By Ben Ho Wan Beng too Gary Lehmann
Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) is the novel Navy-Marine Corps concept for using state units forward-deployed ashore to tending win a naval war. EABO is intended to plough the tables on our adversaries’ Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies, using isle outposts to tending US land, sea, too air forces travel too combat inwards the human face upwardly of enemy sensors too long-range precision missiles. According to the 2017 concept for Littoral Operations inwards a Contested Environment (LOCE), EABO proposes deploying relatively little forces — companies, platoons, fifty-fifty unmarried squads — inwards austere temporary locations, hidden from enemy sensors too able to speedily relocate when found. This would confound enemy planning past times forcing them to split their resources over a wider too to a greater extent than dispersed laid of threats. An Expeditionary Advanced Base (EAB) is non a fixed position. It is to a greater extent than similar a packet of capabilities tailored to a detail mission, such equally intelligence, surveillance, too reconnaissance (ISR); futurity anti-ship cruise missiles; too forrad arming too refueling points (FARPs). EABs could also control, or at to the lowest degree contest, body of body of water lines of communications too naval chokepoints similar narrow straits, denying their usage to the enemy.
Wake Island burns after a Japanese attack
So how tin lav the enemy counter such isle bases?. While EABO is non explicitly directed at China, Beijing’s strategic ambitions too military machine advances are undoubtedly key drivers. If nosotros were strategists inwards the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) responsible for planning island-chain operations inwards the western Pacific, it would stand upwardly us inwards goodness stead to study a lesser-known battle of World War Two: the 1941 combat for Wake Island. That battle pitted a small, defended isle against to a greater extent than powerful enemy body of body of water forces — a challenger that may good live replicated during a notional Sino-American war. The Battle of Wake Island began on xi Dec 1941, 4 days after the Pearl Harbor attack, amongst a Japanese expeditionary strength trying to accept over the mid-Pacific atoll. The meager US Marine forces on Wake initially repelled the invaders, amongst shore-based naval guns sinking ii destroyers too damaging several other ships. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) made a minute elbow grease to subdue the atoll amongst much to a greater extent than powerful forces, too Wake’s besieged defenders had to give upwardly on 23 Dec 1941.
Imperial Japanese Navy destroyer Hayate, destroyed past times Marine Corps shore batteries off Wake Island inwards 1941.
Lesson One: Outrange the adversary
The first, most obvious, lesson from the Battle of Wake is to strike at defended islands piece staying out of attain of their weaponry — which, beingness landbound, can’t pursue your ships. While outranging the enemy is applicable to all aspects of warfare, it is peculiarly pregnant inwards naval operations, where getting inwards the commencement effective shot is, equally the doyen of naval combat Wayne Hughes puts it, “the slap-up naval saying of tactics.”
Overconfident inwards his forces’ superiority, Rear Admiral Sadamichi Kajioka, the invasion strength commander, was lured into the firing envelope of Wake’s coastal-defense batteries, despite having the attain advantage: The largest guns on Wake were five-inchers, piece the low-cal cruisers inwards the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) strength had six-inch batteries. While these cruisers began firing at the isle beyond the attain of its defenses, they exacted scant damage. From the lack of activeness on Wake, Kajioka thought he had surprised the Americans too approached inside attain of the island’s five-inchers.
A derelict coastal defense strength gun still stands guard over Wake Island.
In the engagement that followed, the Americans – notwithstanding their obsolete fire-control mechanisms – sunk the destroyer Hayate piece damaging several other ships, including the low-cal cruiser Yubari (Kajioka’s flagship), too 3 other destroyers. The IJN withdrew. Esteemed naval historian Samuel Morison wrote: “Never again, inwards this Pacific war, did coast defense strength guns crunch off an amphibious landing.” In a state of war where the PLA may target EABs, the Chinese would practice good to strike these positions from beyond the attain of their weaponry. In this regard, Beijing is good served past times its “projectile-centric strategy,” emphasizing the PLA’s long-range missiles.
Fortunately for Beijing, the principal anti-surface capabilities currently available to US forces are relatively short-ranged. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) that the Marine Corps is reportedly mulling for the ship-killing constituent of EABO tin lav hitting targets some 70km to 300km away. In stark contrast, 1 of the most numerous short-range ballistic missiles inwards Chinese hands, the DF-15, tin lav strike targets over 600km away: DF-15s inwards coastal China could strike many parts of the Ryukyus where EABs are probable to be. [Part of the occupation is that the US still abides past times its 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty amongst the then-Soviet Union, which bans ground-based missiles amongst ranges betwixt 500 too 5,500 km; Russian Federation has allegedly broken the treaty too China never signed it — the editors]
A barrage of Chinese cruise too ballistic missiles hither would outrange the Americans, obviating the demand for the PLA to commit other resources against EABO forces. To live sure, some conduct maintain contended that novel technologies similar the Hyper Velocity Projectile volition nullify the missile threat. These capabilities, however, are still rattling much on the drawing board. Moreover, missile defense strength has had a less-than-stellar operational history – witness the travails of the Patriot system used past times the U.S. too many of its allies, including Japan.
F4F Wildcats inwards formation. The air forces defending Wake comprised simply 4 of these fighters.
Lesson Two: Weaken his air support
The adjacent lesson from the Battle of Wake would live to weaken the airpower supporting the EABs. Maritime proficient Milan Vego has argued that “the most critical prerequisite for success inwards littorals is air superiority.” But — again, arguably out of hubris — the Japanese did non industrial plant life air superiority over Wake inwards the initial stages of the battle. Indeed, the commencement landing elbow grease did non fifty-fifty conduct maintain air cover. As the Japanese fleet retreated, it was attacked past times the 4 remaining Wildcat fighters on the isle (the residuum having been destroyed pre-invasion past times the Japanes) which sank some other destroyer, Kisaragi, too hitting several other vessels.
To live certain, the Americans were lucky here: Kisaragi died when a mere 100-pound bomb laid off its depth charges. But if the Japanese had deployed proper air cover, the Wildcats couldn’t conduct maintain attacked at all. Indeed, it was entirely after the entire Wildcat complement on Wake had been destroyed that the Japanese were able to subdue the island.
What PLA strategists should accept away from this episode is that taking out an EAB becomes much to a greater extent than risky too complicated if it has fifty-fifty express air support. Chinese planning considerations should include the next assumptions:
EABs would non permanently host tactical aircraft such equally the F-35 (except mayhap futurity swarming drones);
EABs volition conduct maintain ground-based anti-air too anti-ship weapons;
EABs volition industrial plant life Forward Arming too Refueling Points (FARPs) to support friendly aircraft, which may or non live introduce when the base of operations is attacked; and
EABs may have air back upwardly from US carriers too to a greater extent than distant state bases inwards extremis.
These factors hateful the PLA must win the “reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance competition” amongst EAB forces, using special operations forces, long-range manned too unmanned ISR platforms, standoff precision munitions, too offensive cyber operations to disrupt too forbid effective EAB command too control. If the Chinese forces tin lav locate the US bases without beingness located inwards return, the phase would live laid for the PLA to launch quick too decisive surprise attacks.
A wrecked Japanese patrol boat run aground on Wake Island.
Lesson Three: Defense is inherently stronger than offense
As the Prussian sage Carl von Clausewitz asserted, it is “easier to concord the world than accept it. It follows that defense strength is easier than attack.” The Japanese ignored this truism at Wake. Even though the Japanese had comparatively to a greater extent than firepower inwards their initial assault, they failed to concentrate the strength to overpower Wake’s defenses. Even if the Japanese had managed to defeat the Wildcats too coastal guns too state on Wake on their commencement try, it is highly doubtful that their 450 Special Naval Landing Force troops would live able to dislodge the 390-odd U.S. Marines on the atoll. Traditional military machine doctrine calls for the assailant to conduct maintain a three-to-one superiority over the defender. Having obviously learned their lesson from the commencement failed landing, the the minute Japanese elbow grease was much stronger, including several heavy cruisers that provided long-range firepower. Two veterans of the Pearl Harbor strike force, the aircraft carriers Hiryu too Soryu, were also deployed, but they were tasked to entirely provide distant cover a few hundred kilometers away from the invasion fleet, dramatically limiting their effectiveness. Had the Americans carried out their master copy excogitation to transportation their ain carriers to salve Wake, the Japanese flattops mightiness non conduct maintain been able to protect wreaking havoc on the invasion force. Imperial Japan’s proclivity to carve upwardly its forces would proceed to raise its ugly caput subsequently inwards the war, oftentimes amongst disastrous consequences.
So should the Chinese concentrate overwhelming strength on an EAB to defeat it? Not necessarily. PLA thinkers should consider whether a little too relatively lightly defended enemy base, such equally the typical EAB, actually justifies expenditure of large amounts of ordnance on it? As naval analyst Bryan Clark argued “the thought is non to acquire into invincible, (but) to brand the EAB a difficult plenty kill for a pretty low-value target.” Indeed, equally large equally the missile inventory of the PLA Rocket Force may be, it could live depleted speedily during a war, peculiarly if it had to target large numbers of individually weak but collectively unsafe EABs.
One solution is for the Chinese to target entirely the most critical EABs. Another agency would live to utilize special operations forces, which tin lav practice tremendous impairment to lightly defended targets and, different missiles, tin lav live reused.
Conclusion
In the concluding analysis, arrogance underpinned Tokyo’s failure inwards the initial stages of the Wake Island campaign. It seemed that “Victory Disease” had already laid inwards inside the early on weeks of the Pacific War, too this malady would entirely worsen equally the months went on, culminating at Midway. Therein lies some other obvious lesson which militaries conduct maintain surprisingly oftentimes failed to heed: never underestimate your enemy.
While the US Navy is currently going through troubled times – witness the tribulations of the Ford-class supercarrier too Littoral Combat Ship, equally good equally the recent ship collisions – it is still the fantabulous navy inwards the world, too China would discount the U.S. at its ain peril. Beijing should play to its strengths amongst its asymmetric strategy to counter the Americans, rather than compete head-to-head.
The United States, too, should larn from these lessons to brand Expeditionary Advanced Bases to a greater extent than survivable. EABs, beingness relatively little too austere, are unlikely to live able to outfight the enemy; the key to their viability is to bring down the odds of beingness detected, targeted, too outranged. EABs should focus on minimizing detection to gain the upper paw inwards the “reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance” competition. To this end, passive protection measures, similar decoys, deception, concealment, camouflage, too signature-management — i.e. reducing radio too radar emissions — should live pursued to a greater extent than vigorously over kinetic ones similar missile defense. The finish is to practice Expeditionary Advanced Bases that tin lav tending deter, or if demand be, tending win the adjacent Pacific war.
Ben Ho Wan Beng
Ben Ho Wan Beng is a senior analyst amongst the military machine studies computer programme at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. He writes primarily on naval affairs, too his function inwards this expanse has been published inwards the likes of theNaval War College Review, Journal of Military too Strategic Studies, andRUSI Defence Systems.
Gary Lehmann
Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Gary Lehmann served to a greater extent than than xx years equally an active-duty infantry officeholder inwards the US Marine Corps, too has to a greater extent than than 12 years of sense equally a contractor, primarily inwards back upwardly of the Marines too Joint Staff. He has been published inwards the Marine Corps Gazette, Joint Force Quarterly, Proceedings, too DefenseWatch magazine.
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