By Robert Bell
Maintaining consensus on NATO’s nuclear posture remains the most demanding aspect of Alliance direction inwards NATO, especially given the fundamentally changed security surroundings inwards Europe. Robert Bell writes that it is thus crucial that Allies sympathize that the benefits of the US’ extension of its nuclear deterrent come upwards with responsibilities. At the same time, the Trump Administration must appreciate that if all Allies are expected to back upwards the enhancements of NATO’s nuclear posture, they volition require an as robust arms control, disarmament as well as non-proliferation posture on the constituent of the US inwards return. In no aspect of NATO’s deterrence as well as defense strength posture is the challenge of Alliance direction to a greater extent than demanding than inwards its nuclear dimension. This is especially the representative at a fourth dimension when Russia’s aggressive actions as well as threatening demeanour have got fundamentally changed the security surroundings inwards Europe, as well as President Donald Trump’s approach to NATO has presented challenges of its own.
In this context, it is crucial that Allies sympathize the positions that they have got agreed on inwards price of arms control, disarmament as well as non-proliferation (ADN), as good as nuclear weapons policy, doctrine as well as posture.
Considering the security benefits they have inwards render for the United States’ extension of its nuclear deterrent to its NATO Allies, these states must also distinguish betwixt the nuclear-related roles as well as responsibilities they are expected to select on as well as those with regard to which they have got the selection to ‘opt out’.
For its part, the Trump Administration must appreciate that if all Allies are expected to unopen ranks behind the enhancements to NATO’s nuclear posture that are needed inwards monastic say to answer to Russia’s threatening behavior, many volition require an as robust arms control, disarmament as well as non-proliferation posture as a quid pro quo.
INTRODUCTION
The American political scientist Kenneth N. Waltz observed inwards his classic study of the theory of international relations that: “In the quest for security, alliances may have got to endure made; 1 time made, they have got to endure managed”.1 Among the many dimensions of the deterrence as well as defense strength posture of the North Atlantic Alliance, none presents to a greater extent than demanding challenges for managing the ever-present imperative for maintaining consensus, solidarity as well as unity with all Allies than NATO’s nuclear dimension. This is especially truthful at a fourth dimension when Russia’s aggressive actions as well as threatening demeanour have got fundamentally changed the security surroundings inwards Europe, as well as President Donald Trump’s approach to the Alliance presents challenges of its own.
This Working Paper looks at the challenges of NATO Alliance direction from the betoken of persuasion of the US as good as its NATO allies. It is crucial that Allies sympathize the Alliance’s consensus positions on arms command disarmament as well as non-proliferation (ADN), on nuclear policy, doctrine as well as posture; as well as the inter-relationship betwixt the two. For the Trump Administration, that agency understanding, as well as acting upon, the political reality that if Allies are to bring together consensus behind the enhancements to NATO’s nuclear posture that are needed inwards monastic say to answer to the security challenges at nowadays beingness presented yesteryear Russia, maintaining a robust ADN policy is the quid pro quo for many members.
In addition, the non-US Allies must also recognize that the security benefits they have from the United States’ extension of its nuclear deterrent inwards defense strength of their sovereignty as well as territorial integrity requires obligations inwards return. Accordingly, it is crucial that Allies sympathize the distinction betwixt the nuclear-related roles, responsibilities as well as obligations they are expected to select on, as well as those with regard to which they have got the selection to ‘opt out’.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR NATO NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
In 1983, President Ronald Reagan said: “A nuclear state of war tin give notice never endure won as well as must never endure fought”.2 That insight remains as truthful today as it was 35 years ago. NATO’s challenge, therefore, remains to discover ways to ensure that an essentially incredible threat tin give notice locomote along to credibly underpin its overall deterrent posture as well as advance Allies’ security interests. To this end, for to a greater extent than than a one-half century, nether Republican as well as Democratic administrations from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama, US policies on nuclear deterrence have got consistently been linked to its policies on nuclear arms command as well as strategic stability. Both elements of the nuclear dimension of national security – deterrence as well as arms command – have got been developed, negotiated as well as implemented inwards their inter-relationship.
For over 50 years, the deterrence policy of “Mutual Assured Destruction” (MAD) has been broadly defined yesteryear the the States to include a survivable 2D strike-capable Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) “Triad” of heavy bombers, ICBMs, as well as SLBMs, plus forward-deployed Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces (NSNF), to supply Extended Deterrence to allies inwards Europe as well as the Pacific.3 During these decades, the the States has spent literally trillions of dollars on nuclear weapon modernization as well as replacement as well as on nuclear enterprise sustainability, including for the yesteryear 25 years the capacity to hold confidence inwards US nuclear bombs as well as warhead models inwards the absence of actual nuclear explosive testing.
That investment of national treasure has been paralleled yesteryear successive nuclear weapon reduction efforts based on the principles of reciprocity as well as verifiability. From Richard Nixon to Barack Obama, the the States secured a progression of treaties that were proposed as well as negotiated (albeit non e'er ratified as well as brought into force) to heighten stability as well as thereby trim the threat of actual nuclear weapon use, including the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) as well as Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty nether Richard Nixon, the 2nd SALT (SALT II) nether Jimmy Carter, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty nether Ronald Reagan, the get-go Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START I) nether George H. W. Bush, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTB) nether Bill Clinton, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) nether George W. Bush, as well as most lately the New START nether Barack Obama.
This parallel arms command rails has paid dividends inwards price of fulfilling US obligations nether Article VI of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).4 The total US nuclear arsenal was reduced yesteryear over 75% from 1990 to 2014; the total number of deployed US strategic warheads has been reduced yesteryear 80% inwards this same period; as well as from its peak, the total number of deployed US non-strategic nuclear bombs as well as warheads was reduced yesteryear to a greater extent than than 90%.5 As announced yesteryear so Vice-President Joe Biden at the destination of the Obama Administration, the active US nuclear stockpile is at nowadays downwards to 4,018 weapons inwards service, with some other 2,800 inwards line for destruction.6 For the yesteryear 5 decades, the NPT has remained inwards force, as well as inwards 1995 the Clinton Administration, inwards concert with the UK, France, Russian Federation as well as PRC (the so-called P-5), secured its indefinite as well as unamended extension. Throughout this period, only a handful of novel nuclear weapon states emerged – a number far below what conventional wisdom predicted inwards the 1960s – as well as some nations voluntarily yielded their nuclear arsenals or terminated their nuclear weapon evolution programs.
In recent years, however, Russia’s hostile as well as provocative unusual as well as defense strength policies have got dramatically changed the post-Cold War strategic context for NATO nuclear deterrence policy. As summarized yesteryear NATO Heads of State as well as Government at their July 2018 Brussels Summit:
“The Euro-Atlantic security surroundings has locomote less stable as well as predictable as a termination of Russia’s illegal as well as illegitimate annexation of Crimea as well as ongoing destabilization of eastern Ukraine; its armed forces posture as well as provocative armed forces activities, including close NATO borders, such as the deployment of modern dual-capable missiles inwards Kaliningrad, repeated violation of NATO Allied airspace, as well as the continued buildup inwards Crimea; its meaning investments inwards the modernization of its strategic forces; its irresponsible as well as aggressive nuclear rhetoric; its large-scale, no-notice snap exercises; as well as the growing number of its exercises with a nuclear dimension.”7
NATO leaders also condemned Russia’s acquit on the arms command as well as confidence- as well as security-building front, noting that the armed forces threats cited inwards a higher house were beingness “compounded yesteryear Russia’s continued violation, non-implementation, as well as circumvention of numerous obligations as well as commitments”.8
NATO’S POSITIONS ON ADN AND ON NUCLEAR POLICY, POSTURE AND DOCTRINE
Notwithstanding the malign Russian demeanour as well as aggressive actions cited above, the Alliance has for its constituent remained committed to its ADN goals. It continues to believe that a partnership with Russian Federation “based on honor for international police clit as well as commitments, including as reflected inwards the NATO-Russia Founding Act as well as the Rome Declaration, would endure of strategic value”, although it acknowledges that the weather condition for such a partnership do non currently be as well as that “there tin give notice endure no ‘business as usual’ until at that topographic point is a clear, constructive alter inwards Russia’s actions”.9
NATO has made it clear that the NPT “remains the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime as well as has an essential role inwards the maintenance of international peace, security as well as stability”.10 At their recent Brussels Summit, Allies also emphasized that they “are strongly committed to total implementation of the NPT inwards all its aspects, including nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, as well as the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” as well as they “reaffirmed their resolve to seek a safer globe for all as well as to select farther practical steps as well as effective measures to create the weather condition for farther nuclear disarmament negotiations as well as the ultimate goal of a globe without nuclear weapons inwards total accordance with all provisions of the NPT, including Article VI, inwards an ever to a greater extent than effective as well as verifiable way that promotes international stability, as well as is based on the regulation of undiminished security for all”.11 Allies also praised the New START as well as urged its extension, commended the the States as well as Russian Federation for the strategic arms reductions undertaken to date, declared their back upwards for farther arms command negotiations, as well as called on all nations “to declare as well as to hold a voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapon evidence explosions or whatever other nuclear explosion, pending the potential entry into strength of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty”.12
In what was effectively a ‘package deal’, NATO Allies at Brussels juxtaposed these ADN policy positions with paragraphs on enhancing the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent capabilities to select line of piece of job organisation human relationship of changes inwards the security environment. Since the adoption of its Deterrence as well as Defense Posture Review inwards 2012, beingness a fellow member of NATO has meant agreeing that deterrence of aggression yesteryear a potential adversary against a NATO Ally or Allies depends on an “appropriate mix” of conventional defenses, missile defenses as well as nuclear forces.13 This 3rd “leg” of NATO’s deterrence “triad” could, inwards a hypothetical Article 5 collective defense strength scenario that NATO considers “extremely remote”, entail the so-called “first use” of US nuclear weapons if a nuclear-capable state’s aggression threatened the “fundamental security” of an Ally or Allies.14 Such “first use” yesteryear NATO could endure initiated fifty-fifty if the nuclear-capable attacker province had itself non used nuclear weapons as well as fifty-fifty if the the States had non been direct attacked. US Extended Deterrence is assumed to apply to all/all NATO Member States, no affair how large or small. However, inwards the absence of a specific policy proclamation yesteryear the the States to the contrary, it cannot endure assumed to apply to whatever land non a fellow member of the Alliance.
At their Brussels Summit, NATO Allies elaborated on, as well as inwards some cases strengthened, these basic nuclear deterrence as well as defense strength principles. Several examples best illustrate this point:
Allies restated their fundamental positions that “As long as nuclear weapons exist, [NATO] volition remain a nuclear alliance”, as well as that “[g]iven the deteriorating security surroundings inwards Europe, a credible as well as united nuclear Alliance is essential”;
They reaffirmed their determination to hold “the total arrive at of capabilities necessary to deter as well as defend against whatever threat to the security as well as security of [their] populations, wherever it should arise”(emphasis added);15
Allies also reaffirmed the NATO “first use” policy yesteryear warning whatever potential attacker inwards carefully coded linguistic communication that, “If the fundamental security of whatever of its members were to endure threatened, however, NATO has the capabilities as well as resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would endure unacceptable as well as far outweigh the benefits that whatever adversary could promise to achieve” spell emphasizing that, “The circumstances inwards which NATO powerfulness have got to utilisation nuclear weapons are extremely remote”;
They noted adaptations inwards the nuclear chemical constituent of NATO’s deterrent posture that the Allies had agreed were needed to answer effectively “to changes inwards the posture as well as doctrine of potential adversaries” [i.e. Russia], as well as Russia’s “significant investments to modernize as well as expand capabilities”;16 and
For the get-go time, Allies stated that, “NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture relies on (emphasis added) United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed inwards Europe as well as the capabilities as well as infrastructure provided yesteryear Allies concerned” [i.e. yesteryear those Allies choosing to allow the US-provided B61 nuclear bombs to endure stationed on their soil].17
As a get-go principle, NATO’s nuclear deterrent capabilities are intended to deter the utilisation of nuclear weapons yesteryear a potential adversary against whatever NATO Ally or Allies. Consistent with yesteryear Summit Communiqué language, the Brussels Summit Declaration reiterates that “the strategic forces of the Alliance, specially those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance” (emphasis added).18 The Declaration also repeats text from the Warsaw Communiqué (language that the United Kingdom pressed hard to attain inwards low-cal of domestic fighting over its Trident modernization plans), pointing out that “The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom as well as French Republic have got a deterrent role of their ain as well as contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance” since they constitute “separate centers of decision-making” that would inwards a nuclear crisis “complicate the calculations of potential adversaries”.19 As noted, the Brussels Summit also made it clear that NATO’s ain DCA capabilities play an indispensable role inwards deterring a potential adversary’s utilisation of nuclear weapons against the Alliance.
The possibility that whatever utilisation of nuclear weapons against a NATO Ally or Allies yesteryear a potential attacker powerfulness provoke a nuclear counter-strike yesteryear the the States using its strategic forces, yesteryear the United Kingdom or French Republic using their independent strategic forces, or yesteryear NATO collectively using the forward-deployed B61 bomb strike capability is intended to assure each as well as every Ally that such threats to its security as well as territorial integrity is effectively deterred.20 And as noted above, inwards extremis NATO’s nuclear policy does non dominion out the possibility of its “first use” of nuclear weapons.21 As such, the Alliance’s nuclear capabilities robustly complement as well as reinforce the 2 other “legs” of the NATO deterrence “triad”, its conventional as well as missile defense strength capabilities – capabilities that have got also been substantially bolstered since 2014 as a termination of Russia’s aggressive actions.
MEMBER STATES’ PARTICIPATION IN NATO’S NUCLEAR DIMENSION: WHAT IS REQUIRED AND WHAT IS NOT?
Beyond joining the policy consensus on the nuclear-related underpinnings of deterrence, no NATO Ally is required to participate direct inwards nuclear roles, although all are encouraged to endure engaged to the extent that their domestic consensus allows. As French Republic has demonstrated, an Ally tin give notice create upwards one's hear non to participate inwards NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) – the seniormost decision-making Alliance trunk that establishes as well as oversees nuclear matters.22 Even though, as noted, the yesteryear 2 NATO Summit Communiqués have got made reference to the “deterrent role of [its] own” represented yesteryear the independent French strategic nuclear strength as well as cited its meaning contribution to “the overall security of the Alliance”, French Republic has e'er viewed its “force de frappe” as a capability that would only endure engaged as a in conclusion resort if the security of French Republic itself were threatened. When President Nicolas Sarkozy decided inwards 1999 to contrary General de Gaulle’s 1967 conclusion to exit the NATO integrated armed forces command, he made an exception on nuclear matters yesteryear electing non to rejoin the NPG.
As Kingdom of Denmark as well as Norway, with others, have got demonstrated, no Ally request concur to base of operations US-provided NATO nuclear bombs on its soil or allow whatever nuclear-armed aircraft to larn into or transit its airspace. Indeed, less than one-third of NATO members participate inwards the DCA mission yesteryear allowing B61 nuclear bombs to endure stored as well as maintained at airbases inside their territory.
In the context of the Alliance’s get-go post-Cold War enlargement circular inwards 1999, NATO assured Russian Federation that no US nuclear weapons would endure stationed on the soil of “new” members, a sub-group that includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Republic of Albania as well as Montenegro. In addition, none of these thirteen Allies , as good as several others, supply Dual-Capable (i.e. conventional as well as nuclear) Aircraft (DCA) strike aircraft to deliver, if deemed necessary as well as approved unanimously yesteryear the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or the NPG, US-provided nuclear bombs inwards a NATO Article 5 collective defense strength conflict.23 The DCA-providing nations are limited to the United States, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Turkey as well as Greece. Although the United Kingdom provided such nuclear assets for several decades, at acquaint its commitment to the NATO nuclear role is constituted yesteryear an allotment of a for certain number of warheads carried yesteryear its Trident D5 SLBM force. French Republic has nuclear delivery-capable fighter aircraft, but they are non assigned to NATO’s DCA mission. Beyond the strike aircraft themselves, the Alliance encourages allies to participate indirectly inwards supporting such notional nuclear crisis operations yesteryear contributing other assets that would endure needed to ensure the NATO strike formation could penetrate an adversary’s air defenses, such as air refueling tankers, combat air patrol roofing fighters, or suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) precision-strike fighters. However, no Ally request supply such assets, although many do.24
In price of the command construction for nuclear operations, no Ally is required to supply staff officers to human being nuclear-related “billets” inwards those parts of the Alliance’s NATO Command Structure (NCS) that would, if authorized yesteryear the NAC or NPG, conception such a strike or direct its execution inwards wartime. Every Ally is, however, obliged to pay its allocated budget part (or “dues”) of NATO’s 3 “common-funded budgets” (the Military Budget, Civil Budget, as well as NATO Security Infrastructure Program (NSIP) budget).
In the 1980s, Kingdom of Denmark informed NATO that it would non contribute whatever resources, including funding, to back upwards the deployment of NATO-commanded nuclear Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) as well as Pershing II (PII) ballistic missiles as constituent of the Alliance’s “double track” response to the Soviet Union’s deployment of the SS-20. Accordingly, Kingdom of Denmark withheld its “share” of those parts of the Military as well as NSIP budgets that it associated with these deployments as well as “footnoted” all NATO official documents to demonstrate its non-participation inwards this nuclear program. However, a “work-around” was devised yesteryear which all other Allies “picked up” the Danish “share” of the overall GLCM as well as PII-related costs as well as inwards render Kingdom of Denmark paid that same amount to other parts of the common-funded budgets, thereby effectively cancelling out whatever deficit. This subterfuge has never been, as well as should never be, repeated, as well as fifty-fifty the Danes themselves refer to this episode, known as the “footnote” era of Danish unusual policy, with some embarrassment.
Lastly, every NATO Ally reserves the correct to seek to ensure the NATO consensus on its ADN policies – namely the context inside which they select NATO’s nuclear posture – is as forward-leaning as that Ally deems appropriate. Debates inwards the NAC as well as inwards the drafting sessions for Ministerial as well as Summit declarations on these issues are oft protracted as well as fifty-fifty contentious. Indeed, for many NATO Allies with large domestic constituencies strongly supportive of ADN (such as the Netherlands as well as Belgium, with others), maintaining such a residue is a sine qua non for their beingness able to locomote along to endorse the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent posture as well as policies. Every fellow member province also reserves the correct to seek to influence the consensus positions reached inwards NATO with regard to relations with Russian Federation as well as promoting greater strategic stability inwards general.
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION NUCLEAR POLICIES: WHERE IS THERE CONSISTENCY AND WHERE IS THERE CHANGE?
Formal, inter-agency negotiated as well as presidentially-approved articulations of the Trump Administration’s nuclear policies tin give notice endure found inwards its Feb 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) as well as its Dec 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS).25 While at that topographic point is a mayhap surprisingly high grade of continuity inwards these 2 documents with the NPRs as well as NSS reports released yesteryear its predecessor administrations,26 iv aspects of the Trump NPR as well as NSS study warrant special attention:
The Trump Administration’s policy vis-à-vis the NPT,
Its conception of activeness for nuclear weapon modernization as well as sustainability, • Its policy on nuclear weapon use, and
Its policy on nuclear arms control.
On the NPT: Despite some early on comments yesteryear so candidate Trump that nuclear proliferation to Pacific or Middle East states powerfulness truly endure good, at that topographic point has since his inauguration apparently been a really strong endeavour yesteryear his Administration to ensure that at to the lowest degree 2 electrical current or one-time non-Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), Islamic Republic of Iran as well as North Korea, comply with the provisions of the NPT. The 2018 NPR describes the NPT as “the cornerstone” of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as pledges that the US “will piece of job to strengthen it” spell “we locomote along to abide yesteryear our obligations nether it”.
On the Nuclear Weapons Inventory: Here too, a careful evidence of the Trump Administration’s NPR suggests that at that topographic point is to a greater extent than continuity than change. Its conception for Triad as well as B61 bomb modernization is essentially the same as the Obama program.27 By committing itself to pass or so $1.2 trillion over the adjacent xxx years to modernize the US strategic nuclear “Triad” of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), as well as heavy bombers as well as the long-range nuclear-tipped Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) they carry, as good as billions to a greater extent than for the B61 modernization program, the Trump Administration’s NPR makes it clear that it is intent upon backing upwards its Extended Deterrence commitment with the necessary programmatic actions, no affair how costly.
Where the Trump NPR mainly differs from the Obama conception is with regard to novel systems to counter Russia’s deployment of a nuclear ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) that violates the INF Treaty.28 The Trump Administration intends to develop as well as deploy 2 novel US intermediate-range nuclear weapon options: first, to modify a small-scale number of existing SLBM warheads to supply a lower yield selection than currently exists, and, second, inwards the longer term to start out advanced R&D on a modern nuclear SLCM. Congress has been clear inwards pressing, get-go with the Obama Administration as well as at nowadays with Trump, for countervailing efforts to persuade Russian Federation to admit as well as resolve its non-compliance. Although the Obama Administration had conducted an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) on INF violation response options spell continuing seniormost-level efforts inwards diplomatic channels to persuade Russian Federation to resolve its non-compliance, the Trump Administration has taken the concrete conclusion to proceed with evolution and, if necessary, deployment of the 2 alternatives outlined above. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 3rd selection examined inwards the AoA – a US nuclear-armed GLCM of INF arrive at (a scheme whose testing or deployment is non allowed nether the Treaty) – volition remain inwards a preliminary, treaty-compliant R&D phase (“reviewing armed forces concepts as well as options”) for at nowadays spell the Administration continues to seek to persuade Russian Federation to render to compliance.29
Some have got expressed concern that these 2 INF violation response programs volition lower the nuclear threshold or that they volition unnecessarily alert US NATO Allies.30 However, whatever conclusion yesteryear the NAC or the NPG to authorize the “first use” of nuclear weapons inwards a conflict with Russian Federation would endure momentous as well as require unanimity. It is hard to believe that such a conclusion would endure whatever ‘easier’ for all 29 NATO fellow member states to concur if the explosive powerfulness of the nuclear weapon beingness considered for delivery were ‘only’, say, 10 kilotons (kt) as opposed to, say, xx kt. It is also of import to call upwards that inwards 1979 it was the Europeans, non the Americans, who, led yesteryear Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, insisted that reassurance inwards the human face upwards of the threat against high-value targets inwards Europe posed yesteryear the Soviets’ deployment of the SS-20 was only possible if novel US nuclear systems were deployed, as well as that they needed to endure physically acquaint on European soil. Neither of the 2 Trump options proposed to counter the Russian 9M729 nuclear-capable GLCM requires stationing on European soil, as well as inwards that feel this is non a parallel to the “double track” cruise as well as ballistic missile computer program of the 1980s.
Policy on nuclear use: In its NPR, the Trump Administration renewed the US commitment to the policy of “Extended Deterrence” as well as did so inwards a formulation essentially unchanged from the pledges articulated yesteryear the yesteryear several US administrations.31 The Trump Administration’s earmarking of these vast sums (estimated at most 6% of the total US defense strength budget for these years) to hold as well as heighten NATO’s nuclear deterrence has been paralleled yesteryear substantial budgetary increases inwards US spending on forward-based conventional defense strength inwards Europe, including a close doubling of funding for the Obama Administration’s Enhanced Readiness Initiative (ERI) as well as continued large investments inwards completing NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) architecture inwards Europe.
Nonetheless, diverse statements yesteryear President Trump since taking constituent inwards Jan 2017 questioning NATO’s continued relevance, his frequent attacks on so-called ‘free-riding’ allies, his widely criticized comments exonerating Russia’s malign actions as well as policies at a press conference with President Putin next their Summit inwards Helsinki on July 16, as well as his post- Summit ambivalence inwards world comments concerning the Article 5 security commitment to NATO’s newest member, Montenegro, have got caused concern inwards many quarters that he differentiates betwixt those ‘good’ allies silent protected yesteryear US pledges nether Article 5 as well as those ‘bad’ allies who may, inwards his view, endure on their own.
These concerns have got led many European leaders – from Angela Merkel to Emmanuel Macron to Donald Tusk to Jean-Claude Juncker to Olaf Scholz – to recommend that the European Union (EU) stair upwards its efforts to strengthen its Common Security as well as Defense Policy (CSDP) inwards monastic say to attain to a greater extent than strategic autonomy from the United States. None of these leaders, however, has suggested that the European Union is now, or could shortly be, inwards a seat of such armed forces strength that it could substitute for NATO inwards deterring or defending against aggression against Europe.
Concerns have got also been raised inwards some quarters most the Trump Administration’s NPR positing a nuclear response as a possible selection inwards the representative of devastating cyber attacks. It should endure recognized, however, that NATO Heads of State as well as Government agreed inwards their Warsaw Summit Communiqué inwards 2016 that a cyber assault “could endure as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack” as well as hence so destructive that it could ascension to the bird of triggering Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.32 As previously noted, NATO leaders also agreed at Warsaw, as well as 1 time to a greater extent than at Brussels, that nuclear “first use” powerfulness endure necessary inwards whatever conventional scenario inwards which the “fundamental security” of an Ally was threatened. If an adversary’s cyber attacks tin give notice wreak catastrophic impairment on a national scale such that the fundamental security of an Ally was at risk, so it follows that such an assault – fifty-fifty though non-nuclear as well as technically non “conventional” – should non endure exempt from this key pillar of NATO’s deterrence policy.
Nuclear Arms Control Policy: Lastly, at that topographic point is the number of the Trump Administration’s negative, or at best laissez-faire, positions on diverse arms command topics. The 2018 NPR categorically rejects whatever endeavour on its constituent to secure the US Senate’s advice as well as consent to the CTB33 – a goal that the Clinton Administration sought but failed to attain inwards 1999, as well as 1 which President Obama (and all NATO Allies) steadfastly supported throughout the 8 years of his presidency. To endure sure, the Trump Administration’s NPR states that the long-standing US unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing volition endure observed as well as the US volition pay its required part towards the of import piece of job of the Comprehensive Test Ban Preparatory Organization as well as its international seismic monitoring system. But some inwards the Administration are apparently convinced that the the States tin give notice no longer sustain confidence inwards the nuclear stockpile inwards the absence of actual testing as well as do non desire to endure locked inwards yesteryear a treaty prohibiting it. Given the implications of this seat for the engagement with Democratic People's Republic of Korea as well as Islamic Republic of Iran on ensuring their compliance with the restrictions as well as prohibitions of the NPT, including belongings both countries to an absolute “no nuclear testing” norm, it would appear counter-productive at least.
There is also the enquiry of the Trump Administration’s seat on farther US efforts to trim strategic offensive arms. On the positive side of the ledger, the 2018 NPR notes that with mutual agreement, New START tin give notice endure extended for upwards to 5 years, to 2026, as well as states that the US “remains receptive to hereafter arms command negotiations”, but that this is conditioned upon whether “conditions permit as well as the potential outcome improves the security of the the States as well as its allies as well as partners”.34 In a similar vein, the 2017 NSS study also states that the the States “stands ready” to “consider” such farther arrangements, but it also seems to laid the bar for doing so quite high. The NSS states that the the States volition only pursue these objectives “from a seat of strength”, which it defines inwards price of what it calls “overmatch” – “the combination of capabilities inwards sufficient scale to preclude enemy success as well as to ensure that America’s sons as well as daughters volition never endure inwards a fair fight”.35
If these qualifiers interpret into inaction on farther strategic arms reduction efforts, it could create major problems non exactly for NATO allies which have got strong anti-nuclear domestic constituencies, but also for similar NATO Partners. For such nations, whatever appearance of back-sliding on the ADN tin give notice significantly complicate maintaining regime positions inwards line with the consensus of other, to a greater extent than hawkish, nations inside the Alliance on nuclear posture as well as policy issues. Anti-nuclear domestic constituencies facial expression to many exterior sources for reinforcement of their views, as well as at acquaint they have got a broad arrive at of initiatives with which to align, including:
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (or Nuclear Ban Treaty [NBT]), negotiated nether the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly as well as approved yesteryear 123 nations as well as opened for signature in conclusion September.36 Although the NBT was opposed yesteryear the United States, nether both the Obama as well as Trump Administrations, as well as all of the other 8 NWS plus Islamic Republic of Iran as well as all of the other 26 NATO Allies (with sixteen nations, including Finland, abstaining), it has no ‘conditionality’ requiring accession yesteryear whatever NWS or whatever enforcement mechanisms on non-acceding states, but volition larn into into strength xc days after 50 states deposit their instruments of ratification. The NBT bans the development, testing, production, possession, transfer or utilisation of nuclear weapons, as well as prohibits whatever acceding province from assisting, encouraging or inducing inwards whatever way nuclear weapon-related activities, including agreeing to the stationing of such weapons on their soil. As such, the NBT is totally inconsistent with NATO’s nuclear policies as well as posture, as well as it has, for this reason, been really strongly opposed yesteryear the Obama as well as Trump Administrations, as well as yesteryear NATO collectively.37
Second, as well as fully aligned with as well as supportive of the NBT, is the Non-Governmental Organization known as ICAN, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which was awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize. ICAN, many of whose staff as well as members are veterans of some other NGO’s successful get inwards the 1990s to pressure level nations to ban the possession or utilisation of anti-personnel landmines,38 is convinced that fifty-fifty though all nine NWS boycotted the negotiations as well as have got no intention of acceding to it, over fourth dimension global transnational moral suasion volition convey them about 1 yesteryear one.
Last but non least, the Pope is presently setting nuclear weapons abolishment as 1 of the Vatican’s highest priorities. In Nov 2017, he convened a landmark Vatican conference on the ‘Perspectives for a World Free from Nuclear Weapons as well as for Integral Disarmament’. In his address to the Conference, which included several Nobel Peace Prize laureates, representatives of the NWS as well as non-NWS, NGOs, as well as NATO, the Pope commended the success of “a meaning alliance betwixt civil society, states, international organizations, churches, academies as well as groups of experts” inwards achieving the NBT, as well as urged the globe non to endure discouraged yesteryear a “certain pessimism” that he said powerfulness Pb 1 to conclude that “prospects for a globe gratis from nuclear arms as well as for integral disarmament appear “increasingly remote”.39
These 3 nuclear disarmament initiatives, no affair how sincere as well as firmly embraced yesteryear their supporters, are non going to alter the globe today or tomorrow, or Pb whatever NWS anytime shortly to renounce its nuclear arsenal. But they volition brand maintaining solidarity with many allies as well as partners on nuclear deterrence far to a greater extent than hard inwards the months as well as years ahead. At the extreme, the NPT regime itself could endure at risk, as President Trump’s NPR as well as the 2018 NATO Brussels Summit Declaration brand clear.
Notwithstanding the to a greater extent than sensible residue betwixt nuclear weapon modernization as well as arms command that has been struck inwards the 2018 NPR as well as the 2017 NSS report, at that topographic point had been a long tape of strong criticisms yesteryear Trump of yesteryear as well as electrical current nuclear treaties earlier he became president. In a similar vein, the 2016 Republican Party Platform, on which so candidate Trump campaigned, sharply criticized the New START as unverifiable as well as unequal, calling for it to endure abandoned as well as for the policy of MAD to endure ended.
Hence the enquiry had remained opened upwards as to how the president himself, or his electrical current National Security Adviser for that matter, Ambassador John Bolton (appointed inwards April), whose yesteryear sudden criticisms of the New START are well-documented, would approach these issues at the July sixteen Helsinki Summit, where to their credit President Trump as well as President Putin engaged inwards discussions on arms command as well as strategic stability matters. No articulation tilt was negotiated there, as well as no ‘on the record’ de-briefing has been given yesteryear the US National Security Advisor or whatever other senior official, but on August 17 an unnamed US ‘administration official’ told journalists that although New START as well as INF (which Russian Federation without justification accuses the the States of violating as well) were indeed discussed, “the 2 leaders did non concur on a way forward”.40 For their part, according to post-summit world comments yesteryear several Russian regime officials, from Putin on down, the 2 sides agreed to engage inwards follow-up talks with the objectives, inter alia, of extending the New START as well as resolving differences over the INF Treaty.41
To locomote along whatever dialogue truly transpired betwixt the 2 presidents at Helsinki, Bolton met with his Russian counterpart, Nikolai Patrushev, inwards Geneva on August 22. Afterwards, he stressed inwards a briefing to media that the Administration was “very, really early on inwards the procedure of considering” what to do with regard to New START or other strategic arms command efforts, noting 3 options nether review: extend New START, scrap it as well as render to the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), or re-negotiate New START as well as supervene upon it with a novel strategic arms reduction accord.
During a September eighteen hearing held yesteryear the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Democratic Senators pressed senior representatives of the State Department as well as the Department of Defense (DoD) to assure the Committee that the Administration did non intend to “walk away” from the New START.42 However, the DoD witness, Deputy Under Secretary of Policy David Trachtenberg, would locomote no farther than to province that, “we are taking a deliberate approach to our assessment of all these treaties”, as well as that at that topographic point would endure no “rush to judgement”.
CONCLUSION
To the credit of the Trump Administration, at that topographic point is a mayhap surprisingly high grade of continuity on nuclear issues inwards the National Security Strategy study as well as the Nuclear Posture Report it has released inwards the in conclusion yr with the counterpart reports presented yesteryear preceding administrations. The 2 reports hold the US seat viewing the NPT as the “cornerstone” of US non-proliferation policy, acquaint plans as well as budgets for US nuclear weapon modernization as well as sustainability to a greater extent than oft than non consistent with those of Barack Obama, as well as codify policies on nuclear weapon utilisation essentially unchanged from the direction of Bill Clinton.
It is, however, its unambitious if non neutral policy on nuclear arms command that raises the principal concern inwards price of effective Alliance direction of nuclear issues. Despite expectations at the fourth dimension that the July sixteen Summit inwards Helsinki betwixt Presidents Trump as well as Putin powerfulness good Pb to progress on New START as well as INF, their two-hour individual discussions would at nowadays appear, several months after the fact, to have got proven ultimately inconclusive, Russian claims to the contrary notwithstanding, as well as the US National Security Council-led inter-agency silent faces the challenge of forging a Trump Administration consensus seat on these complex issues. As the Administration endeavors to consummate this process, it is crucial that both parties present goodness faith. For its part, Russian Federation must abandon the intransigent seat it has taken for the yesteryear several years on its violation of the INF Treaty, as no US Senate could endure expected to approve implementation of whatever novel agreements spell this illegal deployment remains fielded. For its part, the get-go steps taken yesteryear the 2 presidents to re-activate the US/Russian strategic partnership inwards this domain must non endure allowed yesteryear the Trump Administration to stall or fail.
Allies recognize that the United States’ willingness over several decades as well as across many administrations to reinforce their security yesteryear maintaining the policy of extended nuclear deterrence entails substantial fiscal costs as well as entails clear political risks for America, as well as thus their incentive to arrive at consensus on these matters is really high. But whatever democratic regime is ultimately accountable to the views of its people on all matters, unusual as well as domestic.
To best ensure NATO cohesion as well as solidarity is maintained, the the States needs to rest inwards the nuclear arms command game proactively as well as Pb global efforts with a genuine feel of urgency as well as priority. The essentially passive seat taken inwards the Trump Administration’s NSS study as well as the NPR – that it stands ready to consider such farther arrangements, but only if the international security surroundings improves – only looks also much similar ‘leading from behind’, to utilisation a phrase. Instead, the the States needs 1 time to a greater extent than to endure the demandeur for farther strategic nuclear reductions with Russia. America can, of course, locomote it alone. But as the 2017 NSS itself notes, “Allies as well as partners magnify our power”, as well as Russia’s recent intentions “are non necessarily fixed”.43
Notes
1 Waltz 1979, p. 166.
2 Address to the Japanese Diet inwards Tokyo, Nov 11, 1983.
3 However, the in conclusion US non-strategic nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Republic of Korea during the George H. W. Bush Administration inwards Dec 1991.
4 Under Article VI of the NPT, “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations inwards goodness organized faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early on engagement as well as to nuclear disarmament, as well as on a treaty on full general as well as consummate disarmament nether strict as well as effective international control”.
5 Roberts 2016, pp. 47–48.
6 Remarks yesteryear the Vice-President on Nuclear Security, Jan 11, 2017. Washington, D.C., Office of the Vice-President, the White House.
7 Brussels Summit Declaration, Issued yesteryear the Heads of State as well as Government participating inwards the coming together of the North Atlantic Council inwards Brussels, 11–12 July 2018, NATO Press Release, July 11, 2018, Paragraph 44.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., Paragraph 9.
10 Ibid., Paragraph 44.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., Paragraphs 44–45.
13 Deterrence as well as Defense Posture Review, May 2012, NATO Website.
14 US Extended Deterrence is considered a “Positive” Security Assurance. The United States, together with the UK, France, Russian Federation as well as China, have got each adopted a so-called “Negative Security Assurance” (NSA) nether which they pledge non to endure the get-go to utilisation nuclear weapons inwards a conflict if the adversary is a non-nuclear weapon province that is inwards compliance with its obligations nether the NPT. These NSA were formally codified inwards a United Nations Security Council Resolution inwards 1995 as constituent of their successful get to attain the indefinite as well as unamended extension of the NPT as well as later embraced inwards essentially the same formulation yesteryear successive US administrations, including that of President Trump. The NSA pledge does non apply to nuclear-armed states, to non-nuclear states that pass upwards to accede to the NPT, or to non-nuclear states violating the NPT yesteryear trying to develop nuclear weapons.
15 “Full range” should endure read to include nuclear weapons.
16 Then Secretary of Defense Ash Carter inwards remarks several weeks after the Warsaw Summit described the nuclear adaptations that Allies had agreed on at that topographic point (which were later reaffirmed at the Brussels Summit) inwards the next terms: “We’re refreshing NATO’s nuclear playbook to ameliorate integrate conventional as well as nuclear deterrence to ensure nosotros conception as well as develop similar we’d fighting as well as to deter Russian Federation from thinking it tin give notice do goodness from nuclear weapons utilisation inwards a conflict with NATO, from trying to ‘escalate to de-escalate’, as some at that topographic point telephone outcry upwards it”. ‘Remarks yesteryear Secretary Carter to Troops at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota’, DoD Press Release, September 26, 2016.
17 Brussels Summit Declaration, op. cit. 7, Paragraph 35. In Paragraph 53 of its 2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, NATO had said that NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture also “relies inwards part” on the forward-based NSNF systems as well as infrastructure. The Brussels Declaration dropped the qualifier “in part”.
18 Ibid., Paragraphs 35–36.
19 Ibid., Paragraph 35.
20 In a vox communication inwards Tallinn on September 3, 2014 – only months after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea as well as its armed forces intervention inwards eastern Ukraine – President Obama said: “We volition defend our NATO Allies, as well as that agency every Ally. In this Alliance, at that topographic point are no old members or novel members, no junior partners or senior partners – at that topographic point are exactly Allies, pure as well as simple. And nosotros volition defend the territorial integrity of every unmarried Ally. … Because the defense strength of Tallinn as well as Riga as well as Vilnius is exactly as of import as the defense strength of Berlin as well as Paris as well as London”. White House Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, September 3, 2014.
21 In his Jan 11, 2017 vox communication (op. cit.12), Biden revealed that President Obama as well as he had come upwards to “strongly believe” that the the States had made plenty progress inwards enhancing its non-nuclear capabilities as well as that “deterring – as well as if necessary, retaliating against – a nuclear assault should endure the sole piece of job of the US nuclear arsenal”. However, inwards the human face upwards of strong dissent from his senior national security advisors, he did non formally direct the abandonment of the “first use” doctrine, leaving the affair for incoming President Trump to decide. In its NPR, the Trump Administration declared that, “To assist save deterrence as well as the assurance of allies as well as partners, the the States has never adopted a ‘no get-go use’ policy and, given the contemporary threat environment, such a policy is non justified today”. (page 22)
22 Currently, all NATO Allies except French Republic participate inwards the NPG.
23 The Brussels Summit Declaration states inwards Paragraph 35 that “National contributions of dual-capable aircraft to NATO’s nuclear deterrence mission remain cardinal to this effort. Supporting contributions yesteryear Allies concerned to ensure the broadest possible participation inwards the agreed nuclear burden-sharing organisation farther heighten this mission”. However, this appeal is hortatory as well as non mandatory or binding.
24 This DCA supporting mission is known inwards NATO yesteryear the unusual acronym SNOWCAT (Support for Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air Tactics).
25 Nuclear Posture Review, with Preface yesteryear Secretary Jim Mattis, Feb 2018; as well as National Security Strategy of the the States of America, Dec 2017. For a comprehensive assessment of the NPR, its elements of continuity, as well as the changes it proposes that volition have got an touching on the US contribution to NATO’s nuclear deterrent posture as well as hence on the Alliance’s direction of these issues, see: Durkalec 2018.
26 In an online critique, a one-time NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), Admiral James Stavridis, wrote that the Trump NSS was “pleasantly centrist” as well as “essentially a well-written amalgam of mainstream unusual policy principles that could easily have got emerged from a Hillary Clinton White House”. Bloomberg Opinion Online, Dec 10, 2017.
27 For an overview of the Obama Administration’s terminal plans for nuclear modernization as well as sustainability, see: ‘Remarks yesteryear Secretary Carter to Troops at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota’, op. cit. 16.
28 See ‘Russian General Reveals INF Violation’, Bill Gertz, The Washington Times, Nov 15, 2017. The the States announced inwards July 2014 that Russian Federation had violated its INF obligations yesteryear developing a GLCM with a prohibited range, a scheme – labelled the 9M729 – that it asserts has later been operationally deployed.
29 NSS, op. cit. 34, p. 10.
30 ‘Trump’s Nuclear Posture Review Shows Greater Willingness to Use Nukes, Say Critics’, CNBC online, Jeff Daniels citing criticisms yesteryear the Union of Concerned Scientists as well as the Arms Control Association, Feb 2, 2018.
31 The NPR states: “The the States has extended nuclear deterrence commitments that assure European, Asian, as well as Pacific allies. The the States volition ensure the credibility as well as effectiveness of its commitments”. (page 22)
32 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, issued yesteryear the Heads of State as well as Government participating inwards the coming together of the North Atlantic Council inwards Warsaw 8–9 July 2016. NATO Press Release (2016) 100, July 9, 2016, Paragraph 70.
33 Ibid, p. 72.
34 NPR, op. cit. 34, p. 73.
35 NSS, op. cit. 14, pp. 25, 28 & 32.
36 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations General Assembly A/CONF.229/2017/8, July 7, 2017.
37 The Trump Administration’s NPR states that the Treaty “is fueled yesteryear wholly unrealistic expectations of the elimination of nuclear arsenals without the prerequisite transformation of the international security environment. This endeavour has polarized the international community as well as seeks to inject disarmament issues into non-proliferation fora, potentially damaging the non-proliferation regime. This Treaty could impairment U.S. security as well as the security of many allies as well as partners who rely on U.S. extended deterrence. The price of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty could also undermine ongoing as well as prospective armed forces cooperation betwixt the the States as well as signatory states, cooperation that is critical to the maintenance of credible extended nuclear deterrence”. NPR, op. cit. 34, p. 72. At their Brussels Summit, NATO leaders agreed that the Treaty “is at odds with the existing non-proliferation as well as disarmament architecture, risks undermining the NPT, is inconsistent with the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence policy as well as volition non heighten whatever country’s security”. Brussels Declaration, op. cit. 7, Paragraph 44.
38 In 1997, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
39 ‘Pope to Disarmament Conference: World without Nuclear Weapons non Impossible’, Vatican News online, Nov 10, 2017.
40 ‘Bolton to Discuss Arms Control, Syrian Arab Republic inwards Talks with Russian Counterpoint’, Reuters, August 17, 2018.
41 ’What Helsinki Agreements? This is non Normal’, article yesteryear Steven Pifer, Brookings Institution online, July 19, 2018. Ambassador Pifer cites Putin as describing the Summit as “successful overall” as well as maxim it led to “useful agreements”, Foreign Minister Lavrov describing the outcome as “fabulous – ameliorate than super”, Russian Ambassador to the the States Antonov as claiming at that topographic point had been “verbal agreements” on extending New START as well as resolving INF, as well as the Russian MoD spokesman as stating that Russian Federation was at nowadays “ready for practical implementation of the agreements inwards the sphere of international security reached yesteryear the Russian as well as U.S. Presidents,” including on New START.
42 ‘US Officials Express Doubts on Future of Nuke Pact with Russia’, Voice of America Online, September 18, 2018.
43 NSS, op. cit. 14, pp. 4 & 25.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brussels Summit Declaration, Issued yesteryear the Heads of State as well as Government participating inwards the coming together of the North Atlantic Council inwards Brussels, 11–12 July 2018. NATO Press Release, July 11, 2018.
Durkalec, Jacek. The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, NATO’s Brussels Summit as well as Beyond. Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, June 2018. Available at: https://cgsr.llnl.gov/ content/assets/docs/NPR2018BOOKdigital.pdf. Last accessed 4 Oct 2018.
National Security Strategy of the the States of America, Dec 2017.
NATO Deterrence as well as Defense Posture Review, May 2012, NATO Website.
Nuclear Posture Review, 2018, with Preface yesteryear Secretary Jim Mattis, Feb 2018.
Roberts, Brad. 2016. The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons inwards the 21st Century. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968.
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 2017.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Relations. Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press.
Warsaw Summit Communiqué, issued yesteryear the Heads of State as well as Government participating inwards the coming together of the North Atlantic Council inwards Warsaw, 8–9 July 2016. NATO Press Release 100, July 9, 2016.
About the Author
Robert Bell is a dinstinguished professor of practive at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Institute of Technology. He is the one-time Senior Civilian Represenatitve inwards Europe of 4 US Secretaries of Defense, 2010-2017.
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