TONG ZHAO
In recent years, Cathay has expended considerable efforts to build a sea-based nuclear strength for the primary utilization of enhancing its overall nuclear deterrent. Although Beijing’s destination is express in addition to defensive, the practical implications of its efforts for regional stability in addition to safety volition live on significant. ARMS RACE STABILITY
A fleet of survivable nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) would trim China’s concerns nearly the credibility of its nuclear deterrent in addition to lessen the country’s incentives to farther expand its arsenal. Such benefits, however, volition live on tempered yesteryear vulnerabilities associated amongst Beijing’s electrical flow generation of SSBNs. In the close to mid-term, developing an SSBN fleet volition require Cathay to substantially enlarge its previously pocket-size stockpile of strategic ballistic missiles, mayhap exacerbating the threat perceptions of potential adversaries in addition to causing them to accept countermeasures that mightiness eventually intensify an emerging arms competition.
China needs to utilization substantial general-purpose forces to protect its SSBNs inward coastal waters. This requirement volition larn an of import driver of a buildup of China’s conventional armed forces assets. Efforts to protect Chinese SSBNs, peculiarly inward the South Cathay Sea, could live on interpreted yesteryear neighboring countries every bit attempts to undermine others’ liberty of navigation, to expand China’s sphere of influence, in addition to to seek regional dominance. Such concerns could intensify already fraught arms race dynamics inward East in addition to Southeast Asia.
CRISIS STABILITY
A sea-based nuclear capability volition non brand Cathay to a greater extent than inclined to utilization nuclear weapons during a crisis. Nonetheless, the country’s emerging SSBN strength volition silent get got of import implications for crisis stability. Beijing may abandon its traditional do of maintaining a depression alarm score for its nuclear weapons inward peacetime in addition to instead arm its sea-launched ballistic missiles amongst nuclear warheads during routine SSBN patrols. There is every bit good doubtfulness over how reliable China’s SSBN command, control, in addition to communication organization is in addition to how Beijing assesses the gamble of unusual interference amongst this system. As a result, Cathay may appear a hard choice betwixt maintaining a highly centralized command in addition to command organization in addition to giving SSBN crews around autonomy, including perhaps yesteryear pre-delegating launch ascendence for nuclear weapons nether sure enough circumstances. If Cathay concludes that it must accept the latter route, the gamble of an accidental and/or unauthorized launch of a sea-based nuclear ballistic missile volition live on higher.
Tong Zhao is a beau inward Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy.
Moreover, China’s deployment of SSBNs will, for the offset time, brand its nuclear weapons vulnerable to unusual armed forces attacks exterior of the country’s territory. Foreign countries could utilization non-nuclear armed forces forces, including unmanned systems, to track, trail, in addition to laid on Chinese SSBNs, creating a dilemma over how Beijing should response if i of its SSBNs faces a conventional armed forces threat during a crisis. As the U.S. in addition to its allies cash inward one's chips on to heighten their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities inward the region, Cathay may experience increasing pressure level to reconsider its unconditional no-first-use policy. If that were to happen, Beijing may inadvertently motivate potential adversaries to farther intensify their strategic ASW operations against Chinese SSBNs. Moreover, due to the technical difficulty of assessing intentions, the gamble of an overreaction would increase, every bit Cathay may error ASW operations against its laid on submarines for operations against its SSBNs.
China’s probable reliance on general-purpose forces to protect its SSBNs, peculiarly if Beijing finds it necessary to obtain sea-control capabilities in addition to create SSBN bastions inward the South Cathay Sea, would likely heighten the gamble of clashes betwixt China’s conventional forces defending its SSBNs in addition to enemy ASW platforms. The likelihood of incidents in addition to inadvertent escalation may live on farther exacerbated yesteryear the technical in addition to logistical difficulties of maintaining effective command, control, in addition to communication systems inward a contested maritime environment. The introduction of unmanned systems—whether surface vessels or underwater vehicles—would acquaint farther challenges, including the quest for effective communication betwixt ii camps of hostile forces to avoid incidents.
RISK REDUCTION
Formal in addition to verifiable arms command agreements are unlikely to live on a realistic response to these risks, given the usual distrust betwixt the ii countries in addition to the extreme secrecy over submarine operations. Instead, cooperative and/or unilateral confidence-building measures should live on pursued every bit the offset pace toward mitigating the negative potential consequences for arms race in addition to crisis stability. At the senior political level, it is fourth dimension for the U.S. to clarify its policy toward China’s sea-based nuclear weapons. U.S. decisionmakers should recognize that pursuing ASW capabilities against China’s SSBNs contradicts their commitment to maintaining strategic stability amongst Beijing. H5N1 U.S. declaratory policy that explicitly rejects the choice of conducting strategic ASW against Cathay would assist mitigate Beijing’s concerns in addition to so discourage it from adopting a to a greater extent than destabilizing armed forces posture. For its part, Cathay should reassure the international community nearly the strategic objectives behind its SSBN plan yesteryear shedding to a greater extent than lite on its views nearly the hereafter evolution of in addition to operational requirements for its SSBN force. Doing in addition to so could assist other states amend assess for themselves whether China’s SSBN plan is guided yesteryear the express objective of ensuring a nuclear second-strike capability, or whether it is a to a greater extent than open-ended exertion driven yesteryear resources availability and/or expansionist ambitions.
At the operational level, confrontations stemming from China’s efforts to protect its SSBNs in addition to unusual ASW forces are probable to cash inward one's chips on for the foreseeable future. It is of import to commence exploring possible rules of the route to regulate interactions betwixt such forces, including inward scenarios inward which unmanned vehicles are employed. This procedure should involve both U.S.-Chinese bilateral efforts in addition to a broader regional overture. To build trust amid all relevant parties, greater transparency in addition to voluntary restrictions yesteryear Cathay nearly its SSBN operational principles in addition to deployment postures would live on helpful, every bit would practical steps to reaffirm China’s negative safety assurances to regional countries in addition to its early on signing in addition to ratification of the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.
Looking ahead, Cathay should accept a issue of unilateral measures to farther heighten strategic stability piece securing its ain interests. Beijing should select to alive amongst a relatively pocket-size SSBN force, which would live on sufficient for maintaining the credibility of its sea-based nuclear deterrent. Keeping a moderate alarm status for its SSBNs in addition to non rushing to adopt continuous-at-sea SSBN patrols would every bit good assist to ensure effective deterrence without creating unnecessary risks.
Finally, at that spot is a quest for serious domestic discussions nearly what evolution in addition to deployment strategy makes the most feel for China’s sea-based nuclear weapons. Some Chinese analysts in addition to commentators appear to grip major misunderstandings nearly trends inward unusual countries’ evolution of SSBNs and, every bit a result, get got advocated for risky policy alternatives. More in-depth domestic combat would live on useful for enhancing understanding nearly the costs in addition to benefits of different SSBN evolution in addition to deployment strategies. Well-informed in addition to prudent policy choices volition improve China’s ain safety interests, contribute to regional stability, in addition to heighten Beijing’s international picture every bit a responsible nuclear power.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Part of this study is based on inquiry published every bit an essay called “China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent” inward a larger compilation edited yesteryear Ashley J. Tellis titled “Regional Voices on the Challenges of Nuclear Deterrence Stability inward Southern Asia” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016).
This function is made possible yesteryear generous fiscal back upward from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. I would similar to peculiarly give cheers James Acton for his extensive advice in addition to input throughout the project. I am really grateful to Linton Brooks in addition to Christopher Twomey for providing constructive critiques to before drafts. Several Young Ambassadors at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, namely David Logan, Cole Landfried, Jason Arterburn, Raymond Wang, in addition to Lynn Lee get got provided splendid inquiry assistance for this project. Finally, I want to give cheers all the anonymous experts who get got shared their insights amongst me, every bit good every bit the Carnegie communications squad for their bang-up assist amongst editing in addition to publishing the report. I am peculiarly indebted to Ryan DeVries who has been extremely helpful every bit the principal editor of this report. Of course, responsibleness for whatsoever errors inward the resulting function remains my own.
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