TONG ZHAO
In recent years, Communist People's Republic of China has expended considerable efforts to build a sea-based nuclear strength for the primary role of enhancing its overall nuclear deterrent. Although Beijing’s destination is express in addition to defensive, the practical implications of its efforts for regional stability in addition to safety volition last significant. ARMS RACE STABILITY
A fleet of survivable nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would bring down China’s concerns nigh the credibility of its nuclear deterrent in addition to lessen the country’s incentives to farther expand its arsenal. Such benefits, however, volition last tempered past times vulnerabilities associated alongside Beijing’s electrical flow generation of SSBNs. In the close to mid-term, developing an SSBN fleet volition require Communist People's Republic of China to substantially enlarge its previously pocket-sized stockpile of strategic ballistic missiles, perhaps exacerbating the threat perceptions of potential adversaries in addition to causing them to create got countermeasures that mightiness eventually intensify an emerging arms competition.
China needs to utilization substantial general-purpose forces to protect its SSBNs inwards coastal waters. This requirement volition teach an of import driver of a buildup of China’s conventional military machine assets. Efforts to protect Chinese SSBNs, particularly inwards the South Communist People's Republic of China Sea, could last interpreted past times neighboring countries equally attempts to undermine others’ liberty of navigation, to expand China’s sphere of influence, in addition to to seek regional dominance. Such concerns could intensify already fraught arms race dynamics inwards East in addition to Southeast Asia.
CRISIS STABILITY
A sea-based nuclear capability volition non brand Communist People's Republic of China to a greater extent than inclined to utilization nuclear weapons during a crisis. Nonetheless, the country’s emerging SSBN strength volition soundless create got of import implications for crisis stability. Beijing may abandon its traditional do of maintaining a depression alarm score for its nuclear weapons inwards peacetime in addition to instead arm its sea-launched ballistic missiles alongside nuclear warheads during routine SSBN patrols. There is likewise incertitude over how reliable China’s SSBN command, control, in addition to communication organization is in addition to how Beijing assesses the opportunity of unusual interference alongside this system. As a result, Communist People's Republic of China may aspect a hard selection betwixt maintaining a highly centralized command in addition to command organization in addition to giving SSBN crews about autonomy, including perhaps past times pre-delegating launch say-so for nuclear weapons nether sure as shooting circumstances. If Communist People's Republic of China concludes that it must create got the latter route, the opportunity of an accidental and/or unauthorized launch of a sea-based nuclear ballistic missile volition last higher.
Tong Zhao is a beau inwards Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy.
Moreover, China’s deployment of SSBNs will, for the commencement time, brand its nuclear weapons vulnerable to unusual military machine attacks exterior of the country’s territory. Foreign countries could utilization non-nuclear military machine forces, including unmanned systems, to track, trail, in addition to laid on Chinese SSBNs, creating a dilemma over how Beijing should reply if 1 of its SSBNs faces a conventional military machine threat during a crisis. As the United States of America of America in addition to its allies transcend away on to heighten their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities inwards the region, Communist People's Republic of China may experience increasing pressure level to reconsider its unconditional no-first-use policy. If that were to happen, Beijing may inadvertently motivate potential adversaries to farther intensify their strategic ASW operations against Chinese SSBNs. Moreover, due to the technical difficulty of assessing intentions, the opportunity of an overreaction would increase, equally Communist People's Republic of China may error ASW operations against its laid on submarines for operations against its SSBNs.
China’s probable reliance on general-purpose forces to protect its SSBNs, particularly if Beijing finds it necessary to obtain sea-control capabilities in addition to create SSBN bastions inwards the South Communist People's Republic of China Sea, would likely heighten the opportunity of clashes betwixt China’s conventional forces defending its SSBNs in addition to enemy ASW platforms. The likelihood of incidents in addition to inadvertent escalation may last farther exacerbated past times the technical in addition to logistical difficulties of maintaining effective command, control, in addition to communication systems inwards a contested maritime environment. The introduction of unmanned systems—whether surface vessels or underwater vehicles—would acquaint farther challenges, including the require for effective communication betwixt 2 camps of hostile forces to avoid incidents.
RISK REDUCTION
Formal in addition to verifiable arms command agreements are unlikely to last a realistic response to these risks, given the usual distrust betwixt the 2 countries in addition to the extreme secrecy over submarine operations. Instead, cooperative and/or unilateral confidence-building measures should last pursued equally the commencement pace toward mitigating the negative potential consequences for arms race in addition to crisis stability. At the senior political level, it is fourth dimension for the United States of America of America to clarify its policy toward China’s sea-based nuclear weapons. U.S. decisionmakers should recognize that pursuing ASW capabilities against China’s SSBNs contradicts their commitment to maintaining strategic stability alongside Beijing. H5N1 U.S. declaratory policy that explicitly rejects the choice of conducting strategic ASW against Communist People's Republic of China would assist mitigate Beijing’s concerns in addition to hence discourage it from adopting a to a greater extent than destabilizing military machine posture. For its part, Communist People's Republic of China should reassure the international community nigh the strategic objectives behind its SSBN plan past times shedding to a greater extent than low-cal on its views nigh the time to come evolution of in addition to operational requirements for its SSBN force. Doing in addition to so could assist other states ameliorate assess for themselves whether China’s SSBN plan is guided past times the express objective of ensuring a nuclear second-strike capability, or whether it is a to a greater extent than open-ended travail driven past times resources availability and/or expansionist ambitions.
At the operational level, confrontations stemming from China’s efforts to protect its SSBNs in addition to unusual ASW forces are probable to transcend away on for the foreseeable future. It is of import to start out exploring possible rules of the route to regulate interactions betwixt such forces, including inwards scenarios inwards which unmanned vehicles are employed. This procedure should involve both U.S.-Chinese bilateral efforts in addition to a broader regional overture. To build trust amid all relevant parties, greater transparency in addition to voluntary restrictions past times Communist People's Republic of China nigh its SSBN operational principles in addition to deployment postures would last helpful, equally would practical steps to reaffirm China’s negative safety assurances to regional countries in addition to its early on signing in addition to ratification of the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.
Looking ahead, Communist People's Republic of China should create got a issue of unilateral measures to farther heighten strategic stability land securing its ain interests. Beijing should select to alive alongside a relatively pocket-sized SSBN force, which would last sufficient for maintaining the credibility of its sea-based nuclear deterrent. Keeping a moderate alarm status for its SSBNs in addition to non rushing to adopt continuous-at-sea SSBN patrols would likewise assist to ensure effective deterrence without creating unnecessary risks.
Finally, at that topographic point is a require for serious domestic discussions nigh what evolution in addition to deployment strategy makes the most feel for China’s sea-based nuclear weapons. Some Chinese analysts in addition to commentators look to handgrip major misunderstandings nigh trends inwards unusual countries’ evolution of SSBNs and, equally a result, create got advocated for risky policy alternatives. More in-depth domestic struggle would last useful for enhancing understanding nigh the costs in addition to benefits of different SSBN evolution in addition to deployment strategies. Well-informed in addition to prudent policy choices volition improve China’s ain safety interests, contribute to regional stability, in addition to heighten Beijing’s international ikon equally a responsible nuclear power.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Part of this written report is based on inquiry published equally an essay called “China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent” inwards a larger compilation edited past times Ashley J. Tellis titled “Regional Voices on the Challenges of Nuclear Deterrence Stability inwards Southern Asia” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016).
This move is made possible past times generous fiscal back upwardly from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. I would similar to particularly give thank y'all James Acton for his extensive advice in addition to input throughout the project. I am really grateful to Linton Brooks in addition to Christopher Twomey for providing constructive critiques to before drafts. Several Young Ambassadors at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, namely David Logan, Cole Landfried, Jason Arterburn, Raymond Wang, in addition to Lynn Lee create got provided first-class inquiry assistance for this project. Finally, I want to give thank y'all all the anonymous experts who create got shared their insights alongside me, equally good equally the Carnegie communications squad for their corking assist alongside editing in addition to publishing the report. I am particularly indebted to Ryan DeVries who has been extremely helpful equally the master copy editor of this report. Of course, responsibleness for whatever errors inwards the resulting move remains my own.
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