By Holger Anders
Holder Andes contends that United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKOs) could brand a significantly greater contribution to the monitoring of illicit arms flows. To highlight how, as well as address why so few PKOs get got wages of their potential capacity inwards this area, Andes reviews 1) the mandates of such operations; 2) their relations amongst United Nations panels of experts on embargo monitoring; as well as 3) their approaches to monitoring. He also presents instance studies of the PKOs inwards Côte d’Ivoire as well as Mali, which get got extensive sense inwards this field. This article was originally published past times the Small Arms Survey on June 2018. Image courtesy of United Nations Photo/Nektarios Markogiannis/Flickr (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0). Overview
UN Peacekeeping operations are inwards a unique seat to monitor flows of illicit arms as well as ammunition inwards their areas of operation. Systematic collection as well as analysis of information regarding matériel encountered past times peacekeeping operations tin john heighten their situational awareness. It tin john provide of import information nearly sources as well as render chains of armed actors illicitly procuring arms as well as ammunition, every bit good every bit assist inwards assessing capacities, intent, as well as geographical expansion of those actors. It tin john also brand of import contributions to the operate of United Nations Panels of Experts monitoring arms embargoes.
This Briefing Paper reviews relevant aspects of United Nations peacekeeping operations— their mandates, relations amongst United Nations Panels of Experts, every bit good every bit different approaches towards monitoring illicit arms flows. The Paper presents instance studies on the United Nations peacekeeping operations inwards Côte d'Ivoire as well as Mali. The Paper considers the orbit for improving administration of arms as well as ammunition past times peacekeeping missions to foreclose materiel from beingness lost or otherwise diverted.
This Briefing Paper concludes that United Nations peacekeeping missions could go substantially to a greater extent than involved inwards monitoring illicit arms as well as ammunition flows. This requires greater awareness as well as back upwardly for such operate inside the United Nations scheme as well as inwards its operations. This Paper’s findings are also relevant to efforts to monitor progress towards the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, specifically SDG sixteen as well as Target 16.4, which calls on states to significantly cut illicit arms flows.
Key findings
United Nations peacekeeping operations often stay unaware of their potential contribution to identifying as well as combatting illicit arms flows.
A key factor inwards this regard may last a lack of awareness of the requirements of United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as other relevant obligations.
Limited engagement inwards the monitoring of illicit arms flows tin john outcome inwards opportunities to seat as well as combat such flows going unused.
Technical staff, either recruited past times United Nations peacekeeping missions or if they are given access to materiel recovered past times these missions, may greatly heighten capacities for the monitoring of illicit arms flows.
Introduction The illicit flow of arms as well as ammunition contributes to destabilizing countries inwards which United Nations PKOs operate. Understanding such flows is a prerequisite for effective countermeasures. United Nations PKOs1 are uniquely placed to assist inwards the identification as well as monitoring of these flows; inwards some cases, PKOs also get got legal obligations to get got for certain actions to counter diversion. At the same time, few PKOs get got wages of their potential capacity to monitor illicit arms flows. This appears to last mainly due to a lack of awareness as well as agreement of the requirements of PKOs. In turn, this leaves unused an of import tool that is available for identifying as well as eventually countering illicit arms flows.
This Briefing Paper showtime looks at the mandates of United Nations PKOs as well as at why missions as well as the troop- as well as police-contributing countries (TCCs as well as PCCs) that get got role inwards them tin john brand a meaning contribution to the monitoring of illicit arms flows. The newspaper as well as so highlights the relevant experiences of ii United Nations PKOs amongst extensive sense inwards this field: Côte d’Ivoire as well as Mali. It concludes amongst a give-and-take of lessons learned as well as challenges faced.
Mandates of peacekeeping operations
The potential capacity of United Nations PKOs to monitor United Nations arms embargoes was raised inwards international negotiations on tracing illicit small-scale arms as well as low-cal weapons inwards 2005.2 The United Nations Security Council followed upwardly on these discussions amongst generic resolutions inwards 2013 as well as 2015, outlining a framework for embargo monitoring past times PKOs (UNSC, 2013; 2015a). In addition, Security Council resolutions providing mission-specific mandates sometimes comprise linguistic communication relating to the monitoring of illicit arms flows.3 Further, PKOs may engage inwards monitoring activities every bit role of operational needs to maintain situational awareness inwards conflict zones.4
PKOs are typically also explicitly requested to provide logistical as well as other assistance to United Nations Panels or Groups of Experts on embargo monitoring that operate inwards mission areas (see below). Indeed, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to direct relevant PKOs as well as other entities to ‘provide the utmost assistance to the operate of’ Panels of Experts inwards the ‘implementation as well as compliance monitoring’ of arms embargoes (UNSC, 2015a, para. 28). Further, the Security Council has raised the potential role of United Nations PKOs inwards direct contributing to combatting illicit arms flows. This includes providing assistance to host countries inwards tracing illicit arms (UNSC, 2015a, para. 4). The Security Council has also raised the possibility of assigning dedicated staff to United Nations missions to effectively monitor arms embargoes (UNSC, 2015a, para. 9).
Relations amongst United Nations Panels of Experts on embargo monitoring
There is continued involvement inwards the number of monitoring Security Council embargoes amongst a sentiment to identifying how best such monitoring tin john last undertaken.5 In the United Nations scheme the primary tool for this is Groups of Experts or Panels of Experts (Panels). The Security Council mandates Panels to investigate as well as written report on possible breaches of embargoes. As noted above, PKOs are requested to assist these Panels. Typically, this is done using an internal focal betoken nominated past times the mission to back upwardly the Panel inwards damage of logistics for visits as well as in-country movements.
Assistance provided past times PKOs to Panels tin john vary, however.6 In at to the lowest degree a few cases PKOs may also seek to distance themselves from the findings of Panels that bill either host governments or neighbouring countries of potential embargo violations.7 Indeed, interviews amongst personnel of several PKOs advise that missions may perceive embargo monitoring every bit an essentially political tool that volition outcome inwards accusations (against the PKO) of potential wrong-doing— past times either host governments or United Nations fellow member states. PKOs may so pick out to curtail their farther engagement inwards monitoring activities.8
The converse of this reluctance is heightened engagement: PKOs may go much farther inwards their back upwardly of Panels and, to a greater extent than broadly, the identification as well as monitoring of illicit arms flows. Specifically, PKOs may pick out to monitor such flows to seat whether novel materiel is arriving inwards conflict areas. This is assort from possible subsequent efforts to constitute which thespian or actors may last responsible for producing as well as transferring the materiel. PKOs may so engage inwards monitoring without having to draw as well as constitute responsibleness for illicit flows.
Unique seat of peacekeeping operations
The continuing presence of PKOs inwards relevant conflict zones tin john let them to brand strong contributions to the essential showtime stride of collecting information on illicit arms as well as ammunition flows. For example, Panels typically get got only express fourth dimension available during their one-year appointments to move inwards conflict zones as well as acquire information on materiel used past times embargoed actors. In contrast, PKOs often get got a full-time presence inwards conflict zones. This tin john let PKO teams to chop-chop mobilize after an armed clash to inspect battlefields and, if it is condom as well as secure to make so, document evidence left behind at these sites, such every bit fired casings of ammunition cartridges. Likewise, peacekeepers tin john document relevant evidence inwards cases inwards which they are the targets of attacks.
PKOs may also get got opportunities to document as well as centralize information on illicit arms as well as ammunition inwards a multifariousness of other situations. These tin john include the regain of arms caches as well as the disarmament programmes of old combatants every bit role of disarmament, demobilization, as well as reintegration (DDR) processes. Further, depending on the context, peacekeeping missions may access illicit arms as well as ammunition seized past times national defense forcefulness as well as security forces inwards armed conflicts or at criminal offence sites.9
It is of import to banking company bill that, where PKOs document as well as centralize information on illicit materiel, they are non replacing Panel activities on embargo monitoring. Rather, PKOs tin john occupation their presence as well as proximity to collect information on a much broader as well as systematic grade than what is typically possible past times Panels. The collected information can, inwards turn, greatly assist Panels inwards the identification of possible embargo violations.
This, at least, is suggested past times the sense of the United Nations Operation inwards Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), where the technical staff generated novel files whenever they encountered materiel considered of possible involvement from an embargo-monitoring perspective.10 The files were offered to the relevant Panel, which followed upwardly on many of them past times initiating tracing requests to the countries of production of the materiel. The Panel as well as so presented its findings inwards its reports to the Security Council Sanctions Committee roofing Côte d’Ivoire.11
Approaches to monitoring
PKOs approach the monitoring of illicit flows differently. While Security Council resolutions provide a framework for monitoring illicit arms flows, it is PKOs themselves that often determine on the specific structures as well as procedures they volition occupation to achieve this task. These decisions are based on identified needs as well as available resources, also taking into line organisation human relationship the differing contexts inwards which PKOs operate.
For example, several PKOs—including the missions inwards the Congo-Kinshasa (DRC) as well as the Central African Republic (CAR)—created advertising hoc working groups that take away together different mission components to coordinate their efforts inwards relation to embargo monitoring. Missions may also adopt advertising hoc structures for specific tasks. In Nov 2013 the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission inwards the Congo-Kinshasa (MONUSCO)12 convened an assessment squad to document materiel left behind past times the M23 armed grouping inwards eastern DRC after the grouping withdrew from the area.13 One of the tasks of the MONUSCO squad was to assess whether the materiel contained whatever evidence of states inwards the subregion illicitly supplying M23.14
Monitoring past times UNOCI
UNOCI,15 which closed inwards June 2017, had an extensive mandate on embargo monitoring, including carrying out inspections of the stockpiles of embargoed province actors inwards Côte d’Ivoire.16 Notably, UNOCI’s activities inwards this regard were strongly encouraged past times the Panel of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire (CDI Panel): every bit early on every bit 2005 the Panel urged the creation of stronger monitoring capacities inside UNOCI, including recommending the recruitment of a consultant on embargo monitoring.17
Under this strong mandate UNOCI established the Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit at its headquarters. This unit of measurement collated information collected past times inspection teams throughout the country. The mission farther strengthened its capabilities inwards 2011, appointing a technical specialist inwards identifying as well as monitoring illicit arms flows. This meant that UNOCI was non express to collecting as well as sharing information only amongst the CDI Panel. Rather, the mission was able to proceed independently amongst preliminary analyses of whether the materiel it encountered suggested possible violations of the arms embargo.18
For example, UNOCI monitoring staff regularly screened materiel collected inwards disarmament programmes, noting models, producers, as well as years of production, amid other characteristics. This screening allowed for the identification of diverse types of arms as well as ammunition whose presence suggested possible embargo violations. Thus, where materiel produced after the embargo of 2004 was encountered,19 it could last flagged every bit of possible involvement from an embargo perspective. As noted above, these instance files were as well as so shared amongst the CDI Panel, which decided on possible follow-up. Without the monitoring unit’s work, the CDI Panel would arguably non get got been aware of the presence of diverse materiel inwards the country.20
Box 1 Foreign-sourced materiel used past times Malian terrorist groups
Much of the arms as well as ammunition used past times armed groups inwards Republic of Mali was looted from stockpiles of national defense forcefulness as well as security forces inwards 2012, every bit good every bit inwards previous rebellions inwards northern Mali. Armed groups who arrived from Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya closed to 2011–12 brought other materiel to Mali, particularly heavy machine guns mounted on 4 × 4 vehicles. While armed groups maintain to occupation such materiel, they also add together to their stocks amongst ongoing procurement from nearby countries.
In this context, Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was as well as remains an of import source of arms as well as ammunition for armed groups inwards Mali. This is particularly truthful amongst observe to anti-vehicle mines as well as mortar shells (including both 81 mm as well as threescore mm). Until 2016 investigators regularly documented small-scale arms ammunition coming from Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya that appeared inwards ‘waves’: similar ammunition would last found for a duo of months, as well as would as well as so last replaced past times other ammunition that was non previously present. These waves reflected the arrival of novel shipments for the diverse armed groups.
New sources
More recently, MINUSMA investigators tin john increasingly draw small-scale arms ammunition used past times armed groups inwards Republic of Mali to states inwards the subregion other than Libya. Investigators get got also documented diverse supplies from the territories of West African coastal states. This materiel includes explosives for occupation inwards commercial mining operations that terrorist groups occupation inwards the construction of improvised explosive devices inwards Mali.
It is interesting to banking company bill that much of the to a greater extent than late encountered materiel was produced inwards recent years: MINUSMA investigators oftentimes run into ammunition used past times armed groups inwards Republic of Mali that was produced inwards 2014 as well as 2015. Such ammunition was clearly diverted after the crisis inwards northern Republic of Mali inwards 2012. Similarly, investigators traced commercial explosives recovered inwards an arms cache inwards May 2017 to an export to a province inwards the sub-region inwards Nov 2016, which agency that the materiel was diverted inside months of its arrival at its master copy destination.
Collaboration amongst exterior investigators
PKOs human face upwardly constraints inwards the information they tin john percentage amongst non-UN actors. It is of import to banking company bill that MINUSMA is only i of several actors inwards Republic of Mali involved inwards the collection as well as analysis of arms as well as ammunition used past times armed groups. Other actors include national authorities, international armed forces, as well as the staff of specialized non-governmental organizations.
In practice, collaboration betwixt MINUSMA as well as exterior investigators is indirect. MINUSMA alerts national authorities to the identification of perchance embargo-violating materiel every bit role of its mandate to assist them inwards combatting illicit small-scale arms flows. National authorities get got afterwards used this information every bit the footing for their ain requests to exterior investigators to deport tracing operations designed to seat the concluding known betoken of the materiel inwards legal possession. The findings of these tracing operations are as well as so shared amongst both national authorities as well as MINUSMA to assist inwards their monitoring activities.
Significance
Tracing diverted materiel is reactive: it typically deals amongst materiel that has already been diverted. But monitoring illicit weapons flows as well as identifying sources let MINUSMA to complement its agreement of the intent as well as capabilities of armed groups. In addition, they heighten MINUSMA’s agreement of the orbit of the activities of armed groups inwards the sub-region. Importantly, these activities also let national as well as international actors to ameliorate target trafficking routes inwards efforts to disrupt armed groups’ render lines.
Case study: rifles used past times terrorist grouping Al Murabitun inwards attacks on hotels as well as other locations
MINUSMA’s role inwards monitoring illicit arms flows is illustrated past times investigations into materiel used past times the Al Murabitun brigade, an armed grouping affiliated to al-Qaeda as well as operating inwards West Africa. On seven August 2015 assailants attacked a guesthouse inwards which United Nations contractors were residing inwards Sévaré, Mali, killing 8 people. One attacker also died inwards a firefight amongst Malian soldiers who arrived on the scene after the start of the attack. Al Murabitun afterwards claimed responsibleness for the attack.
Following the attack, MINUSMA documented an AKMS-pattern assault rifle used past times the attacker who was killed. The rifle was 7.62 × 39 mm inwards calibre as well as produced inwards 2011 (see photograph inset inwards Map 1). In collaboration amongst Malian authorities, MINUSMA investigators established that assault rifles of the model, producer, as well as twelvemonth of production inwards inquiry were non role of the stockpiles of the Malian Defence as well as Security Forces. In other words, at that topographic point was a clear indication that the rifle had been illegally trafficked into Mali.
This finding became fifty-fifty to a greater extent than pertinent after the recovery of farther assault rifles of the same model, producer, as well as twelvemonth of production next subsequent attacks inwards Bamako, Mali;21 Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso;22 Grand Bassam, Côte d’Ivoire;23 as well as inwards Gao, Gao region, Mali.24 In all of the attacks the assailants used assault rifles from the same initial illegal transfer to Al Murabitun. MINUSMA as well as associated investigators could so link the diverse attacks as well as confirm that they had probable been centrally planned as well as facilitated. These findings clearly demonstrated the capacity of Al Murabitun to phase attacks non only inwards cardinal as well as northern Mali, but inwards neighbouring countries every bit well. This allowed security actors to ameliorate hide Al Murabitun’s capacities (see Map 1).
Map 1 Geographical distribution of Al Murabitun attacks
Photo inset: AK-pattern rifle recovered from the site of i of the attacks. Source: Holger Anders (2017)
Box 2
Tracking domestic distribution If monitoring illicit supplies from abroad is i focus of MINUSMA activities, some other is the tracking of the domestic distribution of the materiel investigators encounter. Such tracking allows MINUSMA to confirm the areas of operations of specific armed groups, every bit good every bit commonalities as well as differences inwards procurement betwixt as well as amid the groups. In the Malian context, which is marked past times a multitude of armed groups, such tracking has proven highly beneficial inwards damage of improving MINUSMA’s situational awareness.
For example, based on the recovery of specific ammunition next assassinations inwards cardinal Republic of Mali inwards 2016, investigators confirmed that the assailants were connected to a particular armed group: at the fourth dimension of the onset the armed grouping inwards inquiry was the only i to occupation this ammunition. Investigators were also able to demonstrate that armed groups operating inwards northern Republic of Mali provided cloth back upwardly to groups inwards cardinal Mali. This finding contributed to a revision of MINUSMA’s terrorist threat predictions for cardinal Mali.
Developing investigative leads
As noted above, MINUSMA as well as collaborating investigators assisted national authorities inwards establishing links amid several terrorist attacks inwards the menstruum 2015–16 (see Box 1). MINUSMA as well as collaborating investigators also assisted authorities inwards Republic of Mali as well as Burkina Faso inwards establishing linkages betwixt several attacks inwards 2017.25 As amongst the before attacks, investigators were able to link assault rifles used inwards the attacks to a specific armed group. Notably, the rifles were linked to arms recovered inwards a prior seizure inwards Republic of Mali inwards early on 2016. This demonstrated that the arms seized inwards early on 2016 came from the same armed grouping stockpile every bit the arms used past times assailants inwards the 2017 attacks, providing novel investigative leads that were unlikely to get got been otherwise explored.
Significance
Tracking the domestic distribution of arms as well as ammunition used past times armed groups contributes to situational awareness regarding both the areas of functioning as well as the identity of the armed groups responsible for attacks inwards Mali. MINUSMA’s operate inwards this regard also assists national authorities inwards their ain investigations. It direct contributes to edifice their nascent capacities for the identification as well as monitoring of illicit arms flows.
Case study: distribution of 2015-produced small-scale arms ammunition inwards terrorist attacks
Since 2016 MINUSMA as well as collaborating investigators get got repeatedly documented for certain ammunition used inwards diverse attacks as well as associated incidents inwards cardinal Mali. The collection of this ammunition—calibre 7.62 × 39 mm, produced inwards 2015—at specific onset sites allowed MINUSMA to necktie it direct to Katibat Massina, an al-Qaeda-affiliated armed group. After determining that this ammunition was non used past times whatever other armed grouping inwards Republic of Mali as well as was non inwards broader circulation inwards cardinal Republic of Mali (it was non used inwards crimes or bandit attacks, for example), MINUSMA was able to gain greater insights into Katibat Massina’s procurement lines. MINUSMA’s regain also provided investigative leads for national authorities linked to a hit of assassinations of local authorities as well as religious leaders inwards cardinal Republic of Mali that, prior to the finding, could non last linked to Katibat Massina.
Monitoring past times MINUSMA
Security Council Resolution 2253 as well as related resolutions established an arms embargo on for certain terrorist groups (UNSC, 2015b). Some of these groups operate inwards Mali. In its resolutions mandating the operations of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission inwards Republic of Mali (MINUSMA)26 the Security Council requested the mission to assist the sanctions-monitoring squad inwards the verification of the implementation of this embargo.27
MINUSMA, dissimilar UNOCI (see above), does non get got a formal construction to monitor the arms embargo on terrorist groups operating inwards the centre as well as northward of Mali. Despite the lack of a formal structure, staff amongst sense inwards embargo monitoring are supporting mission-wide efforts to document as well as centralize information on arms as well as ammunition used inwards terrorist attacks against MINUSMA or other targets. Collected information on materiel is systematically entered into a database, together amongst contextual information on the location as well as appointment of use, documentation of the materiel, as well as information on the presumed users of the materiel.28
In 4 years MINUSMA documented to a greater extent than than 600 armed forces small-scale arms as well as low-cal weapons as well as to a greater extent than than 12,000 rounds of associated ammunition. The materiel was documented after its recovery inwards some 430 terrorist attacks, caches, as well as other incidents, including acts of banditry.29 The collected information was as well as so compared against known stock of Malian defense forcefulness as well as security forces. In collaboration amongst national authorities, MINUSMA staff get got identified diverse materiel that was probable trafficked illegally into Republic of Mali from abroad (see Box 1). MINUSMA staff also rail the in-country internal distribution of relevant materiel to seat the domestic render chains of terrorist groups (see Box 2). As mandated, MINUSMA shares the information amongst the relevant Panel, every bit good every bit national investigative as well as judicial authorities.30
Beyond monitoring: improving mission administration of arms as well as ammunition
While PKOs may brand meaning contributions to monitoring illicit arms flows, they themselves may also feed illicit markets if seized as well as recovered arms as well as ammunition are non managed adequately. Policies, procedures, as well as best practices closed to the administration of recovered weapons past times PKOs tin john vary considerably, as well as anecdotal information suggests that, inwards some instances, seized materiel may genuinely get got re-entered illicit circulation. Furthermore, arms as well as ammunition that peacekeeping troops take away amongst them into mission areas—known every bit contingent- owned equipment (COE)—can last diverted if captured during attacks or lost due to pitiable administration as well as lack of accountability. As enquiry past times the Small Arms Survey has shown, the job of lost as well as diverted COE is much wider than previously understood, representing millions of rounds of ammunition as well as thousands of weapons.31
In Jan 2018 the United Nations published a handbook for DDR practitioners entitled Effective Weapons as well as Ammunition Management inwards a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization as well as Reintegration Context.32 The Small Arms Survey, every bit role of its Making Peace Operations More Effective project, is assisting regional organizations that authorize peace operations to improve on electrical flow practices to foreclose such losses.
Member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are amid the most active TCCs involved inwards United Nations PKOs.33 They are bailiwick to obligations placed on them past times their governments every bit a outcome of the 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms as well as Light Weapons, Their Ammunition as well as Other Related Materials, which entered into forcefulness inwards 2009 (ECOWAS, 2006), as well as the 2010 Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms as well as Light Weapons, Their Ammunition as well as All Parts as well as Components that Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair as well as Assembly, which entered into forcefulness inwards 2017 (Kinshasa Convention, 2010).
Article xi of the ECOWAS Convention as well as Article 22 of the Kinshasa Convention both require troops from the fellow member states of these ii regions to document inwards centralized sub-regional databases the small-scale arms as well as ammunition they take away into as well as get got out of mission areas (including their parts as well as components). The ECOWAS Convention contains a requirement that TCCs from fellow member states
declare to the ECOWAS Executive Secretary all the small-scale arms as well as low-cal weapons seized, collected and/or destroyed during peace operations on their territory as well as inwards the ECOWAS part (ECOWAS, 2006, art. 11.1.c).
Similarly, the Kinshasa Convention stipulates that
data relating to weapons as well as ammunition collected during disarmament, demobilization as well as reintegration operations, shall last kept inwards the subregional database of weapons used inwards peacekeeping operations for a minimum of thirty years (Kinshasa Convention, 2010, art. 22.2).
At introduce these measures are largely aspirational. The Small Arms Survey is working amongst ECOWAS to constitute as well as implement a reporting tool that would assist start to brand these provisions a reality.
Best practices as well as lessons learned
Experience demonstrates the feasibility of monitoring illicit arms flows past times PKOs. Lessons learned include the demand for systematic information collection as well as centralization. In practical terms, this may entail the collection of cartridge cases as well as other evidence from sites of attacks against PKO personnel (where this is non done past times national authorities). It may also require consistent efforts to adequately document arms as well as ammunition seized past times PKOs or national authorities, or otherwise recovered from illicit circulation as well as use. Any such information that is gathered should last centralized to let for the analysis as well as identification of trafficking flows as well as changes to them.
Collection as well as documentation efforts volition greatly make goodness if the trained personnel conducting them know how to tape the information nearly arms as well as ammunition that is useful for the purposes of monitoring illicit flows. (This type of information is necessarily to a greater extent than detailed than, for example, the usual documentation required past times DDR programmes.) The evolution of identification guides as well as baseline studies on materiel introduce inwards a province tin john last considered best practise inwards this regard. Maintaining a database on encountered materiel over a longer-term menstruum (as MINUSMA does inwards Mali, for example)34 facilitates the identification of previously undocumented materiel as well as tin john assist inwards the identification of materiel that has only late arrived inwards a conflict area.
A to a greater extent than comprehensive approach to monitoring tin john last provided inwards cases inwards which PKOs get got staff who get got the technical noesis required for the identification of illicit materiel as well as the sense to determine whether this materiel may reverberate recent trafficking flows. If no such trained, experienced staff are available, PKOs may also consider (within the framework of their mandates) providing access to collected information to technical specialists from elsewhere inwards the United Nations system, or to specialized nongovernmental organizations.
In the longer term it may also last useful to ameliorate link different PKOs active inwards the monitoring of illicit arms flows inwards their areas of functioning amongst a sentiment to sharing noesis as well as experience, as well as harmonizing information collection tools. This may assist inwards providing a broader motion-picture demo of the illicit circulation of arms. It may also assist inform sub-regional efforts to combat the illicit trafficking of arms as well as ammunition.
Challenges
There are a number of challenges to PKOs’ collection of information on illicit arms as well as ammunition flows. Practically, access to arms as well as ammunition of embargoed actors tin john last difficult. Even the recovery of materiel next armed attacks tin john pose security as well as security risks or require move to remote as well as insecure locations. PKOs also human face upwardly conceptual constraints. The lack of awareness inside PKOs nearly the capacities required for identifying as well as monitoring illicit arms flows is i such constraint. The belief that—in the absence of explicit linguistic communication authorizing such activities— PKOs lack the mandate for such operate as well as that it should last left solely to Panels of Experts appointed past times the Security Council tin john curtail collection efforts. As a outcome of these challenges, the full general dominion is that PKOs only rarely engage inwards the systematic documentation of arms as well as ammunition of embargoed actors, leaving unexploited their unique opportunities to seat as well as monitor illicit flows of arms, ammunition, as well as related materiel.
At the same time, some debate that PKOs may run into difficulties if they make to a greater extent than than monitor illicit arms flows. PKOs may last comfortable monitoring whatever illicit materiel newly arrived inwards conflict zones—when it arrives, who is using it, as well as what mightiness last learned from its distribution—but using this information every bit the footing of farther investigation may elevate other issues. Thus, if a PKO sought to initiate international tracing requests inwards an elbow grease to comprehensively document the transfer chains of materiel from its legal producer upwardly to its betoken of diversion, it could human face upwardly farther challenges. For example, if producer states were unwilling to cooperate inwards such tracing operations the PKO leadership could go concerned nearly political backlash from states accusing the mission of ‘overstepping’ its mandate.
Even acknowledging the potential challenges posed past times doing more, monitoring illicit flows—even without establishing exact points of diversion—can greatly assist PKOs inwards fulfilling their missions. Monitoring tin john improve situational awareness for PKOs, every bit good every bit assist national authorities inwards carrying out investigations as well as taking appropriate measures to disrupt illicit arms flows. Further, the instance of MINUSMA suggests that PKOs tin john also make goodness from information provided past times exterior investigators supporting national authorities through the deport of tracing operations inwards relation to materiel identified every bit potentially representing embargo violations.
At present, the primary reasons that PKOs are non systematically including the monitoring of illicit flows inwards their activities are twofold. Firstly, at that topographic point appears to last express awareness inside PKOs on how to seat as well as monitor illicit arms flows. Secondly, express resources inside PKOs may foreclose the information collection as well as analysis activities that would last required for such work. Thus, the absence of technical staff that could assist PKOs to develop agency as well as mechanisms that would let them to ameliorate brand occupation of their opportunities is the full general norm for PKOs.
Conclusion: looking ahead
UN PKOs are uniquely placed to assist inwards the identification as well as monitoring of illicit arms flows. How they approach such monitoring may differ according to their specific mandates as well as circumstances. Experience suggests, however, that PKOs tin john brand meaning contributions inwards this area. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 critical chemical element inwards this regard is the availability of staff amongst adequate technical knowledge. Such staff tin john back upwardly mission-wide efforts at systematic information collection, centralization, as well as followup, whether past times doing the PKO’s ain analysis, forwarding the information to relevant United Nations Panels of Experts, or forwarding it to national authorities. Raising awareness of these possibilities inside both the United Nations as well as its PKOs may assist to build back upwardly as well as capacities for such work.
PKOs may also consider enhancing their monitoring capacities inwards areas related to arms trafficking that are pertinent to their mandates as well as contexts. For example, inwards Mali, it is non only illicit arms as well as ammunition that fuel armed violence, but also commercial components. For example, the vehicles armed groups use, whether to displace closed to inwards conflict-affected areas or inwards attacks, improvised explosive devices, or suicide bombings, constitute a relevant expanse for monitoring.35 More broadly, monitoring illicit flows of arms as well as associated materiel tin john make goodness from parallel investigations into the financing of embargoed actors and, every bit relevant, trafficking inwards natural resources or related issues.
In a longer-term view, if to a greater extent than PKOs strengthen their relevant capacities, information sharing amid such missions could generate greater agreement of illicit cross-border trafficking affecting the countries inwards which the PKOs operate. Dedicated staff inwards the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (which manages PKOs at United Nations Headquarters level) could farther back upwardly PKOs inwards strengthening their monitoring capacities, every bit good every bit centralize the information collected past times missions to inform discussions at the headquarters level, as well as fifty-fifty amid national stakeholders.
Further efforts inside the United Nations scheme to strengthen the capacity of PKOs to monitor illicit flows of arms as well as associated materiel may require resources that are hard to obtain. That said, fifty-fifty basic processes as well as a minimum of expertise inwards PKOs to improve the collection as well as analysis of information required for the monitoring of illicit arms flows may go a long way towards ameliorate utilizing the unique seat of PKOs to seat as well as assist inwards the pattern of measures to disrupt such flows as well as the violence they fuel.
List of abbreviations as well as acronyms
CAR Central African Republic
CDI Panel Panel of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire
COE Contingent-owned equipment
DDR Disarmament, demobilization, as well as reintegration
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECC AS Economic Community of Central African States
ECOW AS Economic Community of West African States
MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission inwards Mali
MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission inwards the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Panel (UN) Panel of Experts
PCC Police-contributing country
PKO Peacekeeping operation
TCC Troop-contributing country
UN United Nations
UNOCI United Nations Operation inwards Côte d’Ivoire
Buat lebih berguna, kongsi:
