by Amos Fox
In a March–April 2015 Military Review article, Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster wrote virtually a handful of fallacies that plague thinking virtually modern war. Specifically, inwards “Continuity in addition to Change: The Army Operating Concept in addition to Clear Thinking About Future War,” McMaster suggested, “These fallacies are unsafe because they threaten to consign the USA armed forces to repeat mistakes in addition to prepare articulation forces ill-prepared for hereafter threats to national security.” The fallacies—the “vampire fallacy,” the “Zero Dark thirty fallacy,” the “Mutual of Omaha Wild Kingdomfallacy” in addition to the “RSVP fallacy”—are a practiced starting holler for when thinking virtually modern warfare. However, the counter-Islamic State grouping inwards Republic of Iraq in addition to Syrian Arab Republic adds farther legitimacy to McMasters’ vampire fallacy, which posits that technological conception volition deliver quick, slowly in addition to cheap victories spell lifting fog in addition to friction from the battlefield.
The counter-Islamic State campaign, underwritten past times USA precision-strike capability, provided to a greater extent than or less other chance for the proponents of precision boom to advance their position. Yet the difficult slogs inwards Mosul, Iraq; Raqqa in addition to Aleppo, both inwards Syria; and, to a lesser degree, Ramadi, Iraq, possess got farther eroded the promises of precision warfare. As such, McMasters’ vampire fallacy lives on, but peradventure alongside an additional wrinkle—a precision paradox.
The next rapidly scans Operation Inherent Resolve’s Battle of Mosul in addition to looks at how the allure of precision warfare, the physical embodiment of the vampire fallacy, resulted inwards a pulverized metropolis in addition to discredits the thought of precision warfare inwards urban environments…
Read on .
Buat lebih berguna, kongsi:
