By Adam Gopnik
Charles de Gaulle, Julian Jackson insists inwards the preface of his novel biography, “De Gaulle” (Harvard), is “everywhere” inwards modern France, its undisputed hero. This claim, similar some other confident statements inwards the book, may strike a reader as both narrowly truthful in addition to what a French thinker powerfulness telephone telephone metaphysically false. His cry is for sure everywhere—on the great drome exterior Paris; on the Place Charles de Gaulle, in i trial called the Étoile, where traffic streams perpetually around the Arc de Triomphe—but his instance seems remote. He is to a greater extent than a ceremonial than a controversial figure, his operate right away done. In 40 years of passing inwards in addition to out of France, I receive got almost never heard him pointed to as an exemplar useful inwards whatever way for today’s crises. His cry having been placed on l’Étoile is apt: the traffic goes around all intend solar daytime but never stops for long. If he lives anywhere, it is inwards the endless menstruation of books most the Second World War written past times Americans in addition to Brits, inwards which he emerges as the biggest hurting inwards the donkey inwards the history of the liberal order. By alphabetical accident, the heading “De Gaulle: Personal Characteristics” inwards Jackson’s index gives us, inwards sequence: arrogance, austerity, authoritarianism, cigarette smoking, coldness, contempt for human nature. It’s quite a list. Yet, as this classically composed in addition to authoritative (if culturally somewhat shallow) volume makes clear, he remains an amazing figure.
De Gaulle had 3 rendezvous amongst history, inwards the old-fashioned feel he loved: inwards 1940, inwards 1958, in addition to inwards 1968. On all 3 occasions, he saved the French province past times sheer theatricality in addition to élan. First, past times embodying the French republic inwards retreat from the Germans; in addition to thus past times seizing power, inwards a republican mode, to destination the Algerian crisis; and, finally, when he ended the potential chaos of the May revolt past times massing almost a i K one thousand people on the Champs-Élysées inwards a counter-demonstration.
It was non all theatrical élan. As Jackson, a British history professor, shows, it also involved political savvy in addition to the serenity weighing of odds amid competing factions. But he depended to a greater extent than on theatrical élan than did pretty much whatever other populace human of his century. Churchill inwards 1940 was far from powerless. He had radar in addition to Ultra, an intact R.A.F. in addition to a large empire. De Gaulle had aught except his uniform in addition to his voice. No i has ever played a weaker mitt to a greater extent than compellingly. His life was i long vivid bluff, in addition to the things that create him exasperating—his vanity in addition to closed-mindedness; his unearned feel of superiority in addition to egocentric blindness—were also why the bluffs worked. He convinced others, sitting at the menu tabular array amongst all the aces inwards their hands, that he powerfulness receive got somehow manufactured an extra ace past times pure forcefulness of will.
He is, perchance to a higher identify all, a pregnant figure owing to the fidelity of his republicanism: from a background that inwards most places in addition to circumstances would receive got led, inwards crisis, toward some cast of Bonapartism, he remained a faithful believer inwards the norms of democracy, inwards oscillating governments in addition to principled resignation. He believed inwards “a sure thought of France,” to utilisation his famous phrase, but it was a republican thought of France. He embodied a reactionary in addition to majestic vogue of politics, completely distinct inwards tone from the park “progressive” kind, but no less committed to the institutions of democracy. This was achieved only amongst some coaxing from his advisers at key moments (but, then, he had chosen the advisers) in addition to amongst sporadic fits of spleen—but inwards the destination de Gaulle e'er offered a staunch reaffirmation of republican values. His life is proof that unapologetic right-wing politics practise non necessarily curvature toward absolutism; they tin also sometimes stiffen the spine of liberal democracy.
Before 1940, when he emerged as the vocalism of Free France, de Gaulle was best known as a career French military machine man, notable chiefly for having survived Verdun; for having written inwards favor of modernizing the French Army, peculiarly on behalf of the in addition to thus daring doctrine of tank warfare; in addition to for beingness really tall. Personal traits matter: people looked upwards to him because they had to.
Although he insisted on his origins amid the province gentry, inwards fact he was raised inwards Paris’s Seventh Arrondissement—then a place, as he lay it perfectly, marked past times a “military melancholy,” a sadness of grand in addition to empty light-green spaces. As Jackson ably shows, his identify unit of measurement may receive got been hyper-conservative in addition to Catholic, but they did non appear to live passionate anti-Dreyfusards. His father, who taught inwards a lycée, was aligned amongst the Catholic, reactionary side of politics—but past times no way amongst its Jew-hating or monarchist fanaticism. (De Gaulle was, unusually for a human of his background, non peculiarly anti-Semitic. He condescended to Jews, but in addition to thus he condescended to everyone.)
De Gaulle’s reactionary politics were also humanized past times a dense literary culture. “The most wonderful undertaking inwards the world would live as a librarian,” he in i trial said. He was beingness puckish but non solely so. He knew Corneille past times pump in addition to could quote his plays, in addition to this immersion, Jackson makes plain, was non simply for show. De Gaulle had absorbed the lesson of French tragedy: that most hopes are doomed, that all choices come upwards at a cost, that enduring loss amongst dignity is the highest of human callings. This stoical persuasion was married to a witting philosophy of action. He had been exposed at length to the philosopher Henri Bergson, whom he chose to read as a form of proto-existentialist. Intellect needed to live braced past times impulse, in addition to impulse should live valued as a form of instinctive ethics. What y'all felt y'all should do, even thus irrational it powerfulness seem to others, is most frequently what needed to live done.
When the worst happened, in addition to the High German tank corps overran France, inwards the jump of 1940, de Gaulle felt non only that his talents had been misused but, worse for a Frenchman of intellect, that his theories had been ignored. “Our initial defeat,” de Gaulle, newly promoted to brigadier general, wrote inwards a memorandum whose trial on his desperate superiors i tin only wonder at, “comes from the application past times the enemy of ideas that are mine.” There’s right away a lively debate amid military machine historians most the truthful causes of the autumn of France. For a really long time, it was widely accepted that the speed in addition to the panache of the High German Army left the French Army helpless inwards its entrenched in addition to conservative defensive positions. H5N1 newer generation of military machine historians—for instance, John Mosier, inwards “The Blitzkrieg Myth”—argues persuasively that the blitzkrieg happened to a greater extent than frequently than non inwards panicked headlines, that the High German tank corps had outrun its furnish lines, in addition to that French Republic was inwards no worse shape inwards May of 1940 than it had been inwards a similar instant inwards 1914.
The failure—and this is a persuasion that Jackson seems to share—was political. Paul Reynaud, the Prime Minister, had plenty of room to autumn dorsum in addition to reorganize, as the French had done successfully inwards the Great War. But Reynaud, crazily, chose to convey into the cabinet the defeatist generals Pétain in addition to Weygand, in addition to he was nether the crucial influence of his as defeatist lover, Madame de Portes. Perhaps to a greater extent than important, the toll of the before comeback had been millions of dead Frenchmen, in addition to at that spot was simply no volition to essay that experiment again. The French leaders had no create out inwards them, or non enough.
And thus de Gaulle chose exile. H5N1 mere sub-cabinet government minister of defense, he fled to London amongst no arms in addition to few supporters. “Since the French revolution,” Jackson writes, “exile has had only negative connotations inwards French political culture.” Here, as inwards his estimation of de Gaulle’s identify inwards contemporary French political culture, Jackson’s certainties seem a piffling at odds amongst the facts. Victor Hugo, the greatest hero of the French left, had chosen honorable exile inwards Britain, as did thus many refugees from the Commune in addition to the Franco-Prussian War. And, just as Hugo was heard best from exile, thus was de Gaulle. He made 2 speeches on the BBC that, Jackson documents, could non receive got been heard past times really many Frenchmen in addition to yet somehow burned through the damaged French consciousness. What was said most the speeches seems to receive got been to a greater extent than of import than what the speeches said. In the midst of a squalid surrender, i immature full general had spoken upwards for France. The thought of French honor, quaint but essential, was revived.
In de Gaulle’s isolation, paradoxically, lay his strength. There was something of St. Joan most it, in addition to his solitariness appealed to the French collective myth of the unmarried defiant individual. His passion inwards London was, exactly, a scene out of Corneille, similar that of Rodrigue inwards “Le Cid,” the hero who rises to gloire inwards a instant of private trial. (Shakespeare’s heroes, similar Henry V, rising past times inspiring others, as Churchill knew; Corneille’s past times duelling lonely amongst their principles.)
As Jackson demonstrates inwards hilarious detail, the Pétainist regime inwards Vichy unintentionally added to de Gaulle’s prestige. In a really French touch, the Vichy officials get-go publicly stripped him of his rank as full general in addition to and thus made him the middle of a abhor campaign, showing his tall figure on posters hidden behind a microphone surrounded past times swarthy Jews. This had the trial of making him the i anti-German leader whom most French people had heard of. The Vichy regime, inwards the blindness of its hatred, helped create—and promote—the de Gaulle brand.
Jackson’s is an essentially sympathetic concern human relationship of de Gaulle inwards London—which does non maintain de Gaulle from seeming fifty-fifty to a greater extent than of an egotist in addition to a prima donna than his previous biographers had made him. Both the British allergy to hyperbolic disquisition in addition to the American gustatory modality for getting correct downwards to cases—not quite the same thing—were alien to him. He irritated Churchill, inwards particular, amongst his refusal to placate Roosevelt, acting as if he were inwards command of a major Blue Planet forces instead of a few borrowed rooms inwards Mayfair. Jackson recounts an episode inwards which Churchill summoned de Gaulle to verbalize to him. One interpreter after some other was thrown out for non conveying what each intended to say to the other—Churchill was trying to peachy de Gaulle, in addition to the interpreter, understandably uneasy, made him audio diplomatic—until at finally the 2 men were alone, conversing inwards French.
But only past times beingness impossible could de Gaulle receive got an independent voice. “You volition see, if y'all say ‘no,’ they volition crawl to y'all in addition to offering y'all the moon,” he in i trial explained to a subordinate. His demeanor was maddeningly adolescent, but he chose it for the same ground that an adolescent chooses his—as the i way, inwards a seat of actual dependency, to declare one’s autonomy. Slamming the door of your chamber is sometimes the only powerfulness y'all receive got when y'all are living inwards someone else’s house. And he knew, as well, that the Allies had no plausible choice to him, in addition to that Churchill admired (and identified with) what Jackson rightly calls the quixotic side of de Gaulle’s character.
Eisenhower, despite Roosevelt’s distaste, turned out to live the i to fully screen de Gaulle as indispensable to the Normandy invasion. The American full general understood what subsequent American generals planning invasions of poorly understood countries receive got easily forgotten—that it is essential to receive got on your side non the local forces y'all want were pop but the local forces who genuinely are popular. De Gaulle had become, frequently to the exasperation of those doing the fighting in addition to dying within France, the sole credible symbol of French resistance. “From the purely military machine viewpoint nosotros must . . . bargain amongst him alone,” Eisenhower wrote dwelling to Roosevelt. And, as Eisenhower saw, de Gaulle could live a skillful listener, too. In Michel Tauriac’s oral history of Gaullism, “Vivre avec de Gaulle,” i of his subordinates points out that when de Gaulle appeared to live listening, eyes broad opened upwards in addition to attentive, he was genuinely ignoring you; only when he took on his to a greater extent than familiar pose of sleepy-eyed indifference was he genuinely engaged.
Jackson does a vivid undertaking detailing the development of de Gaulle from a normal French officeholder who has contempt for the squabbling, mediocre politicians of the Third Republic into a clear vocalism for republicanism. He came to empathize that only revolutionary republican values could verbalize to a working grade inwards demand of a democratic choice to Communism. In this, he showed the influence of Jean Moulin, the high-ranking left-wing prefect who came to London to build a underground army, in addition to and thus was parachuted dorsum into French Republic to Pb it.
At first, de Gaulle had no vision of an armed internal resistance inwards France. The fight, he thought, would come upwards from the colonies in addition to the remnant French armies in addition to navy. But the colonies were of limited value; for a while, the only pledge of back upwards de Gaulle got was from New Hebrides, inwards the South Pacific, non hugely useful for a European war. Only when, amongst the assist of Moulin, he saw that at that spot was resistance within the occupied province did his tactics in addition to politics change.
It didn’t escape him that Moulin’s strength of grapheme in addition to clear mastery of the only credible resistance network within French Republic were tied to his impeccably republican attitudes. De Gaulle, realizing that he had to movement left to concur the center, in addition to thus had to execute a complex dance. The Communist Party of French Republic was a slavishly obedient arm of Stalinism in addition to the Soviet Union—which did non alter the other reality that, after the invasion of Russia, inwards 1941, many of the most courageous of the resisters would live Communists. Moulin had credibility amongst all sides; de Gaulle took on some of it. This was critical as he sought to thread his way through a maze of sects in addition to sides. On a unmarried page of this biography i encounters the C.F.L.N., the C.N.R., the F.F.I., the B.C.R.A., the amgot, in addition to the C.D.L.—all Free French factions of the forties.
Especially after Vichy made anti-republicanism synonymous amongst surrender, de Gaulle came to regard that French Republic had to live addressed past times the republic’s magic words—liberty, equality, in addition to fraternity—and non the near-Vichyite ones of fatherland in addition to family, which he had get-go favored. De Gaulle was the farthest thing inwards the world from an instinctive democrat, but he didn’t receive got to be. It was plenty that he understood that republic had larn i of the instincts of France.
The tale of de Gaulle’s years inwards exile is a reproach to anyone who underestimates the utilisation of personality inwards history. People of all sides who met de Gaulle were exasperated past times him, but to a greater extent than frequently than non they were impressed past times him—by the way his personality was enfolded inwards his politics, in addition to his politics inwards his personality. Jackson reproduces a moving missive of the alphabet from Georges Boris, a socialist Jewish journalist inwards exile, to the imprisoned Jewish socialist Léon Blum, inwards France, detailing his persuasion of de Gaulle: “De Gaulle gave me dorsum honour, the possibility of beingness able to await people inwards the human face again. . . . To a large degree, his unwillingness to bend, his intransigence are willed. He likes to say that beingness as weak as he is, intransigence is his only weapon.”
Moulin was eventually tortured to decease past times Klaus Barbie, betrayed to the Gestapo inwards circumstances that rest murky. Was Moulin’s Judas a Communist fellow-resister obeying Moscow’s orders to eliminate anti-Communists? We soundless don’t know. We practise know that when de Gaulle heard of Moulin’s vicious murder he simply said, amongst the stoicism of a Corneille hero, “Continuons”: “We’ll move on.”
And he did. On August 26, 1944, after the Allies liberated Paris, he claimed the victory as his own, organizing a personal parade downwards the Champs-Élysées, inwards which he walked alone—his fellow-resisters were asked to hang dorsum a few feet—amid a hysterical throng that may live the largest ever assembled inwards Paris. He fifty-fifty managed to larn the French as witnesses to the High German surrender, the next May, which was “a remarkable achievement, inconceivable without de Gaulle’s tenacity, obstinacy in addition to political skill,” as Jackson writes. (“The French are here, too?” i of the High German generals reportedly said.) If this triumph allowed the French to evade what had genuinely happened during the war—the abject armistice amongst Hitler, the delivery of the deportees to their persecutors, the entire dark hole of Vichy from which thus piffling lite escaped for thus long—it did lay French Republic inwards a seat to, well, move on.
De Gaulle’s coexistence amongst the Fourth Republic, inwards which he briefly led several governments, was unhappy in addition to contentious; his general’s temperament was non made for intricate parliamentary maneuvering. Now that he was a caput of government, his theatrical tactics backfired. The Fourth Republic that emerged largely after his resignation from regime was, as Jackson itemizes, far to a greater extent than of a success than is frequently allowed. But it came crashing downwards amid the horror of the impossible Algerian war; similar Lyndon Johnson’s Administration, it did good domestically in addition to had a disaster inwards a colonial war.
Then, inwards June of 1958, a grouping of right-wing French military machine men, alarmed past times the Fourth Republic’s failure to defeat the ongoing rebellion inwards Algeria, in addition to worried that the French nationals at that spot would live abandoned, laid most to organize a coup of sorts. They to a greater extent than or less took accuse inwards Algiers, in addition to demanded a alter of regime inwards Paris. De Gaulle, who amongst rather magnificent Machiavellianism both did in addition to did non encourage the junta’s actions, cultivating its actors at the fourth dimension in addition to condemning them non long after, was asked past times the French President to Pb a regime of “national union” for vi months in addition to and thus to offering a novel Constitution, which became that of the soundless extant Fifth Republic.
The complexities of the Algerian crisis are soundless tragic to read about. The O.A.S., the colonial underground army, continually attempted assassinations, in addition to the Algerian guerrillas, the F.L.N., continued, bizarrely, to commit terrorist acts inwards Paris long after the game was essentially won. After 2 years of futile negotiations, de Gaulle gave up, proverb that “France would contemplate amongst the greatest sangfroid a solution past times which People's Democratic Republic of Algeria would cease to belong to her.”
This was, as everyone knew at the time, a sellout of the pieds noirs, the huge community of French nationals inwards Algeria, for whom it had been as much a dwelling as whatever other subdivision of France. As Jackson says, de Gaulle got just what whatever other French pol would have: a give upwards amongst the barest fig leaf. (One thinks of the long autumn of Vietnam, where what was achieved inwards 1975 was also what would receive got happened inwards 1968 anyway, amongst fewer deaths along the way.) The pieds noirs were left helpless, as were the Harkis, Algerian Muslims who had fought amongst the French Army. De Gaulle’s triumph, as Jackson writes, was to create the French “believe that he had controlled the process; in addition to to create a compelling narrative that explained France’s disengagement from People's Democratic Republic of Algeria in addition to turned it into a victory rather than a defeat.”
But, at the same time, de Gaulle rebuilt French Republic in addition to made it modern. The underground of the Fifth Republic, as Herrick Chapman details inwards his novel history, “France’s Long Reconstruction,” was that, beneath the sonorous grandiosity in addition to medievalist rhetoric, de Gaulle’s regime was solely technocratic in addition to modernizing. Many of the most of import policies that his Prime Minister, Michel Debré, took upwards were, inwards an age-old cycle, the policies of the previous, much maligned direction of the Fourth Republic. But they were pursued amongst exceptional vigor: the Fifth Republic, nether Debré, became an fifty-fifty to a greater extent than technocratic in addition to administrative i than French Republic had had before—which is proverb something.
The effects of these reforms could live salubrious. French Republic became, inwards many respects, an fifty-fifty to a greater extent than extraordinarily well-run state; anyone who has had encounters amongst the upper reaches of the hautes fonctionnaires grade of the Fifth Republic soundless has to live impressed amongst their flat of education, worldliness, in addition to efficiency. And the effects could also live infuriating: French Republic remained an extraordinarily bureaucratic state, too. Anyone who has ever had regular contact amongst the lower reaches of the administrative regime volition know of the parallel paper, or pixelated, universe inwards which no trial has occurred on Earth until it has a folder inwards a file.
Jackson writes wonderful political history, but social history does non sneak into his operate really frequently or really well: the larger world of literature in addition to commentary inwards which French political life is e'er entangled is non dramatized amongst whatever relish, giving the biography a slightly dutiful monotone. Sartre in addition to Camusmake at best sideways appearances, although they were de Gaulle’s ideological antagonists as much as whatever politician. (Sartre was at i signal during the Algerian state of war thus extreme inwards his back upwards of the F.L.N. that he was on the verge of beingness arrested, until, as the storey goes, de Gaulle said, “One does non arrest Voltaire.”) Jackson’s writing, encyclopedic inwards knowledge—obscure sources create slow appearances—is a piffling brusk on pictorial in addition to sensory intensity. During de Gaulle’s days inwards power, the monuments of Paris were all sandblasted, nether his in addition to Malraux’s orders, in addition to the human face of the metropolis changed from grimy dark dorsum to its original blue-gray in addition to beige in addition to white. It was as keenly symbolic of Gaullist triumph as whatever law or edict, but, though the alteration is mentioned, nosotros never genuinely regard it or experience it.
Jackson does create us experience i consequential flaw inwards the Fifth Republic as a political invention. By seeming to concentrate thus much powerfulness inwards i majestic figure, de Gaulle made it possible to dominion French Republic again, but also insured that opposition would receive got to live impassioned in addition to clamorous to register at all. Prime Ministers, when they larn unpopular, are eased out past times their supporters; kings, when they larn unpopular, must live thrown out past times a mob. Afterward, theatrical mini-revolutions became the norm inwards French politics. The powerfulness of each novel President to endure the coming moving ridge of street protests became fifty-fifty to a greater extent than of import than his powerfulness to concur the legislature together.
Of the anti-government demonstrations that de Gaulle confronted, the most famous manif was the i that proved fatal to his career: the pupil rebellion that began inwards the streets of Paris in addition to and thus spread to the factories exterior it. An anti-materialist revolt amongst a largely incoherent practical politics—a militant French version of the Summer of Love, “Sgt. Pepper” amongst Trotskyite liner notes—it expressed thus deep an impatience amongst Gaullism that it transformed French Republic within a week. De Gaulle retreated to his province house, in addition to seemed on the brink of resignation. Instead, he returned to Paris in addition to led an immense counter-demonstration. It was a reminder that the middle of pop gravity inwards French Republic remained on the right, fifty-fifty as its withdraw heed in addition to imagination remained on the left; inwards elections held inwards June, the Gaullist political party gained an outright parliamentary majority. For all that, the Events of May seemed to exhaust him spiritually; he resigned only a yr later, after losing an insignificant plebiscite on regional reform. It was a cast of ritual political suicide.
And de Gaulle’s legacy? H5N1 reasonable instance tin live made, after closing Jackson’s book, that it was all theater in addition to hot air. The Allies would receive got retaken French Republic amongst or without him, in addition to some French pol would receive got taken that walk inwards 1944. French Republic was going to give upwards People's Democratic Republic of Algeria sooner or later; all de Gaulle did was extend the create out in addition to lay a noble human face on the surrender. He knew this as good as anyone. “In reality nosotros are on the phase of a theater where I receive got been keeping upwards the illusion since 1940,” he in i trial told a confidant. “I am trying to give French Republic the appearance of a solid, firm, confident in addition to expanding country, spell it is a worn-out nation. . . . The whole thing is a perpetual illusion.”
Worse, past times placing myth over history, he injected a toxic hallucinogen into French memory. It took decades for French Republic to laid out to address the reality of Vichy. Almost to this day, the reality of the civil state of war that People's Democratic Republic of Algeria ignited inwards French Republic is obscured: the drowning, past times the police, of perchance 5 hundred Algerians inwards Paris inwards 1961 was suppressed at the time, in addition to is barely commemorated now. There is a side of de Gaulle that is simply hateful: vindictive in addition to vain in addition to deeply selfish. His ingratitude to the British, who had saved his life in addition to given him a platform to salve his country—an ingratitude that became almost obsessively bitter inwards his memoirs—is unforgivable, except as a reminder of the truth that nosotros e'er resent most those to whom nosotros owe most. His infamous improvisation inwards Quebec inwards 1967, when he cried out “Vive le Québec libre!,” was inspired past times his absurd fantasy that Quebec, already becoming a multiethnic modern state, was soundless occupied past times the “English.”
Yet this concern human relationship misses the key lesson that de Gaulle intuited: myths matter. Without a feel of shared symbols, it is impossible for whatever modern province to move on. French Republic is a frustrating state, but it has never been a failed one. It works. National dignity is hugely of import to whatever computer program of national renewal. (Had American policy toward Russian Federation post-1989 been shaped amongst an optic non just to that country’s political organisation but to its pride—to making sure that the Russians had a myth of their ain self-liberation, instead of beingness thus apparently plundered in addition to defeated—the ensuing disaster would, conceivably, receive got been less disastrous.) De Gaulle crafted a symbolic history for the French inwards identify of a existent one, because symbols were amid the most existent things they knew.
The distinction that’s sometimes made betwixt patriotism in addition to nationalism is at the essence of his existence. The patriot loves his identify in addition to its cheeses in addition to its people in addition to its idiosyncrasies; the nationalist has no particular feel of affection for the actual identify he advocates for (he is frequently an outsider to it) but channels his obsessive grievances into acts of ethnic vengeance. De Gaulle is a nearly perfect instance of the right-wing patriot inwards power—of the constitutional conservative who accepts the modern order.
With his dear of honour in addition to pageantry, de Gaulle powerfulness seem to offering a really dated model of politics. And yet inwards an strange way there’s an urgent, living lesson for the twenty-first century inwards what de Gaulle accomplished, i that can’t live overlooked—indeed, President Macron spends every intend solar daytime trying non to overlook it. What de Gaulle’s instance reminds us is how valuable an insistence on the shared symbols of a mutual fate tin live if carried out amongst integrity in addition to a balance deposit of democratic values. The politics of grandeur, he shows, demand non live the exclusive province of bullies in addition to gangsters in addition to crooks in addition to clowns. It’s a fine French lesson. ♦
Buat lebih berguna, kongsi:
