By: Nicholas J. Myers
Despite the relatively irksome stair of Russian military machine modernization (see EDM, Nov 8, 2016), the country’s Ministry of Defense announced inwards May that to a greater extent than than 50 pct of the equipment inwards service amongst the Armed Forces volition live on “modern” past times the halt of 2018 (Mil.ru, May 24). Last January, the Chairman of the United States’ Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, cited these to a greater extent than routine changes every bit the primal guide a opportunity to European security (Defense.gov, Jan 15). Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, conversely, claimed of late that the actual destabilizing factors inwards European security stimulate got been the military machine buildups past times the U.S.A. as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) inwards the Baltic part (Izvestia, June 20) as well as inwards the “southwest strategic direction” or Black Sea part (RIA Novosti, June 20). Furthermore, Shoigu labeled Central Asia the primary rootage of potential threat to Russia’s security at a coming together of the collegium of the Ministry of Defense, inwards Sochi (RIA Novosti, May 25), implying that military machine modernization efforts would live on concentrated inwards the Central Military District (RIA Novosti, May 25).
In truth, both sides stimulate got been edifice upward their capabilities inwards Europe. NATO has concentrated the volume of its release energy on bolstering the Multinational Corps Northeast (Nato.int, June 15, 2017) as well as establishing a Multinational Corps Southeast (Nato.int, Dec 3, 2015), based out of Poland as well as Romania, respectively. These formations are clearly aimed at deterring Russian military machine actions on the European continent. But where has Russian Federation been concentrating its modernization efforts?
Russian defence ministry building press releases on deployed technologies for the past times 3 completed grooming periods inwards the Russian Federation (i.e., Dec 2016–May 2018) collectively render valuable insights into answering the inwards a higher house question. And when the information is grouped past times type of equipment as well as and so divided according to the expanse of responsibleness of the Ground Forces regular army or regular army corps, the results yield a release of interesting conclusions (Warvspeace.org, June 28, 2018)
This article groups Russia’s regular army areas of responsibleness into the next geographical theaters:
Theater Constituent Elements
Baltics sixth Army (ZVO)
Central Europe 1st Guards Tank Army (ZVO)
11th Army Corps (ZVO)
Ukraine 20th Guards Army (ZVO)
8th Guards Army (YuVO)
Black Sea 49th Army (YuVO)
22nd Army Corps (YuVO)
Caucasus 58th Army (YuVO)
Strategic Rear/
Central Asia 2d Guards Army (TsVO)
41st Army (TsVO)
China 29th Army (VVO)
35th Army (VVO)
36th Army (VVO)
Pacific fifth Army (VVO)
68th Army Corps (VVO)
Arctic 14th Army Corps
With these theaters established, the information comes out every bit follows (grouping all deliveries every bit a collective signal of 1, excepting fighter aircraft which are counted individually):
Ground Forces Modernization, Dec 2016 – May 2018
Baltics Central Europe Ukraine Black Sea Caucasus Central Asia PRC Pacific Arctic Total #
MBTs 0% 44.4% 11.1% 11.1% 0% 11.1% 0% 11.1% 11.1% 9
AFVs 5% 0% 5% 0% 20% 45% 10% 0% 0% 20
ARTY 4.8% 19.0% 28.6% 4.8% 9.5% 23.8% 9.5% 0% 0% 21
Tactical Missiles (SSMs & Coastal Defense) 0% 33.3%[1] 0% 0% 0% 0% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 6
Logistics 7% 20.9% 20.9% 7% 7% 20.9% 14% 0% 2.3% 43
UAVs 0% 0% 0% 11.1% 0% 66.7% 0% 11.1% 11.1% 9
EW 0% 0% 50% 0% 16.7% 0% 33.3% 0% 0% 6
Aerospace Force Modernization, Dec 2016 – May 2018
Baltics Central Europe Ukraine Black Sea Caucasus Central Asia PRC Pacific Arctic Total #
Aircraft 21.1% 5.3% 15.8% 15.8% 0% 20.2% 16.7% 5.3% 0% 114
Helo 15.4% 11.5% 11.5% 15.4% 0% 7.7% 11.5% 23.1% 3.8% 26
AD 5.4% 16.2% 5.4% 13.5% 0% 29.7% 13.5% 5.4% 10.8% 37
Radar 20% 10% 10% 10% 5% 25% 10% 5% 5% 20
Navy, Dec 2016 – May 2018 (by appointment of commission)
Kronshtadt Kaliningrad Black Sea Caspian Vladivostok Kamchatka Arctic Total #
Submarines 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 50% 2
Missile Ships 0% 0% 50% 0% 25% 0% 25% 4
Other Ships 9.1% 13.6% 18.2% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 45.5% 22
Many observations from this organization of the information are worth focusing on. Perhaps most notable is the relative dearth of novel naval vessels—only 2 submarines, 4 missile ships as well as 22 other vessels—despite efforts to enhance the Military-Maritime Fleet’s (Voyenno-Мorskoy Flot—VMF) visibility from its nadir inwards the 1990s as well as early on 2000s. Furthermore, i of the 2 submarines “delivered” (in the Arctic) was only the completion of the refurbishment of the sometime cruise-missile submarine (SSGN) Orel (Voennoe Obozrenie, Apr 11, 2017). Efforts to meliorate the Russian navy’s global standing stimulate got involved both increased international exercises (Mil.ru, Nov 29, 2017) as well as deployments (Flot.com, Dec 13, 2017) every bit good every bit comparable domestically focused measures (Mil.ru, Nov 23, 2017). Yet, the depression release of ships entering service over the past times twelvemonth as well as a one-half tin laissez passer the sack live on partly attributed to the completion of deliveries of 3 Varshavyanka-class (Improved Kilo) diesel-electric submarines (SSK) to the Black Sea Fleet presently earlier this information fix starts (TASS, May 6, 2017). Two farther keels for these SSKs for the Pacific Fleet were pose on July 28, 2017 (Mil.ru, Oct 4, 2017), but they volition non live on completed for or so time.
Another critical observation is that the distribution of equipment is currently beingness apportioned largely evenly across the Russian Federation’s vast territory. Only the Caucasus house appears relatively neglected, having received no novel primary battle tanks (MBT), tactical or coastal-defense missiles, drones, air defenses, or aircraft. This part had previously been prioritized for modernization. But efforts in that place are immediately mainly concentrated on carrying out active two-sided multi-domain exercises nether the management of the most-publicized currently active Russian commander, Colonel-General Aleksandr Dvornikov of the Southern Military District (Mil.ru, June 1, 2018).
Shoigu’s comments close the defence ministry’s focus on rearming the Central Military District band truthful regarding non-MBT armored fighting vehicles, including Typhoon-K Spetsnaz (special forces) vehicles (Mil.ru, Dec 22, 2017), 30-millimeter cannon-equipped BTR-82As (Mil.ru, Jan 9, 2018), as well as guided missile–equipped BMP-2Ms (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, May 30, 2018). The Central Military District has also received many varieties of unmanned aerial vehicles (Mil.ru, November 2, 2017, May 17, 2018). The 2d Guards Army headquartered inwards Yekaterinburg, inwards the Ural Mountains, fifty-fifty formed a novel motor rifle brigade inwards slowly 2016 (Mil.ru, Dec 14, 2016). Otherwise, however, the Central Military District does non stand upward out.
The European front end taken every bit a whole (i.e., Russian regions facing the Baltics, Central Europe, Ukraine as well as the Black Sea) represents a pregnant part of Russian Armed Forces modernization, but non disproportionately so, owing to how many armies are stationed in that place relative to the repose of the country, Russia’s concentrated population westward of the Urals, as well as ongoing unrest inwards Ukraine. The western part does characteristic a relatively high concentration of MBTs, Electronic Warfare (EW) complexes as well as air assets of all varieties. Tank deliveries during Dec 2016–May 2018 took the shape of T-72B3s beingness sent inwards 4 installments to fill upward out the 2d Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division, close Moscow (Novosti VPK, Jan 12, 2018). Electronic Warfare buildup on the Ukrainian edge took multiple forms, including a Leer-3 complex delivery inwards Kursk (Mil.ru, March 2, 2018) as well as the equipping of Su-34 fighter-bombers amongst Khibiny EW systems inwards Voronezh (Mil.ru, May 4, 2018). Many unlike air assets stimulate got been delivered to the European front, but the most notable stimulate got been Su-35 4++-generation fighters deployed to Karelia (Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, Nov 29, 2017) as well as Su-30SM fighters to Kursk (Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, Apr 29, 2018) as well as Kaliningrad (Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, August 28, 2017).
Russian military machine modernization has been prone to setbacks: the large amphibious Project 11711 ship Ivan Gren was only commissioned inwards slowly June 2018, nearly xiv years afterward outset beingness revealed to the world (Flot.com, June 20, 2018). Estrangement from the Euro-Atlantic community as well as Ukrainian technologies long embedded inwards the Russian military-industrial complex stimulate got likewise delayed or so aspects of modernization, such every bit the desired An-124 heavy carry bird reboot (TASS, June 3). Nevertheless, this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin proudly declared victory against a Western “blockade” designed to constrain Russian military machine technological evolution (RIA Novosti, May 25).
The most of import lesson of this comparative assessment seems to live on that Russian Federation is committed to modernizing its Armed Forces inwards nearly every geographical front end as well as across multiple domains. Characterizations of Russian Federation alone edifice upward its forces along its European frontiers or only to secure the province against potential instability stemming from Central Asia are, thus, both inaccurate.
[1] Reports of Iskander deployments inwards Kaliningrad notwithstanding. It is non yet definitively proven that they stimulate got truly been deployed.
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