Eric Rosand
Some aspects are noteworthy, such as the inclusion of domestic terrorism, the focus on strengthening counterterrorism partnerships alongside countries exactly about the globe, the emphasis on intervention as well as rehabilitation as well as reintegration programs, as well as the pledge to run alongside civil lodge as well as other local actors. However, the strategy is low-cal on details on the “how”—it offering no insight on, for example, the sectionalization of labor amid the dozens of relevant U.S. authorities departments as well as agencies, as well as says piddling nearly the comparative advantages of possible unusual authorities as well as multilateral partners. As such, it falls brusque inwards a number of of import ways. Although the strategy reflects ane of the of import lessons of the yesteryear 17 years of counterterrorism practice—that armed services as well as tidings operations, inwards isolation, do non halt terrorist movements as well as that complementary (and enhanced) civilian-led efforts are required—it gives brusque shrift to a number of every bit of import ones.
1The get down is that the most effective strategy for fighting terrorism as well as tearing extremism is ane that avoids backlash, backsliding, as well as other unintended consequences through policies as well as practices that protect the basic rights as well as freedoms of citizens.
Over the yesteryear nearly 2 decades—whether inwards Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, the Philippines, Yemen, or elsewhere—and as confirmed yesteryear study after study, heavy-handed counterterrorism tactics stimulate got created serious grievances against the province as well as its safety forces, undermining futurity efforts as well as diminishing societal resilience against tearing extremism. In fact, the data on what drives back upward for terrorism as well as tearing extremism is clear: State violence against its ain population is amid the unmarried largest factors inwards back upward for terrorist or tearing extremist organizations. Excessive as well as routine police delineate brutality are amid the fundamental sources of grievance inside communities that tearing extremist propaganda exploits.
Beyond the violence itself, overly wide definitions of terrorism or tearing extremism—particularly across the Middle East, North Africa, as well as Sub-Saharan Africa, but increasingly inwards the global North—are as good oftentimes used to criminalize the legitimate actions of opposition groups, civil lodge organizations, as well as human rights defenders. Again, this tin generate grievances against the authorities that terrorist recruiters exploit. It also generates challenges inwards edifice partnerships alongside the community-level actors that the strategy acknowledges are so critical to preventing local recruitment as well as radicalization to terrorism.
Moreover, the novel strategy fails to reference human rights: The furthest it seems to acquire is a telephone telephone to ensure partner countries comport their counterterrorism operations “effectively as well as justly.” This represents a sudden deviation from the policies as well as rhetoric of the previous management as well as an approach that seems to a greater extent than suitable for Moscow than Washington.
2The second, as well as related lesson, is to avoid a narrow as well as short-term safety lens to anoint countries as “good” counterterrorism partners, spell overlooking human rights violations as well as bad governance, or at to the lowest degree admit the tensions that be inwards developing, permit lone sustaining, safety partnerships alongside the likes of Egypt, Pakistan, the Philippines, as well as Saudi Arabia.
The priority inwards the novel strategy seems to hold out on the number, as opposed to the character of the partners, which is non surprising given that amid the goals seems to hold out to trim back reliance on U.S. assistance. The telephone telephone “on our capable as well as well-resourced partners to growth their back upward to countries lacking resources as well as capabilities” seems to signal the finger at wealthy countries inwards the Gulf to stimulate got on to a greater extent than of the counterterrorism burdens—a potentially ominous sign for human rights advocates.
3A tertiary lesson is the importance of addressing the underlying atmospheric condition or grievances that tin give rising to terrorism as well as tearing extremism inwards the get down place. These include governance challenges such as the alienation as well as marginalization of many people exactly about the globe, as well as issues of inequality, including inwards relation to gender, which stimulate got contributed to attacks inwards places as various as Belgium, France, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, as well as Tunisia.
Although the document does refer the ask to mitigate atmospheric condition inwards a few instances, it does non offering whatsoever insight into what those grievances powerfulness hold out as well as signals that the US volition run solely “with local stakeholders as well as civil lodge to mitigate” them. This, of course, leaves out the critical role that national governments have, at times, played inwards generating (particularly structural) grievances—such as inequality earlier the law, economical as well as political exclusion as well as marginalization, governance as well as trust deficits, corruption, as well as uneven resources allotment as well as service provision—that stimulate got led to rising levels of tearing extremism.
4A 4th lesson is that is that interventions to forbid as well as counter tearing extremism—or what the strategy seems to equate alongside “countering terrorist radicalization as well as recruitment” or “terrorism prevention”—have as good oftentimes been defined yesteryear political as well as other considerations, leading to a preference for short-term, risk-averting measures, based on assumptions rather than evidence. Counternarratives, which the novel strategy prioritizes, are prominent examples of this flawed approach.
Particularly given the Islamic State’s sophisticated media capabilities as well as dissemination of slick digital content to accelerate recruitment, the US as well as other donors stimulate got invested heavily inwards counternarrative as well as other communicative programming. This typically involves identifying local civil lodge organizations (CSOs)—often youth, women, or religious leaders alongside “credibility” inwards the relevant community—and providing these grassroots actors alongside the information as well as technical skills required to railroad train communications campaigns that oftentimes emphasize the evolution as well as delivery of a “counter-narrative” or “alternative narrative.” The novel strategy embraces these efforts.
The employment is that although the programs are popular, including on Capitol Hill, at that topographic point is piddling proof that counternarratives inwards isolation are effective inwards reducing the threat of tearing extremism. In fact, the available research does non advise that online terrorist propaganda is a causative constituent inwards extremist violence. H5N1 recent European Parliament study on counternarratives concluded, “the concept itself is rather underdeveloped as well as lacks a thorough grounding inwards empirical research.” Further, existing counternarrative programs rely on questionable metrics as well as express empirical foundations, lack a fully articulated theory to underpin their impact, as well as oftentimes neglect to differentiate betwixt radicalization as well as recruitment to violence. As a result, the higher upward study concluded that “there is a ask for greater enquiry inwards this surface area as well as effective monitoring as well as evaluation of electrical flow counter-narrative projects inwards monastic enjoin to hold out able to ensure that lessons are learned.” Yet, rather than putting a intermission on the “counter-narrative” pedal, the White House seems to stimulate got stepped on the gas.
Among the reasons for the continued global popularity of these initiatives is that it allows the focus to remain on the demeanor as well as ideology of the tearing extremists—a signal of emphasis inwards the novel strategy—and non on the demeanor of governments towards their citizens as well as the grievance-generating structural issues inwards a society. This is amid the reasons why at that topographic point has been an overemphasis on the role that ideology emanating from exterior of a terra firma or lodge plays inwards tearing extremism, leading to the neglect of structural, material, as well as psychological factors. The novel U.S. strategy merely reinforces this approach.
5A 5th lesson that does non appear reflected inwards the novel strategy is that efforts to forbid as well as counter tearing extremism run bestwhen they are led yesteryear local actors, such as municipalities, schools, as well as civil lodge since “they know the local context as well as what motivates some people to commit horrible acts.” The willingness of these local actors to engage inwards this space—and the depth of their involvement—is really much linked to how the number is framed as well as what terminology is used. Careful attending needs to hold out paid to avoid instrumentalizing local actors for purposes of a global counterterrorism agenda. H5N1 bold novel U.S. strategy that calls for the United States—making no refer of other governments (whether national or local), permit lone the United Nations—to Pb efforts to do a “global [terrorism] prevention architecture alongside the assist of civil society, somebody partners, as well as the technology scientific discipline industry” is unlikely to resonate alongside the local stakeholders that are essential to creating, permit lone sustaining such an architecture.
In the end, the novel strategy is a lot improve than some feared it would be—there is much continuity from the previous 2 administrations to welcome—and the career counterterrorism experts across the U.S. authorities no incertitude deserve a lot of credit for minimizing the damage. However, yesteryear failing to larn v of import lessons from the yesteryear 17 years of counterterrorism practice, the strategy falls brusque inwards a number of ways, thence undermining its effectiveness.
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