By Michael Semple
Zalmay Khalilzad, the United States’ envoy for Afghan reconciliation, has breathed novel life into attempts to behaviour peace talks betwixt the Afghan regime together with the cautiously optimistic” most reaching a peace care yesteryear Apr of side yesteryear side year.
Yet equally far equally Taliban leaders are concerned, the grouping has lilliputian argue to commit to a peace process: it is on a winning streak. The Taliban command key Afghan highways together with are conducting targeted assassinations across the country. They receive got made of import territorial gains together with forthwith receive got consummate or partial command over some 250 of most 400 districts.
These gains are non sufficient to pose an existential threat to an Afghan regime with U.S. backing, but they receive got emboldened the Taliban to hold fighting, inwards the hope of eventually eroding U.S. resolve. Even if Khalilzad manages to choose the Taliban to the table, don’t hold off his efforts to make a lasting peace anytime soon.
On the surface, the residual of mightiness inwards Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan appears to live shifting inwards the Taliban’s favor, peculiarly since their annual confine offensive began inwards April. The insurgents billed the armed services operation—which they named “Al Khandaq,” after a historic battle fought yesteryear the Prophet Muhammad—as a crusade to “crush, kill, together with capture” invading U.S. forces together with their allies piece avoiding impairment to civilians. They dismissed the Afghan regime equally a corrupt U.S. stooge and, inwards a bizarre twist, claimed that enemy-controlled areas hosted “secret centers for obscenity.” For all that, the Taliban reiterated their “policy of peaceful negotiation,” with the proviso, of course, that the US was deliberately “sabotaging all chances of peace” yesteryear keeping its forces inwards the country.
As far equally Taliban leaders are concerned, the Al Khandaq armed services crusade has been a dandy success. Government security forces had promised a major force of their ain for 2018, but the insurgents felt they kept the regime on the defensive all year. Across the country, Taliban forces receive got pushed into rural areas. They receive got made inroads into the country’s fundamental together with northern provinces, ane time firmly nether regime control. In November, they fifty-fifty made a sally into Shiite-populated districts of Ghazni, an anti-Taliban stronghold due south of Kabul, provoking panic together with demonstrations inwards the capital.
In marked contrast to what they announced inwards April, the Taliban receive got non prioritized attacking U.S. forces. Instead, they receive got targeted the so-called arbakai—local militias assigned to protect pro-government rural areas. Across Afghanistan’s northern provinces, the Taliban stair out their progress inwards the hundreds of these militiamen that they receive got killed, forced into surrender, or pushed dorsum into bigger towns.
The insurgents themselves by together with large steer clear of urban areas. Taking towns is costly, together with success is oftentimes short-lived. Instead of capturing cities, the Taliban flex their muscles on the highways that link them. The band route that connects Kabul to Kandahar inwards the due south together with Herat inwards the west, for instance, bristles with impromptu Taliban cheque posts, where the insurgents behaviour identity checks together with arrest or execute anyone they dub a regime collaborator.
The Taliban receive got worked on their storming tactics for taking isolated regime security posts—and rejoice inwards the fact that many of the outposts receive got been abandoned anyway. Meanwhile, assassination squads are busy picking off regime officials, pro-regime clerics, together with tribal or political figures. In October, the grouping claimed its most prized scalp inwards the individual of General Abdul Raziq, a high-ranking police force master copy inwards Kandahar. In all of this, the Taliban receive got benefited from increasingly advanced weapons together with know-how—including, allegedly, night-vision equipment together with newly trained snipers.
A propaganda machine runs approximately the clock to spread give-and-take of these achievements, primarily with the group’s ain activists together with supporters. Taliban commanders receive got fallen inwards beloved with messenger apps, which supply a daily flow of multimedia content boasting of victory after victory. Using these apps comes at a considerable risk, because smartphones tin privy alarm U.S. drones to their targets’ location. Still, it seems equally if every captured or killed enemy soldier must live filmed together with the video disseminated to boost morale through the Taliban ranks.
PLANNING FOR PEACE
Nominally, the Taliban are led yesteryear the group’s supreme leader, Sheik Haibatullah. But the leader is inwards hiding together with conducts few meetings, making him to a greater extent than a convenient figurehead than an active commander. In practice, mightiness rests with Haibatullah’s ii deputies, Mawlvi sYaqoob together with Khalifa Haqqani, who atomic number 82 an unofficial commission of approximately ane dozen Taliban heavyweights dispersed approximately Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan together with Pakistan. Decisions are reached collectively—with due weight given to the interests of the armed services wing, which holds the most power—and passed downward to other commanders. The Taliban also operate a Political Commission, which is oftentimes inwards the headlines because it is based inwards Qatar together with acts equally the group’s international representative. But the men inwards the Political Commission are effectively diplomats who choose their orders from the leadership collective.
That collective has decided that the Taliban’s battlefield strength warrants an ambitious political agenda focused solely on a unmarried goal: U.S. withdrawal. Absent this withdrawal, Taliban leaders pass upwardly negotiations with the Afghan government, which they reckon equally a U.S. puppet lacking potency over the issues inwards dispute.
To this end, the grouping is trying to erode back upwardly for the Afghan regime yesteryear reaching out to powerful Soviet-era jihadists, such equally Ismail Khan together with Atta Nur, inviting them to cutting deals with the Taliban together with promising them protection together with a house inwards the coming Islamic Emirate. The Taliban’s diplomatic fly inwards Qatar, meanwhile, is working to restore the movement’s international legitimacy yesteryear casting it equally Afghanistan’s rightful—and inevitable—ruler. The existent get of conflict inwards Afghanistan, according to the Taliban’s representatives inwards Doha, is the continued presence of U.S. troops, together with the Taliban volition live opened upwardly to compromise ane time the troops are out. This, inwards essence, was the message that the Taliban’s delegates delivered at a peace conference Russian Federation hosted inwards early on November.
Absent U.S. withdrawal, Taliban leaders pass upwardly negotiations with the Afghan government, which they reckon equally an American puppet.
For its part, the US has signaled openness to a negotiated settlement, non to the lowest degree yesteryear appointing Khalilzad equally its envoy. Officially, U.S. policy remains to encourage the Taliban to negotiate with the Afghan government. But Khalilzad has proved to a greater extent than willing than his predecessors to engage direct with Taliban representatives, together with he has actively consulted with Afghan political figures together with regional powers. The regime inwards Kabul remains committed to peace negotiations but has shown signs of unease with the grade of U.S. involvement, fearful of losing command (or, to a greater extent than politely, “ownership”) of the peace process.
Yet the notion that the Taliban are on the cusp of coming to the tabular array is wishful thinking. So far, the grouping has remained decidedly uninterested inwards political compromise together with steadfast inwards its world disavowal of talks with the Afghan government. The Taliban receive got a runway tape of missing opportunities together with overplaying their hand. Instead of committingto serious peace talks, they may seek to win mightiness without a settlement. Taliban leaders seem confident that they tin privy gradually wearable out U.S. leaders until they withdraw their armed services back upwardly for the regime inwards Kabul. Taliban fighters are told that the US is defeated together with volition delineate out its troops yesteryear 2020, opening the means for the grouping to recapture the country.
SO LONG, SAIGON?
In some ways, the Taliban are trying to replicate the weather condition that drove the US out of South Vietnam inwards the 1970s. U.S. President Richard Nixon together with his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, had been looking for a means out of Vietnam equally early on equally 1969. Kissinger ratcheted upwardly the armed services together with diplomatic pressure level on the Vietnamese communists, seeking to shore upwardly the anticommunist South Vietnamese regime with concessions extracted from the North inwards negotiations. This strategy, Kissinger hoped, would ensure the survival of the Saigon regime fifty-fifty without U.S. troops at that topographic point to defend it.
Nixon together with Kissinger presently had to arrange their ambitions downward. Despite heavy losses, the North Vietnamese fought relentlessly. The regime inwards the South, crippled yesteryear nepotism together with corruption, was no match. Growing domestic opposition to the state of war forced the US to speed upwardly its troop withdrawal together with confine its armed services assistance to the South’s forces. By the fourth dimension of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, Washington was by together with large looking for a face-saving exit: gratis captured U.S. soldiers together with treat a “decent interval” betwixt U.S. withdrawal together with the collapse of the South’s regime, which came ii years later. Taliban leaders today seem to hope that nearly ii decades of attrition warfare against U.S. troops volition presently yield a similar outcome.
Yet Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan is non Vietnam, together with today’s Taliban leaders are incorrect to imagine that they tin privy replicate the successes of the Vietnamese communists. For all its messy politics together with clientelism, the Afghan province is to a greater extent than feasible than the South Vietnamese was. There is a shared political culture, an thought of national unity, together with fifty-fifty important buy-in to the democratic project. Reforms, an inclusive national leadership that took existent ownership of the war, together with a political shape focused to a greater extent than on security together with reconciliation than on its ain privileges would all help. Still, the political organization centered inwards Kabul is a reality for millions of Afghans. The parliamentary elections inwards Oct were chaotic, but the media, political parties, over 2,500 candidates, together with most people inwards government-controlled areas all embraced the contest.
The Taliban’s political base, yesteryear contrast, is inwards the Sunni clergy, which has provided them with a reliable cadre for fighting the war. But this is likewise narrow a constituency to brand a plausible bid to atomic number 82 a national regime or remake the political system. The Taliban may receive got been able to capture mightiness together with impose authoritarian dominion inwards the midst of a civil state of war 25 years ago. But Afghan citizens today hold off security, freedom, economical management, together with unusual relations from their government, together with few believe the Taliban could deliver.
Taliban leaders are incorrect to imagine that they tin privy replicate the successes of the Vietnamese communists.
Internationally, the Taliban remain far to a greater extent than isolated than North Vietnam always was. No international histrion is prepared to supply serious logistic or armed services back upwardly to them. And despite recent tensions betwixt the United States, Russia, China, together with Iran, these powers soundless broadly concord that a well-governed Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan must non live a terrorist security haven of the form the Taliban ran earlier 2001.
On the armed services front, the Taliban are much weaker than their propaganda suggests. For years, Taliban fighters receive got been stuck inwards a guerrilla phase, incurring heavy casualties whenever they seek to operate with formations of to a greater extent than than a few dozen fighters. Recent gains inwards the countryside are non then much proof of the insurgents’ tactical skills equally they are a testament to Kabul’s mismanagement of its local militias.
It is telling that the Taliban’s electrical flow offensive has no official objective beyond continued fighting: for whatever hope of a armed services victory, the Taliban receive got to hold off for the US to destination back upwardly to the regime inwards Kabul. Yet the state of war inwards Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan costs Washington far less than Vietnam did inwards its day. In 1968, the state of war travail inwards Vietnam took upwardly approximately 2.3 per centum of U.S. GDP. By 2016, U.S. spending on the state of war inwards Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan had fallen to most 0.17 per centum of GDP. Likewise, the Vietnam War faced violent domestic opposition inwards the US and, yesteryear the end, was widely questioned fifty-fifty inwards the military. Residual involvement inwards Afghanistan, yesteryear contrast, draws lilliputian ire from the U.S. world together with enjoys back upwardly inwards Congress together with the military.
In effect, the US has “Afghanized” the conflict, shifting responsibleness to the Afghan regime piece U.S. forces operate inwards the background, providing air cover, specialist support, together with money. Washington, inwards other words, has the capacity to sustain its commitment to Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan for some fourth dimension to come upwardly together with is nether no obligation to choose a bad deal. Leaving Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan would live a thing of choice, non necessity.
As long equally this fact is lost on Taliban leaders, however, U.S. efforts to mediate peace talks are unlikely to acquit fruit. Khalilzad could seek to tempt the Taliban with a commitment to withdrawal that avoids timelines together with instead sets a substantive goal, such equally the restoration of peace. If such an travail produced a cease-fire together with political talks, that could score the kickoff of a existent peace process.
Yet getting at that topographic point volition postulate changing the Taliban’s basic calculus. Any displace that boosts American staying mightiness helps—even if this comes at the terms of piece of cake reducing the U.S. footprint. Already, some Taliban are showing signs of state of war fatigue. During a cease-fire inwards June, fighters poured into Afghan towns together with spoke openly of their wishing for peace. Local peace deals together with de-escalation could choose wages of these sentiments. And unfashionable equally it sounds, enhancing the effectiveness together with democratic legitimacy of the Afghan regime would also aid the get of peace.
The US may non care a responsible larn out from Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan yesteryear 2020. But at that topographic point is soundless a peril to meaningfully ameliorate the province of affairs on the dry soil and, yesteryear then doing, trim the Taliban’s mightiness to wage war. The travail is worth making for the sake of the time to come together with the shared interests of Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan together with the United States.
Buat lebih berguna, kongsi:
