Lt Gen Prakash Menon
Had Republic of Republic of India too Islamic Republic of Pakistan non been nuclear powers, Kargil would take hold played out differently. What are the lessons it holds for the nuclear age? This is Chapter half dozen (‘Kargil: Deterrence Perspectives’) of Lt Gen Prakash Menon’s book, The Strategy Trap: Republic of Republic of India too Islamic Republic of Pakistan Under the Nuclear Shadow.
‘Pakistan’s state of war machine institution had entertained ideas of deterring Indian nuclear too conventional capabilities amongst its nuclear weapons too carrying out a brash, bold boom to unloose Kashmir which would larn unchallenged if the Indian leadership was weak too indecisive.’ —The Kargil Committee Report
Kargil is separated from the Kashmir Valley past times the groovy Himalayan arrive at too is accessible through National Highway 1-A (NH-1A) via the Zoji La pass, which is snowbound from Dec to April. The Line of Control (LC) comes uncomfortably unopen to NH-1A equally it emerges out of Zoji La too dips southwards unopen to Drass at a superlative of 5,353 m, from where it runs almost parallel to the NH-1A, till Kargil town. In mid-1999, the LC inward proximity to Kargil played host to a limited India–Pakistan conflict.
Pakistan had consistently targeted the route inward the Kargil–Drass expanse past times artillery fire, to hinder the motion of convoys proceeding from Zoji La towards Leh. In the 1965 war, major battles were fought amongst an aim to take Pakistan’s straight observation over this area. The Pakistani posts at Pt 13,620 (ft) too Black Rock (15,000 ft) were captured, but handed dorsum nether the Tashkent Agreement too during the 1971 War, these posts were i time to a greater extent than recaptured along amongst the contiguous areas of Tortuk too Chalunka inward the following Shyok Valley.
The alignment of the LC inward Kargil has never been inward dispute too eastward of Kargil too Batalik, the LC was never physically held inward strength though some special patrols operated inward these areas fifty-fifty inward winter. No major offensive thrust could live on launched, because of unfavourable conditions conditions too a long too arduous logistic lifeline via the rugged terrain of Gilgit too Skardu. Interdiction of convoys past times artillery burn or temporary blockages past times infiltrating columns could crusade delays but do no more. To capture areas to a greater extent than or less Drass or Kargil or anywhere close the NH-1A too sustain it logistically was assessed to live on beyond Pakistan’s state of war machine capability.
Planning
Exasperated past times the Indian artillery burn too sniping into the Neelam Valley inward Kashmir, equally good equally the Indian actions on the Siachen Glacier, Pakistani state of war machine tacticians looked for a site where Republic of Republic of India could live on given a gustatory modality of their ain medicine. Along most of the LC, the Indians held the dominating heights so only a few places looked suitable. The most obvious site was the Kargil-Drass sector. The knowledge that every wintertime the state of war machine posts inward the expanse were vacant, too the realisation that the crucial NH-1 would live on slow to interdict, made it to a greater extent than suitable.
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan Army’s programme was to occupy the dominating heights inward the Kargil-Drass expanse spell Zoji La transcend was closed too before the Indian Army reoccupied the positions, using regulars disguised equally Kashmiri militants. They assumed that the Indians needed fourth dimension to get together their forces, acclimatise their troops, ready upwards their logistics, which would live on hard before the Zoji La transcend opened too amongst the payoff of the commanding heights, amend acclimatisation too logistics, the province of affairs would live on distinctly inward their favour. Republic of Republic of India would also take hold to endure unacceptable casualties inward attacking the heights which they calculated, would render sufficient fourth dimension for an internationally arranged ceasefire.[1] The initial programme was executed successfully too the un-held heights were occupied past times Islamic Republic of Pakistan regular army regulars inward the guise of militants past times Apr 1999.
It seems that at that spot were some major purchases of wintertime state of war machine equipment past times Islamic Republic of Pakistan too that for certain units amongst the responsibleness for the defense strength of the LC had been reinforced through 1998–99. According to intelligence sources, the number of Mujahideen existence trained inward north-east Islamic Republic of Pakistan increased markedly towards the terminate of 1998. Around 40 novel camps sprang upwards inward the Neelam Valley, to a greater extent than or less Muzaffarabad too inward the barren hills of Baltistan. When a reporter visited Skardu inward Apr 1999, bearded fighters inward combat kit, many speaking Pashto, the linguistic communication of the North-West Frontier Province too Afghanistan, were real much inward evidence inward the bazaar.[2]
What is beyond dubiousness now, however, is that at some betoken inward the wintertime of 1997–98, Pakistan’s armed forces too the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) deliberately chose non to select the status quo inward Kashmir too opted, instead, for conflict. It is possible that the Nawaz Sharif authorities mightiness take hold been kept inward the loop so amongst the caveat that these were state of war games too contingency plans, but equally the pressures of bankruptcy intensified after Pakistan’s nuclear explosions, too Sharif turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bailout, the regular army headquarters must take hold concluded that the civil authorities could no longer live on relied upon. From so on, Kargil seemed purely a state of war machine initiative,[3] though General Musharraf has continued to insist that everyone was on board the Kargil operation. The chairman of India’s officially sponsored Kargil Committee Report, K Subrahmanyam, has been quoted equally affirming that Sharif was good aware of the planned incursions too had visited frontward positions on the Pakistani side days before the Lahore summit.[4] Sharif was deposed past times President Musharraf inward Oct 1999 too convicted to a life term. During his deposition at the trial, referring to the fact that his differences amongst Musharraf dated dorsum to Kargil which was i of the worst crises inward the country’s history, the one-time Prime Minister said, ‘Musharraf was playing enshroud too seek on this number non only amongst me but also amongst the armed forces. My objection to this demeanour became a source of resentment for him…I volition non for reasons of national safety elaborate whatever farther on this issue, although it is necessary for the people of Islamic Republic of Pakistan to live on informed of nearly the truth nearly Kargil.’[5] He subsequently told reporters at Attock: ‘This ill-planned too ill-conceived functioning was kept so secret that too the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of the Navy too Air Force were also kept inward the dark.’[6] The Musharraf authorities spokesman responded to Nawaz Sharif’s contestation past times stating that Sharif had been briefed at to the lowest degree 4 times on the state of war machine aspects of the Kargil operation.[7]
India’s Reaction
The Indian Army detected the intrusions betwixt three too 12 May 1999 too state of war machine activity to evict the intruders commenced to a greater extent than or less 26 May. The mission was code named Operation Vijay. The Indian Army reacted much faster than what Islamic Republic of Pakistan had anticipated too the Indian authorities authorised strength application without violating the LC on 25 May 1999. While the tactical battle was existence fought inward Kargil, steps were taken at the strategic degree to heighten the ante for Islamic Republic of Pakistan too to influence the class of events through reinforcement of the Western Fleet of the Indian Navy from the Eastern Fleet too the frontward movements of strategic formations of the Indian Army towards the border inward the western too southern theatre. Pakistan, meanwhile, tried to vestibule amongst the international community for a ceasefire, which would larn out it amongst some parts of Indian territory, and, therefore, justify its misadventure. Initially, at that spot was back upwards for a ceasefire but i time the Indian state of war machine success unfolded, the international community called on Islamic Republic of Pakistan to withdraw from too observe the sanctity of the LC. Republic of Republic of India succeeded past times July 1999 inward forcing Islamic Republic of Pakistan to withdraw from Indian territory, albeit at the costs of substantial state of war machine casualties too intervention past times the US.[8]
Pakistan’s Motivations
The Kargil Review Committee Report cites Pakistani writings to break the probable motivations for task the Kargil intrusions amongst the prime number politico-strategic motive cited equally ‘to internationalise Kashmir equally a nuclear flashpoint requiring urgent third-party intervention’.[9] The written report farther postulates that Islamic Republic of Pakistan had probable undertaken the Kargil intrusions based on the supposition that their nuclear capability would forestall whatever major Indian conventional response; it also gambled on the promise that the international community would intervene early on thus enabling Islamic Republic of Pakistan to larn by from a seat of strength.
Pakistan’s actions also undermined the sanctity of the LC that has served equally a de facto border betwixt the 2 nations inward Kashmir for to a greater extent than than a quarter of a century. Islamic Republic of Pakistan sent Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz to Republic of Republic of India inward early on June 1999 for talks too his principal objective inward New Delhi seemed to live on to develop the representative that talks amongst Republic of Republic of India were futile too demand the intervention of the international community so equally to compel Republic of Republic of India to negotiate nether pressure. Projecting a failure on the diplomatic front end too escalating the conflict inward Kashmir were the 2 elements of Pakistan’s strategy to challenge the real pregnant of the LC too seek international intervention.
Stability–Instability Paradox
India weaponised its nuclear capability betwixt 1992 too 1994.[10]The evolution had been underway since the belatedly 1980s too one-time Chief of Air Staff told the Kargil Review Committee that he was inducted to piece of job for the nuclear delivery programme sometime inward 1986. It is thence possible that Pakistani threats betwixt 1984 too 1990 were founded on the notion of nuclear asymmetry, a theme that was existence widely debated inward Republic of Republic of India during that period.[11] Ever since the demonstration too annunciation of nuclear capability past times Republic of Republic of India too Islamic Republic of Pakistan inward May 1998, the overt province of affairs had changed. Though both sides possessed only rudimentary arsenals, the mere possibility of suffering devastation on a catastrophic scale was considered past times Islamic Republic of Pakistan equally sufficient to deter an Indian conventional reply to Pakistan’s proxy state of war inward Kashmir, too to a greater extent than importantly, to telephone telephone international attending to the picture of Southern Asia existence a nuclear flashpoint. However, the thinking inward Republic of Republic of India on conflicts inward the nuclear era has been focused on the number of limited war, which does non quite correspond into the Pakistani prototype of the nuclear umbrella facilitating a proxy state of war without inviting an Indian response.
The origins of the stability–instability paradox prevarication inward the tension that nuclear weapons take hold generated betwixt political objectives too state of war machine strength application. Victory through utilisation of nuclear weapons betwixt nuclear-armed adversaries is no longer possible too conventional state of war possibilities are at nowadays endangered due to the fright of escalation into nuclear realm. In the India–Pakistan context, a nascent nuclear arsenal coupled amongst an ongoing proxy state of war has presented both countries amongst a strategic dilemma that reflects the terminate products produced of the stability–instability paradox.
Pakistan’s strategy has been to utilise the political value of nuclear weapons past times using the nuclear province of affairs to pigment Southern Asia equally a nuclear flashpoint. At the same time, it feels emboldened that its proxy state of war volition non invite an Indian conventional retaliation due to the presence of nuclear weapons. For the past times several decades, Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been fighting a proxy state of war amongst Republic of Republic of India using militants trained, equipped too operating nether their orders amongst terrorism existence their primary musical instrument too has included a fairly large per centum of Pakistanis. Pakistan’s strategy to wrest Kashmir past times strength is no longer a possibility specially due to the emergence of the nuclear factor betwixt the two. But they believe, the nuclear factor tin facilitate political victory if the nuclear bill of fare is used to secure international intervention. How international intervention volition facilitate political victory for Islamic Republic of Pakistan is itself a highly debatable number too is i to a greater extent than illusion that Islamic Republic of Pakistan has nursed over the years. The Kargil adventure was also a reflection of this illusion specially when the nuclear capability of both nations was silent at a nascent stage.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability
Historical evidence of Pakistan’s growing interest inward Jammu too Kashmir suggests that its interest growth bend trajectory paralleled its nuclear capability[12] which at the fourth dimension of Kargil consisted of a real limited but unknown number of nuclear warheads. Its delivery capability restricted primarily to a few aircraft (F-16s or Mirages) suitably modified. Though Islamic Republic of Pakistan had before carried out several tests of short-range (Hatf too Shaheen) too medium-range (Ghauri) missiles, none of them were operational at the fourth dimension of the Kargil war. In summary, Islamic Republic of Pakistan at the fourth dimension of the Kargil conflict possessed an opaque too highly limited quantity of un-deployed nuclear weapons too restricted delivery capability. The arsenal past times one-time President Musharraf’s ain admission was non operational.[13]It was amongst a non-existent capability to a greater extent than or less which Islamic Republic of Pakistan wove its prototype of a nuclear umbrella, to forbid escalation equally good equally leverage the nuclear flashpoint bill of fare internationally.
Pakistan’s Beliefs too Nuclear Threats
The roots of the Pakistani belief that nuclear deterrence volition forbid Republic of Republic of India from whatever major conventional reaction lay inward their misperception that they had successfully deterred Republic of Republic of India through nuclear threats inward 1984, 1987 (Brass Tacks) too the 1990 crises.[14]
In 1984, the Pakistani authorities threatened to retaliate amongst ‘all the agency at its disposal’, though the utilisation of nuclear weapons was neither specifically mentioned nor excluded.[15] This threat, if intended equally a nuclear one, was an outright bluff equally Islamic Republic of Pakistan in all likelihood achieved nuclear weapons capability only inward 1987.[16]
In 1987, during Operation Brass Tacks, when Pakistani too Indian forces faced each other, SK Singh, the Indian Ambassador inward Islamabad, was summoned to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Foreign Office too Zain Noorani, the Pakistani government minister of province for unusual affairs, asked him to bring a message from General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, ‘If Republic of Republic of India took whatever activity non conducive to its sovereignty too territorial integrity, so Islamic Republic of Pakistan was capable of inflicting unacceptable harm on it. Pakistan’s activity would non live on limited to northern Republic of Republic of India solitary but also to facilities exterior the north.’ When asked whether this implied an assail on Mumbai, the Pakistani government minister replied that it ‘might live on so’.[17] H5N1 nuclear threat was also publicly conveyed past times Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan’s primary nuclear scientist, inward an interview published after the terminate of the state of war machine practice inward the British newspaper, The Observer.
In 1990, when India–Pakistan tensions were high, Pakistan’s unusual minister, Sahibzada Yakub Khan visited Republic of Republic of India from Jan 21–23 too met the so external affairs minister, IK Gujral too Prime Minister VP Singh. Gujral inward his coming together amongst the Kargil Review Committee recalled that Yakub Khan was real melodramatic too was reading from a prepared banknote too used price (in Urdu) similar ‘fire would live on spitting from the skies too at that spot would live on a holocaust’.[18]
Pakistan’s beliefs of having deterred Republic of Republic of India had been based on the notion that Republic of Republic of India was preparing or planning an attack. This was, inward fact, non the representative too such an selection was non available or seriously considered due to the commitment of the Indian Army inward Sri Lanka, countering terrorism inward Punjab too insurgency inward the North East too inward Jammu too Kashmir.[19] In psychological terms, Pakistani fright psychosis conjured imaginary fears, which they thought they had successfully countered through nuclear threats too found safety inward the belief—a belief which has endured too from the Pakistani viewpoint been proven inward the 2001–02 crisis too the Bombay terrorist assail inward 2008 too continues to live on the source of their miscalculation inward hereafter crises.
India–Pakistan Situations: Competing Bluffs
The India–Pakistan nuclear threats are fundamentally unbelievable because of the possibility of usual destruction. So, when Islamic Republic of Pakistan promotes the notion that its nuclear capability volition live on used early on inward a conventional conflict, what it logically agency is that, at that point, Islamic Republic of Pakistan has decided to commit suicide. It is an obvious state of war machine bluff meant for political effect.
India, on the other hand, threatens nuclear retaliation only to the utilisation of nuclear weapons, which it describes equally ‘massive too designed to inflict unacceptable damage’ too postulates the feasibility of limited conventional war. Limited state of war objectives are inherently discordant amongst large penalties too to peril it all for little objectives appears senseless, specially if the punishment is non credible; risk-taking past times i side volition probable prompt risk-taking past times the other. Neither adversary, equally Robert Jervis has written, ‘can confidently displace from i expanse of important line of piece of job concern to the other without groovy peril of incurring real high costs—if non immediately, but equally a final result of a chain of actions that cannot live on only foreseen or controlled’.[20]
The critique of massive retaliation past times Henry Kissinger too other Cold War deterrence strategists silent rings true, ‘Given the powerfulness of modern weapons, a nation that relies on all-out state of war equally its primary deterrent imposes a fearful psychological handicap on itself. The most agonising conclusion a statesman tin human face upwards is whether or non to unleash an all-out war; brusk of a straight assail threatening the national existence, all pressures volition brand for hesitation, brusk of a straight assail threatening the national existence.’[21]
Pakistan’s reliance on threats based on escalation to the nuclear realm to deter India’s application of conventional strength is, therefore, considered past times India, to live on a bluff that should live on called whenever required. Importantly, the betoken to banknote is that such dilemmas do non apply to a NFU powerfulness similar India.
Lessons for Deterrence
Nuclear Factor
In whatever hereafter state of war situation, Islamic Republic of Pakistan volition flash its nuclear bill of fare equally early on equally possible inward gild to invite international intervention too neutralise India’s conventional edge. India’s reaction would depend on the stakes involved. The nuclear card, though fundamentally incredible, tin ship political utility too take hold strategic effect. Here the engagement takes house betwixt the minds of the opposing leaderships. Therefore, fifty-fifty if nuclear weapons are non genuinely used, the outcome of the political crisis or fifty-fifty the political effects of limited state of war machine engagements are influenced past times the nuclear factor. Bruce Reidel, who was a special assistant to American President Bill Clinton, has written that he was acquaint when the President informed Sharif that the Pakistani Army had mobilised its nuclear-tipped missiles.[22] India’s unusual government minister at the fourth dimension of the Kargil crisis, Jaswant Singh, confirms that, ‘India had some data regarding some deflective activity inward Pakistan’s Tilla ranges close Jhelum, indicating that it could live on operationalising its nuclear missiles. This was treated past times Republic of Republic of India equally a mere gambit. H5N1 nuclear angle to this conflict merely did non exist.’[23] Singh, however, elucidates that whatever conclusion other than the i to hold the conflict geographically confined inward spatial price too non cross the LC though ‘tactically disadvantageous, would take hold been a strategic fault of incalculable dimensions, principally because of the nuclear status of both Republic of Republic of India too Pakistan, which for the the world was the primary worry. We had assessed this carefully too were clear that at that spot was to live on no internationalising of the issue; nosotros wanted no repeats of Tashkent; nosotros undertook, therefore, diplomatic manoeuvres to ensure that the thing did non larn before the Security Council.’[24]General VP Malik, India’s Army Chief during the Kargil war, also confirms that the ‘nuclear weapons factor played on the minds of the political conclusion makers’ too confirms that the nuclear number was non discussed inward the CCS, the highest political decision-making mechanism, though it was discussed betwixt General Malik too the National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra a twosome of times.[25]
There is, therefore, sufficient grounds to believe that fifty-fifty though nuclear weapons were never physically used inward the Kargil crisis, the political shadows cast past times the nuclear factor influenced Pakistan’s planning, India’s reaction too its eventual conclusion through the diplomatic intervention of the US, which also points inward the direction of the demand for international back upwards for waging wars.
International Support
India’s conclusion non to violate the LC was a conclusion largely aimed to garner international back upwards inward the crisis. This was inward recognition of the belief that international back upwards was a strategic requirement inward waging modern wars equally at that spot are limits to national sovereignty inward task state of war machine operations, fifty-fifty inward its ain defence.[26]They non only add together a novel perspective to the nature of hereafter wars too forces required, but that international back upwards too cooperation, class essential ingredients to waging conflicts successfully.
Escalation Control
The Kargil state of war is considered illustrative of a conflict inward which escalation was successfully controlled. The peculiarities of the Kargil state of war are, however, noteworthy. Islamic Republic of Pakistan sought to disguise aggression through a façade of Mujhahideen having carried out the operation.[27]India reacted past times announcing its policy of non crossing the LC, simultaneously signalled its resolve to escalate past times the frontward motion of its strategic formations, too motion of naval ships. The Kargil Review Committee Report concludes that these moves deterred Islamic Republic of Pakistan from escalating the conflict.[28] But this conclusion is founded on the supposition that Islamic Republic of Pakistan intended to escalate the conflict too was prevented from doing so. Whereas from all accounts of Pakistani objectives too the intercept of the telephone conversation betwixt Musharraf too Muhammad Arif, the Chief of General Staff, advise that Islamic Republic of Pakistan had no intention to escalate too had asked their air too ground people to remain back[29] too the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Air Force did non react to the utilisation of air powerfulness inside Indian territory, though the Indian Air Force Chief had initially expressed the thought that the utilisation of air powerfulness would escalate the conflict.[30] The Pakistani Navy also kept good away from Indian naval deployments. What the Indian moves in all likelihood achieved, equally the Kargil Review Committee Report states, is that it sent a clear message that all intruders volition live on evicted at whatever cost. For India, the stakes were high plenty to escalate, if necessary. Deter, it in all likelihood did not, because the Pakistani game programme was to utilisation the hush-hush nature of the intrusion to forbid escalation.
Nuclear Linkage
During the Kargil conflict, nuclear signalling past times Islamic Republic of Pakistan was restrained. This appears to take hold been due to Indian state of war machine activity existence politically limited to its ain side of the LC. The Kargil Review Committee Report reveals that Islamic Republic of Pakistan conveyed some veiled nuclear signals to Republic of Republic of India during the conflict. On xxx May 1999, shortly after Republic of Republic of India employed air powerfulness inward the Kargil conflict, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan unusual secretary, Shamshad Ahmad told The News International too Daily Jang newspapers: ‘We volition non hesitate to utilisation whatever weapon inward our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity,’ given the overt nuclearisation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan inward May 1998, this threat had obvious connotations.[31] The contestation was denied the same nighttime past times the Islamic Republic of Pakistan unusual spokesman past times maxim that the unusual secretarial assistant had been completely misquoted too his comments reported out of context. The nuclear threat, however, made international headlines too may take hold served, albeit marginally, the Pakistani operate of linking the state of war to the nuclear issue. The of import nuclear lesson of Kargil was that such linkages would live on easier inward hereafter conflicts.
Political Caution
While India’s political conclusion non to cross the LC was conveyed unequivocally, it’s rationale for non crossing the LC has been interpreted differently. The official Indian thought is that it was aimed to discredit Pakistan, bolster India’s picture equally a responsible nuclear powerfulness too garner international support. Pakistan, on the other hand, believed that India’s conclusion reflected the deport on of nuclear deterrence too bolstered their picture of Republic of Republic of India equally a ‘soft state’. One could postulate that things would take hold been dissimilar if nuclear weapons were non-existent, a thought that is buttressed past times the historical fact that Republic of Republic of India reacted differently inward 1965. But the to a greater extent than of import betoken to banknote is the fact that the boundaries of the conflict were circumscribed politically, communicated to the adversary too respected past times both sides—a reflection of a cooperative endeavour. It would, however, live on imprudent to hold back such cooperation during hereafter conflicts.
Crystallisation of Belief Systems
Pakistan believed that nuclear weapons had constrained Indian reply options, too therefore, they tin successfully utilisation nuclear deterrence to back upwards aggression too a proxy war. They felt that the threshold of conflicts could live on raised too had successfully taken greater risks. Indians believed that a limited state of war against Islamic Republic of Pakistan could live on fought too won despite the presence of nuclear weapons. This clash of belief systems represented the potential for a hereafter war. Both sides imbued deterrence amongst dissimilar potentialities. These beliefs sustained too set the foundations of a potentially unsafe province of affairs too the eruption of the India–Pakistan crisis of 2002 tested these belief systems.
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