Mission command is considered the principal method of command in addition to command (C2) inward the United States of America military. Its effectiveness is predicated on giving subordinates sufficient liberty to human activity hence they tin exercise initiatory inward the course of study of executing their assigned missions. The Navy’s deeply rooted goose egg tolerance for error, however, is incompatible amongst truthful mission command. For to a greater extent than than 3 decades, the zero-defect mentality has pervaded the service. Reversing these policies volition ask a cultural revolution inward the way the Navy thinks in addition to acts. What Is Mission Command?
The origins of mission command tin live on traced to the era of Frederick the Great in addition to the Prussian military machine reforms led yesteryear General Gerhard von Scharnhorst later on defeats inward the battles of Jena in addition to Auerstadt inward Oct 1806 against Napoleon I. These reforms institutionalized to a greater extent than independent activity for subordinate commanders. After 1815, however, decentralized C2 was forgotten inward the Prussian Army. It was non until 1857, when then-General Helmuth von Moltke became master copy of the Prussian General Staff, that decentralized C2 was non alone restored but also given increased emphasis.
Mission command, or Auftragstaktik —a term coined inward the early on 1890s—initially widely was considered a threat to military machine plain of study and, yesteryear extension, to everything military. 1 However, it proved to live on extremely effective inward practice, provided its prerequisites were met in addition to it tenets followed faithfully. The key prerequisites for the success of mission command are a proper agreement of the Clausewitzian pedagogy of the nature of war, a highly educated in addition to trained force, splendid relationships betwixt higher commanders in addition to subordinates, a mutual operational or tactical outlook, sufficient liberty to act, in addition to a mutual vocabulary.
The Germans viewed the confusion of battle equally a source of potential opportunities, in addition to they built a C2 philosophy inward which that potential could live on realized through decentralized determination making. 2 Subordinate commanders, they believed, were amend able than the higher commander to take away maintain situations inward which split-second decisions frequently are pivotal. Mission command brought other benefits, equally well:
• It gave subordinate commanders to a greater extent than ownership of their actions, which stimulated greater determination inward carrying out their mission. 3
• It allowed greater flexibility for adapting rapidly to changing combat situations, dealing amongst unforeseen problems, in addition to exploiting fleeting opportunities. 4
• It encouraged initiatory in addition to inventiveness on the component division of subordinates.
• It greatly enhanced motivation in addition to morale.
The main argue for the Germans’ success amongst mission command was their unwavering focus on leadership in addition to warfighting at all levels of command in addition to the trust that yielded. The higher commanders had confidence their subordinates, inward exercising the initiative, would live on successful. In turn, subordinates trusted that their superiors would back upward them inward whatever actions they took inward expert faith. They were non afraid to give accurate, critical reports on the status in addition to performance of their forces. five The amend commanders in addition to subordinates knew in addition to trusted each other, the shorter in addition to less detailed orders could be. 6
Freedom of activity inward the execution of an social club was conditioned on a leader’s willingness to select responsibility, but the Germans also understood that bang-up successes inward state of war could non live on achieved without bang-up danger. vii From the highest commander to the youngest soldier, inaction was considered much worse than an error of judgment based on a sincere essay to human activity decisively. Although errors mightiness campaign setbacks, the broad exercise of initiatory yesteryear subordinate commanders ultimately would create to a greater extent than expert than harm. Thus, no opprobrium was associated amongst failure resulting from a thinking leader’s prudent risk taking. 8
Zero Error Tolerance
A goose egg error tolerance policy imposes strict penalisation for violating the stated rules, amongst the aim of eliminating exceptional behaviors or activities. H5N1 someone inward say-so is non allowed to exercise discretion inward meting out penalisation to gibe the circumstances. Among other things, a zero-error mentality is direct responsible for risk aversion, overcentralization of C2, pervasive interference yesteryear higher commanders, lack of initiatory in addition to creativity, distrust of the senior leaders, in addition to erosion of the warrior spirit. It also negatively affects retentiveness of officers.
In the United States of America Navy, in that place is a widespread perception that no mistakes or failings volition live on tolerated. Such goose egg error tolerance is 1 of the main reasons for the relief from command of United States of America naval officers inward the yesteryear 2 decades. nine It is highly doubtful that such splendid admirals equally Ernest J. King (negative fitness reports), Chester W. Nimitz (grounding of a destroyer in addition to reprimand yesteryear a fleet commander), in addition to Raymond S. Spruance (reprimand yesteryear the Secretary of the Navy) would receive got reached fifty-fifty the rank of captain today.
Former Commandant of the United States of America Marine Corps General Charles Krulak observed that the zero-defect mentality is at odds amongst effective leadership. His observation seemed to live on borne out inward a 2014 survey of naval officers, many of whom indicated petty wishing to select higher command inward component division because of the increasing risk aversion. 10
Risk aversion in addition to risk avoidance are 2 sides of the same coin. Risk avoidance—so prevalent inward the Navy in addition to other services today—is reverse to the traditional notion of leadership. One of the commencement casualties of risk avoidance is the loss of trust of peers, subordinates, superiors, in addition to fifty-fifty the organization.
Risk avoidance is a symptom of a profound failure to empathise the nature of risk. Any determination inward combat (and sometimes inward peacetime) carries a sure enough grade of risk. H5N1 commander tin cut risk yesteryear having accurate, timely, in addition to relevant information, but an pick that is risk-free is rare. Commanders must live on willing to select high but prudent (or calculated) risks, in addition to that way making decisions nether varying degrees of uncertainty. In taking a calculated risk, a commander would reckon the probability of a jeopardy or opportunity of failure prior to making a decision. In contrast, a take away chances is to select a risk inward the promise of getting a desired result. If a calculated risk fails, 1 tin recover; inward the illustration of a gamble, recovery by in addition to large is impossible.
Risk avoidance is today a component division of around every pace of the decision-making procedure inward the Navy. Obviously, a commander inward developing options ever should consider risk to his or her forces. It is detrimental, however, to constantly remind commanders to focus on so-called risk administration or risk mitigation inward their gauge of the situation. Risk currently is an integral component division of the mission analysis, comparing in addition to decision, in addition to fifty-fifty commander’s intent.
An obsessive focus on risk cannot but outcome inward lack of boldness on the component division of commanders. An overly cautious commander would non alone tiresome the tempo of the functioning but also neglect to select total wages all of a abrupt alter inward the situation. If everything inward combat is reduced to criterion dangers in addition to loss, commanders are unlikely to properly empathise the opportunities for gains. The worst illustration is making decisions out of fearfulness of losing, rather than amongst whatever expectation of winning.
It is tempting to consider risk equally alone negative, but risk is non something inherent in addition to unchangeable. What mightiness live on considered risky prior to an functioning mightiness non aspect rattling risky inward combat. H5N1 commander tin greatly overestimate or greatly underestimate the risk inward carrying out a sure enough option. H5N1 doctrine that characterizes risk alone equally jeopardy in addition to loss cannot aid but imbue its practitioners amongst an excess of risk aversion inward combat. Sound doctrine should non focus on averting hazards in addition to losses but on agreement what is hazarded in addition to what mightiness live on lost against what mightiness live on gained. 11
One of the principal requirements for success of mission command is liberty to act. This is achieved yesteryear issuing commander’s intent in addition to and hence expecting subordinates to human activity amongst initiatory inward executing their assigned missions. Although subordinates mightiness brand to a greater extent than or less mistakes, they volition live on to a greater extent than successful if higher commanders rely on mission command. Freedom to human activity implies that subordinate commanders may divert from the assigned missions inward illustration of a drastic alter inward the situation, when quick activity is necessary in addition to the higher commander is non inward a seat to brand a decision. 12
Risk avoidance results inward overcentralization of C2 in addition to undue interference of the higher commanders inward the say-so in addition to responsibilities of their subordinate commanders. When higher commanders number highly detailed orders to subordinates, the destination mightiness live on to ensure no mistakes are made. Yet, their subordinate commanders chop-chop would realize the dangers of acting on their ain initiative. The outcome is lack of activity in addition to waiting on orders instead of making quick in addition to independent decisions equally opportunities arise. 13
As experience shows, it is invariably bad when a commander bypasses his or her immediate subordinate commanders in addition to issues direct orders to tactical commanders. Commanders who essay to specify everything for their subordinates are outflow to acquire lost inward the maze of details in addition to lose operational perspective. They also lose the trust in addition to back upward of their subordinates in addition to undermine the rattling ground for their ain decisions in addition to actions. fourteen Overly centralized C2 does non encourage risk taking. It does non allow subordinates to brand mistakes in addition to larn from them. Subordinates run passive because they experience their ideas are non welcome or they are non allowed to brand a contribution. 15
Focus on Leadership
Mission command is the most effective method of command in addition to command ever devised. War is chaotic in addition to unpredictable. Accidents, chance, in addition to luck abound. All decisions in addition to actions inward state of war entail a sure enough grade of risk. Yet, risk also offers opportunities for gaining a decisive advantage. Success inward combat is best achieved yesteryear issuing commander’s intent in addition to and hence providing subordinates sufficient liberty of activity to exercise their initiatory in addition to creative skills inward executing their assigned missions.
Zero-error mentality in addition to associated risk avoidance violate both the spirit in addition to missive of the alphabet of mission command. An overemphasis on risk avoidance genuinely creates a bigger risk for the Navy yesteryear undermining its deterrent value in addition to its powerfulness to win the nation’s wars. The Navy should dismantle electrical current goose egg error tolerance policies in addition to convey dorsum a theatre in addition to unwavering focus on leadership in addition to warfighting; otherwise it mightiness endure bang-up setbacks in addition to fifty-fifty defeat against a highly trained, skillful, in addition to determined opponent.
1. Werner Widder, “Auftragstaktik in addition to Innere Fuehrung: Trademarks of High German Leadership,” Military Review five (September–October 2002), 6.
2. Daniel J. Hughes, ed., Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings , translated yesteryear Harry Bell in addition to Daniel J. Hughes (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993), 175.
3. John T. Nelsen II, “Mission Command: H5N1 Case for Decentralized Battle,” Parameters (September 1987), 25.
4. Paul K. van Riper in addition to F. G. Hoffman, “Pursuing Real Revolution inward Military Affairs: Exploiting Knowledge-Based Warfare,” National Security Studies Quarterly (Summer 1998), 11–12.
5. Antulio J. Echevaria, “ Auftragstaktik In Its Proper Perspective,” Military Review , no. 10 (October 1986), 53.
6. Echevaria, “ Auftragstaktik In Its Proper Perspective,” 54.
7. Günter May, Zum Probleme der Auftragstaktik inward schwierigen Lagen: Der “Haltebefehl” Hitlers, buy the farm deutsche Heeresführung und buy the farm Entschlussfreiheit des Truppenführers während der Winterkrise des Russlandfeldzuges 1941/42 (Hamburg: Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1983), 4. Hughes, Moltke on the Art of War , 219.
8. Nelsen, “Mission Command,” 24.
9. Wyatt Olson, “Do Fired Navy COs endure from ‘Bathsheba Syndrome?’” Stars in addition to Stripes , fourteen March 2012, 1; www.stripes.com/news/do-firdd-navy-cos-suffer-from-bathsheba-syndrome-l.l
10. Guy Snodgrass (Team Lead) in addition to Ben Kohlmann, “2014 Navy Retention Study,” 1 September 2014, 18.
11. Jay Briggs, An Aversion to Risk: H5N1 Warning from the Past (Norfolk, VA: Joint Advanced Warfighting School, National Defense University, 2 June 2014), 55; cited inward Brendan Gallagher, “Managing Risk inward Today’s Army,” Military Review (January-February 2014), 90.
12. Heinz Loquai, “Die Mission command als militärische Führungskonzeption,” Truppenpraxis half dozen (June 1980), 444–45.
13. Robert Kissel, The Hidden Cost of Down-Sizing (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps War College, 3 June 1999), 26.
14. Widder, “ Auftragstaktik in addition to Innere Fuehrung ,” 10.
15. Kissel, The Hidden Cost of Down-Sizing , 21.
⎯ Dr. Vego is the R. K. Turner Professor of Operational Art at the Naval War College inward Newport, Rhode Island.
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