Adam Ni together with Bates Gill
At the terminate of 2015 the missile branch of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Second Artillery Force (第二炮兵部队), was formally elevated to a amount service together with renamed the Rocket Force (火箭军; PLARF) percentage of a sweeping drive to meliorate the PLA’s articulation operations, command together with control, together with combat effectiveness. The establishment of the PLARF signals the increasing importance of conventional together with nuclear missiles to PLA warfighting together with deterrence capabilities. It likewise foreshadows continued, substantial investment inward missile forcefulness modernization at both tactical together with strategic levels inward the years ahead. Since its creation, the PLARF has made notable progress inward upgrading missile capabilities, reorganizing command together with command systems, developing realistic combat preparation for its troops, together with growing its puddle of talent. However, deep-seated challenges stay inward all these areas. This two-part serial volition examine the rationale for the PLARF’s creation, its mission, together with the challenges that stand upward inward its way. The challenges are real, together with could frustrate the PLARF’s aspiration of becoming a world-class missile forcefulness if non addressed effectively.
Drivers together with Motivations
There are iii fundamental drivers behind the creation of the PLARF. One of import driver is bureaucratic. The Second Artillery Force has for decades operated inward a role similar to the iii traditional PLA services (Army, Navy together with Air Force) inward organizing, equipping together with controlling the forces nether its command. The creation of the PLARF together with the designation of it every bit a amount service should live on seen every bit the formalization of de facto arrangements, responsibilities together with relations [1].
Another driver was the demand to recognize the increasing importance of missile forces for China’s armed forces strategy together with national security. On a conventional level, China’s speedily developing missile capabilities are giving the PLA to a greater extent than options inward planning for regional scenarios, such every bit those involving Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, together with the Korean Peninsula. On the strategic level, China’s rapid modernizing nuclear forces convey substantially increased the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Seen inward this light, the creation of the PLARF both recognizes the progress of China’s missile capabilities together with signals its continued importance going forward.
A terminal driver behind the creation of the PLARF may live on the demand to formalize the responsibilities of the Second Artillery Force together with so that it is aligned amongst the comprehensive overhaul of the PLA command construction that was initiated inward belatedly 2015. Under this laid of reforms, the PLA formalized together with redefined the roles of the services such that they would focus on forcefulness evolution instead of commanding operations. Formalization of the roles together with responsibilities of the PLARF was peculiarly important, given its growing role every bit percentage of the overall PLA forcefulness posture.
New Status, Old Grade
Unlike the Second Artillery Force, which was designated every bit an independent branch/service arm (独立兵种), the PLARF is at in i trial considered a fully fledged service, along amongst the Army, Navy together with the Air Force, together with has thus received the designation junzhong (军种 or service). The PLA Strategic Support Force is a forcefulness (部队) non a service.
This alter of condition is reflected inward the way that official Chinese sources refer to the PLARF. The term used when the Second Artillery Force was included along amongst the iii traditional services was “services together with branches” (军兵种), indicating that the missile forcefulness was a branch of the PLA instead of a amount service. Today, the PLARF is straight referred to every bit a “service” (军种), both when it is referred to individually together with inward the companionship of the other iii services (China Military Online, May 17, 2017). In addition, the PLARF acquired its ain uniform pattern together with flag soon afterwards it was elevated to a service, indicating its novel status, distinct from the sometime Second Artillery Force which used PLA Army uniforms together with a generic PLA flag (Ministry of National Defense, June 30, 2016; China Military Online, August 18, 2016).
The alter inward designation, however, does non announce a ascension inward the bureaucratic condition (referred to every bit “grade”) of the organisation inside the PLA hierarchy. In fact, fifty-fifty earlier it became the PLARF, the Second Artillery Force was at the same bureaucratic degree every bit the iii traditional services. Just every bit before, the PLARF has the highest degree inside the PLA organisation beneath the supreme Central Military Commission (CMC). It is currently a Theater Command Leader-grade (正战区级) organisation (Weibo, June 15, 2017).
New Tip, Same Spear
The PLARF is a critical chemical factor of China’s armed forces power. At the inauguration ceremony for the PLARF on Dec 31, 2015, CCP General Secretary together with CMC Chairman Xi Jinping described it every bit China’s “core forcefulness of strategic deterrence (战略威慑的核心力量); a strategic back upward (战略支撑) for China’s groovy might status; together with an of import cornerstone (重要基石) of its national security” (Xinhua, Jan 1, 2016). The strategic requirement for the novel forcefulness is to live on prepared to ship out “comprehensive deterrence together with warfighting” (全域慑战) operations amongst “both nuclear together with conventional” (核常兼备) capabilities. In club to accomplish this, Xi ordered the PLARF to heighten “credible together with reliable nuclear deterrence together with counterstrike capabilities” (可信可靠的核威慑和核反击能力); “medium together with long make precision strike capabilities” (中远程精确打击力量); together with the might to contribute to “strategic balance” (战略制衡) betwixt China together with its chief strategic competitors.
In many ways, every bit the successor organisation of the Second Artillery Force, the PLARF represents continuity every bit much every bit change. There is clear continuity inward damage of substance mission (strategic deterrence, nuclear counterattack together with precision strike), capabilities requirements (both nuclear together with conventional missiles) together with hereafter aspirations [2].
However, the meridian of PLA’s missile forces has created a to a greater extent than expansive role for PLARF than its predecessor. Organizational reform together with technological progress convey made what were mere aspirations for the Second Artillery Force into fundamental requirements for the PLARF. The PLARF is expected to ready for, together with ship out if necessary, a various make of warfighting together with deterrence operations, either independently or every bit percentage of a articulation effort. According to i PLA source, “[the establishment of the PLARF] volition sure as shooting spot forrad higher requirements amongst abide by to the construction of [China’s] strategic missile forces” (China Military Online, Jan 2, 2016).
PLARF Missions
The PLARF has 2 fundamental missions: strategic deterrence together with conventional warfighting. In damage of strategic deterrence, the PLARF is responsible for deterring nuclear attacks or coercion against China past times signalling a credible nuclear second-strike capability. This signalling tin send away live on delivered through a diversity of means, including armed forces exercises, media campaigns, armed forces parades, together with forcefulness deployments. If strategic deterrence fails together with China comes nether nuclear attack, the PLARF is responsible for carrying out nuclear counterattack “either independently or together amongst the nuclear forces of other [PLA] services” (State Council Information Office, Jan 2009).
In its conventional warfighting role, the PLARF is responsible for “conducting medium- together with long-range precision strikes” amongst land-based missiles against “key strategic together with operational targets of the enemy” (State Council Information Office, Jan 2009). PLA missile strategy specifies that its conventional missile forcefulness is to live on used against high-threat together with high-value enemy targets, such every bit reconnaissance, intelligence, command together with command electronic warfare, anti-air, together with logistics systems [3].
The strategic requirement for the PLARF to live on cook for “comprehensive deterrence together with warfighting” operations suggests that the PLARF volition convey to develop a amount spectrum of missile capabilities. This would require advanced missile technologies, appropriate doctrines together with fundamental supporting systems, such every bit command together with control, communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, targeting, together with tracking platforms.
Nuclear Modernization
The PLARF’s establishment marks a milestone inward China’s nuclear modernization drive, which has made pregnant progress since the early on 2000s. China continues to develop its nuclear forces both inward damage of size together with quality. However, despite an estimated doubling of its number of nuclear warheads, from around 145 inward 2006 to 270 inward 2017, China’s nuclear arsenal is soundless dwarfed past times the United States’ arsenal of 6,800 warheads [4]. The wearisome but steady growth inward the size of China’s nuclear arsenal has been accompanied past times a rapid modernization of its nuclear delivery capabilities, which are becoming increasingly diversified, mobile together with resilient.
To parent the credibility of China’s land-based nuclear deterrent, the PLARF has deployed mobile, solid-fueled missile systems to increment the mobility together with survivability of its nuclear forces. The virtually notable recent additions inward this regard include the dual-capable DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), the off-road-capable DF-31AG intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (Sina, July 24, 2017), together with the powerful side past times side generation DF-41 ICBMs (People’s Daily, Nov 28, 2017).
The solid-fueled DF-26 is designed to perform both nuclear together with conventional missions against province together with body of body of water targets, including large ships (Ministry of National Defense, Apr 28). Its deployment highlights the PLARF’s growing regional strategic deterrence together with conventional precision strike capabilities together with options. Both DF-31AG together with DF-41 ICBMs are highly mobile together with survivable, together with are capable of carrying multiple warheads including independently targetable vehicles (MIRVs).
In add-on to land-based nuclear missiles, the PLA is likewise working to develop sea- together with air-based nuclear deterrent every bit percentage of an emerging nuclear triad consisting of land-based nuclear missile systems, nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), together with strategic bombers [5].
Dr. Bates Gill is Professor of Asia-Pacific Security Studies at Macquarie University. He has had a 30-year career every bit scholar, policy advisor, together with institution-builder amongst a interrogation focus on Chinese unusual together with safety policy, US-China relations, together with Asia-Pacific security.
Adam Ni is a Visiting Fellow at the Strategic together with Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. His areas of involvement include China’s international relations, strategy together with safety issues. He has worked inward various China-related positions inward academia, authorities together with the private sector.
Notes
[1] H5N1 solar daytime afterwards the creation of the PLARF, Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Senior Colonel Yang Yujun explained that the advert alter together with meridian of China’s missile forces to a amount service branch was because “the Second Artillery Force had inward reality shouldered the functional tasks of a service branch.” See Ministry of National Defense, Jan 1, 2016.
[2] For official characterizations of the Second Artillery Force’s mission, strategic requirements together with evolution aspirations, come across State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy (Beijing, May 2015), department IV; together with The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: Apr 2013), department II.
[3] See Military Strategy Research Department, PLA Academy of Military Science, Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013, 236.
[4] See Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, together with Matthew G. McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces together with U.S. Nuclear War Planning (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists together with Natural Resources Defense Council, Nov 2006), 42, 43, 145; together with Global nuclear weapons: Modernization remains the priority, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), July 3, 2017.
[5] For to a greater extent than on China’s SSBN program, come across Renny Babiarz, China’s Nuclear Submarine Force, China Brief (Vol 17, Issue 10), July 21, 2017. For a detailed word of the motivations together with challenges of China’s nuclear-armed submarine program, come across Tong Zhao, China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016). On the H-20 strategic bomber, come across Andreas Rupprecht, The PLA Air Force’s “Silver-Bullet” Bomber Force, China Brief (Vol 17, Issue 10), July 21, 2017.
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