Military Strategy : India

Lieutenant General Gautam Banerjee's Articles on Military Matters

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1. Celebrating 1962 : H5N1 Golden Jubilee of National Blunder.

CELEBRATING 1962 : H5N1 GOLDEN JUBILEE OF NATIONAL BLUNDER !

“ ...... a permanent slice of pedagogy ......” , Pandit Nehru referring to the 1962 debacle.

Forethought

Who, inwards his correct senses, would ‘celebrate’ a national debacle that rankles Indian conscience fifty-fifty after l years?

Recalling those days of tardily 1962, it is impossible to forget how terrible the trauma was. Shaken out of a xv years long dream-sequence of ‘swadheenta’ (freedom), every citizen of Republic of Republic of India was seized with grief every bit the tidings of the debacle filtered through. The injure upon the collective psyche` was aggravated yesteryear stories of unimaginable gallantry shown yesteryear officers in addition to soldiers of the Indian Army inwards confront of deprivation, decease in addition to defeat, in addition to the contrasting breakdown of the ‘will to fight’ alongside many of the superlative armed forces leadership. The political leadership, made of personages of impeccable vision in addition to honour, was overwhelmed yesteryear the guilt of having invited state of war on an ill-prepared nation. The acre went into mourning. H5N1 fright of revisit of that province of affairs remains palpable inwards the defense forcefulness establishment till today.

How tin in addition to then ane celebrate that trial of supreme national failure in addition to have got the insolence of casting its 50th anniversary inwards the haloed mould of a ‘Golden Jubilee! As it would live discovered inwards the next discussion, this odd urge emanates from attempts made herein to re-discover strategic wisdom from the ‘lessons’ taught to us yesteryear Communist People's Republic of China on hard facts of statecraft. Indeed, the mauling Republic of Republic of India received at the hands of Communist People's Republic of China inwards that ‘war’ – a express border conflict inwards fact – caused the regime to institute far-reaching improvements inwards its armed forces administration. Articulation of diplomacy too went through drastic revision. The ‘lesson’ had been learnt well. To the government’s credit, it must also live stated that the neglected in addition to demoralised Indian Army was resuscitated inside a brusk menstruum of but 3 years, so to live able to stand upward up to its mandate inwards 1965 War in addition to and then exceeding the national expectations inwards the People's Republic of Bangladesh War of 1971. There is thence expert argue for the debacle of 1962 to live seen every bit a drive celebre` , a reminder to our mandarins of the South Block inwards New Delhi – both civilian in addition to armed forces – non to autumn dorsum into the pre-1962 abyss e'er again.

The purpose of this word would, therefore, live served if our apex leadership reaffirms every bit to what they ‘must non permit’ to arrive at ane time to a greater extent than inwards our journeying ahead to peace in addition to prosperity.

We may start with the post-independence scene.

Post-Independence Turf Grab

Better component subdivision of governance inwards Republic of Republic of India had been delegated to the ‘natives’ much before the formal promulgation of independence. On the eventide of independence therefore, ability was transferred to an already sharp political leadership. These were persons of highest intellect who yet lacked ane of import insight into the state-craft: direction in addition to articulation of armed forces power. Thus, having inherited a world-celebrated fighting forcefulness inwards the flat of the British Indian Army, they tried to comprehend the blind spot yesteryear turning to those they had befriended - departing British Generals in addition to members of civil service who had provide for the ‘steel frame’ on which stood the British Indian Empire. The former, disconcerted yesteryear the unstated interrogation over the loyalty of Indian armed forces in addition to fright of some other 1857, which was a strong argue for the British to leave, could non have got been generous inwards their suggest regarding nurturing a native armed forces institution. Similarly, so far marginalised inwards matters of armed forces administration, Indian civil servants were known to live chary of losing an opportunity, every bit provided yesteryear the transfer of power, to ride over ‘headstrong’ armed forces professionals.

Thus fooled yesteryear motivated chants whispered into their ears, politicians of the Nehruvian school, inwards comfort of conviction that the armed mightiness had no role to play inwards their ‘tryst with destiny’, found justification to their drive of marginalising, if non decimating, their newly inherited armed forces establishment - it was of no work if ane could have got one’sway but yesteryear “turning the other cheek”. Indeed, brazen presumptions like, “We do’nt take away a defense forcefulness plan, our policy is non-violence!”, “We reckon no armed forces threats, scrap the Army!” in addition to “The police pull are expert plenty to encounter our safety needs”, came to suitcase the political minds. There was utter of doing away with the Army, but starting fourth dimension the Pakistan-sponsored tribal invasion of Jammu & Kashmir inwards 1947-48, in addition to and then a self-aggrandising urge to arbitrate inwards international quarrels postponed that event. Finally, China’s belligerent posture on the Indo-Tibet Border since the mid-1950’s position paid to that suicidal idea.

Saved yesteryear our neighbours from committing that ‘suicide’, a disoriented province apparatus right away proceeded to dismember itself yesteryear weakening its armed forces institution. Thus was perpetrated the lie, that British dominion was perpetuated through the British Indian Army - genuinely that role was played yesteryear its civil services in addition to police pull - in addition to therefore, the Army was a forcefulness of the aliens. Innuendo from power-brokers, ‘whispered’ to the political masters in addition to yet for the entire set down to hear, went on to propagate the looming of a ‘military coup’. The job so invented was in addition to then sought to live prevented yesteryear distancing the armed forces hierarchy from policy-advisory role, undermining their authority, promoting acquiescing favourites inwards superlative command positions in addition to investing on police pull organisations, these beingness traditionally amenable to political expediencies (1). Thus emerged a governing apparatus that discarded the role of armed forces ability – in addition to along with it, armed forces men – from their politico-diplomatic calculations (2). With the armed forces establishment atrophied thus, the stage was laid for the catastrophic state of war of 1962, a debacle that paid position to India’s political, diplomatic in addition to economical aspirations for one-half a century.

Lesson ane of 1962 debacle was that it was of import for the politicians to empathise that when it came to jostling for infinite in addition to power, the armed forces hierarchy stood outwitted yesteryear inter-cadre coalition of ‘common-cause’ bureaucrats. They also needed to appreciate that spell edifice upward institutional armed forces spirit was a long in addition to tedious process, but some signs of neglecting dispensation was plenty to undermine it. Therefore, every bit the bureaucratic instinct of usurpation of cadre-advantages was a fact of life, it was incumbent of the political leadership to live the fair arbitrator inwards fostering balanced equation alongside province institutions. Politicians, therefore, may non overlook inter-cadre turf race when it impacts the armed forces institution, in addition to work their say-so to protect its sensitivities - for the expert of the nation.

Obviously, this lesson has non been learnt. South Block’s instinct of marginalising the armed forces is ane time to a greater extent than on show. Nuances of armed forces preparedness – both tangible in addition to intangible - is decided yesteryear bureaucrats, scientists in addition to auditors, spell politicians would rather non intervene on an number which is exterior their focus towards ‘power’. Finding themselves cast aside, armed forces leaders inwards increasing numbers are taking leave of absence of the hard path of their ‘calling’ in addition to freeing themselves from the hoary compunctions of the ‘spirit’ of soldiering. Sadly, the armed forces establishment is ane time to a greater extent than inwards a province of profound anguish, every bit it was prior to 1962; it seems to live ane time once to a greater extent than on the verge of weakening its war-winning asset: the élan of exclusivity.

Restitution measures from the province every bit good every bit from inside the armed forces fraternity is urgently called for.

Military Factor inwards State-craft

Great nations, from times immemorial, have got factored armed forces recourse into articulation of political ability much before this regulation was formally propagated yesteryear Lord's Day Zsu, Chanakya, Machiavelli, Clausewitz in addition to Morgenthau. Institutional sense of thousands of years inwards state-craft in addition to near-continuous engagement inwards war-fighting since the mid-19th Century had thus prompted the post-World War II leadership inwards Communist People's Republic of China – Guomintang nationalists in addition to their successor Communists - to factor armed forces ability every bit a pillar of their political aspirations. Indeed, expansionist territorial ambitions had been a mutual persuasion of all Chinese regimes at all times. They also understood that claimed territories could live secured either yesteryear the threat or actual work of armed might; no set down was expected to cede territory inwards charity.

It was thence solely natural that inside a twelvemonth of settling the Civil War inwards its favour inwards 1949, Communist Communist People's Republic of China starting fourth dimension invaded Tibet inwards 1950-51, in addition to and then proceeded to extend her suitcase over the outlying areas of Tibet in addition to East Turkmenistan, spell edifice upward an elaborate logistic infrastructure to consolidate her territorial sovereignty. Consequently, the policy of physically occupying the claimed but un-demarcated swathe of open-usage areas astride the Indo-Tibet Border belt was position inwards do during the mid-1950’s. Republic of Republic of India meanwhile had already declared her sovereignty over much of these areas, with expert reasons, in addition to thence responded yesteryear inching her border postsnorthwards (3). Thus started a race, chequerboard game of establishing novel ‘flag’ posts, with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in addition to the Indian Army trying to crunch each other inwards establishing command over their versions of the borderline. And inwards matching steps with her growing armed forces preparations, territorial claims that Communist People's Republic of China had been ‘mumbling’ so far were right away beingness asserted firmly. Thus went yesteryear the 1950’s. Indeed, India’s so called “Forward Policy” was genuinely the solely recourse at her manus to crunch Communist People's Republic of China to her gain of ‘adverse possession’ over Indian territory (4). In hindsight, therefore, it is clear that a clash of some variety betwixt Communist People's Republic of China in addition to Republic of Republic of India on the boundary number was inevitable, to a greater extent than or less.

But what may smasher the students of politics of the 1950’s in addition to 1960’s, is that Communist People's Republic of China coupled armed forces forcefulness every bit an musical instrument of political ability to foster a status that she was unable to convey almost yesteryear other means. India, on the other hand, believed inwards using her armed forces ability to deny fruition of her adversary’s work of force. In other words, inwards India’s understanding, the armed forces establishment was meant to live used, non inwards the flat of a proactive ‘power’ of change, but solely every bit a reactive ‘force’ to undertake ‘police action’ so to say, to discourage the adversary from using forcefulness to address contentious issues. This conceptual deviation manifested inwards 1962 when Chinese strategists defined an ‘end state’, devised deliberate in addition to infallible programme of operations, built upward for state of war to the indicate of over-insurance, in addition to and then striking hard when ready. India, on the other hand, pushed upward pocket-size detachments of armed forces personnel armed with minimal wherewithal to human being isolated ‘posts’ nether the extra-ordinary presumption that the fifty-fifty if prodded, the “Chinese would never attack” (5).

Mired inwards poverty in addition to backwardness, in that location was much politico-economic merit inwards India’s disavowal of armed forces ability inwards articulation of her statecraft. However, our founding fathers failed to distinguish their urge for peace with the politics of power-play. They deceived themselves with the simplistic notion that elaborate preparations take away non live made when recourse to work of forcefulness had been adopted aversely in addition to for defensive purpose. They banked on pious ‘hope’ against ‘realities’ of real-politick.

Lesson ii of 1962 debacle was that whether or non a acre factors armed forces ability into its state-craft, maintenance of a judicious flat of armed forces preparedness was a mandatory responsibility, in addition to that deliberate preparations in addition to planning were imperatives fifty-fifty when armed forces operations are launched with express aim. The lesson was visible till the tardily 1980’s.

Looking at today’s province of cost-ineffective defense forcefulness budget, archaic expenditure procedures, stale defense forcefulness industry, stagnant enquiry in addition to development, regressive personnel direction in addition to disjointed modernisation schemes, the interrogation looms: has the lesson diffused over time? No doubt, many steps are underway to ameliorate the disconnect, but the sweep in addition to the footstep of reforms are but non adequate.

Political Understanding of War

1962 highlighted a contrast inwards exercise of political command over the war. Chinese political leaders – Mao inwards the atomic number 82 – ensured that the armed forces programme was enmeshed with diplomatic postures from fourth dimension to fourth dimension in addition to political objective of the state of war dictated the range in addition to footstep of the armed forces operations (6). The PLA was fully provisioned, acclimatised in addition to built upward to overwhelming strength over the years, leaving nil to chance. The most experienced Generals were placed inwards command in addition to every scrap of data regarding the terrain every bit good every bit Indian dispositions, weaponry in addition to strength was collected to construct upward a clear intelligence picture. Mao Dezong himself approved the ‘rules of engagement’ in addition to the offensive plans before leaving it to local commanders to execute inwards the fashion they considered fit. It was so that fifty-fifty for their superiority, the PLA displayed utmost restraint till ordered to engage, in addition to when engaged, striking so ruthlessly every bit to instil daze in addition to awe. All principles of state of war were strictly adhered to, for the strategy analysts to grade this state of war every bit the most perfectly executed e'er yesteryear the PLA.

In contrast, likewise occupying distant ‘posts’ that were selected off the map, piffling political command was exercised yesteryear the Indian regime to care the impending crisis, likewise of course, annoyed dismissal of professional person concerns in addition to playing favours. The Earth forces brass, e'er on back-foot due to trust deficit, easily gave-in to the pressure level to advance towards the claimed border alignment – the exertion was express solely yesteryear the capacity to maintain troops supplied with subsistence rations in addition to fuel. No doubt, armed forces commanders have got to give-in to their political masters fifty-fifty against their professional person judgement, but then, adverse contingencies are to live anticipated in addition to catered to. Indians, however, had no such ‘plan B’.

Once engaged inwards unanticipated conflict, political in addition to armed forces leaders failed to appreciate that armed forces operations tin non live called off halfway, at the starting fourth dimension signs of setback. Indeed, the reverses inwards the Western in addition to Walong Sectors were but usual experiences inwards the initial stages of defensive warfare. Truly, therefore, but ane laid of serious reverses - that is astride the Tawang-Se La-Bomdila Axis - had caused these leaders, all formidable inwards their yesteryear reputation, to panic. While ane mightiness live inclined to grade the politicians for undermining the armed forces ‘spirit’ inwards peace in addition to and then exposing their ain ‘soft belly’ inwards war, the loss of fighting spirit alongside higher armed forces leadership inwards 1962 was shocking - the formation commanders were distinguished World War II veterans after all.

Ironically, whereas diplomacy is meant to avert war, in addition to failing inwards that, to strengthen the war-effort, inwards this instance, Indian diplomacy managed to aggravate China’s belligerence. By repeated refusal to engage inwards substantive parlays, New Delhi made it easier for Beijing to implement her long decided programme to, every bit their diplomats proclaimed with a direct face, “counter-attack inwards self defence”! It is hard to create upward one's take away heed which of the ii ‘performances’ was to a greater extent than bizarre.

Lesson 3 of 1962 was that a for sure flat of agreement of state of war alongside political leadership was necessary, every bit indeed was the take away for mutual trust betwixt politicians, diplomats, intelligence heads in addition to the armed forces brass. In the aftermath of 1962, the lesson was good assimilated. Today, however, in that location is discernable isolation alongside these pillars of the province - the lesson has non survived; the armed forces leadership has turned professionally to a greater extent than emphatic though. 

Fostering Military Professionalism

Our narrative of the 1962 border conflict is but a listing of self-deprecating ‘never dos’. H5N1 forcefulness of but 3 weak brigades inwards the Eastern in addition to ii inwards the Western Sectors out of xl odd inwards the Indian Army at that time, were inducted post-haste to occupy disjointed defensive positions with piffling inwards damage of depth, burn downward support, obstacles, manoeuvre elements, etc., to offering what bloody resistance the valiant officers in addition to men could. Deserted yesteryear cardinal tactical sense inwards confront of political pressure, superlative Indian commanders had thus left the entire combat zone for every bit many every bit 5 divisions equivalent of the battle-hardened PLA to manoeuvre at volition in addition to unhinge their defensive positions before overrunning these. In short, in that location was but ane episode replayed over in addition to over ane time to a greater extent than all along the front end line: sections, platoons in addition to companies from unlike units, hurriedly formed in addition to deployed inwards static positions for administrative expediency, fighting out through sheer grit in addition to piffling else inwards damage of weapons, ammunition in addition to equipment, till overwhelmed yesteryear text-book manoeuvre of a vastly superior forcefulness (7). It was a serial of hopeless battles fought for armed forces abide by yesteryear pocket-size groups of soldiers nether the leadership of spirited immature officers who had been left to their devises.

In contrast, the Chinese had foreseen the offensive at to the lowest degree 5 years earlier, planned inwards meticulous details at the highest flat leaving nil to chance, in addition to led yesteryear the most sharp Chinese Generals of that fourth dimension (8). Preparations – intelligence, logistics, induction, acclimatisation, etc. - were deliberate in addition to thorough in addition to the state of war was fought every bit ane must be. Hardened yesteryear continuous warfare for over 3 decades, the PLA attacked resolutely fifty-fifty if the expected resistance did non materialise. Truly, our self-righteous disapproval of China’s ‘betrayal’ of our political solidarity, surreptitious armed forces construct up, tactics of infiltration, ‘cutting off’ in addition to ‘human wave’ laid on was nil but a lament of a loser over what are cardinal to sharp armed forces practices of deception, manoeuvre in addition to concentration of force. Similarly, our soldiers having no wintertime habiliment or modern rifles did non drive us to lose the state of war – Indian soldiers had fought nether worse weather condition in addition to yet emerged victorious.

We lost because nosotros had pawned our armed forces acumen in addition to with it, lost the nervus to maintain the struggle alive. We deployed amateurishly, fought mechanically, did non convey to deport the ameliorate component subdivision of what forces nosotros had including our air power, broke upward when ‘cut off’ in addition to accepted defeat inwards what was genuinely but a few battles lost inwards an early on stage of what should have got been a protracted war. Unlike our officers in addition to men, higher commanders in addition to their political mentors lost the tum for struggle fifty-fifty before gearing up. The panic apparent alongside the Chinese leadership when faced with approach of winter, triggered yesteryear some delay inwards India’s answer to their offering of ‘unilateral ceasefire’, makes interesting reading inwards this context (9). The prospect of beingness trapped across shut passes spell the formidable Indian Army girdled upward to fight, was anything but enticing to them. No doubt, India’s credence of the ceasefire came every bit a groovy relief to Chinese leaders – it helped secure the political gains that they had sought to achieve.

Lesson 4 had led to the armed forces rededicating to the fundamentals of armed forces professionalism: contingency planning, resolute leadership, adherence to battle procedures, repudiation of short-cuts in addition to steadfast struggle against all odds. After 1990, however, in that location seems to have got crept-in some dilutions inwards the commitment to the exactions of hard soldierly ‘calling’. Military fundamentals – preference for hard options inwards training, planning, execution in addition to graphic symbol building, in addition to Chetwodian leadership, never tardily to follow, seem to live giving way to cosier, promotion hoc ‘solutions’. That such illness is a for sure recipe for dilating the armed forces structure, is a disturbing thought.

Arguably, inside the polity in that location is a connectedness betwixt thrust on economical liberalisation, ascent inwards socio-political aspirations in addition to acquiescence with ‘hollowness’ inwards armed forces resources. May be, this causes adulteration inwards armed forces professionalism. This is a virus of which the armed forces leaders have got to live wary of.

Emergence of New Maladies

Lessons of 1962 in addition to the government’s alacrity inwards acting fast allowed Republic of Republic of India to ascent apace from the impairment done to her internal every bit good every bit international standing. Thus during the next ii decades or so, India’s internal in addition to external policies reflected a novel found strength. However, effects of stale economical policies finally blew upward inwards 1991, to the extent that the acre had to pawn its golden bullion to maintain afloat. In the preserve act, defense forcefulness spending had to live cutting to remainder the budget, in addition to stalling operational preparedness became a create solution. The regression was exacerbated yesteryear collapse of the Soviet Union, the dependable origin of armed forces hardware, failure of the DRDO to deliver in addition to procurement scandals perpetuated yesteryear greed inwards the scheme which position the procurement physical care for inwards deep freeze.

Fundamentally sensitive to swift degeneration, the armed forces were shortly afflicted yesteryear depilating deficiencies inwards their inventory of war-material. Finally inwards 1996, every bit the Army Chief position it to the government: “the (Army’s) spirit is strong but torso is weak”, he rued. Soon plenty came the territorial intrusion into Kargil when supreme valour in addition to sacrifice from immature officers in addition to men saved the day. This fourth dimension the sorry province of the Army was reflected inwards the Army Chief ‘s pronouncement that, “We volition struggle with what nosotros have”. Then, similar a weak torso playing host to viruses, immorality, favouritism, recalcitrance in addition to misappropriation started festering upon the torso military. The government, yesteryear its nonchalant indifference to the soldier’s sense of entitlements, did what it could to hasten the decline. That is the province today, worse than 1962, every bit it appears.

To this province of affairs may live added some novel maladies that seem to emerge to the farther detriment of nation’s armed forces establishment : -

· Image of a ‘soft state’, adapting to reconciliation with intransigence abounds. Hard realities of power-play are overlooked inwards the comfort of ostrich-like approach to armed forces planning. Inimical forces are encouraged thus to play mischief. 

· The political directive to the armed forces remains ambiguous. The ‘Raksha Mantri’s Directive’ to the armed forces, likewise beingness cursory, is literally a ‘poor’ document because the regime is unable to provision her forces to live able to fulfil that mandate.

· Nuclear weaponisation, with the armed forces assigned to superficial role, is seen every bit panacea of all voids inwards basic armed forces hardware. Consequently, a credible deterrence in addition to comprehensive schemes for war-fighting remains elusive to the tertiary largest armed forcefulness inwards the world!

· As if hardware deficiencies are non enough, character soldiery is inwards brusk supply, every bit indeed is the absence of cutting-edge battle leadership. Average criterion of grooming is gradually tapering brusk of what must live achieved to struggle a modern state of war inwards all its hues – selected few gladiators do non win wars.

· Defence manufacture has failed to care proper turnover of equipment in addition to ammunition, causing latent weakness inwards fighting formations.

· Most crucially, modernisation schemes stay disjointed inwards scope, inadequate inwards arrive at in addition to depth, in addition to trapped inwards political every bit good every bit procedural quagmire. Logistic upgrades stay excruciatingly irksome inwards coming, spell ‘jointness’ inwards armed forces endeavours has non proceeded beyond lip service.

The Indian province seems to live intent on pushing its armed forces establishment dorsum towards the nadir!

Renewal of Past Resolve

1962 is a illustration study inwards contrasting strategies. One lightly equipped force, unprepared for combat, was hastily moved to unknown terrain in addition to ordered yesteryear the regime to engage inwards combat with a deliberately composed armed forces adversary, that was acclimatised in addition to logistically good supported, was experienced inwards combat inwards hard terrain, in addition to nurtured yesteryear a civilian leadership that understood the complexities of combat.

Lessons assimilated of the 1962 debacle had paid us expert dividends. It saved Republic of Republic of India inwards 1965, brought glory inwards 1971, preserved Indian interests inwards the part in addition to prevented inimical forces from dismembering India. However, the post-1990 menstruum gives indications that all may non live good whatever more. Thus nosotros had the armed forces crying out their ‘hollowness’ inwards state of war wherewithal, the failure inwards forestalling “Kargil War’, in addition to the recent uproar of consternation on neglect of the servicemen’s sensitivities that went to the deplorable extent of appeal to the Supreme Court in addition to the President of India. Meanwhile, larger issues of armed forces strategy - rigid policy on ‘security vs budget vs strength vs preparedness’, an achievable political directive in addition to final result oriented range in addition to schedule of modernisation - stay unaddressed. The province falters fifty-fifty inwards attracting best candidates to shoulder the excruciating burden of soldiering, fifty-fifty when it earns the dubious distinction of becoming the largest importer of arms inwards the world!

The Kargil Committee Report states, “An objective assessment of the in conclusion 52 years volition demonstrate that the set down is lucky to have got scraped through diverse national safety threats without too much damage, except inwards 1962. The set down tin no longer afford such an promotion hoc functioning”. It goes on to add, “The world discourse on armed forces modernisation currently revolves some procurement delays, purchase scandals in addition to issues of pay in addition to status”. H5N1 dozen years later, every bit successive annual reports of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence repeat, the province of affairs has non changed!

Larger in addition to smaller nations, developed in addition to developing, have got maintained their armed forces inwards expert fettle. Celebrating the 1962 debacle may rekindle a resolve alongside the Indian polity to rescue itself from some other blunder. 

* * *

ENDNOTES

(1)- In spite of beingness at the receiving cease of their ‘danda’, the liberty fighters-turned- politicians were comfortable with policemen, whereas soldiers shunned them in addition to cared piffling for their political expediencies when weighed against adherence to armed forces ethics. Hoary traditions of the armed forces permitted that liberty to the soldiers; the ‘system’ did non allow policemen that choice.

(2)- Thus the 3 service headquarters were kept away from conclusion making at the Ministry of Defence. The ‘rules of business’ inwards the Ministry crystallised to apportion say-so to unaccountable bureaucrats, when at last, yesteryear the mid-1950’s, it assigned the burden of ‘defending India’ to the Defence Secretary, in addition to inwards 1962, that of ‘ordering’ the Army to fight, to an Under Secretary! The surreptitious physical care for of easing out military’s leverage over defence-specific establishments – armed forces R&D, character assurance, defense forcefulness estates, ordnance factories in addition to right away the MES – followed, every bit did the devaluation of armed forces ranks. The armed forces hierarchy did non aid to resist such machinations - inwards whatever case, it was no stand upward for for the hard-boiled machinations of civil servants.

(3)- It is no cloak-and-dagger that these so called ‘posts’ were genuinely to a greater extent than of police pull type ‘nakas’ of ane or ii department strength. Neither sited for positional defense forcefulness nor for offensive manoeuvre, in addition to devoid of logistics of combat, job of these posts was forced upon the combat units yesteryear Generals who had willingly gone along with political naiveté`.

(4)- The Communist Party of Communist People's Republic of China (CCP) was non enamoured of whatever law that did non suit her designs. In this case, however, with Indians nowhere introduce some the contentious areas, this law did suit her expansionist plan.

(5)- Admittedly, had non the regime of Republic of Republic of India pushed her border posts towards the Indo-Tibet Border, howsoever weak in addition to vulnerable these mightiness have got been, the electrical current Line of Actual Control (LAC) would have got been much to a greater extent than adversely aligned. Indeed, gratitude is due to those soldiers in addition to policemen who paid with their lives for the existent estate that was snatched from for sure gobble-up yesteryear the Chinese – in addition to of course, to Pandit Nehru in addition to his advisors.

(6)- Chinese strategists displayed a perfect illustration of using armed forces ability every bit a rigid tool of politics. In fact, inwards the Chinese scheme, the Earth forces has oftentimes been obliged to ‘buy’ decease in addition to devastation inwards social club to secure political objectives. Subservience of her armed forces strategy to political grand strategy inwards Korea was a glaring example. 

(7)- All tenets of war-fighting were jettisoned: units had been broken upward in addition to sub-units placed nether unlike units, to a greater extent than units were placed inwards command of battalion in addition to brigade headquarters than what they could control, troops were thinly spread, hardly whatever back upward weapons were deployed, ammunition was woefully short, etc – the listing of ‘never done’ is endless. The defensive battles were fought just every bit these must non be.

(8)- China’s preparation, planning, execution in addition to extrication from the Conflict was perfect. All Principles of War were adhered to in addition to the armed forces programme was dovetailed perfectly into the overall political objectives. 

(9)- Chinese leaders did non waste materials fourth dimension inwards advocating conciliatory measures fifty-fifty every bit the instant stage of offensive was launched on 17 Nov 1962. The ‘unilateral ceasefire’ was timed to coincide with completion of this phase. The programme to extricate before Republic of Republic of India either decided or was forced yesteryear world watch to gear upward for a long in addition to deliberate fight, was pushed with much alacrity, Zhou Enlai virtually persuading Nehru to select the ceasefire. 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

1. Ed. Prasad SN, “History of Conflict with China, 1962”, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 1992.

2. Ed. Rayan, Finkelstein & McDevitt, “Chinese War-fighting : The PLA Experience since 1949”, KW Publishers, New Delhi, 2010.

3. Dave AK, “The Real Storey of China’s War on India, 1962”, CAFHR, USI, New Delhi, 2006.

4. Banerjee PK, “My Peking Memories of Chinese Invasion of India”, Clarion, New Delhi, 1990.

5. Taylor Maxwell, “India’s Communist People's Republic of China War”, Jaico, Delhi, 1969.

6. Palit DK, “War inwards High Himalaya: Indian Army inwards Crisis, 1962”, Lancer International, London,1991.

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