By: Adam Ni, Bates Gill
At the terminate of 2015 the missile branch of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Second Artillery Force (第二炮兵部队), was formally elevated to a amount service as well as renamed the Rocket Force (火箭军; PLARF) component of a sweeping drive to ameliorate the PLA’s articulation operations, command as well as control, as well as combat effectiveness. The establishment of the PLARF signals the increasing importance of conventional as well as nuclear missiles to PLA warfighting as well as deterrence capabilities. It too foreshadows continued, substantial investment inward missile forcefulness modernization at both tactical as well as strategic levels inward the years ahead. Since its creation, the PLARF has made notable progress inward upgrading missile capabilities, reorganizing command as well as command systems, developing realistic combat preparation for its troops, as well as growing its puddle of talent. However, deep-seated challenges rest inward all these areas. This two-part serial volition examine the rationale for the PLARF’s creation, its mission, as well as the challenges that stand upwardly inward its way. The challenges are real, as well as could frustrate the PLARF’s aspiration of becoming a world-class missile forcefulness if non addressed effectively.
Drivers as well as Motivations
There are 3 telephone substitution drivers behind the creation of the PLARF. One of import driver is bureaucratic. The Second Artillery Force has for decades operated inward a role similar to the 3 traditional PLA services (Army, Navy as well as Air Force) inward organizing, equipping as well as controlling the forces nether its command. The creation of the PLARF as well as the designation of it equally a amount service should live seen equally the formalization of de facto arrangements, responsibilities as well as relations [1].
Another driver was the demand to recognize the increasing importance of missile forces for China’s military machine strategy as well as national security. On a conventional level, China’s speedily developing missile capabilities are giving the PLA to a greater extent than options inward planning for regional scenarios, such equally those involving Taiwan, the South Communist People's Republic of China Sea, the East Communist People's Republic of China Sea, as well as the Korean Peninsula. On the strategic level, China’s rapid modernizing nuclear forces accept substantially increased the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Seen inward this light, the creation of the PLARF both recognizes the progress of China’s missile capabilities as well as signals its continued importance going forward.
A lastly driver behind the creation of the PLARF may live the demand to formalize the responsibilities of the Second Artillery Force as well as then that it is aligned amongst the comprehensive overhaul of the PLA command construction that was initiated inward belatedly 2015. Under this laid of reforms, the PLA formalized as well as redefined the roles of the services such that they would focus on forcefulness evolution instead of commanding operations. Formalization of the roles as well as responsibilities of the PLARF was specially important, given its growing role equally component of the overall PLA forcefulness posture.
New Status, Old Grade
Unlike the Second Artillery Force, which was designated equally an independent branch/service arm (独立兵种), the PLARF is similar a shot considered a fully fledged service, along amongst the Army, Navy as well as the Air Force, as well as has thence received the designation junzhong (军种 or service). The PLA Strategic Support Force is a forcefulness (部队) non a service.
This alter of condition is reflected inward the way that official Chinese sources refer to the PLARF. The term used when the Second Artillery Force was included along amongst the 3 traditional services was “services as well as branches” (军兵种), indicating that the missile forcefulness was a branch of the PLA instead of a amount service. Today, the PLARF is straight referred to equally a “service” (军种), both when it is referred to individually as well as inward the fellowship of the other 3 services (China Military Online, May 17, 2017). In addition, the PLARF acquired its ain uniform blueprint as well as flag presently later it was elevated to a service, indicating its novel status, distinct from the erstwhile Second Artillery Force which used PLA Army uniforms as well as a generic PLA flag (Ministry of National Defense, June 30, 2016; China Military Online, August 18, 2016).
The alter inward designation, however, does non announce a rising inward the bureaucratic condition (referred to equally “grade”) of the organisation inside the PLA hierarchy. In fact, fifty-fifty earlier it became the PLARF, the Second Artillery Force was at the same bureaucratic bird equally the 3 traditional services. Just equally before, the PLARF has the highest bird inside the PLA organisation beneath the supreme Central Military Commission (CMC). It is currently a Theater Command Leader-grade (正战区级) organisation (Weibo, June 15, 2017).
New Tip, Same Spear
The PLARF is a critical chemical ingredient of China’s military machine power. At the inauguration ceremony for the PLARF on Dec 31, 2015, CCP General Secretary as well as CMC Chairman Xi Jinping described it equally China’s “core forcefulness of strategic deterrence (战略威慑的核心力量); a strategic back upwardly (战略支撑) for China’s peachy might status; as well as an of import cornerstone (重要基石) of its national security” (Xinhua, Jan 1, 2016). The strategic requirement for the novel forcefulness is to live prepared to send out “comprehensive deterrence as well as warfighting” (全域慑战) operations amongst “both nuclear as well as conventional” (核常兼备) capabilities. In society to accomplish this, Xi ordered the PLARF to heighten “credible as well as reliable nuclear deterrence as well as counterstrike capabilities” (可信可靠的核威慑和核反击能力); “medium as well as long attain precision strike capabilities” (中远程精确打击力量); as well as the might to contribute to “strategic balance” (战略制衡) betwixt Communist People's Republic of China as well as its master copy strategic competitors.
In many ways, equally the successor organisation of the Second Artillery Force, the PLARF represents continuity equally much equally change. There is clear continuity inward price of pith mission (strategic deterrence, nuclear counterattack as well as precision strike), capabilities requirements (both nuclear as well as conventional missiles) as well as time to come aspirations [2].
However, the exceed of PLA’s missile forces has created a to a greater extent than expansive role for PLARF than its predecessor. Organizational reform as well as technological progress accept made what were mere aspirations for the Second Artillery Force into telephone substitution requirements for the PLARF. The PLARF is expected to gear upwardly for, as well as send out if necessary, a various attain of warfighting as well as deterrence operations, either independently or equally component of a articulation effort. According to 1 PLA source, “[the establishment of the PLARF] volition sure as shooting position forrard higher requirements amongst honour to the construction of [China’s] strategic missile forces” (China Military Online, Jan 2, 2016).
PLARF Missions
The PLARF has 2 telephone substitution missions: strategic deterrence as well as conventional warfighting. In price of strategic deterrence, the PLARF is responsible for deterring nuclear attacks or coercion against Communist People's Republic of China yesteryear signalling a credible nuclear second-strike capability. This signalling tin hand the axe live delivered through a diversity of means, including military machine exercises, media campaigns, military machine parades, as well as forcefulness deployments. If strategic deterrence fails as well as Communist People's Republic of China comes nether nuclear attack, the PLARF is responsible for carrying out nuclear counterattack “either independently or together amongst the nuclear forces of other [PLA] services” (State Council Information Office, Jan 2009).
In its conventional warfighting role, the PLARF is responsible for “conducting medium- as well as long-range precision strikes” amongst land-based missiles against “key strategic as well as operational targets of the enemy” (State Council Information Office, Jan 2009). PLA missile strategy specifies that its conventional missile forcefulness is to live used against high-threat as well as high-value enemy targets, such equally reconnaissance, intelligence, command as well as command electronic warfare, anti-air, as well as logistics systems [3].
The strategic requirement for the PLARF to live cook for “comprehensive deterrence as well as warfighting” operations suggests that the PLARF volition accept to develop a amount spectrum of missile capabilities. This would require advanced missile technologies, appropriate doctrines as well as telephone substitution supporting systems, such equally command as well as control, communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, targeting, as well as tracking platforms.
Nuclear Modernization
The PLARF’s establishment marks a milestone inward China’s nuclear modernization drive, which has made meaning progress since the early on 2000s. Communist People's Republic of China continues to develop its nuclear forces both inward price of size as well as quality. However, despite an estimated doubling of its number of nuclear warheads, from approximately 145 inward 2006 to 270 inward 2017, China’s nuclear arsenal is soundless dwarfed yesteryear the United States’ arsenal of 6,800 warheads [4]. The dull but steady growth inward the size of China’s nuclear arsenal has been accompanied yesteryear a rapid modernization of its nuclear delivery capabilities, which are becoming increasingly diversified, mobile as well as resilient.
To lift the credibility of China’s land-based nuclear deterrent, the PLARF has deployed mobile, solid-fueled missile systems to increment the mobility as well as survivability of its nuclear forces. The almost notable recent additions inward this regard include the dual-capable DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), the off-road-capable DF-31AG intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (Sina, July 24, 2017), as well as the powerful side yesteryear side generation DF-41 ICBMs (People’s Daily, Nov 28, 2017).
The solid-fueled DF-26 is designed to perform both nuclear as well as conventional missions against nation as well as body of body of water targets, including large ships (Ministry of National Defense, Apr 28). Its deployment highlights the PLARF’s growing regional strategic deterrence as well as conventional precision strike capabilities as well as options. Both DF-31AG as well as DF-41 ICBMs are highly mobile as well as survivable, as well as are capable of carrying multiple warheads including independently targetable vehicles (MIRVs).
In add-on to land-based nuclear missiles, the PLA is too working to develop sea- as well as air-based nuclear deterrent equally component of an emerging nuclear triad consisting of land-based nuclear missile systems, nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), as well as strategic bombers [5].
Dr. Bates Gill is Professor of Asia-Pacific Security Studies at Macquarie University. He has had a 30-year career equally scholar, policy advisor, as well as institution-builder amongst a inquiry focus on Chinese unusual as well as safety policy, US-China relations, as well as Asia-Pacific security.
Adam Ni is a Visiting Fellow at the Strategic as well as Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. His areas of involvement include China’s international relations, strategy as well as safety issues. He has worked inward various China-related positions inward academia, authorities as well as the private sector.
Notes
[1] Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 twenty-four hr menses later the creation of the PLARF, Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Senior Colonel Yang Yujun explained that the cite alter as well as exceed of China’s missile forces to a amount service branch was because “the Second Artillery Force had inward reality shouldered the functional tasks of a service branch.” See Ministry of National Defense, Jan 1, 2016.
[2] For official characterizations of the Second Artillery Force’s mission, strategic requirements as well as evolution aspirations, encounter State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy (Beijing, May 2015), department IV; as well as The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: Apr 2013), department II.
[3] See Military Strategy Research Department, PLA Academy of Military Science, Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013, 236.
[4] See Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, as well as Matthew G. McKinzie, Chinese Nuclear Forces as well as U.S. Nuclear War Planning (Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists as well as Natural Resources Defense Council, Nov 2006), 42, 43, 145; as well as Global nuclear weapons: Modernization remains the priority, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), July 3, 2017.
[5] For to a greater extent than on China’s SSBN program, encounter Renny Babiarz, China’s Nuclear Submarine Force, Communist People's Republic of China Brief (Vol 17, Issue 10), July 21, 2017. For a detailed word of the motivations as well as challenges of China’s nuclear-armed submarine program, encounter Tong Zhao, China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016). On the H-20 strategic bomber, encounter Andreas Rupprecht, The PLA Air Force’s “Silver-Bullet” Bomber Force, Communist People's Republic of China Brief (Vol 17, Issue 10), July 21, 2017.
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