By Jeffrey W. Meiser, Sitara Nath
INTRODUCTION
Strategy is a theory of success. If yous do non receive got a theory of success, yous do non receive got a strategy. If yous do non receive got a strategy, yous are unlikely to attain your goals.[1] These are straight-forward, in addition to maybe fifty-fifty obvious principles. However, judging from what passes every bit strategic analysis in addition to strategic thought, these principles are non obvious; inward fact, these principles are consistently violated.
Examples of strategic malpractice are slowly to honour amid practitioners in addition to scholars. In a reply to criticism that the US does non receive got a Middle East strategy, Kori Schake latterly asserted the Trump administration’s “strategy is to bound American involvement, to force responsibleness for outcomes inward the part dorsum onto states inward the region, in addition to to allow powerfulness create upwards one's hear outcomes.”[2] By what Definition is this a strategy? Is this a listing of actions or goals? How are they connected? Schake argues this is a strategy of offshore balancing, suggesting the U.S. goal is withdrawal of its troops from the Middle East. Despite the insightful give-and-take of possible motivations behind the administration’s actions inward the Middle East, Schake provides no evidence that offshore balancing is truly the U.S. strategy, in addition to seems to confuse goals amongst strategy. Withdrawing forces is non an goal inward itself. If the U.S. is truly engaging inward offshore balancing (which is unlikely), what is the overall goal? What policy is this strategy supposed to achieve?
Other analysts render clearer conceptualizations of strategy; unfortunately their definitions tend to live likewise vague or incomplete to live analytically useful. In a recent Strategy Bridge essay, Julian Koeck defines strategy every bit “the fine art of reaching attainable goals amongst express resources.”[3] While at that spot is an admirable attending to the demand for creatively pursuing goals, how does 1 assess an art? Does this Definition render a way to pose in addition to analyze a strategy? Does it exclude anything? M.L.R. Smith, follows a similar path inward claiming, “Strategy denotes the endeavour to relate ends to means.”[4] He is evoking the notion of linking strategy to the human relationship betwixt goal in addition to means, but does non give us tools for identifying or assessing the resultant strategy. What does it hateful for strategy to live an endeavour? How should the strategist relate ends to means? If yous successfully relate ends to means, do yous necessarily receive got a expert strategy? In a terminal example, Adam Elkus defines strategy every bit “an instrumental device that is given pregnant past times the policy. Policy is that which a regime decrees, in addition to strategy is a highly technical laid of steps to accomplish it.”[5] This Definition is useful inward noting that strategy is a thing humans create (a device) to assist them attain goals (policy), but referring to strategy every bit a “highly technical laid of steps” suggests a strategy is a excogitation that tin flame live mapped out inward item in addition to amongst precision ahead of time. This conceptualization encourages thinking narrowly close tasks rather than broadly close the basic logic for achieving success.
These examples suggest strategists in addition to analysts rely on definitions that lack consistency in addition to analytical value. In reply to these problems, nosotros derive in addition to apply a framework for strategic analysis based on defining strategy every bit a theory of success. Our approach provides the tools for practitioners in addition to scholars to understand, analyze, in addition to evaluate strategies. In the balance of this essay nosotros briefly pull our approach, apply it to the 2017 National Security Strategy of the US of America to demonstrate the utility of our approach, in addition to conclude amongst a give-and-take of how our framework tin flame assist avoid bad strategy.[6]
STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
A strategy is a theory of success. Theories are “statements predicting which actions volition Pb to what results—and why,” or to a greater extent than simply, “causal explanation.”[7] Therefore, a strategy is an explanation of how in addition to why a given laid of actions volition get a desired outcome to occur. Defining strategy inward this mode gives us a tool for identifying a strategy, analyzing the conceptual clarity in addition to logic of the strategy, in addition to assessing the lineament of the strategy. It provides a wide foundation from which all types of strategy tin flame live defined, analyzed, in addition to assessed, including corporate strategy, grand strategy, in addition to military machine strategy.[8]
Conceptualizing strategy every bit a theory of success provides the footing for strategic analysis.[9] Strategic analysis is the application of the concept of strategy, operationalized every bit 3 principal tasks:
identify theories of success, which may live explicit or implicit;
assess the conceptual clarity in addition to logic (in price of causal reasoning) of the strategy; and
assess the lineament in addition to accuracy of the strategy through empirical testing and/or inward comparing amongst other well-evidenced strategies.
To summarize in addition to amplify, nosotros brand 3 fundamental claims. (1) All strategies must live identifiable every bit theories of success or they are non strategies. (2) Strategies should live evaluated inward price of their internal validity, i.e., their clarity inward defining the actions in addition to the goals in addition to their causal logic. (3) Strategies should live evaluated inward price of their external validity, i.e., their likelihood of success given our existing noesis base. The adjacent department of this essay is a strategic analysis of the 2017 National Security Strategy.
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE 2017 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Military Superiority every bit a Cause of National Security (Authors' Work)
The 2017 National Security Strategy does non comprise an explicit, fully articulated strategy. This creates a challenge for performing the foremost measuring of strategic analysis, identifying theories of success. Because of the absence of an explicit strategy, it is necessary to endeavour to derive implicit theories of success from the document. Careful analysis suggests the Trump management has 1 full general implicit strategy (theory of success) for national security: military machine superiority causes national security. This theory is exemplified inward the concepts “position of strength” in addition to military machine “overmatch” along amongst the fundamental pillar of the document, “Preserve Peace Through Strength.”[10] The National Security Strategy asserts military machine superiority volition deter or defeat aggression, get competitors to cooperate, in addition to get peaceful direction of conflict.[11] Furthermore, a status of strength volition get to a greater extent than effective U.S. diplomacy, create an international surround conducive to U.S. interests, in addition to volition get other countries to believe inward U.S. resolve in addition to commitment.[12] The Trump administration's strategy has trivial to say close how to attain military machine overmatch except to claim that overmatch is caused past times the restoration of U.S. powerfulness to innovate, along amongst the increased readiness in addition to increased size of the U.S. Armed Forces.
While the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy contains a plausible (albeit implicit) strategy, the 2nd measuring of strategic analysis suggests several conceptual in addition to logical weaknesses. First, the strategy contains a narrow persuasion of power, equating national strength amongst difficult power, peculiarly physical military machine power.[13] The document shows trivial awareness of other dimensions of military machine powerfulness or other forms of powerfulness such every bit soft power.[14] The strategy calls for “new operational concepts,” but does non explicate what these novel concepts are or what they should achieve.[15] There is an supposition throughout the document that the previous management did non exercise military machine powerfulness effectively, but at that spot is no description of how military machine powerfulness should live used differently to attain improve results. The phrase “other elements of national power” is used once, alone inward passing.[16] The strategy does non pull the other elements or say how they volition live integrated amongst military machine powerfulness to attain national security.[17] In fact, when other potential elements of powerfulness are discussed they are derivative of military machine power. For example, effective diplomacy is portrayed every bit the final result of military machine strength rather than an independent source of powerfulness in addition to influence.[18] Soft powerfulness is mentioned obliquely inward the introduction through the assertion that “American principles are a lasting forcefulness for expert inward the world” in addition to that all countries do goodness from American strength, confidence, in addition to leadership.[19] However, the give-and-take of this topic alone gives examples of how American principles receive got been expert for Americans, non how they receive got been expert for the world.[20] Discussion of allies in addition to alliances is perfunctory in addition to focuses on how allies tin flame in addition to should do to a greater extent than to heighten American power.[21] This presentation of soft powerfulness in addition to alliances is consistent amongst the America First approach, but reinforces the narrow, unrealistic agreement of powerfulness seen throughout the document.
Second, the Trump management does non clearly conceptualize success. As shown above, at that spot are many signifiers of success, but they are all fairly generic. Without a to a greater extent than precise goal, it is unlikely American strategy volition attain anything meaningful. Richard Rumelt argues the gist purpose of a strategy is to overcome the fundamental challenge faced past times the strategizing organization.[22] To define that fundamental challenge is to define a successful outcome. Competition, along amongst the claim that the U.S. is falling behind, is a running topic of the National Security Strategy; therefore, it is plausible to consider winning the contest every bit the fundamental goal of the Trump administration. The clearest description of successful contest inward the National Security Strategy is an assertion of the demand to “strengthen our sovereignty” to “renew confidence inward ourselves every bit a nation,” which, inward turn, enables successful protection of national interests.[23] The National Security Strategy seems to evoke an intangible feel of confidence that comes from a secure in addition to strong nation. This evocation of national confidence is intriguing, but likewise narrow inward its conceptualization. The National Security Strategy seems to equate the narrow pursuit of American interests (“America First”) amongst a feel of confidence, but this approach ignores the possibility that national confidence is caused past times a deep feel of national purpose in addition to regulation rooted inward shared values in addition to aspirations. The phrase “principled realism” hints at a broader agreement of national interests, but ultimately the conceptualization of success inward materialistic, transaction price is incomplete.[24]
Conceptualizing Success (Authors' Work)
Third, the causal logic of the implicit strategy of the National Security Strategy is questionable. The U.S. is already the predominant military machine powerfulness inward the world, in addition to at that spot is trivial risk whatever province volition grab upwards soon.[25] If the U.S. is losing the global contest amongst its electrical flow advantage, why should nosotros retrieve additional increments of military machine superiority volition significantly alter the situation?[26] The National Security Strategy claims the U.S. is foremost to lose its wages inward some areas of military machine capability, but it makes no elbow grease to link these decreasing advantages to whatever negative outcomes.
...STRATEGY CAUSES POWER; POWER ITSELF IS NOT H5N1 STRATEGY.
Finally, in addition to most importantly, the proposed causal connectedness betwixt increased military machine powerfulness in addition to American success suggests the authors of the National Security Strategy do non appreciate that 1 of the gist purposes of strategy is to create power.[27] From this perspective, strategy causes power; powerfulness itself is non a strategy.
The 3rd measuring of strategic analysis, assessing the lineament in addition to accuracy of the strategy, suggests military machine primacy could live counterproductive past times making competitive pressures worse.[28] As noted, the National Security Strategy evokes the realist premise that fabric powerfulness is crucial for national success. However, realist theory is complicated in addition to has many variants. Offensive realists assert that to a greater extent than powerfulness is improve every bit long every bit it is non likewise costly to obtain, but defensive realists assert that likewise much powerfulness causes fearfulness inward other countries in addition to may Pb them to band together to balance against the predominant power. Defensive realists also warn against the temptations of power, suggesting that attempting military machine primacy volition Pb to majestic overstretch in addition to increased vulnerability.[29] By siding amongst 1 laid of scholars inward an ongoing theoretical debate, the US is accepting a high marker of risk for uncertain benefits.
The 2017 National Security Strategy of the US of America has been critiqued past times others, but these critics tend to either assume at that spot is no strategy or focus on particular elements of the strategy.[30] Our analysis suggests at that spot is a strategy, in addition to nosotros render a condensed illustration of a systematic critique, showing the National Security Strategy is flawed inward specific, fundamental ways.
Flanked past times members of the military, U.S. President Donald Trump signs the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. (Mark Wilson/Getty Images)
CONCLUSION
The 2017 National Security Strategy of the US of America does receive got an implicit theory of success. It is conceptually in addition to logically weak, however, in addition to the veracity of the causal logics used is highly questionable is highly questionable. The National Security Strategy assures the American people that to a greater extent than physical military machine powerfulness volition solve all problems in addition to attain all goals, but is soundless on vital questions: What are the tradeoffs in addition to chance costs? How volition increased levels of military machine superiority attain what our electrical flow marker of military machine superiority purportedly failed to achieve? What marker of superiority is enough? How volition military machine overmatch live used? How volition military machine mightiness live translated into political outcomes? What are the risks of military machine primacy?
...IT IS SEDUCTIVE TO THINK THAT SIMPLY APPLYING THOSE RESOURCES TO ANY AND ALL PROBLEMS WILL CAUSE SUCCESS, BUT information technology WILL NOT.
By asserting the unproblematic application of resources volition attain national security, the Trump management has fallen into the trap of means-based planning.[31] At a fourth dimension when the U.S. maintains a important military machine wages over all other countries, it is seductive to retrieve that but applying those resources to whatever in addition to all problems volition get success, but it volition not. As a country, the U.S. tin flame in addition to must do better. One modest measuring toward improving American strategic competence is to explicitly articulate our strategies every bit theories of success based on clear conceptualization of all variables in addition to causal mechanisms. This approach volition assist focus debate on the crucial issues of how to define in addition to get national success in addition to convey greater clarity in addition to focus to American national safety strategy.
Jeffrey W. Meiser is an assistant professor at the University of Portland in addition to was previously an associate professor at the College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University. His book, Power in addition to Restraint: The Rise of the United States, 1898-1941, was published past times Georgetown University Press inward 2015. Sitara Nath is a senior at the University of Portland. She is majoring inward political scientific discipline in addition to philosophy.
This article appeared originally at Strategy Bridge.
NOTES:
[1] On defining strategy run into Jeffrey W. Meiser, “Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy,” Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly 46, No. four (Winter 2016–17): 81-91. On the value of strategy, amongst an emphasis on grand strategy, run into Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 1-16, 194-195.
[2] Kori Schake, “Trump’s Syrian Arab Republic Strategy Actually Makes Sense,” Defense One, Apr 16, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/04/trumps-syria-strategy-actually-makes-sense/147467/.
[3] Julian Koeck, “Strategy inward Postmodern Times,” The Strategy Bridge, March 20, 2018, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/3/20/strategy-in-postmodern-times.
[4] M.L.R. Smith, “Strategic Theory: What it is…and precisely every bit importantly, what it isn’t,” E-International Relations, Apr 28, 2011, http://www.e-ir.info/2011/04/28/strategic-theory-what-it-is%E2%80%A6and-just-as-importantly-what-it-isn’t/.
[5] Adam Elkus, “The Policy-Strategy Distinction: Clausewitz in addition to The Chimera of Modern Strategic Thought,” Infinity Journal Special Edition, Clausewitz in addition to Contemporary Conflict, Feb 2012, 24-27, https://www.infinityjournal.com/article/50/The_PolicyStrategy_Distinction_Clausewitz_and_The_Chimera_of_Modern_Strategic_Thought/.
[6] Our approach is heavily influence past times Richard Rumelt’s work, especially “The Perils of Bad Strategy” McKinsey Quarterly, June 2011, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-perils-of-bad-strategy.
[7] Clayton M. Christensen in addition to Michael E. Raynor, “Why Hard-Nosed Executives Should Care About Management Theory,” Harvard Business Review (September 2003): 3, https://hbr.org/2003/09/why-hard-nosed-executives-should-care-about-management-theory. Stephen M. Walt, “The Relationship Between Theory in addition to Policy inward International Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 8 (2005): 26.
[8] For a give-and-take of the similarities betwixt grand strategy in addition to work organisation strategy run into Ross Harrison, Strategic Thinking inward 3D (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013).
[9] Concepts are the foundation for theory, analysis, in addition to assessment, run into Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: H5N1 User’s Guide (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
[10] Overmatch is defined every bit “the combination of capabilities inward sufficient scale to forestall enemy success in addition to to ensure that America’s sons in addition to daughters volition never live inward a fair fight,” The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, December, 2017, 28, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf(hereafter abbreviated NSS).
[11] NSS, 26.
[12] NSS, 28.
[13] Clausewitz suggests the intangible or “moral factors” are to a greater extent than of import than physical capabilities. Recent piece of work on military machine powerfulness backs upwards this claim, run into Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory in addition to Defeat inward Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Kirstin J.H. Brathwaite, “Effective inward Battle: Conceptualizing Soldiers’ Combat Effectiveness,” Defence Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2018): 1-18. For a give-and-take of Clausewitz’s arguments close “moral strength” inward war, run into Jeffrey W. Meiser, “The Moral Factor inward War: Understanding Variation inward American Military Effectiveness,” Working Paper, 2016, https://www.academia.edu/29741017/The_Moral_Factor_in_War_Understanding_Variation_in_American_Military_Effectiveness.
[14] See Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success inward World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2009).
[15] NSS, 29.
[16] NSS, 2.
[17] For example, Brian McGrath, notes the NSS “does non offering whatever substantial give-and-take of howmilitary powerfulness industrial plant to protect in addition to sustain economical prosperity” (Brian McGrath, “The National Security Strategy’s Implications for Seapower,” Texas National Security Review, Dec 21, 2017, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-make-trumps-national-security-strategy/.)
[18] NSS, 26.
[19] NSS, 1 & 3.
[20] There is some give-and-take of how other countries volition do goodness from embracing American values in addition to joining the American-led “network of states that advance our mutual interests in addition to values,” but at that spot is no cognizance that American values tin flame live a source of strength in addition to influence (NSS 37-39, 41).
[21] For example, diplomats should “galvanize allies” in addition to allies should do to a greater extent than to heighten U.S. military machine superiority (NSS 26-28, 33, 37-39).
[22] Richard Rumelt, Good Strategy/Bad Strategy: The Difference in addition to Why It Matters (New York: Crown Business), 77-94.
[23] NSS, 4.
[24] NSS, 1.
[25] See Stephen G. Brooks in addition to William C. Wohlforth, America Abroad: Why the Sole Superpower Should Not Pull Back from the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
[26] For additional analysis on this betoken run into Andrew Hill, “Nostalgia in addition to Strategy: There Never Was a Golden Age,” Texas National Security Review, Dec 21, 2017, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-make-trumps-national-security-strategy/.
[27] See Freedman, Strategy, xii; Rumelt Good Strategy/Bad Strategy, 21-31.
[28] Assessing the lineament or accuracy of a theory has the broadest range of enquiry in addition to ought to include empirical testing of the theory every bit good every bit a survey of relevant theories in addition to their supporting empirical evidence. For reasons of space, nosotros tin flame alone give a brief demonstration of how an analyst tin flame exercise existing theory for lineament assessment.
[29] For a realist critique of the NSS, run into Emma Ashford in addition to Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “Trump’s National Security Strategy: H5N1 Critic’s Dream,” Texas National Security Review, Dec 21, 2017, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-make-trumps-national-security-strategy/.
[30] See Rebecca Lissner, “The National Security Strategy is Not a Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Dec 19, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-12-19/national-security-strategy-not-strategy in addition to William Inboden et al., “Policy Roundtable: What to Make of Trump’s National Security Strategy,” Texas National Security Review, Dec 21, 2017, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-make-trumps-national-security-strategy/.
[31] On means-based planning, run into Meiser, “Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy.”
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