demonstrate the effectiveness of chosen counterterrorism policies, ranging from the blunt work of armed forces forcefulness to the subtleties of “countering vehement extremism” (CVE) or preventing “radicalization.” Tankel is to hold upwards farther commended for situating his analysis of counterterrorism cooperation inwards the full general framework of theories of alliances in addition to unusual policy, rather than treating it inwards isolation. Implicit inwards his analysis is a critical query nigh the electrical flow U.S. strategy of “by, with, in addition to through,” which emphasizes reliance on local forces rather than committing American combat regular army inwards large numbers.15 This model may receive got been successful inwards destroying the Islamic State (ISIS) caliphate after 2014, but the United States of America of America should hold upwards cautious nigh relying on it as a full general solution to managing civil conflict. Recommending caution does non imply that unilateralism is a ameliorate alternative. However, U.S. decision-makers demand a ameliorate suitcase on appraising the safety interests in addition to cooperative inclinations of local partners inwards the state of war on terror.
In his book, Tankel develops a specific question: What tin the United States of America of America reasonably hold back from its partners inwards counterterrorism operations abroad? His respond is based on an impartial consideration of a select subset of those partners: states that receive got active jihadist insurgencies in addition to terrorist groups in addition to that are aided yesteryear the United States of America of America inwards the absence of whatever formal treaty obligations. To hold upwards included inwards Tankel’s analysis, these states must also hold upwards countries where the United States of America of America does non or did non receive got a major armed forces presence. Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan in addition to Republic of Iraq are thus excluded as Republic of Iraq is a former line of piece of work zone, in addition to nearly 15,000 active troops are soundless deployed inwards Afghanistan. Included inwards his sample gear upwards are Algeria, Egypt, Mali, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, in addition to Yemen. The gear upwards is thus weighted toward the Middle East in addition to North Africa, where the United States of America of America is engaged inwards extremely volatile conflicts with local in addition to transnational dimensions. To set this choice inwards global context, yesteryear mid-2017, U.S. Special Operations forces were deployed to 137 countries.16
While these partner states are relatively friendly to the United States, the strength of each bilateral alliance varies. Some partners are much to a greater extent than ambivalent in addition to reluctant — indeed recalcitrant — than others. In addition, some ongoing conflicts are to a greater extent than “frontline” inwards nature for the United States of America of America than others, making American involvement inwards partner safety uneven. The comparative illustration studies that Tankel presents are tightly organized around 4 aspects of partnership: domestic counterterrorism efforts, tactical cooperation with the United States, regional cooperation, in addition to the somewhat ambiguous catch-all of “countering vehement extremism.” The illustration studies are clear in addition to informative, presented chronologically, giving the reader a sense of how cooperation has fluctuated over time.
Tankel argues that U.S. expectations of partner cooperation should hold upwards tempered yesteryear the recognition that at that topographic point is frequently a fundamental misalignment of the threat perceptions of a given terrorist grouping or insurgency. This misalignment seems largely inevitable in addition to probable to continue. To the United States, the threat is external. The greatest concern is preventing terrorist attacks on the American homeland that mightiness emanate from groups active inwards these countries, such as al-Qaeda inwards the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) inwards Republic of Yemen in addition to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) inwards Pakistan, both of which receive got directed terrorist plots against the United States of America of America that came nigh to completion.17 AQAP was behind the thwarted Christmas 2009 airliner bombing, in addition to LeT instigated the Times Square bombing plot inwards 2010.18 But these instances of externally organized terrorism are rare. There is also the danger of decentralized “homegrown” terrorism, inspired yesteryear jihadist appeals to action, peculiarly from ISIS. Still, the direct terrorist threat to the United States of America of America from these groups is far from existential. The United States of America of America also has a less proximate, but nevertheless real, involvement inwards ensuring that hostile jihadist organizations do non take away over territory that they tin in addition to so work to gear upwards on Americans or to destabilize local allies. Hence the switch from opposing Bashar al-Assad to opposing ISIS inwards the Syrian civil state of war after ISIS had declared its caliphate in addition to occupied large swathes of territory inwards Syrian Arab Republic in addition to Iraq. The United States of America of America is similarly concerned with groups inwards Islamic Republic of Pakistan that undermine the safety of Afghanistan.
For the weaker partners at the midpoint of Tankel’s analysis, the threat is primarily an internal ane — in addition to sometimes fifty-fifty an existential one. Cross-border transnational terrorism overlaps with local insurgencies that undermine province command in addition to could potentially trigger the collapse of the state. What is at stake for these countries is profound. Yet, paradoxically, sometimes the “threat” is also an asset. Some of these partners concur with the U.S. topographic point that jihadist groups are belligerent opposing forces to hold upwards diminished, defeated, or eradicated, fifty-fifty at high cost. Others consider goodness ground to collaborate with such groups, since these countries typically human face upwards multiple armed opposition groups. There are also diverse levels of indifference in addition to tolerance that prevarication inwards betwixt total belligerence in addition to total cooperation.
Tankel points out, logically, that longstanding bilateral alliances, inwards which 2 states part a history of cooperation, tin ease the path of partnership. But at that topographic point are limits to such familiarity. He notes that Saudi Arabia, certainly a long-time U.S. ally, inwards the halt resists doing much nigh the doctrine of Wahhabism, which bolsters jihadism worldwide but remains the source of the regime’s legitimacy. Tankel also finds that tactical armed forces cooperation (e.g., providing intelligence) is easier than initiatives of larger scale or that receive got to a greater extent than of an impact on domestic politics inwards the host country, such as CVE or, inwards particular, the acutely sensitive dependent acre of safety sector reform.
The Future for U.S. Partnerships Is non so Bright
The overall conclusions of this volume are non optimistic, which is unsurprising. Tankel finds that “absent catalytic events, efforts to modify partners’ threat perception receive got non met with much success.”19 Providing safety assistance to partners is highly problematic, in addition to it is hard to consider how to create the problem. Any solution depends on tackling such confounding issues as wretched governance in addition to corruption, problems that are deeply rooted inwards the countries inwards question. Effective counterterrorism goes beyond edifice province capacity to encouraging the sorts of political solutions that receive got so far taken the dorsum topographic point to armed forces ones. Tankel argues that armed forces capacity-building efforts receive got emphasized tactics over the basic reform of the partner’s institutional safety apparatus. Military planners (who are at the forefront of partner relations) must discover it frustrating in addition to unrewarding to tackle endemic, intertwined problems of graft in addition to corruption, lack of motivation, wretched training, in addition to weak leadership. Kinetic efforts are much to a greater extent than glamorous, producing visible results inwards the small term, fifty-fifty if the long-term effect is, at best, inconclusive, in addition to at worst, harmful. As Tankel notes, U.S. partners abroad sometimes human activity as enablers inwards this respect. They provide tactical cooperation such as access to territory, intelligence information, in addition to detention in addition to rendition of suspects, inwards club to avoid to a greater extent than onerous, demanding, in addition to costly forms of cooperation, peculiarly those that would jeopardize the grip on powerfulness of local elites.
Adding farther to the job is the fact that the United States of America of America has non excelled at assessing the cost or the pay-off of counterterrorism efforts. Here, at that topographic point is obvious room for improvement, at to the lowest degree incrementally. For starters, the United States of America of America could ameliorate monitor safety assistance. Tankel includes inwards a footnote inwards With Us in addition to Against Us the telling observation that the United States of America of America cannot fifty-fifty rail the coin it is spending on safety assistance.20Similarly, America’s CVE efforts inwards Islamic Republic of Pakistan were hampered yesteryear a lack of knowledge nigh the sources of the problem. Despite the encouraging observation that these efforts became to a greater extent than informed over time, indicating that governments tin learn, at that topographic point was soundless a “lack of metrics.”21 Tankel was unable to figure out how much American assistance was devoted to CVE because the different agencies involved characterized it differently.22 The Stimson Center inwards Washington late released an impressive, although admittedly imprecise, study on the overall cost of U.S. counterterrorism activities, including overseas assistance as good as homeland security, which estimated a total of $2.8 trillion spent during financial years 2002 through 2017.23 The study cited lack of transparency, inconsistent criteria for what counts as counterterrorism, in addition to incomplete information as the footing for its conclusion that it is impossible to assess whether or non coin is beingness spent to counter the most of import threats or how efficacious such spending is overall. The state of war on terrorism has move so diffuse in addition to open-ended that it is impossible to rail accurately.
While Tankel’s volume focuses primarily on exposing the inconsistences of America’s partners, the U.S. authorities tin also hold upwards erratic. Even nether the same direction inwards Washington, different agencies tin receive got different threat perceptions, inwards add-on to all the other divisions that foster compartmentalization in addition to bureaucratic rivalry.24 The United States of America of America is also probable to switch enemy priorities: The adversary inwards Syria, for example, was Assad — until it was ISIS.25 Tankel does acknowledge such American inconsistencies, but it is probable that they touching U.S. partners’ perceptions to a greater extent than than most American policymakers realize. It would hold upwards real enlightening to receive got a glimpse at that perspective to consider how those partners sentiment America’s role inwards counterterrorism cooperation.
Although Tankel does non stress this point, he does allude to some disastrous American policy mistakes, including the “difficult to overstate corrosive effect” of the invasion of Iraq, in addition to the “enduring stain” of Guantanamo. But it was non just these tragic blunders that disrupted chains of events in addition to patterns of partnership. It was the way that decisions, which perchance seemed inconsequential or fifty-fifty helpful at the time, inwards the halt had unexpected consequences inwards the region. Adapting to these faulty decisions in addition to sometimes shocking consequences is made all the to a greater extent than hard if allied relationships are non robust in addition to if local partner elites are divided in addition to insecure. One illustration of this is the Obama direction beingness blindsided yesteryear the Arab Spring in addition to yesteryear the civil state of war inwards Syria, setting the phase for the breakdown of Yemen. The conduct of America’s partners at that topographic point — the regimes of Ali Abdullah Saleh in addition to Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, as good as Kingdom of Saudi Arabia — was, at best, unreliable in addition to opportunistic, in addition to at worst, destructive, causing fifty-fifty to a greater extent than problems. Counterterrorism efforts inwards Republic of Yemen that were focused on AQAP eventually morphed into supporting the Saudi crusade against the Houthi rebels.
Another illustration is Libya, where the overthrow of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi led to an unexpected descent into chaos that disrupted the entirety of North Africa in addition to the Sahel part (in add-on to causing the decease of the American ambassador to Libya).26 Both al-Qaeda inwards the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in addition to the Islamic State inwards the Greater Sahara at nowadays receive got operational bases there, which has, inwards turn, led to American drone strikes. Yet some other illustration inwards the part is Mali, which was so caught off guard in addition to threatened yesteryear the motility of AQIM into the northward of the country, due to the Algerian state’s victory inwards the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria civil state of war that began inwards the 1990s, that French Republic was invited to intervene. Now, the part is inwards turmoil, in addition to the United States of America of America is establishing an armed drone base of operations inwards Niger. In effect, Algeria, a U.S. ally, was so effective inwards defeating what was largely a local jihadist motility that it pushed the local organizers to ally with al-Qaeda inwards 2006. AQIM’s southern branch in addition to so spilled over into partner Mali, undermining Mali’s ain safety in addition to territorial integrity as good as regional stability to a greater extent than broadly. The chaos inwards Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya only made the conflict worse yesteryear providing ungoverned spaces as good as an abundant provide of arms.
Tankel’s study reinforces the findings of other scholars who receive got similarly stressed misaligned preferences as the cause of difficulties inwards patron-client relationships. Their inquiry expands the analysis beyond counterterrorism to other areas, counterinsurgency inwards particular, in addition to highlights different province partners.27 These scholars are every bit pessimistic nigh what tin hold upwards achieved through these types of U.S. partnerships. In documenting the obstacles to effective safety assistance, they discover that, inwards club to work, it requires levels of intrusiveness in addition to conditionality that mightiness non hold upwards practical or desirable. The bottom line is that differences betwixt patron-client preferences require the patron, inwards this illustration the United States, to drive a hard deal to acquire whatever sort of compliance or cooperation. The Jan 2018 suspension of State in addition to Defense Department safety assistance to Pakistan, inwards the hopes of compelling stronger activity against the Afghan Taliban in addition to the Haqqani network, mightiness hold upwards an instance of such a hard bargain, but its effectiveness is doubtful.28 Paul Kapur has argued convincingly that Islamic Republic of Pakistan is irreversibly committed to the thought that supporting jihadist groups, as good as the Taliban, is essential to its regional security. It regards Bharat as a much greater threat than domestic extremism, in addition to it volition non abandon the human relationship with its jihadist clients, despite the disastrous consequences that Kapur predicts.29 What’s more, a Brookings study yesteryear Vanda Felbab-Brown points out that the United States of America of America decreased its armed forces assistance to Islamic Republic of Pakistan yesteryear lx percentage betwixt 2010 in addition to 2017 without whatever discernible impact on Pakistani behavior.30
It is understandable that U.S. armed forces leaders mightiness non completely grasp the complexities in addition to ambiguities that Tankel describes, peculiarly when they are dealing with newer counterterrorism partners. Transparency is not, after all, a strong request inwards these regimes. Tankel is certainly right to say that it is critical for the United States of America of America to empathize its partners’ calculations. But is it realistic to hold back this degree of insight or to hold back mutual comprehension? Reading this volume would hold upwards a goodness start, but distrust in addition to suspicion of duplicity in addition to manipulation are probable to remain.
There’s More to Learn About U.S. Partnerships
Tankel’s analysis raises questions that merit farther consideration in addition to research. The declaration proposed inwards his volume could hold upwards extended to partners who are engaged inwards active combat against jihadists, such as the Philippines, which is a U.S. treaty ally that has had unopen armed forces cooperation with America over the years. Niger also comes to mind, since American soldiers receive got been killed inwards armed forces operations against the Islamic State inwards the Greater Sahara and, as noted above, the United States of America of America is expanding its commitment at that topographic point yesteryear edifice a novel base of operations for armed drones. Another potential request of comparing to explore is betwixt province in addition to non-state partners, such as the Kurds.
A farther query to explore is how different is the job of combatting terrorism from other safety areas inwards which the United States of America of America similarly needs the assist of sometimes dubious or less than willing/capable partners, in addition to wants its partners to hold upwards the “tip of the spear.” For example, would it hold upwards instructive to examine U.S. cooperation with partners similar United Mexican States inwards combating transnational drug dealing in addition to organized crime? Jihadist violence may hold upwards fundamentally different because the actors behind it are what Tanisha Fazal describes as “religionist rebels” whose intransigence distinguishes them from other regime opponents.31 However, at that topographic point mightiness soundless hold upwards lessons to hold upwards learned yesteryear applying Tankel’s analysis to these non-terrorism safety areas.
Tankel finds that, as fourth dimension passed after 9/11, the United States of America of America reduced its reliance on unreliable partners. It would hold upwards worthwhile to know to a greater extent than nigh how this withdrawal was possible in addition to what was the alternative to that reliance. Is it slow to switch partners? What happens if the United States of America of America abandons a partner? Can partner reliability hold upwards predicted? It would non seem so, but at that topographic point are sure some identifiable characteristics of partners that could hold upwards known inwards advance, beyond their yesteryear performance as an ally.
Perhaps at that topographic point is a correlation betwixt U.S. uncertainty nigh the gravity of a given threat in addition to U.S. willingness to press partners inwards the sensitive areas of safety sector reform in addition to civilian institution-building, both of which appear key to effective counterterrorism as good as counterinsurgency. When the United States of America of America perceives a threat as acute, local partners are able to play the weak ally card, as South Vietnam did in addition to as Islamic Republic of Pakistan soundless does. The United States of America of America is in all likelihood to a greater extent than willing to impose the conditionality recommended yesteryear Tankel in addition to others when American policymakers are less impatient in addition to less eager to consider immediate results. But in addition to so again, paradoxically, uncertainty nigh the jihadist threat inwards Republic of Mali did non halt the United States of America of America from escalating involvement inwards the Sahel region.
In the end, it seems unlikely that the problems with partners that this volume identifies tin hold upwards solved without a ameliorate defined in addition to ameliorate articulated national counterterrorism policy. The electrical flow anti-jihadist strategy is essentially a mix of counterterrorism in addition to counterinsurgency strategies. Partners are asked to counter jihadist insurgencies in addition to terrorism non just to assist themselves but to assist the United States of America of America defend its interests against transnational terrorism in addition to cascading instability as the number of civil wars involving jihadist movements steadily increases. Furthermore, the diverse elements of counterterrorism policy are non good integrated. How tin armed forces operations, whether unilaterally conducted yesteryear the partner or inwards cooperation with the United States of America of America or regional allies, hold upwards compatible with countering vehement extremism in addition to undermining the jihadist claim that the West is at state of war with Islam? It is also hard to reconcile Washington’s opposition to “nation-building” with providing effective safety assistance to these weak partners. Jihadists take away payoff of in addition to exploit civil conflicts stemming from local grievances that U.S. partners receive got non been able or willing to deal with. Military cooperation volition non resolve those grievances, although it could purchase fourth dimension for solutions to hold upwards pursued. Tankel is right to emphasize that, ultimately, the job is to a greater extent than political than military.
Martha Crenshaw is a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies’ Center for International Security in addition to Cooperation in addition to Professor of Political Science, yesteryear courtesy, at Stanford University. She is the co-author, with Gary LaFree, of Countering Terrorism (Brookings Institution Press, 2017).
4. America in addition to Its Counterterrorism Partners: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 Principal-Agent Relationship
By Jacob N. Shapiro
Stephen Tankel’s novel book, With Us in addition to Against Us: How America’s Partners Help in addition to Hinder the War on Terror, marks a important contribution toward understanding why states do (or do not) cooperate with major powers to combat terrorist groups.32 The volume addresses a basic puzzle: What accounts for the great variation over fourth dimension in addition to across groups inwards how hard key states receive got worked to cooperate with America’s counterterrorism efforts? Pakistan, for example, worked reasonably good with the United States of America of America to capture in addition to kill al-Qaeda operatives from 2002 to 2005 (with of import exceptions), mostly allowed a make of militants to operate with nigh impunity from 2006 to 2008, in addition to and so provided tacit back upwards to the massively ramped upwards U.S. drone crusade inwards some regions of the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier from 2009 to 2011. Islamic Republic of Pakistan has also had the habit of targeting some groups piece leaving others untouched at the same request inwards time.
Tankel’s volume reveals that this form of variation is non unusual. In his chapters on Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Mali, in addition to Egypt/Algeria, Tankel lays out the competing strategic incentives that influence the United States’ putative allies inwards the “War on Terror.” Each chapter walks through the history of how the province inwards query has cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts over the years, as good as how it has worked at cross purposes to U.S. goals. What becomes clear as the volume progresses is that at that topographic point is tremendous variation inwards the extent of cooperation with U.S. efforts. Understanding the cause of that variation is critical inwards several respects, most importantly because policies that assume unconditional cooperation are clearly misguided in addition to doomed for failure. But to a greater extent than subtly, having a clear sense of the weather that hinder cooperation tin assist policymakers topographic point ways to gear upwards the phase for our allies to do more.
To analyze patterns of cooperation inwards each country, Tankel employs a duad of two-dimensional graphs that illustrate a) the extent to which the United States of America of America in addition to its ally part the same threat perception of different terrorist groups in addition to b) the extent to which a terrorist grouping is either useful or poses a threat to the U.S. ally inwards question. By placing specific groups on these 2 graphs, Tankel concisely highlights whether the United States of America of America in addition to its ally would hold upwards conflicted nigh neat downward on a given group. Tankel argues that when the United States of America of America in addition to its ally disagree nigh the threat-level in addition to when a grouping has some utility to the ally — situating it inwards the lower right quadrant of each graph — in addition to so ane should hold back to consider shoddy cooperation or outright subversion of U.S. interests on the component of the ally.
This is a create clean declaration that helps brand sense of a great deal of variation within each private illustration — e.g., Islamic Republic of Pakistan cooperating with the United States of America of America against some Islamist militants piece supporting groups with superficially similar ideologies — in addition to the evidence set out is persuasive. The illustration studies provide tight chronological narratives for each province in addition to take away together a make of events that every scholar in addition to policymaker working on the topic should know about. Overall, the volume highlights the inherent limits on cooperation betwixt states inwards counterterrorism efforts in addition to should encourage caution amid policymakers who receive got too-easily assumed that other states volition follow U.S. priorities on counterterrorism because they are strong allies inwards some other area. Tankel’s key advice to the policy community is dead on:
It is critical to encompass the safety epitome that drives a partner’s decision-making, how relations with the terrorists that are the target of cooperation friction match into that paradigm, in addition to how U.S. policies influence the political in addition to safety challenges the partner faces.
Great History, Wrong Framework
The primary weakness of the volume is that, yesteryear framing the analysis inwards the literature on alliances,33 Tankel situates his run inwards the incorrect literature. As Tankel himself points out, the form of cooperation the United States of America of America is seeking inwards its counterterrorism efforts is fundamentally different from the commitments sought inwards traditional interstate alliances. Moreover, the alliance literature that Tankel presents never deals explicitly with the complexities of politics within private states, in addition to so provides niggling guidance for thinking through how potential counterterrorism partners volition behave. Although Tankel does non rely heavily on alliance theory inwards his analysis, at that topographic point is nevertheless a missed chance here. Specifically, alliance theory, with its focus on structural conditions, provides niggling insight into the vexing query of how the United States of America of America in addition to other great powers should run with allies inwards the counterterrorism fight.
The issues Tankel studies would receive got been ameliorate understood through the lenses of way theory in addition to organizational economics. Because these approaches are focused tightly on how to configure relationships that tin Pb to cooperation betwixt interdependent entities with partially aligned interests, they provide deeper insights into how to shape the strategic thinking of allies inwards counterterrorism than do the literatures on alliance conduct in addition to coercion. In particular, principal-agent models highlight the challenge of sustaining cooperation when a) the principal has to delegate sure activities to an agent, e.g., running counter-radicalization programs; b) the agent’s preferences differ from those of the principal, e.g., it mightiness disagree nigh which groups are genuinely “radical”; in addition to c) the principal cannot credibly punish the agent for taking actions that are inwards its ain involvement instead of the principal’s. Threats to punish tin neglect because the principal cannot hold upwards sure whether the agent has taken payoff of the principal’s discretion (say yesteryear non working as hard as the principal would like) or because the threat of penalty is non ane the principal is probable to send out when the fourth dimension comes.
From the perspective of organizational economics, the United States of America of America is clearly engaged inwards a principal-agent human relationship with its counterterrorism partners. The United States, the principal, seeks to delegate diverse counterterrorism activities (collecting intelligence, protecting U.S. sites, running de-radicalization programs, etc.) to some other state, its agent. That state, however, tin take away actions that are non inwards U.S. interests in addition to the United States of America of America has only imperfect tools to compel cooperation. That is both because it is hard to stair out counterterrorism efforts (because many are necessarily covert) in addition to thus hard to know how hard an ally is working, in addition to also because the agents are balancing multiple priorities in addition to know that the United States of America of America volition non completely cutting them off fifty-fifty if they misbehave. Take Pakistan, for example: United States of America of America policymakers wished to punish Islamic Republic of Pakistan for its back upwards of the Haqqani network at points, but were constrained yesteryear their reliance on Islamic Republic of Pakistan for cooperation against al-Qaeda in addition to for transshipment of supplies to U.S. forces inwards Afghanistan, making a consummate breach inwards relations over counterterrorism issues unthinkable.
Two books — ane that was late published in addition to ane that is forthcoming — that address the challenges of working with allies to accomplish counterinsurgency goals from a principal-agent perspective tin assist foster a ameliorate understanding of the rich illustration histories that Tankel presents. Walter C. Ladwig III’s, The Forgotten Front: Patron Client Relations inwards Counterinsurgency,34 applies way theory to empathize why the United States of America of America had such difficulties achieving its strategic goals inwards the Philippines after World War II, Vietnam from 1957 to 1963, in addition to Republic of El Salvador from 1979 to 1992. He begins the volume yesteryear pointing out that, inwards both Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan in addition to Iraq, armed forces activity yesteryear exterior powers created moments of political chance that were non capitalized upon yesteryear local governments. Ladwig in addition to so pivots to outline inwards rich item the many problems way theory predicts states should receive got inwards managing what he price “patron-client relationships.”
Ladwig argues that structural factors inwards the international scheme do a wretched project of explaining the variance inwards the extent to which principals inwards counterinsurgency efforts (essentially great powerfulness patrons) tin shape their agents’ actions. Put to a greater extent than provocatively, the kinds of variables that play a major role inwards theories of alliance conduct in addition to interstate coercion receive got niggling explanatory value when trying to empathize cooperation inwards counterinsurgency. It is slow to debate that the same is truthful with honor to understanding cooperation inwards counterterrorism, in addition to it would seem Tankel agrees, given that his analysis makes niggling work of alliance theory after the introductory setup.
Ladwig demonstrates that moral peril — a term of fine art for the problems that occur when an agent tin take away actions that increment its utility at the expense of the principal — loomed large inwards each of his 3 examples because it was commonly hard for the U.S. authorities to monitor what its agents were doing in addition to to credibly threaten penalty for whatever identified transgressions. Sometimes that difficulty arose from the lack of credible options exterior of the local partner, as when the U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam was quoted as arguing, “We would assist a Communist takeover yesteryear withholding our aid, fifty-fifty if it must necessarily hold upwards given to a authorities which is less than perfect,”35 in addition to sometimes it stemmed from the unwillingness of leaders inwards the United States of America of America to publicly acknowledge their allies’ shortcomings inwards the context of zero-sum Cold War competition.
Many of the themes inwards Ladwig’s volume are deepened in addition to extended inwards the forthcoming Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents, edited yesteryear Eli Berman in addition to David Lake.36 The authors of this volume debate that “Working through local proxies has ever been a key tool of unusual policy,” in addition to therefore, “Understanding indirect control, how to motivate local leaders to human activity inwards sometimes costly ways — in addition to when in addition to how it succeeds — is essential to effective unusual policy inwards today’s world; peculiarly for managing violence in addition to illicit activities yesteryear non-state actors operating from the territory of other states.” This insight is driven yesteryear years spent talking with U.S. policymakers as they struggle to “do to a greater extent than with less” in addition to “work by, with, in addition to through” local allies inwards Iraq, Afghanistan, in addition to elsewhere.
To assist create a richer understanding of indirect command Berman in addition to Lake take away a novel approach, working with game theorists Gerard Padró i Miquel in addition to Pierre Yared to lay downward a logically coherent in addition to mathematically-derived concern human relationship of the principal-agent dynamics involved inwards indirect control. Eight other authors inwards this edited volume in addition to so apply that theoretical framework to ix proxy relationships, including the United States of America of America in addition to South Korea, Nazi Federal Republic of Federal Republic of Germany in addition to Denmark, in addition to State of Israel in addition to Hamas, amid others, examining a different outcome in addition to different gear upwards of principal-agent challenges inwards each case.
The book’s essential declaration is that the great powerfulness principal tin select different methods for addressing what Berman in addition to Lake generically term “a disturbance,” which tin include terrorism emanating from poorly governed spaces, as inwards parts of Pakistan, or drug production inwards remote areas, as inwards regions of Colombia. At ane extreme, the principal tin engage inwards direct activity (e.g., armed forces strikes) or it tin disengage in addition to take away ongoing disturbances. The principal tin also exertion a strategy of indirect command inwards which it either a) promises rewards in addition to punishments to the proxy to receive the proxy to suppress the disturbance,37 or b) enhances the capacity of the proxy to care the disturbance, for example, yesteryear providing safety forcefulness assistance.38 The optimal mix of carrots, sticks, in addition to supplements depends on how tightly aligned the principal’s interests are with those of the agent, echoing Tankel’s give-and-take of shared understanding on the severity of the threat in addition to the extent to which the agent sees strategic value inwards the grouping producing the disturbance. Situations that Tankel classified as having high U.S. threat perceptions, depression ally threat perceptions, in addition to high ally utility for the terrorist group, are those that Berman in addition to Lake would depict as having wretched preference alignment betwixt principal in addition to agent. Cooperation is non impossible inwards such settings according to their argument, but securing it requires the principal to create strong incentives for the agent to comply with its demands. And it is inwards thinking nigh how to create such incentives, that the way theory approach pays greatest dividends.
In Berman in addition to Lake’s formulation, interests tin diverge when disturbances are to a greater extent than costly for the principal than the agent, when the proxy simply has higher priorities, or when reducing the disturbance is politically costly for the agent (as going after the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Taliban inwards the wake of the Abbottabad raid would receive got been for the Pakistani government, for example). When interests diverge a great deal, the principal volition receive got to provide large rewards or important punishments to brand the agent comply. Simply providing capacity, however, volition non help. Weapons in addition to preparation tin hold upwards diverted to address problems other than the disturbance the principal cares nigh (in the illustration Tankel studies, armed forces assistance provided to bring upwards Pakistan’s powerfulness to combat local insurgents was spent bolstering the country’s defence against India). When interests diverge modestly, then, the great powerfulness tin tailor punishments in addition to rewards to acquire its proxy to deal with the threat to some extent, but capacity edifice volition largely hold upwards a wasted investment. This prediction is consistent with the wretched results of U.S. safety forcefulness assistance inwards Iraq. It is only when interests are closely aligned that unconditional capacity edifice volition work, or so Berman, Lake, in addition to the other contributors to this volume argue. In practical terms, their declaration implies that increased aid, armed forces training, in addition to other forms of assistance should hold upwards used sparingly in addition to only inwards cases such as postwar Europe, where the United States of America of America in addition to (most of) its allies agreed on the nature of the Soviet threat.
This perspective finds much back upwards inwards the examples discussed inwards Proxy Wars, though at that topographic point are exceptions. Overall, the authors discover that great powers receive got been overly sanguine nigh the potential for capacity edifice to assist proxies care disturbances in addition to that explicit rewards in addition to punishments are non used as frequently as ane would think, despite their tape of success. Stephen Biddle’s closing chapter draws on that observation to topographic point key policy lessons, many of which mirror suggestions made yesteryear both Tankel in addition to Ladwig, regarding the demand for beingness realistic nigh the incentives facing province partners.
Not surprisingly, Berman in addition to Lake’s theoretical arguments are fully supported yesteryear the facts presented inwards Tankel’s careful dissection of the U.S.-Pakistan proxy relationship. Capacity edifice for purposes of counterterrorism largely did non work. Meanwhile, without credible punishments, Islamic Republic of Pakistan routinely invested less than the United States of America of America would receive got liked inwards containing threats emanating from its territory in addition to redirected armed forces assistance to its ain purposes. And during periods when working with the United States of America of America was to a greater extent than politically costly for Pakistani politicians in addition to armed forces leaders, levels of cooperation went downward across the board. What the way theory approach brings to the tabular array is a clear-eyed sentiment of what would hold upwards required to gain that cooperation: a way to credibly threaten to punish the Pakistani province when groups that it sees as valuable — e.g., the Haqqani network — create costs for the United States. Absent that, Islamic Republic of Pakistan is probable to stay a partial cooperator at best.
Overall then, Tankel’s With Us in addition to Against Us is a valuable in addition to welcome contribution to the literature on counterterrorism in addition to counterinsurgency. The volume provides an essential history of counterterrorism cooperation inwards Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Mali, Egypt, in addition to Algeria. And it does to a greater extent than than whatever other volume to illustrate how fifty-fifty the best allies tin advance the United States’ goals against some groups piece working against them with regards to others. In this respect, With Us in addition to Against Us makes a unique contribution to the growing gear upwards of books highlighting just how express cooperation frequently is inwards this domain. It should hold upwards required reading for anyone inwards the executive branch considering a counterterrorism strategy that relies on local cooperation in addition to for anyone inwards the legislative branch considering funding such strategies.
Jacob N. Shapiro is Professor of Politics in addition to International Affairs at Princeton University in addition to directs the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, a multi-university consortium that compiles in addition to analyzes micro-level information in addition to other information on politically motivated violence inwards countries around the world. He studies conflict, economical in addition to political development, in addition to safety policy. He is writer of The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations in addition to co-author of Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution inwards Modern Conflict. His inquiry has been published inwards a broad make of academic in addition to policy journals as good as a number of edited volumes. He has conducted acre inquiry in addition to large-scale policy evaluations inwards Afghanistan, Colombia, India, in addition to Pakistan.
Endnotes
1Garrett Epps, “A Bill to Curtail the Forever War, or Extend It?” Atlantic, May 7, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/05/a-bill-to-stop-the-forever-war-or-extend-it/559769/.
2Stephen Tankel, With Us in addition to Against Us: How America’s Partners Help in addition to Hinder the War on Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).
3Tankel, With Us in addition to Against Us, 58.
4 Paul Scharre, “Why Drones Are Still the Future of War,” Foreign Affairs, Feb 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-02-15/why-drones-are-still-future-war.
5Recommendations in addition to Report of the Task Force on US Drone Policy (Second Edition) (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2015), https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/recommendations_and_report_of_the_task_force_on_us_drone_policy_second_edition.pdf.
6Tankel, With Us in addition to Against Us, 159.
7For farther reading on Pakistan’s history of cultivating non-state actors, as good as the history of its cooperation with the United States, consider Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, in addition to Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2004); Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda in addition to the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage Books, 2006); Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: Free Press, 2001); in addition to Stephen Tankel’s Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
8Tankel, With Us in addition to Against Us, 131.
9Aamair Latif, “Pakistan Nuclear Body Staff Comes Under Suicide Attack,” Andalou Agency, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/pakistan-nuclear-body-staff-comes-under-suicide-attack/1134625; Gul Yousafzai, “Pakistani Army Kills Senior Militant, Seven Suicide Bombers,” U.S. News in addition to World Report, May 17, 2018, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2018-05-17/pakistan-kills-senior-lashkar-e-jhangvi-militant-in-baluchistan-raid.
10Tankel, With Us in addition to Against Us, 158
11Tankel, With Us in addition to against Us, 158.
12Lisa Ferdinando, “Pentagon Spokesman: U.S. Wants Islamic Republic of Pakistan to Take ‘Decisive Action’ Against Terrorism,” Department of Defense, Jan. 8, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1410401/pentagon-spokesman-us-wants-pakistan-to-take-decisive-action-against-terrorism/. Missy Ryan in addition to Carol Morello, “Trump direction suspends most safety assistance to Pakistan,” Washington Post, Jan. 4, 2018; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-suspends-security-aid-to-pakistan/2018/01/04/303145e4-f18a-11e7-b3bf-ab90a706e175_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b4db88e61e92.
13Robert Burns, “Amid niggling scrutiny, US armed forces ramps upwards inwards Afghanistan,” Military Times, Mar. 10, 2018; https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2018/03/10/amid-little-scrutiny-us-military-ramps-up-in-afghanistan/.
14Stephen Tankel, With Us in addition to Against Us: How America’s Partners Help in addition to Hinder the War on Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).
15Linda Robinson, “SOF’s Evolving Role: Warfare ‘By, With, in addition to Through’ Local Forces,” Rand Blog/Cypher Brief, May 9, 2017, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/05/sofs-evolving-role-warfare-by-with-and-through-local.html.
16Nick Turse, “American Special Ops Forces Have Deployed to seventy Percent of the World’s Countries inwards 2017,” Nation, June 26, 2017, https://www.thenation.com/article/american-special-ops-forces-have-deployed-to-70-percent-of-the-worlds-countries-in-2017/.
17Stephen Tankel has also written an first-class volume on LeT, Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
18See the useful website maintained yesteryear New America, Terrorism inwards America After 9/11, https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/.
19But if at that topographic point are some fifty-fifty pocket-size successes it would hold upwards goodness to know to a greater extent than nigh them. re trying to request out. nd effect aretthe hateful in addition to connect with the Earth in addition to friends with developmental disabilities.evelopment
20Tankel, With Us in addition to Against Us, 345.
21Tankel, With Us in addition to Against Us, 161, 357.
22Admittedly CVE remains a nebulous concept in addition to practice, fifty-fifty within the United States. The marrow of the policy is countering vehement ideologies, attitudes, in addition to beliefs rather than degrading, defeating, or eradicating an enemy organization.
23Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending, Protecting America While Promoting Efficiencies in addition to Accountability (2018), https://www.stimson.org/content/counterterrorism-spending-protecting-america-while-promoting-efficiencies-and-accountability. See also “Counterterrorism: DOD Should Fully Address Security Assistance Planning Elements inwards Global Train in addition to Equip Project Proposals,” U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 30, 2018, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-449.
24See the brilliant accounts inwards Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. in addition to America’s Secret Wars inwards Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan in addition to Islamic Republic of Pakistan (New York: Penguin Press, 2018).
25Tankel says that a noteworthy effect of edifice an anti-ISIS coalition after 2014 was that it brought Muslim bulk countries into the counterterrorism cooperation framework. Still, ISIS was less of a priority for Kingdom of Saudi Arabia than for the United States. In Yemen, the Houthi threat alone dominates the safety concerns of America’s former counterterrorism partner.
26Christopher S. Chivvis in addition to Andrew Liepman, North Africa’s Menace: AQIM’s Evolution in addition to the U.S. Policy Response (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2013), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR415.html.
27Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, in addition to Ryan Baker, “Small footprint, little payoff: The armed forces effectiveness of safety forcefulness assistance,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 41, nos.1-2 (2018): 89–142; Barbara Elias, “The Big Problem of Small Allies: New Data in addition to Theory on Defiant Local Counterinsurgency Partners inwards Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan in addition to Iraq,” Security Studies, 27, no. 2 (2018): 233–262; Walter C. Ladwig, The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relations inwards Counterinsurgency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); in addition to Daniel Byman, “US counterterrorism intelligence cooperation with the developing Earth in addition to its limits,” Intelligence in addition to National Security 32, no. 2 (2017): 145–60.
28Mark Landler in addition to Gardiner Harris, “Trump, Citing Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a ‘Safe Haven’ for Terrorists, Freezes Aid,” New York Times, Jan. 4, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/us/politics/trump-pakistan-aid.html.
29Paul Kapur, Jihad as Grand Strategy: Islamist Militancy, National Security, in addition to the Pakistani State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
30Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Why Islamic Republic of Pakistan supports terrorist groups, in addition to why the US finds it so hard to receive change,” Brookings Institution, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/05/why-pakistan-supports-terrorist-groups-and-why-the-us-finds-it-so-hard-to-induce-change/.
31Tanisha M. Fazal, “Religionist Rebels & the Sovereignty of the Divine,” Daedalus 147, no. 1 (2018): 25–35.
32Stephen Tankel, With Us in addition to Against Us: How America's Partners Help in addition to Hinder the War on Terror, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).
33Tankel, With Us in addition to Against Us, 49–54.
34Walter C. Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front: Patron Client Relations inwards Counterinsurgency (Cambridge University Press, 2017). For an outstanding review of Ladwig’s volume consider Will Selber’s first-class slice at War on the Rocks: Will Selber, “Hope in addition to Hype: Advising Foreign Forces inwards the Middle of a Counterinsurgency Campaign,” War on the Rocks, Aug. 17, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/hope-and-hype-advising-foreign-forces-in-the-middle-of-a-counterinsurgency-campaign/.
35Ladwig, The Forgotten Front, 71–72.
36Eli Berman in addition to David Lake, Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming). Full disclosure, I am a co-PI on the grant that funded the book, but did non participate inwards writing it.
37Along the lines of the contract that Ladwig advises establishing at the start of a principal-agent human relationship for counterinsurgency purposes.
38Interestingly, both methods receive got been used over the years as the United States of America of America tries to care its counterterrorism human relationship with Islamic Republic of Pakistan and, as Tankel shows, receive got had uneven success.
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