By Isaac Kfir
After the deaths of Osama bin Laden in addition to several other leaders inwards 2011 in addition to 2012, followed past times the ascent of Islamic State, many considered al-Qaeda ‘a spent force’. But inwards an of import brief, (with an expanded version for the Lowy Institute), leading terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffman argues that Ayman al-Zawahiri has used the past times 7 years to rebuild al-Qaeda. So piece counterterrorism specialists convey celebrated the rolling upwardly of Islamic State’s ‘caliphate’, al-Qaeda’s resurgence shows that much piece of occupation remains to hold upwardly done.
Zawahiri cutting his teeth inwards Egypt’s jihadi culture—he was arrested at 15, joined the Muslim Brotherhood in addition to later on led Egyptian Islamic Jihad—but he’s no charismatic leader. Following the popular off of Osama bin Laden in addition to the ascent of the Islamic State, Zawahiri opted to focus on iii primal objectives.
Survival: In 2011, al-Qaeda faced irrelevancy. It lacked an operational infinite in addition to existed at the mercy of the Afghan Taliban. That may explicate why Zawahiri swore allegiance to Mullah Mansour, Mullah Omar’s successor, inwards 2015. When Mansour was killed inwards a USA drone assail in addition to Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada became the novel leader of the Taliban, Zawahiri pledged allegiance to him. That allowed Zawahiri to stay hidden somewhere along the Afghan–Pakistan border.
Reorientation: In the 1990s in addition to 2000s, every bit al-Qaeda was asserting itself on the global phase every bit the premier Salafi–jihadi terrorist group, its ideology in addition to activity inspired tremendous bloodletting, specially amid Muslims. By the 2010s, Zawahiri recognised the express value of that approach in addition to reoriented the arrangement away from volume casualty-terrorism, specially against Muslims.
To highlight how attuned Zawahiri is to shifting perceptions, he clearly noted that past times the slow 2000s, pollsters were pointing out that populace opinion, specially inwards Muslim-majority countries, had shifted against suicide bombing. In Lebanon, for example, 74% of the population thought that such attacks could hold upwardly justified inwards 2002; past times 2007, that back upwardly had fallen to solely 34%. At that time, WorldPublicOpinion.org noted that large majorities inwards Arab Republic of Egypt (88%), Republic of Indonesia (65%) in addition to Kingdom of Morocco (66%) opposed attacks on civilians.
Zawahiri’s al-Qaeda fifty-fifty chastised Islamic State, accusing it of ‘deviation in addition to misguidance’ in addition to maxim that the grouping ‘exceeded the limits of extremism’. That has meant that the prospect of some other al-Qaeda–inspired 9/11 has decreased, every bit Zawahiri appreciates that such an assail is probable to impairment his get to a greater extent than than to aid it.
Rebuilding: Zawahiri has had to bargain amongst an arrangement that had been decimated. It had lost leaders, primal ideologues, strategic thinkers in addition to fighters. Al-Qaeda was likewise facing a major challenge from Islamic State in addition to its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who publicly rejected Zawahiri’s gild to proceed al-Qaeda’s Jabhat al-Nusra affiliate assort from Islamic State.
Because Zawahiri couldn’t compel Islamic State’s compliance, he opted to engage inwards a franchising program. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 primal facial expression of the rebuilding was using secure communications to spread al-Qaeda’s message. Secure communications convey likewise allowed Zawahiri to reconstitute al-Qaeda’s Shura Majlis (advisory councils). This allows al-Qaeda to adopt a ‘glocalist’ strategy that links local grievances to its globalist campaign.
Zawahiri’s careful three-prong strategy has enabled al-Qaeda to knit together ‘a global displace of more than 2 dozen franchises’ through which it straightaway commands around 20,000 men inwards Syria, 4,000 inwards Yemen, 7,000 inwards Somalia in addition to 3,000 inwards Indonesia. These are all strategically of import locations from which al-Qaeda tin in addition to volition assay to advance its brand.
Interestingly Zawahiri appears to convey adapted the ideas of his arch-enemy, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, who argued that after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, it was fourth dimension for the Arab Afghans (Arabs who had made the hijrah (migration) to Afghanistan) to shift their attending to the near enemy—‘apostate’ Muslim regimes in addition to Israel. Zawahiri had argued that the mujahedeen should focus on the far enemy (the USA in addition to the West inwards general), every bit it was Washington that was keeping the Arab leaders inwards power.
Zawahiri’s electrical flow strategy seems to dot that al-Qaeda is moving away from its initial focus, the far enemy, in addition to focussing instead on the nearly enemy, specifically Arab countries amongst frail governments. There are many such governments across the Muslim in addition to Arab World, specially inwards sub-Saharan Africa in addition to the Maghreb.
‘So where are you,’ Zawahiri asks his followers inwards his latest message. ‘Where is your Islamic zeal? Where is your eagerness? Where is your short town of your duties for the inheritance of your fathers?’
Hoffman has provided a powerful reminder that nosotros can’t savor inwards the defeat of Islamic State. We must reorient our attending to al-Qaeda, which remains committed to freeing Muslim lands, ending the suffering of Muslims at the hands of the infidels in addition to restoring the Muslim umma (nation) to its onetime glory.
In recognising that al-Qaeda remains a strong force, counterterrorism policymakers human face upwardly several challenges, such every bit how to disrupt its operations through activities such every bit limiting its piece of occupation of encrypted messaging, which terrorists seem to increasingly rely on, without undermining basic rights.
An additional challenge is addressing low-intensity conflicts, civil wars in addition to flagrant abuses such every bit those ones inflicted on the Rohingya, the Cham in addition to others, which feeds the Salafi–jihadi narrative of the West’s moral relativism. There’s bear witness that both Islamic State in addition to al-Qaeda are using the Rohingya every bit a rallying cry.
Clearly, the demise of the caliphate has been a huge boost to the counterterrorism world, but Hoffman’s briefs are a timely reminder that nosotros ignore al-Qaeda at our peril.
Buat lebih berguna, kongsi:
