By: Yuri Neves, Columnist
While the connection betwixt terrorist/insurgent groups as well as criminal organizations has been extensively discussed as well as debated,[i] less has been written on the fluidity of these identities. Why terrorist or insurgent groups abandon their political ideologies as well as merely pursue economical motives is an expanse ripe for exploration. Criminal organizations as well as vehement extremist groups part many similarities; they rising upwardly inwards areas amongst like conditions, utilization the same tactics, have got sophisticated structures, commit criminal acts, as well as at times cooperate amongst each other. The fundamental departure betwixt them is a political ideology, or lack thereof. By examining the causes that compel terrorist groups to plough their attending to criminal enterprises, policymakers tin blueprint to a greater extent than effective agency to counter vehement non-state actors. One gene that tin trigger the shift from terrorist/insurgent arrangement to a merely criminal grouping is weakness. If the authorities is bully downwardly on a terrorist/insurgent group, the grouping may non have got the resources to ship out additional attacks. Furthermore, the terrorist arrangement would prefer to bide its fourth dimension as well as regroup rather than antagonize the nation into farther attacks. In this case, the shift may survive temporary rather than permanent.
Another gene that tin provoke a alter inwards organizational identity is the elimination of a key leader. This phenomenon tin survive seen inwards the illustration of Abu Sayyaf, an ISIL affiliate inwards the Philippines. While this terrorist grouping is directly firmly committed to an ideological goal, inwards the past times it has wavered betwixt beingness an insurgency fighting for Moro Independence as well as a criminal gang focused on kidnapping for ransom. One such shift occurred next the decease of its founder, Abdurajak Janjalani. After Janjalani was killed inwards a shootout amongst Philippine police, 2 members, Abu Subaya as well as Ghalib Andang, took on a to a greater extent than prominent role. These 2 men were known for their criminality. Under their leadership, the grouping conducted about of its almost well-known kidnappings, including the 2000 Sidapan as well as 2001 Dos Palmas resort kidnappings.[ii] After their deaths, Abdurak Janjalani’s brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, took command of the group. Janjalani was a to a greater extent than ideologically oriented leader. Consequently, the Abu Sayyaf’s focus ane time once again turned towards terrorism. While the kidnappings continued, directly the hostages were beheaded rather than exchanged for ransom. In 2006, history repeated itself. After Philippines forces killed Khadaffy Janjalani, to a greater extent than criminal elements inside Abu Sayyaf took command of the grouping as well as kidnappings for ransom rose ane time again.[iii]
Another gene that tin Pb to criminalization is a decentralization of command. When insurgent groups decentralize, parts of the arrangement sometimes revise their priorities, as well as focus on coin making activities. This tin survive seen inwards segments of Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Republic of Colombia (FARC) prior to the peace deal, Peru’s Sendero Luminoso, as well as the Afghan Taliban.[iv] When units inside the larger grouping have got reduced contact amongst their leadership, they have less ideological indoctrination, have got to self-fund, as well as are non equally beholden to prohibitions against engaging inwards surely kinds of criminal activities. While the principal grouping powerfulness soundless have got strong ideological convictions, large sections of the arrangement tin completely transform into a purely criminal enterprise.
Similarly tied to decentralization is the splintering of terrorist/insurgent groups. The signing of a peace treaty is typically a positive pace towards stability; however, in that place is the ever-present threat that a grouping may splinter as well as resume fighting. The splinter grouping may proceed to utilization political violence, such equally the Provisional Irish Gaelic Republican Army (PIRA), or it may merely plough to crime. The latter scenario has been especially relevant inwards Colombia. The bulk of Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (EPL) demobilized inwards 1991 as well as entered mainstream politics. Yet a dissident faction, led past times Victor Ramon Navarro Cervano (AKA “Megateo”), continued to partake inwards drug trafficking, abandoning whatever pretense of its Marxist ideology.[v] Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 like progression is currently underway amongst the of late demobilized FARC. There have got already been several reports of dissident elements of the FARC continuing to utilize its old drug trafficking routes, but without expressing whatever of the underlying political motivations that ane time characterized these activities.[vi]
By studying the mechanisms that tin induce an ideologically motivated grouping to transform into a criminal organization, governments tin amend sympathize the implications of such a alter as well as how to mitigate its effects. With this inwards mind, governments should insist that leaders of these terrorist/insurgent organizations have got concrete steps towards demobilization prior to agreeing to whatever peace agreement. Specifically, a peace bargain should include a stipulation that if whatever large contingent of the grouping continues to engage inwards criminal activity, for political purposes or otherwise, hence the understanding shall survive declared nada as well as void. While this may complicate time to come negotiations, it volition spare the nation the headache of signing a peace treaty amongst a grouping exclusively to hence have got to become combat well-trained, heavily-armed splinter groups that class after.
A amend understanding of this terrorist to criminal grouping transformation volition also assistance amongst de-radicalization efforts. If an insurgent or terrorist grouping experiences high levels of criminalization, it could dot that it is non real ideologically motivated as well as its members are susceptible to defection. If coin is the primary motivation, hence authorities initiatives that focus on economical reforms, chore preparation programs, as well as other forms of fiscal relief could potentially persuade members to exit the group. By studying the mechanisms that induce such shifts inside vehement non-state actors, governments tin amend gear upwardly policies to weaken them or mitigate their negative impacts.
[i] “The Organized Crime as well as Terrorist Nexus: Overhyping the Relationship.” Stratfor, Apr 20, 2018, https://worldview.stratfor.com/horizons/fellows/phil-williams/20042018-organized-crime-and-terrorist-nexus-overhyping-relationship.
[ii] Mckenzie Obrien, “Fluctuations Between Crime as well as Terror: The Case of Abu Sayyafs Kidnapping Activities.” Terrorism as well as Political Violence 24, no. 2 (2012): 320-36.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Oscar Palma, “Transnational Networks of Insurgency as well as Crime: Explaining the Spread of Commercial Insurgencies beyond State Borders,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 26, no. iii (2015): 476-96.
[v] “EPL,” InSight Crime, August 06, 2018, https://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/epl/.
[vi] “Ex-FARC Mafia: The New Player inwards Colombian Organized Crime,” InSight Crime, March 29, 2018, https://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/ex-farc-mafia-new-player-colombian-organized-crime/.
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