Gil Barndollar
Perhaps no regular army inwards history has ever juggled equally broad in addition to challenging an array of campaigns in addition to atmospheric condition equally the British Army did from 1897 to 1945. Battling enemies from Burma to Belgium, the British Army rapidly transformed itself from a pocket-sized regal law to a war-winning conscript majority army, shrank dorsum almost overnight, in addition to and then repeated the play tricks barely xx years later. Through it all, from the summit of empire to the Pyrrhic victory of the Second World War, 1 of the army’s few constants was ceaseless mount warfare on the Northwest Frontier of India. The Northwest Frontier, at nowadays the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, is a mountainous percentage that sits higher upwardly the fertile manifestly of the Indus valley. Today the FATA is known equally a sanctuary for the Taliban, a lawless percentage rife amongst insurgents, arms manufacturers, in addition to drone strikes. But the Frontier, in addition to particularly its heartland of Waziristan, has e'er been a source of problem for its neighbors. Living inwards poor, rocky solid reason amongst piddling chance for to a greater extent than than subsistence farming, the Pathan (or Pashtun) tribesmen of the Frontier raided in addition to stole from the rich Indian lands to the due south for millennia. The Frontier also provided a route for to a greater extent than serious invaders. Indeed, inwards the entire recorded history of Republic of Republic of India the British had been the lonely conquerors non to come upwardly from the northwest.
Admired in addition to feared yesteryear his enemies, the Pathan of the Northwest Frontier was a tearing in addition to shrewd fighter. The words of 1 British officer, writing inwards 1943, amount upwardly the full general stance of his peers: “The Pathan is, inwards short, a guerrilla fighter par excellence, physically strong, brave fifty-fifty to recklessness, a born tactician inwards shaver tactics inwards his ain detail type of country, in addition to a practiced shot.”[1] The Frontier became a crucible for British officers, equally the cunning enemy rapidly exposed in addition to exploited fifty-fifty the smallest tactical error. Inadequate defenses at night, a failure to recognize key terrain, or a blunder during a withdrawal could rapidly Pb to the annihilation of a department or platoon. It is no surprise that many of the British Army’s most successful World War II commanders cutting their teeth on the Frontier.[2]
However, success inwards pocket-sized wars does non e'er interpret to an army’s powerfulness to care major conventional wars. Israel’s difficulties inwards Lebanese Republic inwards 2006 are alone the latest proof of this.[3] Did Britain’s longest colonial war, the pacification of the Northwest Frontier of India, improve or retard her army’s powerfulness to care major wars?
There were those, fifty-fifty inwards the Indian Army, who felt that endemic Frontier fighting was a major impediment to preparation for modern mechanized war. Mountain warfare was tedious in addition to methodical, amongst the requirement to deliberately picket a force’s flanks on the high footing patch the primary trunk marched downward a route or valley. The inescapable demand for long columns of pack animals also lent Frontier campaigns an archaic air equally military machine mechanization progressed after World War I. Some advocated the re-creation of a permanent Frontier Force, which would live on highly specialized in addition to unable to care effectively inwards modern wars.[4]
However, inwards both footing wars in that place was ample evidence that despite the peculiarities of Frontier campaigns, service inwards Waziristan had done much to prepare British in addition to Indian troops for modern warfare.
World War I
Northwest Frontier fighting was markedly different from the numerous other punitive expeditions in addition to pocket-sized wars conducted yesteryear the British Army after 1850. Despite beingness illiterate irregulars, the Pathans to a greater extent than closely approximated a European enemy than they did the Zulus or the dervishes of Sudan. Only the Boers, a unique case, would give the British Army a greater challenge than the tribesmen of Waziristan.
The improved armament of the tribesmen was the key evolution of Frontier fighting inwards the early on twentieth century. While it had been relatively low-risk warfare inwards the past, the lethality of Frontier combat rose dramatically due to the increased utilization yesteryear the tribesmen of modern mag rifles using smokeless powder. The Pathans of Kipling in addition to Harry Flashman had carried ancient jezails, erratic flintlocks that yesteryear the mid-nineteenth century couldn’t stand upwardly for British weapons, in addition to that provided clouds of dark fume to seat their firers’ locations. But after 50 years, this pocket-sized arms imbalance began to change. Captain Alexander Mason noted inwards 1892 that the arrival of Snider in addition to Martini-Henry rifles, amongst triple the arrive at of the tribesmen’s onetime muzzle loaders, had fundamentally changed the tactical calculus of the Pathans.[5]
A burgeoning traffic inwards rifles, imported from the Western Farsi Gulf via Afghanistan, was eventually closed downward yesteryear a blockade imposed yesteryear the Royal Navy in addition to the Royal Indian Marine, but yesteryear that betoken much of the harm had been done.[6] The Pathans continued to have rifles stolen from laxer British garrisons farther south, or supplied yesteryear the Russians. Cunning Pathans inwards British service could also sell their coveted Lee-Enfields to their cousins inwards the mountains, purchase an simulated rifle crafted inwards a tribal manufacturing flora (nearly identical until the rifling started to habiliment out after 300 rounds), in addition to steal a tidy profit.[7] In spite of British in addition to Indian measures the tribes’ arsenal grew exponentially: inwards 1902 it was estimated that in that place were over 2,000 breech-loading rifles inwards Waziristan; yesteryear 1919 this release was nearly 140,000, in addition to xx years after that it was idea that the tribesmen possessed over 232,000 modern rifles.[8] The Pathan’s appetite for mag rifles was insatiable, in addition to greatly increased the jeopardy of onslaught for smaller British detachments.
Once the genie of the modern rifle was out of the bottle, the tactical province of affairs changed dramatically for British in addition to Indian troops inwards Waziristan. The Pathans were frequently really skilled amongst their novel weapons; Army Headquarters India’s 1935-36 preparation memorandum noted that ‘the accuracy of the enemy rifle burn at long ranges, over 1,000 yards, was described equally remarkable’.[9] This increment inwards enemy engagement arrive at meant mount pickets had to live on laid out 3 times equally far away from friendly columns equally before, amongst an attendant slowing of motility in addition to greatly increased difficulty of withdrawal.[10] The give-and-take “sniper” originated on the Frontier, though its exact etymology is unknown.
The inundation of modern rifles into the Frontier, combined amongst the Pathan’s natural talent for concealment, gave the British a rude wake upwardly during the Tirah Expedition of 1897. In his in conclusion study on the campaign, dated 24 Feb 1898, Major-General Sir William Lockhart wrote, “No drive on the frontiers of Republic of Republic of India has been conducted nether to a greater extent than trying in addition to arduous circumstances than those encountered yesteryear the Tirah expeditionary force.”[11] Frontier campaigns could no longer live on won yesteryear talented amateurs, in addition to a professionalization of mount warfare preparation rapidly ensued.
The legendary combat shooting of the pocket-sized British Expeditionary Force (BEF) of 1914 is commonly credited to the stupor of the Boer War. After facing highly mobile sharpshooters who were frequently invisible at a few hundred meters, the British revolutionized their marksmanship training.[12] However, equally Edward Spiers has written of the Boer War,these tactical precepts, including careful reconnaissance earlier an attack, to a greater extent than utilization of concealment in addition to extended formations, avoiding artillery positions inside arrive at of an enemy’s infantry, the utilization of continuous rather than sporadic bombardments, to a greater extent than marching in addition to ameliorate tending of horses yesteryear cavalry, in addition to the delegation of responsibleness to battalion in addition to companionship commanders inwards the field, bore all the hallmarks of lengthy service on the Northwest Frontier.[13]
The Indian Army was institutionalizing the novel tactical lessons of the Frontier years earlier “Boer tactics” came into fashion inwards the British Army. The manual Frontier Warfare 1901 condemned volley burn equally a waste materials of ammunition in addition to directed troops to achieve a high flat of proficiency at private fire.[14] Highly realistic long arrive at marksmanship preparation resulted, amongst an emphasis on private soldiers engaging fleeting enemy exposures in addition to shooting moving targets. The lessons of Waziristan, in addition to their dramatic confirmation inwards South Africa, helped ensure that the BEF was largely ready to care a modern European state of war inwards 1914.
The Interwar Period
The British exercise of recruiting both irregular in addition to regular soldiers from amidst the tribes of the Frontier added greatly to the Pathans’ collective military machine science after the First World War. T. R. Moreman has described 1919 equally a turning betoken inwards Frontier warfare:
Mahsud lashkars [tribal state of war bands] had demonstrated a flat of military machine science in addition to tactical effectiveness never earlier encountered. Their carefully organised attacks were unprecedented, amongst well-concealed marksmen providing sufficient roofing rifle burn to pivot downward regal troops, enabling swordsmen to closed in addition to engage inwards hand-to-hand combat. It was strikingly apparent that the graphic symbol of frontier warfare had altered considerably, primarily equally a final result of tribal rearmament amongst high velocity rifles in addition to yesteryear their skilful combination of burn in addition to movement. This new-found tactical effectiveness was primarily attributable to the presence of large numbers of deserters in addition to pensioners from the militia in addition to Indian Army inwards their ranks. Ex-servicemen formed one-fifth to one-sixth of the Mahsud fighting strength – closed to 2,000 men – encountered during the initial stage of the campaign, providing lashkars amongst leadership, dependent area in addition to tactical preparation that they had e'er lacked earlier inwards Waziristan.[15]
Major-General Skipton Climo, commander of the forcefulness sent into Waziristan inwards 1919, concurred. In his Waziristan Force Weekly Appreciation of xiii Jan 1920, he wrote,
I incertitude if it is understood how desperate the fighting has been during these operations. It is, perhaps, to live on expected that those who create non know Republic of Republic of India in addition to the frontier, in addition to fifty-fifty some who accept fought on the frontier, inwards pre-war days but lack the noesis in addition to imagination to realise to what extent atmospheric condition accept altered amongst the bully improvement inwards the armament of the tribesmen, cannot sympathise or believe the criterion of preparation that is required for the Infantry inwards the atmospheric condition that prevail on the Frontier to-day.[16]
The footstep of Pathan tactical improvement was swift. As early on equally 1919, the tribesmen were using parties of bombers armed amongst mitt grenades to onslaught pickets, a trench warfare tactic of the Western Front that had migrated to a greater extent than than 3 chiliad miles east.[17] Colonel F.S. Keen would write inwards the same year, ‘Their tactics accept improved inwards a most disconcerting manner….we give away the Mahsuds carrying out attacks amongst considerable bodies, the advance in addition to laid on scientifically supported yesteryear roofing burn in addition to executed amongst bully dash in addition to boldness.’[18] In 1930, Afridi tribesmen on the Frontier were observed using signal flags inwards the fashion of a regular army.[19]
Though mount warfare seat a premium on the infantry, equally it all the same does today, it was non insulated from mechanization. The Royal Air Force was an integral slice of the interwar fighting on the Frontier, despite beingness restrained yesteryear political considerations in addition to rules of engagement. Armored cars were critical to line of communications safety on the Frontier, in addition to lite tanks fought inwards Waziristan for the offset fourth dimension inwards 1935. The Pathans, lacking a give-and-take for tanks inwards their language, dubbed them “snakes that spit.”[20]
World War II
The British Army ended the First World War equally the finest regular army inwards the world. It had solved the riddle of the trenches, albeit at bully cost, in addition to developed effective combined arms tactics that broke the German linguistic communication regular army at the Battle of Amiens. Yet the British failed to retain these lessons inwards the interwar period, yielding a forcefulness that was tactically unprepared for a minute state of war amongst the Germans. By 1944, the American newcomers were to a greater extent than frequently than non out-performing British troops, despite the latter’s 2 twelvemonth caput start inwards fighting in addition to learning from the enemy.[21]
Imperial commitments, in addition to so the Northwest Frontier, are frequently blamed for the British Army’s failure to retain the lessons of the Great War. The Liddell Hart schoolhouse of history, amongst its contempt for the chimeras of Colonel Blimp in addition to antediluvian cavalrymen, is largely responsible for this myth. In reality, authorities parsimony, the refusal to commit to a Continental war, in addition to an overweening religious belief inwards the tank were far to a greater extent than responsible for British struggles inwards the Second World War.[22] In 1 of import but oft-neglected area, pocket-sized unit of measurement battle drill, the colonial Indian Army was inwards fact far ameliorate prepared for major state of war than its British cousin.
Battle drill is best described equally a laid of uncomplicated rehearsed tactical responses to mutual situations, inwards the fashion of a pre-planned play inwards American football game or basketball. One of the students of the battle drill motility sums upwardly its philosophy equally “Simple things done really good beats skill, inventiveness in addition to imagination – things you lot don’t accept inwards existent combat.”[23] Battle drill was non meant to live on a tactical straight off jacket, but only basic mutual procedures to acquire platoons in addition to sections moving on the correct rails inwards the chaos of combat. However, interwar British Army doctrine seat a premium on non beingness prescriptive, implicitly endorsing a supposed British cultural trait of “muddling through.” Without battle drill or something similar it, many of the tactical lessons of the trenches were lost, particularly at the platoon level. Units muddled through, amongst predictable results inwards French Republic inwards 1940 in addition to inwards the Western Desert thereafter. It took Lionel Wigram, an unconventional Territorial Army captain who had never seen combat, to resurrect battle drill inwards the British Army inwards 1942.[24]
The interwar Indian Army, different the British, embraced a de facto battle drill doctrine inwards gild to succeed inwards the increasingly unsafe fighting on the Frontier. The line of pickets, line of communication security, reactions to ambush, in addition to setting inwards fortified camps were all drilled rigorously inwards loma stations earlier assuming duties on the Frontier.[25] Though this was derided yesteryear some British officers equally a stereotyped if non ritualized cast of fighting, it resulted inwards units trained to a high criterion in addition to confident inwards their tactical responses to mutual battlefield problems.
The Indian Army Training Memorandum No. nine of 1941 stated
This apprenticeship on the Frontier has stood our troops inwards practiced stead inwards Africa….Battalions amongst bully reputations inwards mount warfare were given the toughest jobs to tackle. We all know the results. They may non accept learnt all most modern war, but they had learnt the basic lessons, leadership, discipline, endurance, speed, fieldcraft; all these against a critical instructor – the Pathan.[26]
While it mightiness live on piece of cake to dismiss this equally a sop to the battalions stuck amongst the thankless project of securing the Frontier patch the state of war raged elsewhere, it was borne out yesteryear the facts. The performance of Indian troops stood out inwards both Africa in addition to Italy.[27] In the fourth in addition to 5th Indian Divisions, which excelled inwards North Africa early on inwards World War II, every unmarried Indian in addition to Gurkha battalion had served inwards the hard Waziristan drive of 1936 to 1939.[28] Major-General F. A. M. B. Jenkins, writing inwards the Journal of the United Service Institution of Republic of Republic of India inwards 1944, concluded that “the lessons of the N. W. F. P. apply 100 per cent. to the drive inwards Italy.”[29]
Conclusion
\John Masters, a Gurkha officeholder of distinction on both the Frontier in addition to inwards Burma, wrote after the state of war that
Many Aldershot-type officers maintained that nosotros learned alone bad habits inwards this tribal warfare against what they termed ‘ragged-arsed barnshoots.’ It was non true. From the Frontier itself nosotros learned un-winking, unsleeping alertness. From the Pathans nosotros learned to a greater extent than most the tactical value of footing than whatever of our competitors or futurity enemies knew.[30]
Despite the unique nature of both the terrain in addition to the enemy, fighting on the Northwest Frontier was a cyberspace positive for the British in addition to Indian Armies’ preparation for major war. The Pathans could non ameliorate Britain’s strategic liabilities inwards 1914 or 1939, nor could they create a British Exchequer that would non fund a majority regular army until the evening of war. Waziristan was of class a drain on manpower equally well, requiring 70,000 Indian Army soldiers to “watch in addition to ward” on the Frontier inwards 1942.[31] But equally exacting tactical teachers, the Pathans ensured that their British in addition to Indian pupils were good prepared for pocket-sized unit of measurement combat inwards both footing wars.
The Northwest Frontier in addition to the British in addition to Indian troops that defended it accept something to learn America’s footing forces. We, too, accept spent a generation conducting low-intensity, non-existential combat operations, from Kosovo to the Hindu Kush. Civilian in addition to military machine leaders are at nowadays reorienting the the US military machine on major combat operations, though deployments to Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan in addition to the Middle East continue. We should strive to live on brutally honest inwards identifying in addition to rooting out the many bad habits our pocket-sized wars accept bred, patch also recognizing the ways inwards which our post-9/11 campaigns accept honed our edge.
End Notes
[1] Lieutenant-Colonel F. C. Simpson, ‘Frontier Warfare inwards Retrospect in addition to Prospect,’ Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. 73, No. 313, Oct 1943, p. 378
[2] Field Marshals Slim in addition to Auchinleck are the 2 most prominent examples amidst many.
[3] David E. Johnson, Hard Fighting: State of Israel inwards Lebanese Republic in addition to Gaza, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2011)
[4] ‘Borderer,’ ‘Essay,’ Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. 64, Jan – Oct 1934, pp. nine - 26
[5] Moreman, The Army inwards Republic of Republic of India in addition to the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947, (New York: Palgrave, 1998), p. 44
[6] Moreman, The Army inwards Republic of Republic of India in addition to the Development of Frontier Warfare, p. 98
[7] Charles Chenevix Trench, The Frontier Scouts, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 46
[8] Tim Moreman, ‘“Watch in addition to Ward”: the Army inwards Republic of Republic of India in addition to the North-West Frontier, 1920-1939,’ inwards David Killingray in addition to David Omissi (eds.), Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700-1964,(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 139
[9] British Library L/MIL/17/5/2199, AHQ Republic of Republic of India Training Memorandum No. 12 Collective Training Period 1935-1936 (Delhi, 1936), p. 5
[10] Trench, The Frontier Scouts, p. 27
[11] Moreman, The Army inwards Republic of Republic of India in addition to the Development of Frontier Warfare, p. 68
[12] Spencer Jones, From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army, 1902 – 1914, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012)
[13] Edward M. Spiers, ‘Between the South African War in addition to the First World War, 1902 – 1914, inwards Hew Strachan (ed.), Big Wars in addition to Small Wars: The British Army in addition to the Lessons of War inwards the Twentieth Century, (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 24
[14] Moreman, The Army inwards Republic of Republic of India in addition to the Development of Frontier Warfare, p. 87
[15] Moreman, The Army inwards Republic of Republic of India in addition to the Development of Frontier Warfare, pp. 109 - 111
[16] National Archives WO 106/56 Waziristan Force Weekly Appreciation for Week Ending 13th Jan 1920, p. 51
[17] “W”, ‘Mahsud Waziristan 1919-20,’ Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. 60, No. 259, Apr 1930, p. 194; Imperial War Museum Frontier Warfare – Republic of Republic of India (Army in addition to Royal Air Force), p. 11
[18] Colonel F.S. Keen, ‘Gold Medal Prize Essay, 1922-23,’ Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Volume 53, No. 233, Nov 1923, p. 396
[19] ‘Report on the Afridi Attack on “K” Supply Depot, August 9th, 1930,’ Royal Tank Corps Journal, Vol. 12, No. 140, Dec 1930, p. 252
[20] John Connell, Auchinleck, (London: Cassell, 1959), p. 60
[21] National Archives CAB 106/1060 Reports from Normandy June 6 – July 10 1944 yesteryear Brigadier James Hargest, New Zealand Army. See also Carlo D’Este, Decision inwards Normandy, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1983)
[22] See David French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army in addition to the War Against Federal Republic of Federal Republic of Germany 1919-1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), J. Paul Harris, ‘Obstacles to Innovation in addition to Readiness: the British Army’s Experience 1918-1939’, inwards Williamson Murray in addition to Richard Hart Sinnreich (eds.), The Past equally Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), in addition to Williamson Murray, ‘British Military Effectiveness inwards the Second World War’, inwards Allan R. Millett in addition to Williamson Murray (eds.),Military Effectiveness, Vol. III: The Second World War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)
[23] Email to the writer from William F. Owen, 23 Nov 2016
[24] William F. Owen, ‘Lionel Wigram, The Forgotten Apostle of Battle Drill,’ British Army Review, Number 136, Spring 2005; Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training inwards the British Army, 1940 – 1944, (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. forty - 62
[25] David French, Raising Churchill’s Army, p. 21. See also Imperial War Museum Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier of Republic of Republic of India 1925, in addition to General Sir Andrew Skeen, Passing It On: Short Talks on Tribal Fighting on the North-West Frontier of India, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2010)
[26] British Library L/MIL/17/5/2240, AHQ Republic of Republic of India Training Memorandum No. nine War Series July 1941 (Delhi, 1941), p. 10
[27] Kaushik Roy, Republic of Republic of India in addition to World War II, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 190 - 233
[28] Major the Reverend John Croft, ‘North West Frontier – Training Ground Supreme,’ Army Quarterly in addition to Defence Journal, Vol. 122, No. 1, Jan 1992, p. 51)
[29] Major-General F. A. M. B. Jenkins, ‘Some Lessons from the Italian Campaign,’ Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. 74, No. 314, Jan 2944, p. 16
[30] John Masters, Bugles in addition to a Tiger, (London: Cassell & Co, 1956), p. 252
[31] Roy, Republic of Republic of India in addition to World War II,
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