By Mark B. Schneider
Russia has the most extensive arsenal of naval tactical nuclear weapons inward the world. In stark contrast to President Vladimir Putin’s frequent give-and-take of the country’s strategic nuclear weapons, the Russian authorities to a greater extent than frequently than non is quite secretive virtually its tactical nuclear weapons. The province claims it has reduced its tactical nuclear weapons inventory past times 75 per centum from belatedly Cold War levels. This is belike true, but the Soviet tactical nuclear weapons arsenal was thus large that this yet could operate out 5,000 or to a greater extent than tactical warheads available today, equally Pravda reported inward 2014. [1] The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reports that Russian Federation has 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons in addition to is increasing in addition to modernizing them. [2] If Russian press reports are correct, the NPR number is a considerable underestimate. A 2017 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report, Russian Federation Military Power, says the country’s tactical warhead delivery systems include:
. . . air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, in addition to depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, in addition to naval aviation, equally good equally anti-ship, anti-submarine, in addition to anti-aircraft missiles, in addition to torpedoes for surface ships in addition to submarines. There may likewise live warheads remaining for surface-to-air in addition to other aerospace defense forcefulness missile systems. [3]
The province clearly has maintained the various Soviet arsenal albeit at reduced numbers. H5N1 Carnegie Endowment study edited past times Alexei Arbatov, a fellow member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in addition to retired Russian Army Major General Vladimir Dvorkin reports that Russian Federation has a tactical nuclear stockpile of virtually 700–1,000 antiship in addition to antisubmarine missiles, depth bombs, torpedoes, in addition to submarine-launched cruise missiles equally good equally 630 tactical nuclear warheads for surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). [4] Noted Russian journalist Pavel Felgenhauer has written that the S-300, the S-400, in addition to the S-500 SAM systems are nuclear-capable. These missiles likewise involve hold conventional in addition to nuclear nail capability against surface ships in addition to reason targets. The S-300, the shortest ranged of the three, reportedly tin john nail at a distance of upward to 250 miles. [5]
Russian naval nuclear doctrine is business office of the country’s comprehensive nuclear doctrine that allows for the offset utilization of nuclear weapons inward conventional war. In Oct 2017, state-run Sputnik News drove dwelling this point: “According to . . . state of war machine doctrine, Moscow reserves the right to utilization nuclear weapons inward illustration of a nuclear laid on against the country, equally good equally an human activity of aggression alongside the utilization of conventional weapons.” The Russian Navy regards nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons, equally extremely important.
In 2006, Admiral Mikhail Abramov, Chief of the Main Naval Headquarters, stated that the role of the country’s naval forces is to “deliver surprise in addition to concentrated strikes, including utilization of nuclear weapons at surface targets, aircraft carrier business force[s], detachments of warships in addition to carry convoys, [and] to struggle successfully against submarines of whatsoever enemy.” [6] In 2011, Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy agreed, saying, “In wartime, the strategic role for the utilization of the Navy . . . includ[es] the utilization of non-strategic in addition to strategic nuclear weapons.” Putin issued a decree, “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation inward the Field of Naval Operations for the Period until 2030,” inward July 2017 that emphasized strategic nuclear in addition to non-nuclear deterrence, noting “The general-purpose naval forces occupy an of import house inward coming together strategic deterrence challenges.” It went on to say:
During the escalation of state of war machine conflict, demonstration of readiness in addition to conclusion to employ non-strategic nuclear weapons capabilities is an effective deterrent. . . . Indicators of the effectiveness of measures undertaken to execute the State Policy on Naval Operations are . . . the capability of the Navy to harm an enemy’s fleet at a degree non lower than critical alongside the utilization of non-strategic nuclear weapons. [7]
U.S. Air Force General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress inward May 2017 that Russian Federation is developing novel “nonstrategic” weapons. All, or nearly all, legacy Soviet-era in addition to novel cruise missiles, such equally the advanced naval Kalibr, are “dual capable”—that is, able to deliver conventional in addition to nuclear warheads. [8]
The 2017 DIA study observed, “With the arrival of ii Kalibr-equipped vessels inward 2016, the Russian Baltic Fleet presents a meaning long-range precision conventional in addition to theatre nuclear nail threat to Western Europe.” Legacy Soviet-era warships in addition to submarines are existence modified to acquit roughly iii times the previous number of nuclear-capable cruise missiles, including non solely the Kalibr but likewise the supersonic Onik antiship/land-attack missile. The study says that the Zircon hypersonic cruise missile “is expected to movement into service inward 2018, [and] volition involve hold a 500- to 1,000-kilometer [300- to 600-mile] range.” Russian warships volition acquit Onik missiles, which are prime number candidates for dual capability in addition to volition live real hard to intercept. (Russian press reports virtually cruise missile ranges belike refer to the nuclear versions—and it is probable that actual ranges are longer than those reported. In Nov 2017, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov said the hit of the Kalibr was 2,500 miles, virtually threescore per centum longer than previous reports. In a conflict alongside Russia, facial expression many surprises.)
Contrary to commitments made inward the 1991–1992 articulation U.S.-Soviet/Russian Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), Russian warships seem to larn to sea routinely alongside tactical nuclear weapons on board. In 2005, a Russian Defense Ministry publication, The Structure of the Russian Navy , stated, “The primary nail forcefulness of the Navy consists of nuclear-powered submarines, armed alongside ballistic in addition to cruise missiles alongside nuclear warheads. Those ships are constantly patrolling various regions of the oceans of the basis in addition to [are] laid upward for the immediate utilization of their strategic weapons.” The Russian Northern in addition to Pacific fleets deploy the ballistic missile submarines, managing the country’s strategic naval nuclear nail capability, alongside the other fleets express to tactical nuclear weapons. The Baltic Fleet reportedly keeps tactical nuclear weapons at sea, alongside some at Kaliningrad Oblast, a little extraterritorial province located betwixt Poland in addition to Lithuania. The Northern Fleet’s missile submarine Kursk , which sank inward August 2000, reportedly carried “two cruise missiles alongside nuclear warheads” at the fourth dimension of its sinking. [9]
Russia has exercised naval tactical nuclear strikes on to a greater extent than than 1 occasion inward recent years. In May 2003, piece the U.S. was focused on the opening stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Russian Federation staged a major nuclear practise inward the Indian Ocean. ITAR-TASS reported the launch of Kh-55 (AS-15) nuclear cruise missiles, in addition to other Russian media reported the firing of nuclear-capable antiship missiles. In 2010, the state-run Ria Novosti word way said a mistaken 200-kiloton nuclear detonation occurred inward an Indian Ocean practise but gave no details virtually the scenario. In a recent major warfighting exercise, Vostok 2014, Russian Federation reportedly mistaken nuclear weapons utilization against U.S. in addition to Japanese forces.
Russian leaders alternate betwixt overt nuclear threats in addition to professions of benign intentions, coupled alongside propaganda attacks against U.S. policies in addition to allies. In 2015, Russia’s Ambassador to Kingdom of Denmark Mikhail Vanin declared, “I don’t yell back that Danes fully empathize the lawsuit if Kingdom of Denmark joins the American-led missile defense forcefulness shield. If they do, in addition to thus Danish warships volition live targets for Russian nuclear missiles.” Putin’s 2017 decree is a clear directive to the Russian Navy to live prepared to destroy the U.S. Navy in addition to allies alongside tactical nuclear weapons.
What is to live done? The utilization of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons against U.S. in addition to allied navies must live deterred. In add-on to the run a hazard of escalation in addition to its consequences (nuclear in addition to other weapons of volume devastation could live the halt of civilization), the state of war machine effect of fifty-fifty sub-kiloton nuclear weapons on surface ships would live to a greater extent than than comparable to a battleship mag explosion inward World War I in addition to II, in addition to they would live a sure enough kill against whatsoever submarine.
“Deterrence” is non a prissy word. U.S. presidential administrations involve hold described nuclear deterrence equally existence about: “overwhelming in addition to devastating” responses (President William Clinton); “overwhelming in addition to effective” responses (President Barack Obama); in addition to “fire in addition to fury” (President Donald Trump). Credibility is critical. The U.S. cannot base of operations deterrence on bluffs. Declaratory policy is important, but state of war machine forces-in-being are to a greater extent than important. Today, U.S. deterrence of nuclear laid on on its ain in addition to allied navies rests mainly upon a threat to answer alongside an escalation to nuclear attacks against Russian reason targets. This province of affairs does non maximize deterrence. As Georgetown University Professor Matthew Kroenig wrote inward the Wall Street Journal :
Imagine this scenario: Much similar it did inward Ukraine, Russian Federation invades Estonia. The U.S. comes to the defense forcefulness of its NATO ally, but equally American troops menses forward, Russian Federation uses a tactical nuclear weapon on a U.S. carrier grouping inward the Baltic Sea, killing a few thousand. If you lot were president, how would you lot respond?
The strategy is meant to forcefulness a choice, equally Henry Kissinger position it decades ago, betwixt “suicide in addition to surrender.” The U.S., which lacks commensurate tactical nuclear weapons, could retaliate alongside 1 of its large ballistic missiles or strategic bombers, risking a full-scale nuclear telephone substitution in addition to a global holocaust. Or the U.S. could dorsum down, losing the state of war in addition to shredding the credibility of its defense forcefulness commitments. [10]
An in-kind deterrent capability is critical because Russian nuclear doctrine is based on the thought that Russian Federation tin john deter in addition to command the run a hazard of escalation. Attacks against reason targets probable volition drive much collateral damage—and Western aversion to collateral harm is good known.
The U.S. in addition to its allies are inward a skillful seat to restore deterrence of a Russian tactical nuclear laid on on their navies at a pocket-size cost. In the 2018 NPR, the Trump direction continues the Obama administration’s modernization programme alongside sure enough improvements. Among them is a proposal for a novel nuclear submarine-launched cruise missile, although its characteristics at this betoken involve hold been solely partially defined. Either this missile, or the novel U.S. Air Force nuclear long-range standoff missile, or both, could live given an antisurface send capability past times including inward it a sensor packet capable of detecting warships. Such capability is non probable to alter the terms of either programme much.
The B-61 bomb could live given an antisubmarine capability past times adding a fusing organisation capable of underwater detonation in addition to giving the P-8 and/or the F-35C the might to deliver it. Indeed, during the Cold War, a version of the British WE177 bomb (which was based on the B-61), had an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) mission. In add-on to deterring Russian nuclear ASW attack, this could supply a defense forcefulness against the Russian Status-6 nuclear drone submarine, the existence of which was confirmed inward the NPR.
If the Russians confront the possibility of retaliatory nuclear attacks on their large warships, their assessment of the advantages to naval nuclear first-use may alter dramatically.
[1] Dimitriy Sudakov, “Russia prepares nuclear surprise for NATO,” Pravda.ru , 12 Nov 2014,www.pravdareport.com/russia/ politics/12-11-2014/129015- russia_nato_nuclear_surprise- 0/ .
[2] The Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review , (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018), pp. 2, 53, media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/ 2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018- NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL- REPORT.PDF .
[3] U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Russian Federation Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations , (Washington D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017), www.dia.mil/Portals/27/ Documents/News/Military% 20Power%20.Publications/ Russia%20Military%20Power% 20Report%202017.pdf .
[4] For data on Russian tactical nuclear weapons numbers see Alexandre Kaliadine in addition to Alexei Arbatrov, “RUSSIA: ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,” Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy in addition to International Relations, May 2011, www.sipri.org/sites/default/ files/SIPRIYB2010IMEMO.pdf : Viktor Ruchkin, “In a Broad Context,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online , Apr 30, 2011. (Translated past times World News Connection).; Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, in addition to Natalia Bubnova, “Nuclear Reset: Arms Reduction in addition to Nonproliferation,” (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2012), p. 55, carnegieendowment.org/files/ nuclear_reset_Book2012_web.pdf .
[5] Pavel Felgenhauer , “ Russian Federation Seeks to Impose New ABM Treaty on the U.S. past times Developing BMD,” Eurasia Daily Monitor , Vol. 7, No. 136 (July 16, 2010), www.jamestown.org/single/?no_ cache=1&tx_Ttnews [tt_news]=36624.: Pavel Felgenhauer, “Moscow Is Ready to Supply Islamic Republic of Iran With Powerful S-300 Missiles,” Eurasia Daily Monitor , Vol. 12, No. 71 (April 16, 2015), www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ ttnews[tt_ news]=43800&no_ cache=1#.VTgxxpN4d0Q ; Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia’s S-300 Shipment to Islamic Republic of Iran Appears Stalled Again, Eurasia Daily Monitor , Vol. 13, No. 33 (18 Feb 2016),www.jamestown org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news] =45106&no_cache=1#.Vs3kmeZOyUk .
[6] Admiral M. L. Abramov, “SUBMARINE FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: CURRENT STATUS AND PROSPECTS,” Moscow Military Thought , thirty June 2006. (Translated past times World News Connection).
[7] Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation inward the Field of Naval Operations for the Period until 2030,” The Kremlin, xx July 2017, dnnlgwick.blob.ore. windows.net/portals/0/RMSI_ RusNavyFundamentalsENG_FINAL% 20(1).pdf?sr=b&si=DNN FileManagerPolicy& sig=i110Z1rxZVzKbB% 2BdHJ1CZuTxvwL3N7W34% 2FLpksgT1Bs%3D .
[8] “Meeting alongside Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu,” Kremlin.ru , 8 Dec 2015, en.kremlin.ru/events/ president/news/50892 .
[9] Patrick Goodenough, “Russia Rejects Claim that Kursk Was Carrying Nuclear Weapons,” CNWNews.com , July 7, 2008, www.cnsnews.com/node/10180 .
[10] Matthew Kroenig, “The Case for Tactical U.S. Nukes,” The Wall Street Journal , 24 Jan 2018,www.wsj.com/articles/the-case- for-tactical-u-s-nukes- 1516836395 .
Dr. Schneider is a senior analyst alongside the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, he served inward a number of senior positions inside the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy. He likewise served inward the senior Foreign Service equally a fellow member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.
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