In Oct 2018, a select grouping of Russian too American experts met at the Center for Strategic too International Studies (CSIS) inwards Washington. Their meeting, convened past times CSIS too the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), aimed to speak over iv topics cardinal to U.S.-Russian relations: the conflict inwards Ukraine, the futurity of the European safety order, the state of war inwards Syria, too the inquiry of interference inwards other states’ political processes. The attendees participated non equally representatives of their countries or governments but rather equally experts working collaboratively to define the problems at mitt too consider possible solutions. Their finish was to seat the positions of stakeholders amongst an oculus to defining the possibilities for futurity negotiations too paths out of conflict.
Despite the importance of all iv of those topics to global too regional security, to say naught of bilateral relations betwixt the U.S. too Russia, the adept grouping agreed that the biggest challenge to resolving whatever of them is that Russian, American, European (including Ukrainian), Syrian, too other relevant governments do non take in their resolution equally urgent. Although these stakeholders may non hold upwards happy amongst the status quo, they ofttimes take in alternatives equally probable to hold upwards worse, or at to the lowest degree to pose novel risks.
In Ukraine, for example, the conflict inwards Donbas continues to terms lives. Nonetheless, all the stakeholders take in problems amongst whatever conceivable path toward resolution, at to the lowest degree inwards the brusk term. If Ukraine regains the Donbas, it must integrate it, at cracking economical too probable political cost. Indeed, nether some scenarios, command of the Donbas could weaken Western back upwards for Ukraine. From Moscow’s perspective, resolution agency the loss of an of import bargaining chip too the danger that domestic too unusual audiences volition take in the Kremlin equally having backed down. Calculations are farther complicated past times the style of stakeholders to hope that fourth dimension is on their side: that waiting volition atomic number 82 to a improve outcome. This leads to a style to postpone decisions until ane or some other futurity milestone is met. Elections (U.S., Russian, Ukrainian; presidential too parliamentary) receive got repeatedly served this purpose, exclusively to come upwards too teach amongst no appreciable alter inwards policy.
Participants suggested, however, that the status quo may non hold upwards equally durable equally those who receive got it shout upwards too that fourth dimension is on no one’s side. H5N1 novel Ukrainian president may uncovering it harder to justify whatever concessions. Ukraine too Russian Federation are increasingly at odds inwards the Sea of Azov, a province of affairs that could escalate. The recognition of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s autocephaly from the Moscow Patriarchate leadership also stands to alter the balance.
Experts who participated inwards the workshop agreed that it would hold upwards helpful to integrate the U.S. into the Normandy procedure for resolving the conflict rather than maintain separate channels through which Washington negotiates straight amongst Moscow. This measuring would strengthen Normandy too preclude those involved from leveraging different negotiating fora against ane another. H5N1 unmarried agreed forum would, it is hoped, growth the line per unit of measurement area on all sides for resolution. The grouping also felt that although a novel understanding is non out of the inquiry inwards the future, for straight off Minsk II should stay the framework for resolving the conflict. Participants believe that when too if the political volition emerges inwards Moscow too Kyiv, it volition hold upwards possible to handle on a conception for the Donbas that provides a mensurate of political autonomy (including to maintain a role for the Russian language) too does non permit representatives from the part to obstruct the functioning of the Ukrainian authorities or practice a veto over its unusual policy.
The grouping also agreed that a peacekeeping understanding inwards Donbas should proceed to hold upwards pursued, fifty-fifty inwards the absence of a broader settlement. Indeed, the role of a peacekeeping understanding volition hold upwards to create the infinite (and farther incentives) for such a settlement. Although at that spot be substantial disagreements almost the compass too form out of a peacekeeping forcefulness (regarding phasing, location, role inwards governance, size, too participating countries), the framework exists too the negotiating infinite inwards regulation allows room for compromise.
The group’s give-and-take of European safety echoed that regarding Ukraine. The Ukraine crisis is, of course, a crucial element of European security. Moving beyond it, however, or assuming its resolution, silent leaves many other challenges on the continent. Moreover, when it comes to Ukraine, conversations almost possible solutions are ongoing, fifty-fifty if progress is inadequate. But inwards the context of broader European safety issues—how the many countries that percentage the continent tin forcefulness out experience to a greater extent than secure without threatening the perceived safety of others—participants felt at that spot was a dearth of forward-looking thinking, creative ideas, or fifty-fifty interest.
This is worrisome because participants saw the electrical current province of affairs equally dangerous, amongst a high opportunity of crisis too an arms race. Moreover, resolution of both the Ukraine conflict too the electrical current impasse betwixt the U.S. too Russian Federation are necessary but non sufficient for progress on broader issues of European security. At the same time, the gap inwards concrete thinking agency that experts similar those assembled tin forcefulness out play an of import role inwards laying the groundwork for a novel conversation almost limits too constraints. Formal agreements are non probable inwards the electrical current political climate. But that agency that straight off is precisely the correct fourth dimension to shout upwards almost what sorts of arrangements could hold upwards decided in ane lawsuit the volition emerges.
Critical questions include the prospects too parameters for bringing the conventional arms command framework upwards to appointment too revisiting the Helsinki Final Act, such that these tin forcefulness out hold upwards genuinely useful to all parties. At a minimum, it would hold upwards necessary to define what the “substantial” combat forces mentioned inwards the NATO-Russia Founding Act human face like. Moreover, novel weapons too armed services technologies must hold upwards integrated too geographical constraints on basing, including questions of reinforcement, must hold upwards component subdivision of the conversation. It is possible to envisage how the combination of these tin forcefulness out atomic number 82 to a mutually acceptable arrangement. Participants postulated that peradventure NATO should hold upwards less worried almost Russian defenses inwards Kaliningrad, equally coastal defenses do non threaten Poland (or Sweden). Perhaps Russian Federation also tin forcefulness out hold upwards reassured through a to a greater extent than concrete give-and-take of which weapons may hold upwards deployed inwards NATO’s easternmost fellow member states. However, given the evolving political province of affairs inwards Europe too beyond, whatever moves along these lines must also permit for changes inwards alliances—what mightiness laissez passer on when novel members bring together or quondam members leave.
Beginning these conversations inwards adept fora today volition create a knowledge base of operations that policymakers tin forcefulness out depict on when too if negotiations motility forward. However, progress is unlikely equally long equally governments take in risks equally acceptable or peradventure fifty-fifty beneficial.
In the meantime, the grouping agreed that it was also of import to pick out activity on improving crisis management tools too approaches too to restart too reinvigorate military-to-military dialogues. The grouping also identified opportunity reduction inwards the Arctic equally an expanse for give-and-take too progress. Finally, participants argued that the existing strategic stability talks betwixt the U.S. too Russian Federation should hold upwards broadened to include cybersecurity, “soft” security, too conventional security, equally good equally nuclear security. This approach could reinvigorate the talks too permit policymakers to consider some of the ideas that emerge from adept consultations. More frequent (every iii months, for example) meetings mightiness result, which would hold upwards all to the good. Furthermore, some key steps potentially could hold upwards taken through technical discussions inside existing arrangements, including Open Skies too the Vienna Document.
Experts were to a greater extent than ofttimes than non pessimistic almost progress inwards Syria. Moscow has attained some of its goals inwards that country, such equally the continued tenure of the existing authorities too the institution of Russian Federation itself equally a regional player. However, whatever hopes that Syrian Arab Republic mightiness hold upwards an arena for cooperation amongst the U.S. receive got been largely dashed. U.S. goals, meanwhile, are centered on the devastation of ISIS too limiting the influence of Iran. The grouping to a greater extent than ofttimes than non agreed that preventing the resurgence of ISIS was to a greater extent than probable (although dislodging ISIS too other extremist groups would hold upwards easier than preventing their return) than whatever truthful constraints on Iran. Russia, for its part, is unlikely to abandon Islamic Republic of Iran for many reasons, including its expectation that Tehran volition stay a crucial actor inwards Syrian Arab Republic too the region. Indeed, Turkey too Islamic Republic of Iran are the 2 exterior powers that are most probable to stay at the inwardness of the struggle for Syria, equally they are seeking command of territory too populations. Russian Federation too the U.S. receive got substantial armed services weight, but their interests are less specific to the conflict itself. What happens inwards Idlib too the possible utilisation of chemic weapons could escalate their involvement—and their disagreements amongst ane another.
Despite the lack of U.S.-Russian cooperation, at that spot is overlap betwixt Moscow’s too Washington’s goals inwards Syria. Both desire to forestall the resurgence of ISIS too al Qaeda. Both receive got strong relationships amongst Kurdish groups. Neither wants a state of war betwixt Islamic Republic of Iran too Israel. Both desire to boundary their ain presence too commitment. In principle, parallel actions towards mutual goals should hold upwards possible, fifty-fifty if truthful alignment is out of the question. One tin forcefulness out imagine some coordination to ensure a secure semi-autonomous role for Kurdish communities inwards Syria’s futurity equally good equally to address the challenges posed past times unusual fighters.
However, it seems unlikely that either U.S. or Russian action, or the combination of the two, volition do anything to stabilize Syrian Arab Republic for the long term. The lack of enthusiasm to pay for reconstruction too the express capacity to reconstruct effectively hateful that the conflict inwards Syrian Arab Republic volition continue. The most probable way frontwards may prevarication inwards a deal betwixt Russian Federation too Europe, non the United States. But none of the experts felt that fifty-fifty this outcome would succeed—in the end, resources too skills are probable to hold upwards inadequate to the gargantuan business at hand.
The in conclusion theme on the group’s agenda was political interference. This conversation was inwards many ways the most frustrating of the 2 days of discussions. Some participants felt that agreements or arrangements on at to the lowest degree a few specific topics were possible; for example, that the 2 countries could commit non to unloosen data gleaned through tidings activity inwards ways probable to touching political outcomes. They noted that countries consistently commit to noninterference (even equally they also pick out actions that others take in equally interference). But non all agreed. Some suggested that agreements intended to regulate activities that are inwards fact illegal (that is, tidings collection past times diverse means) were unlikely to hold upwards negotiated or signed.
Participants also found it challenging to handle on what sorts of activities could hold upwards on the table. If limits are defined, whether inwards elections, lobbying, media, or other areas, this mightiness imply that anything that was non thence prohibited would silent hold upwards permitted. Moreover, the inquiry of reciprocity too equivalence across issues is far from clear, equally participants from the U.S. too Russian Federation exhibited really different perceptions, to say the least.
Experts also asked whether at that spot was whatever indicate to agreements nether electrical current conditions, inwards which both parties would probable await the other to cheat from the start. Some postulated that case-by-case tacit arrangements too codes of comport would hold upwards to a greater extent than useful than anything formalized too public. Moreover, some give-and-take may tending to improve define rules of the road. But the grouping to a greater extent than ofttimes than non was to a greater extent than effective at raising questions than finding answers, demonstrating but how underdeveloped this hard theme remains.
To conclude, the RIAC-CSIS convened adept grouping identified concrete recommendations for farther study too for authorities activity inwards the contexts of the Ukraine crisis too European safety to a greater extent than broadly. They discussed possible ways frontwards inwards Syrian Arab Republic but the experts roughly the tabular array inwards Washington were non optimistic that they would hold upwards pursued. Participants were divided over possible mutual or unilateral limits on interference too perceived interference, although they agreed that the conversation was worth continuing. Although the harm done to the U.S.-Russian human relationship is ane critical issue, the challenges such activities pose for the futurity extend far beyond these 2 states too volition proceed to grow equally data too other technologies evolve.
Olga Oliker is a senior adviser too manager of the Russian Federation too Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic too International Studies inwards Washington, D.C. Andrey Kortunov is manager full general of the Russian International Affairs Council inwards Moscow.
This study is made possible past times the generous back upwards of Carnegie Corporation of New York.
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