CAMILLE LONS
The past times few weeks withdraw hold been peculiarly rich inwards novel developments for the UAE’s unusual policy. In Yemen, the UAE is at the forefront of the electrical flow struggle for the seizure of the Houthi-held port of Hodeidah, a critical chokepoint for the arms too humanitarian supplies to the Houthis, too an of import access to the Red Sea too strait of Bab el Mandeb, where 4.8 1000000 barrels of crude oil too 8 pct of global merchandise transit every day. On the other shore of the Red Sea, the Emiratis withdraw hold reportedly played a key purpose at facilitating the rapprochement betwixt 20-year rivals Eritrea too Ethiopia. On July 24, a few weeks afterwards the 2 countries signed a peace agreement, Abu Dhabi hosted a tripartite summit amongst the 2 leaders, where it reaffirmed its back upwards to their peace efforts. For the UAE, the stabilisation of these of import partners could withdraw hold strategic advantages, including for reinforcing its already solid influence on Horn of Africa’s ports. Indeed, Eritrea hosts the UAE’s start unusual armed forces base of operations inwards its port of Assab since 2015, too reports advise that landlocked Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia plans to utilisation this port, peradventure developed past times Dubai Ports World, to diminish its reliance on the port of Djibouti. Finally, the UAE also received concluding calendar week the see of Chinese President Xi Jinping, signing agreements inwards multiple areas, including cooperation on the projection of Maritime Silk Road, given both countries growing footprint on regional ports.
These back-to-back developments grade farther steps inwards the UAE’s rapid maritime expansion inwards the Western Indian Ocean too advise the shaping of an increasingly sophisticated Emirati diplomacy directed towards the achievement of its regional ambitions. This is playing out against the backdrop of regional competition betwixt Gulf states across both the Gulf itself too the Horn of Africa, a competition also drawing inwards others such Turkey too China. This competition to command strategic ports too maritime routes represents a new, too potentially destabilizing, arena for intensifying regional rivalries.
Towards the emergence of an Emirati maritime empire?
Building on its long-standing presence inwards the Red Sea, the UAE has used the state-owned DP World every bit a key commercial too diplomatic tool, allowing it to multiply their commercial concessions too economical agreements amongst the ports on the Horn of Africa. This has resulted inwards a string of UAE controlled ports—running from Assab inwards Eritrea, to Djibouti, Berbera inwards Somaliland, Bosaso inwards the Puntland, Barawe inwards Somalia too Kismayo inwards southern Somalia. On the other side of the Red Sea, inwards southern too western Yemen, the Emirati intervention against the Houthis too Al Qaida has created an opening for the UAE to develop its influence inwards local ports such every bit Mukalla, Bir’Ali, Balhaf, Aden, al-Mokha, too directly Al Hodeidah.
Yemeni fighters from the Amalqa ("Giants") Brigades, loyal to the Saudi-backed government, assemble amongst armed pick-up trucks too armored vehicles on the side of a route during the offensive to seize the Red Sea port metropolis of Hodeida from Iran-backed Huthi rebels, on its southern outskirts close the airdrome on June 21. For a few years now, the UAE has also been using its presence inwards unusual ports every bit a launching pad from which it tin projection its armed forces might into the region. Following the degradation of its human relationship amongst Djibouti, the UAE established its start unusual armed forces base of operations inwards Eritrea’s port of Assab inwards 2015, which played a key purpose inwards enforcing the coalition’s blockade of Yemen, too inwards coordinating the air strikes against the Houthis inwards Yemen. The UAE is also developing a naval too air base of operations inwards Berbara (Somaliland), too tightening its armed forces cooperation amongst the Seychelles.
Emirati efforts withdraw hold been focused mainly on the ports of the Red Sea too Western Indian Ocean, which occupy a strategic place at the crossroads of merchandise routes linking Europe, Africa too Asia. As Islamic Republic of Iran threatens to seat constraints on the access to the Strait of Hormuz, maintaining safety too liberty of navigation inwards the Bab el Mandeb is crucial to the UAE. But maybe to a greater extent than importantly, the UAE is eager to brand itself a key constituent of the Chinese Belt too Road Initiative (BRI), for which the Gulf too Indian Ocean are strategic. At a fourth dimension when Gulf countries are trying to diversify their economies, Asian investments too positioning on global merchandise routes correspond of import opportunities for the UAE’s post-oil economy.
The battle of ports at the oculus of Gulf rivalries
The Emirati port of Jebel Ali provides a quarter of Dubai’s gross domestic product too stands today every bit the largest container port inwards the region, amongst a capacity that has increased past times a 3rd since 2015, reaching some xx 1000000 TEUs. But if the UAE is currently the most proactive too chop-chop expanding maritime might inwards the region, it is non the only one, too other Gulf countries withdraw hold invested heavily inwards the evolution of their ain ports too logistical infrastructures.
An aerial sentiment of Jebel Ali Port inwards Dubai on Oct 25, 2010.REUTERS/AHMED JADALLAH The Saudi ports of King Abdullah too Jeddah are planning to nigh double their capacity over the coming years. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 conception to connect these ports on the Red Sea to the metropolis of Dammam on the Farsi Gulf through novel pipelines too track networks would cutting significantly trading routes, given them a competitive edge. Sultanate of Oman likewise is trying to withdraw hold wages of its strategic place on the Indian Ocean, which allows it to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, past times upgrading its ports inwards Sohar, Salalah, too Duqm.
On the contrary shore of the Gulf, Islamic Republic of Iran is seeking to attract Chinese too Indian investments for the evolution of its port inwards Chabahar, which would last connected to Central Asia via railways. The render of U.S. of America sanctions may withal trammel its ambitions. Finally, Qatar, has brought frontward the opening of its Hamad port to September 2017. While this primarily stems from the postulate to re-draw its trading routes every bit a final result of the UAE-Saudi instigated blockade against it, its novel port could also exceed a credible choice to Jebel Ali.
But command of ports is also an inherently political issue. The blockade of Qatar has demonstrated how interdependency too connectivity tin last used every bit a tool for political pressure. Gulf countries are keenly aware of this run a jeopardy too are attempting to diversify too re-balance cross-border too maritime merchandise routes. As mentioned above, Qatar has re-directed its routes from Jebel Ali towards other regional ports such every bit Sohar inwards Oman, too Shuwakin inwards Kuwait. It has also signed a shipping partnership amongst Islamic Republic of Iran too Turkey to farther assist it bypass the blockade.
Similarly, Sultanate of Oman has framed the evolution of its ports inwards Sohar too Duqm, too greater cooperation amongst Qatar, every bit a agency of lessening its vulnerability to mounting political pressure level from Kingdom of Saudi Arabia too the UAE over Muscat continued human relationship amongst Iran. Even unopen allies such every bit Kingdom of Saudi Arabia too the UAE are existence prudent. Saudi investments inwards the Omani port of Duqm too infrastructure projects boosting solid reason connections betwixt the 2 territories—and circumventing the UAE—can last seen every bit an endeavor past times Riyadh to decrease its reliance on the Emirati ports, too loosen the latter’s monopoly on Gulf trading routes.
Intra-Gulf competition over maritime merchandise routes is non alone confined to domestic ports. In a similar fashion to the UAE, other regional powers withdraw hold also been developing their presence inwards ports too maritime choke points doted across the region, using them every bit ways to make wider influence. But every bit these powers expands outwards into the region, it is geopolitics rather than pure economic science that is becoming the dominant driver.
The Horn of Africa too Red Sea especially withdraw hold been champaign of study to heightened militarisation due to a complex game of regional rivalries involving Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, Islamic Republic of Iran too Egypt. In add-on to existence of import assistance donors to the Horn of Africa, these countries withdraw hold sought to increment their armed forces presence inwards the Red Sea. Besides the Saudi base of operations inwards Djibouti, too Emirati bases inwards Eritrea too Somalia, Turkey is inwards the procedure of opening bases inwards Mogadishu too inwards Suakin (Sudan), Islamic Republic of Iran is conducting anti-piracy operations inwards the Red Sea, too at that spot are rumours that Arab Republic of Egypt is inwards talks on a base of operations inwards Eritrea.
Regional powers withdraw hold also been playing on internal eastern African tensions to counterbalance each other’s influence. In Somalia for example, Ankara too Abu Dhabi are playing on internal rivalries betwixt the primal authorities inwards Mogadishu too somali clans too federal states to increment their influence at the expense of the other.
The international community fears that Gulf-Turkey rivalries could withdraw hold destabilising spill-over effects on an already frail region. The Europeans especially, who withdraw hold high strategic stakes inwards the Horn of Africa too depend heavily on the maritime merchandise routes passing through the strait of Hormuz too Suez Canal, come across this regional might competition amongst a lot of concern. However, the Eritrea-Ethiopia rapprochement advise that the UAE is willing to impose itself every bit a peace broker too stabilising might inwards the region. Future developments volition tell us whether connectivity too economical dependency volition play to a greater extent than every bit a cistron of conflict or every bit a cistron of peace inwards the region—but they are already surely to confirm the Red Sea too regional maritime routes every bit the novel arenas for regional contestation.
Camille Lons is a Programme Coordinator amongst the Middle East too North Africa Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
The views expressed inwards this article are the authors' own.
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