Ronald E. Neumann, David S. Sedney
SHINN: As you lot goal your tiffin as well as dessert, welcome to today’s session inward this serial of—Council on Foreign Relations Series What to Do About… And specifically, today is “What to Do About U.S. Strategy inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan as well as Pakistan.” Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 timely conversation, since this is the 6,025th twenty-four hours of the state of war inward Afghanistan, some would say the longest as well as the bloodiest state of war inward American history. So no surprise that it’s the topic of some reconsideration from a strategic standpoint, as well as that the CFR is non the only seat where this reconsideration is taking place. Here is a missive of the alphabet from the Islamic Emirate of Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan that came out iii weeks agone that asks, what are you—what is U.S. strategy inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan as well as Pakistan? And is it fourth dimension to reconsider? You tin flaming downwardly this—download this, past times the way, off their website, which is rather a slick—has rather a slick user interface.
So the way this serial industrial plant is that nosotros receive got a panel of iii real distinguished speakers, who non only are real familiar amongst unusual policy as well as strategy, but all iii of them—as you lot tin flaming tell from their bios—have had extensive experience inward Afghanistan, as well as inward counterterrorism, as well as inward Islamic Republic of Pakistan across several different—several dissimilar agencies of the U.S. government. So we’re going to go right into the give-and-take for most 45 minutes, soliciting the views of our iii experts form of a—kind of a mock NSC format, where each of them volition brand a few points as well as advocate the strategy—what they regard equally their preferred strategy if, inward fact, it’s whatever dissimilar than what the U.S. is currently doing. And I would reinforce the fact that at that topographic point are truly iii interrelated strategies which, equally the distinguished panel agrees, are the things that brand this such a complicated—what nosotros telephone outcry upwards inward tech a wicked problem. There’s both the civil state of war inward Afghanistan, there’s counterterrorism, as well as so the large interrogation of Pakistan.
So, finally, inward add-on to existence on the record, we—I don’t know if this is existence broadcast live, but inward whatever instance we’d similar to give thank you lot HBO as well as Richard Plepler for their generosity inward funding this series. And so onto U.S. strategy inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan as well as Pakistan. And I thought perhaps we’d start amongst the brief assessment of what that strategy is, since I’m non for certain everyone inward the room spends all their fourth dimension thinking most this subject. And I thought nosotros would start amongst the skilful who has most latterly been engaged inward that—in that policy, which is Courtney—both engaged inward formulation as well as inward execution which, equally Ambassador Neumann has pointed out on several occasions, execution as well as funding is at to the lowest degree equally of import equally strategy formulation.
COOPER: Thank you. Well, the president announced the novel U.S.-South Asia strategy inward August of in conclusion year, equally many of you lot belike know. It was the outcome of a real robust interagency procedure that took several months, commencement inward the fountain of in conclusion year. And it had several key pillars. The firstly pillar that the direction touted is that it was a displace from a time-based strategy to a conditions-based strategy. So doing away amongst the Obama-era give-and-take that at that topographic point would live a drawdown at a for certain dot or our engagement would goal at a for certain point, it truly offered an open-ended commitment to Afghanistan, as well as touted that that engagement would live conditions-based going forward—although, it didn’t truly define what those weather condition were.
It also was touted equally an integrated diplomatic, military, as well as economical approach—so, truly leveraging the total array of U.S. tools as well as powerfulness to advance U.S. involvement inward South Asia. It also included a changed approach to Pakistan—so real much linked our success inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan amongst Islamic Republic of Pakistan agreeing to play a footling scrap to a greater extent than of a constructive of a role inward our powerfulness to advance those interests. It included developing a strategic partnership amongst India, as well as also included a give-and-take of increasing targeting authorities for the Taliban for other groups inward Afghanistan, as well as truly delegating some of those ascendancy to the secretarial assistant of defence to live able to effect as well as prosecute our armed services back upwards to the Afghan regime equally it saw fit.
So those were form of the wide tenets of the—of the strategy. It focused mostly on Afghanistan, though it was discussed equally a Southern Asia strategy. And interestingly, footling give-and-take on the regional aspect inward terms of other regional players inward Afghanistan. Afghan’s neighbors, China, Iran, Russia, non mentioned inward the strategy, or how nosotros would leverage those countries to advance our aims.
SHINN: That’s a goodness summary. Of those policy planks, which one, if any, was the most dissimilar from what had come upwards before?
COOPER: I think the direction saw the alter from a time-based approach to a conditions-based approach. Although, I would note, having also been inward the White House nether the Obama administration, at the goal of the Obama direction nosotros truly had already started to displace to a conditions-based approach. There had been several policy reviews undertaken inward the in conclusion few years of the Obama direction that truly redefined as well as changed the drawdown trajectory that the president—President Obama had announced. So—and that was based on input from commanders, from dissimilar secretaries inward the Cabinet, as well as equally outcome of policy input, so.
SHINN: Maybe plow to David, amongst whom I had the laurels of serving inward the Pentagon. And, past times the way, if you lot read Steve Coll’s wonderful book, Directorate S, that I binge-read in conclusion weekend, there’s a scene where David Sedney arrives equally i of the real firstly diplomats inward the dusty U.S. diplomatic mission inward Kabul, equally the state of war was yet waging, actually—the initial toppling of the Taliban. What is your assessment, because you’ve been—you’ve been looking at this for a long time?
SEDNEY: I have. And I proceed to live real involved inward Afghanistan—traveled at that topographic point repeatedly as well as lived at that topographic point in conclusion year. I think the most of import portion of the strategy that is yet playing out is that alter from a time-based to a conditions-based strategy, because piece some of the actions of the Obama direction were consistent amongst what Courtney Cooper was saying, at that topographic point was no explicit joint of that. And the repeated insistence of administrations—both the Bush direction as well as inward the Obama administration—that the U.S.A. was going to leave of absence Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan has been this major strategic factor behind the actions of Islamic Republic of Pakistan as well as the Taliban.
They receive got believed the U.S. was going to exercise what it said it was going to do, as well as it was going to leave of absence Afghanistan. And if that’s your key strategic view, so you lot go through a surge of 100,000 troops as well as you lot don’t alter your strategy, you lot just hold back it out. You live until they leave, as well as so you lot take away over. I would submit that both the Taliban as well as Islamic Republic of Pakistan are yet playing out the implications of a continued U.S. presence without a fourth dimension limit. And I think that’s behind a lot of some of the—a lot of what I would say some positive progress, most specially the peace initiatory at the President Ghani announced at the Kabul Process Conference inward Kabul a footling over a calendar week ago—something that is real controversial inward Afghanistan.
And the 2nd thing I would stress on that, especially, again, looking forward, is the—is the much tougher approach on Pakistan, the withholding of most a billion dollars a twelvemonth of armed services assistance, which the direction position into seat inward the firstly calendar week of this year. President Trump’s firstly tweet of 2018 was an anti-Pakistan invective that also announced that nosotros were going to position these sanctions on Pakistan. The province of Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been through sanctions before. The U.S. sanctioned them during the 1990s for nuclear weapons development, the consummate cutting off of assist as well as assistance. And equally a old Pakistani leader said, they were willing to consume sand inward gild to live that. They went through those sanctions.
NEUMANN: Grass.
SEDNEY: Eat grass. Thanks, Ambassador. (Laughter.) Eat grass rather than—rather than submit to bullying past times the U.S. against Pakistan’s national interest.
So volition this tougher approach to Islamic Republic of Pakistan pay off? I think that’s real much an opened upwards question. You tin flaming struggle that history is against it. You tin flaming also struggle that history is the past times as well as the time to come is non set. But it’s a large take away chances on the portion of the direction to take away this tougher sanction. I think it’s all yet playing out right straight off equally nosotros speak. This is that phrase, they used to joke that nosotros receive got the watches, but the Taliban has all the time. (Laughter.) They used to say that, but inward the Taliban—the Taliban receive got straight off recognized that the U.S. is trying to say: We receive got the fourth dimension as well as the clock is ticking on you. That’s the message we’re trying to larn to the Taliban.
SHINN: Well, Ambassador Ron Neumann, who I in conclusion saw when he was inward the diplomatic mission inward Kabul, actually, going through a policy strategy review session inward the Bush administration, is also famously quoted inward Steve Coll’s book, where somebody asks him—and I’ll—I don’t desire to sort of position the words inward your mouth. Someone says, well, what most strategy inward Afghanistan? And he says, it’s like shooting fish in a barrel to come upwards up amongst a novel strategy. What you lot demand is the resources to execute the strategy that you lot have. What is your assessment of how good the strategy that Courtney described is existence resourced, as well as resourced critically, is it proportional to the ends posited past times the strategy?
NEUMANN: I think inward fairness, allow me say I’m fairly happy amongst this strategy. I wasn’t real happy amongst the Obama administration, specially because of the fourth dimension elements, which just defeated everything else. The gap inward this strategy is the inadequate Definition of what it’s all about. So Courtney has listed real accurately all the dissimilar pieces. It’s real difficult, unless you lot exercise this materials all day, to maintain all those pieces inward your hear when somebody says what’s the—you know, what’s the strategy. But what they truly desire to know is what’s the goal, because strategy is a map for how you lot larn to a goal. And after all, the strategy tin flaming alter piece the goal remains the same. And the goal Definition is non adequate.
And I lecture regularly to people at the Foreign Service Institute from all agencies of the U.S. government, civilians who are going to Afghanistan. And my firstly question, to brand for certain that I don’t bore them, is: Would everybody who feels comfortable explaining U.S. policy enhance their hand. I would say, at to the lowest degree inward the in conclusion iv lectures, I receive got yet to larn a hand. So if the people who are going to Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan as well as putting themselves on the line exercise non experience they receive got an adequate take away hold on what the strategy—it’s truly what the goal is, because the other pieces all derive from where you’re trying to go.
Within that, I would say that it is reasonably good resourced, if you lot receive got what a long-term proposition this is. You facial expression at—which, past times the way, nosotros don’t verbalize most adequately, which I think is a problem, because I don’t think you’re preparing the American people for what you’re truly doing. So the armed services travail is an travail to primarily prepare upwards the Afghan forces to a much higher level, which I think is possible. I think the huge work of the past times menstruation was nosotros rushed in, tried to prepare quickly, as well as tried to rush out. And nosotros were setting goals which merely could non live reasonably achieved past times grooming inward the fourth dimension nosotros were prepared to give them. Nobody thinks you lot tin flaming take away a 10-year-old—you know, tenth grader inward America as well as throw him into college equally a junior, as well as if you lot give him plenty training—enough tutors as well as plenty money, they’ll graduate inward 2 years.
SHINN: Was the work at that topographic point wasn’t plenty resources applied to the grooming of the Afghan forces, or that it was done also quickly?
NEUMANN: No, the problem—the work was you lot cannot larn the exercise goodness of that grooming in—well, it was both. Training was attached to the national guard. It took a couplet of years before nosotros truly began to prepare trainers before they went. There were initial things that were based on a longer-term. The term was cutting short. I mean, at that topographic point are all kinds of problems of which the largest was the fourth dimension which so magnifies all the other problems.
So what you’re doing straight off is trying to exercise it right. But fifty-fifty if you lot facial expression at DOD internal calculations, you lot regard that they don’t truly hold back the existent exercise goodness on the battlefield to exhibit upwards until good into 2019 as well as 2020. Now, it may or it may not. But if you lot don’t explicate that to people, so past times the goal of this twelvemonth the strategy’s probable to live condemned equally a failure. And so when you lot run around as well as say, well, nosotros e'er knew it was going to take away iii or iv years, that’s an excuse as well as you lot larn run over past times a truck.
So if the timeline—if nosotros are prepared to take away the fourth dimension that this is going to take, so I think the resourcing of that part’s adequate. The other 2 large pieces that are non resources questions—one is at that topographic point is an chemical element of the policy according to—of force per unit of measurement area on the Afghan regime to perform, to principle better. That’s a policy direction or an implementation question. It’s non a resources question, except negatively, perhaps. And so you’ve got this whole concern that Dave was talking to, the force per unit of measurement area on Pakistan, where this has never been tried for to a greater extent than than a brusk period, as well as there’s a long history. My ain guess is that if this is going to truly live tried, it’s going to live long. It’s going to larn much worse inward our relations. After it gets much worse, we’ll discovery out if the American blink, which nosotros e'er receive got before.
SHINN: With regard to Pakistan, you lot mean?
NEUMANN: With regard to Pakistan. And so after you lot discovery that out, if nosotros don’t blink, you’ll discovery out of the Pakistanis move.
SHINN: Well, that is a—that’s a goodness point. Now we’re sort of edging into, you lot know, the operational portion of what to exercise most the strategy inward Afghanistan. And equally you lot suggested, it involves Pakistan. And it involves—and nosotros haven’t talked most this real much—the critical chemical element of counterterrorism, which is what got us hither inward the firstly place. So what we’re going to exercise for the adjacent 25 minutes or so is solicit the real well-informed views of our iii panelists on what, if anything, should live done different. And so we’ll engage the members inward this.
And I think i of the themes of this What to exercise About Series is just this question. It’s non an abstract interrogation most unusual policy formulation, but it’s most the—you know, the tough concern of ensuring that way are proportionate to ends as well as that the fourth dimension as well as the patience adduced to solving the work is realistic. And then, of course, there’s execution, right? I mean, this is—this is something—this is a set of precepts familiar to everybody inward the room, whether you’ve been inward regime or whether you’re trying to run a corporation. You got to larn those iii right.
So what, if anything, would you lot exercise differently? Because straight off you’re on the outside, you lot tin flaming speak a footling to a greater extent than freely. All of this is their views, as well as for that affair my views, equally individuals as well as non attributable to whatever institutions nosotros served for.
COOPER: First, I’ll say I think the administration, the strategy announced inward August was an essential firstly step. As David as well as Ron both noted, the open-ended commitment to Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan was something that was a important shortcoming, I think, of the in conclusion administration, as well as something that truly was needed inward gild to projection our involvement to the region, to the Taliban, to the Afghan regime inward a way that truly helped to advance our interests. I think it was ultimately insufficient, though, inward clarifying what our ultimate objective is. And nosotros pay some lip service to wanting a negotiated settlement, but nosotros don’t truly maximize U.S. leverage to hit that end. And so I think our best interests—or, I think U.S. interests are best secured inward Southern Asia as well as inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan inward particular, past times prioritizing a policy for peace equally paramount, inward gild to hit those interests.
We receive got other real serious safety interests inward South Asia, nuclear security, reducing the endangerment of nuclear conflict betwixt 2 states, counterterrorism, reducing the threat that whatever attacks emanating from Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan could hitting the—could hit the homeland. But I think a lot of these larn lost past times the wayside when we’re spending so much fourth dimension as well as travail focused on fighting the Taliban right now, equally nosotros receive got been over the in conclusion couplet of months. And equally you lot know, at that topographic point is a Taliban letter, that they exercise desire to hit some form of dialogue that helps goal the conflict. And I think that that’s an of import step. I think nosotros could facial expression at that equally a piece of maybe some nuggets of sincerity, as well as perhaps also some propaganda. But I think that’s something worth testing.
So inward terms of—
SHINN: So the firstly thing would live reengaging on some form of a peace process?
COOPER: Absolutely. I think recognizing that the U.S. is political party to the conflict, as well as nosotros receive got the most leverage of whatever other party, whatever other thespian inward the part to convey all parties to the table.
I think that inward terms of a couplet of steps that nosotros should take, one, I think nosotros demand to clarify our populace opinion of supporting a peace procedure inward Afghanistan. And similar I mentioned, though at that topographic point was some lip service paid to this inward August, truly U.S. populace statements form of run the gamut of straight off it’s non fourth dimension to talk, we’re going to live pursuing this on the battlefield, no nosotros truly are interested inward a negotiated settlement. And I think that confusion undermines our involvement inward ultimately having a negotiated settlement. So I also don’t think that the part or the Taliban truly believes us when nosotros pay the lip service to proverb that nosotros desire a negotiated settlement when headlines inward The New York Times say: CIA ramping upwards its fighting against the Taliban. That would signal to anybody that we’re truly focused on a armed services strategy, rather than a diplomatic strategy to goal the conflict.
So truly clarifying that populace stance. And I exercise think that that would—that that would assist convey most regional back upwards to hit our aims inward Afghanistan. I think nosotros demand to resources for success inward this effort. We demand a consistency of negotiating team, a diplomatic squad that’s truly focused on this effort. When I was at the White House as well as this issue, reconciliation, cruel inward my portfolio, I was struck at times how, you lot know, though at that topographic point was an earnestness inward feeling that nosotros would back upwards whatever form of negotiation process, when I looked at resources I had maybe i or 2 counterparts at DOD, at the State Department whose chore it was total fourth dimension to focus on this issue. By contrast, I had dozens if non closed to a hundred all together straight counterparts betwixt DOD as well as State as well as Resolute Support, other colleagues inward the field, that were focused on safety issues, evolution of Afghan safety forces, political issues. And so if nosotros say our ultimate goal is a negotiated outcome that secures U.S. interests inward Afghanistan, nosotros haven’t resourced it fully.
I think nosotros also demand to clarify the conditions. As noted, the direction called this a conditions-based strategy, but those weather condition receive got never been defined. So what is the weather condition for U.S. presence? Is it that the Taliban receive got surrendered? Is it that we’ve eliminated whatever presence of al-Qaida inward Afghanistan, whatever presence of ISIS Khorasan? Is it that the Afghan regime is fully capable of denying infinite to terrorist groups, Afghan safety forces are fully developed? There’s so many dissimilar things that could weather condition for our presence. We haven’t defined them internally, thus it muddles our aims for the residuum of the region.
And I think nosotros also demand to live a footling scrap to a greater extent than flexible inward sequencing. One of the key issues that has delayed the start of the peace procedure is that all parties seem to receive got a dissimilar view of who should live talking as well as how they should live talking. So the Afghan regime thinks it needs to verbalize to Islamic Republic of Pakistan inward gild to receive got peace inward Afghanistan, as well as that the Taliban are a element of that, that they real much view Islamic Republic of Pakistan equally the primary actor. Taliban thinks it needs to verbalize to us before it talks to the Afghan government. The Afghan regime wants to verbalize to the Taliban. So piece there’s this ambiguity most how a procedure should start or would unfold, it’s just i to a greater extent than argue why this procedure gets delayed.
So I think recognizing U.S. leverage, recognizing that the i thing that the Taliban has made clear it wants, which is a reduction of international troops inward Afghanistan, that’s something that only nosotros tin flaming provide, non the Afghan government. And so nosotros exercise receive got a legitimate role inward using our leverage to coax them to the tabular array for what volition live a real genuine inter-Afghan process. But it is a procedure that nosotros receive got a lot of influence to assist jumpstart, if we’re willing to utilisation it.
: David, what’s your take away on this? Since you lot were i of the participants inward the 2010, ’11, ’12, mostly I guess 2011 negotiations amongst the Taliban, amongst Tayyab Agha, as well as so opened that business office inward Doha, which ultimately cruel apart. Well, how would you lot position the peace—the vigorous as well as to a greater extent than clear-eyed peace procedure that Courtney just described inward the context of a broader strategy toward Afghanistan, amongst its counterterrorism element as well as amongst its Islamic Republic of Pakistan component?
SEDNEY: Well, specifically on the number of the peace procedure or role of the U.S.A. inward peace inward Afghanistan, I think you lot exercise receive got to facial expression a footling scrap at history. And Jim’s mentioned Steve Coll’s book, where he goes into that real vigorous effort, because from that menstruation of 2010 through 2013, the Obama direction did prioritize non only the peace process, did position huge efforts, position coming to having peace talks to the Taliban equally is number-one priority. And during that menstruation of time, these real intensive negotiations failed. And non only did they fail, I would struggle that they prolonged the state of war as well as resulted inward many to a greater extent than casualties, including of U.S. troops, as well as fifty-fifty at a greater flat of Afghan civilians, because nosotros went into those—that peace verbalize travail led by—initially past times the belatedly ambassador Richard Holbrooke. And if you lot look, a Steve Coll volume as well as Ahmed Rashid has also written most these initial talks.
They failed. And they failed because of overweening ambition on the portion of the United States. The U.S.A. believed that it could essentially impose peace upon the Taliban as well as the Afghan people, without truly working amongst the Taliban and, most importantly, amongst the Afghan people. And these—these efforts collapsed inward 2013 when then-President Karzai of Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan rejected an organisation the U.S.A. had brokered amongst the regime of Qatar. And mainly, because nosotros didn’t empathize that peace has to live betwixt the Afghani people, amid the dissimilar factions of Afghanistan. I mentioned before President Ghani’s peace plan, it was announced at the Kabul Process yesterday. I think it’s truly a truly clear exposition. And U.S. back upwards for that peace computer program has been unequivocal as well as real clear.
And having that peace computer program equally the number-one part, it gives a alternative to the Taliban. Now, some people believe the Taliban are ready to negotiate as well as are sincere. There are others, article published today past times an eminent scholar of Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan who said it’s all simulated as well as the Afghan—the Taliban are just trying to utilisation peace talks equally a way to hit victory. It’s truly upwards to the Taliban straight off to displace as well as respond to President Ghani’s peace process. But the thought that the U.S.A. tin flaming live both the broker of the peace talks, tin flaming convene them, convey people together, piece it’s a participant inward the war, I think is a fundamentally flawed assumption. If you’re a political party to a war, you lot can’t live the mediator equally well.
And whether you lot desire to hit a Nobel Peace Prize through this, or whether you—whatever other ambitions you lot mightiness have, you lot demand to recognize that a peace procedure that’s betwixt 2 warring civil state of war factions has to live brought most past times discussions betwixt the two. And whatever mediator has to live exterior of the ones who are inflicting violence. So equally Courtney said, headlines such equally we’re ramping upwards efforts as well as sending to a greater extent than troops to Afghanistan—we can’t live a peace broker, as well as nosotros shouldn’t fifty-fifty try. We should—we should—
SHINN: Well, but how exercise you lot exercise it, though?
SEDNEY: We should leave of absence that for the Afghans as well as the Taliban. The peace procedure is going to come upwards out of their decisions that peace is inward their interest. You don’t start fighting a war, as well as you lot don’t proceed fighting a war, unless issues are truly of import to you. And the people who receive got to brand those decisions are the ones involved. We tin flaming help. We tin flaming assist past times the open-ended commitment nosotros made, which I think is portion of what’s allowing for the peace procedure opening, as well as past times putting force per unit of measurement area on Islamic Republic of Pakistan because Islamic Republic of Pakistan is, inward my view, the key thespian inward this—in this process. The back upwards that Islamic Republic of Pakistan has provided to the Taliban, enabling them to receive got a sanctuary, enabling them to get together fighters, weapons, leadership.
The Taliban just finished asset inward Islamic Republic of Pakistan their yearly commanders’ conferences, setting upwards their—setting upwards their drive computer program for the adjacent year, which they commonly volition denote inward the adjacent month. All of this takes seat inward Pakistan, amongst the active connivance of the Pakistani intelligence inward the real top levels of the Pakistani government. The purpose of the administration’s putting greater force per unit of measurement area on Islamic Republic of Pakistan is to alter Pakistani’s behavior—Pakistan’s behaviour inward this regard. During the fourth dimension I was inward the regime amongst Ambassador Holbrooke, nosotros tried some other approach. We tried a carrot approach. We called—we called it creating a strategic partnership inward Pakistan. I personally spent hundreds of hours amongst Pakistani armed services as well as intelligence officials trying to build that partnership. Again, that failed.
I don’t know if the introduce policy of greater force per unit of measurement area volition work, but I exercise know that all our other efforts receive got failed. And I think it’s worth—it’s definitely worth a shot. It’s also real risky. So if you lot inquire what nosotros should exercise more, I think nosotros could truly receive got to a greater extent than on our plate. Where I criticize this direction is that they receive got non been tough plenty on Pakistan. If you—the U.S.A. has a law proverb that nosotros should sanction state-sponsors of terror. If you lot facial expression past times states that nosotros receive got sanctioned equally state-sponsors of terror, you lot facial expression at the show on the ground, the show that’s inward the populace domain, as well as there’s much to a greater extent than exterior of that, Islamic Republic of Pakistan meets every examine the U.S. has ever set out publicly for designation equally a province sponsor of terrorism.
But we’ve e'er pulled dorsum from fifty-fifty initiating a procedure of designating them. I think nosotros should set out that process. Yes, it would outcome inward real severe sanctions on Pakistan, but nosotros demand to allow Islamic Republic of Pakistan know it’s serious. As long equally they proceed to back upwards the Taliban as well as proceed to back upwards terrorist groups that carry out activities inward Kashmir as well as inward India, nosotros should live upfront as well as say: If you lot pursue these policies, these are the consequences. So that’s what I would say, is exercise more.
SHINN: That’s a—that’s a headline statement.
SEDNEY: Yeah. I say exercise more.
SHINN: That’s a headline statement. Though, Steve Coll’s book, truly the principal theme that runs through it is the duplicity as well as the consistency of Pakistani back upwards of the Taliban, as well as its obfuscation past times Directorate S, which is truly the grouping inside the ISI that conducts the back upwards for the Taliban as well as the Haqqanis.
Well, Ambassador Neumann, maybe your views on this, because you’ve had a long experience inward diplomacy. And exercise you lot take away hold amongst David that if you’re going to—if you’re going to proceed, you lot demand to discovery somebody else who tin flaming live a mediator or a negotiator? And if you lot believed amongst Courtney that you’ve got to set your—with some clarity, your goals here?
NEUMANN: Since nosotros are risking at this point, because this is a real complicated subject, as well as I’m afraid we’re risking raising your confusion to a much higher flat of detail—(laughter)—let me essay to just force out a real small-scale number of points. One, I take away hold amongst Courtney, that it is of import to receive got an active travail to hit peace. We don’t know whether that is possible. Two, I take away hold that we—and I’ve said this for a number of years—we cannot live a mediator as well as a combatant at the same time. I think that was—there were at to the lowest degree 2 proposals to Secretary Clinton truly to utilisation a third-party negotiator, as well as she turned them downwardly although those to a greater extent than intimately involved inward the discipline were inward favor of it.
I think at that topographic point is—the role of the third-party negotiator—let me verbalize most that for a second. Why exercise you lot desire a third-party negotiator? Part of it is if you’re talking most a pre-negotiation, which is where you lot are now, anything that a political party says—and Americans think you lot tin flaming say, well, if I did this, would you lot exercise that. It doesn’t work. In an Afghan context, if I’m an Afghan as well as you lot say to me, if I do—if you lot exercise A, so you lot exercise B, I hear, OK, straight off I know a concession he’s prepared to make. I’m going to position that i inward my pocket, as well as give nothing, as well as nosotros proceed the discussion. The role of a third-party mediator is to live able to examine ideas without existence responsible for proverb whether i political party or some other would take away hold amongst them. And it’s a terribly useful role. And I think nosotros ought to receive got such a 3rd party.
SHINN: But who?
NEUMANN: It would probably—it could live the U.N. I mean, commonly this is a U.N. function. The difficulty hither is the U.S. is itself a participant inward the war. But at that topographic point are a number of countries that receive got a tape working on this, Kingdom of Norway as well as others. And the establishment or province is important, belike the personality of the mediator is fifty-fifty to a greater extent than important, as well as belike it should live somebody non also old because they mightiness live at this a while. (Laughter.) The seat I would belike disagree amongst Courtney is on the signal of ramping upwards force. I think nosotros receive got to live able to walk as well as chew gum. I thought this was position real good past times belatedly old Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, who was in i lawsuit asked: How tin flaming you lot negotiate amongst terrorists? And he said I receive got to fighting terrorism equally though at that topographic point were no negotiations, as well as I receive got to negotiate equally though at that topographic point is no terrorism. You receive got to live able to exercise both. They are non alternatives. And you lot receive got to live able to exercise both real seriously.
There is a—there is an operational question, though, which nosotros demand to bargain with, as well as it’s real tough. We receive got maintained all along that Afghans receive got to verbalize to Afghans. Taliban receive got said they desire to verbalize to us, they don’t desire to verbalize to the slave soldiers of the Kabul government, equally they charmingly position it. This is a truly critical dot nosotros receive got to decide. Are nosotros going to maintain that position? And it’s specially of import straight off that President Ghani has set out a real detailed peace proposal—well, fairly detailed, for starters. Said that if nosotros are prepared to negotiate separately, nosotros would live undercutting Ghani’s proposal. I exercise not—we may disagree on this. I exercise non believe you lot tin flaming receive got a dissever negotiation without it existence to a greater extent than oft than non perceived—
COOPER: That’s non what I—
NEUMANN: No, no, I didn’t say—no, you lot didn’t. I wasn’t accusing you lot of it. But at that topographic point are—it is a interrogation that sort of continually ebbs as well as flows. Will we—and straight off we’ve been on it so long that for the U.S. to dorsum off the seat of the Afghans, Taliban receive got to engage amongst each other, would live a major stair back, as well as thus a U.S. concession without whatever reciprocal move. So that’s some other argue to facial expression for a 3rd political party who tin flaming examine intentions, reassure both without having to bargain amongst that. So you lot demand a 3rd party. You demand to say you’re serious.
I don’t know whether nosotros tin flaming engage inside the U.S. regime on some of these critical questions, similar exercise you lot desire to maintain bases? The interagency fighting over that interrogation volition live extreme.
SHINN: But that’s e'er the case, right?
NEUMANN: Yeah, but you—
SHINN: I mean, this is the tragedy—you know, the NSC basically is strategy past times committee, which accounts for why it’s such a sloppy process.
NEUMANN: Yeah, but, you lot know, you lot tin flaming resolve questions similar that when you lot receive got a choice. Resolving them theoretically, grade me skeptical. I would similar to regard us initially position a lot to a greater extent than effort, though, into thinking most how volition you lot verify as well as how volition you lot enforce an understanding if you lot ever larn one. Because also much of the talk, as well as it’s non Courtney, but there’s a lot of pop verbalize most negotiations as well as understanding that acts equally though if you lot had an understanding it would live followed. But there’s truly real footling inward the in conclusion twoscore years of Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan to advise that whatever understanding gets followed. It’s much to a greater extent than like, say, medieval Europe or renaissance, where agreements were something that you lot kept until i side or some other was potent plenty to interruption them.
So if you’re going to receive got an agreement, which I take away hold is an of import thing, nosotros demand to start thinking straight off most these truly tough issues of verification, as well as what’s our role going to live inward enforcement if you lot can—and unless your dot is you lot just desire to receive got an understanding so you lot tin flaming sign it, so you lot tin flaming larn out, as well as you lot don’t attention what happens. Well, so an agreement’s a goal. But otherwise, it’s a tool.
SHINN: So if you lot discovery an intermediary, as well as if you lot receive got some reasonable expectations most verification, where’s the leverage? Let’s assume you lot tin flaming larn the Taliban—some of the Taliban to the table, what exercise you lot exercise most Islamic Republic of Pakistan if currently they’re—or, almost most to live declared province sponsors of terrorism?
NEUMANN: Well, you’ve got a two—you’ve got 2 major levers, which may or may non live adequate to the process. One is the force per unit of measurement area you lot position on Islamic Republic of Pakistan to alter policy, as well as the other is the force per unit of measurement area you lot may or may non position on the Taliban on the battlefield. And neither i is going to live a short-term create at the best of cases. And you lot tin flaming struggle almost endlessly whether or non they volition live sufficient. You tin flaming also struggle endlessly, just to go on as well as on as well as on forever. Actually, at that topographic point is a 3rd dot of leverage, as well as that’s the Afghan regime itself. If it begins to perform somewhat better, if its troops performed better, if people set out to receive got to a greater extent than optimism most that government, so that itself is a 3rd dot of leverage on the Taliban.
Whether whatever of those things volition happen, I’m non guaranteeing. I think they are all possible. Not a unmarried i of them is guaranteed. And none of them are going to live fast as well as certain.
SEDNEY: I’d add together a quaternary dot of leverage, which is inward the international arena. Over the in conclusion 2 years Russian Federation has gone from existence an unalterable opponent of the Taliban to having talks amongst the Taliban. And according to U.S. officials who receive got spoken on the record, providing back upwards to the Taliban. At the same time, Iran, which used to live an almost implacable foe of the Taliban, has opened its borders to grooming camps for the Taliban as well as has increased its human relationship amongst the Taliban. So those gains the Taliban receive got made inward the international arena over the in conclusion couplet years could live position nether force per unit of measurement area if the United States, inward its policy, could discovery ways to piece of work amongst 2 states which patently it has real difficult—
SHINN: Wait a minute, the Russians as well as the Iranians you lot mean?
SEDNEY: The Russians as well as the Iranians, who may good regard Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan equally a seat where they tin flaming take away on the U.S. But their back upwards for the Taliban has helped reinforce the Taliban’s belief that they receive got a time to come equally the rulers of Afghanistan.
And so finally I would add, on the international arena, China. The Chinese receive got risen. China is a great powerfulness now. Through their Belt as well as Road Initiative they’re reaching out to all the areas inward as well as around South Asia, Central Asia. They’re Pakistan’s number-one ally as well as supporter, closer than lips as well as teeth, as well as all kinds of other analogies, which you lot belike know ameliorate than I do, Jim, how the Chinese verbalize most alliances. But the Chinese receive got never truly position whatever existent travail into this confrontation betwixt Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan as well as Pakistan, role of the Taliban. And if China is going to play that form of role—global role that it seems to be, maybe working to assist on this is some other area. So those iii countries, all of which the U.S. has hard relationships with, are all large players hither equally well. And that’s a huge diplomatic challenge, but nosotros should essay it.
COOPER: Just a couplet of quick points to address what my colleagues receive got said. One, just on the strategy, David, I take away hold amongst some of what you lot said, as well as disagree amongst a couplet of points. One, I don’t think anybody would facial expression at 2010 to 2012 as well as say: What exercise you lot think is a hallmark of U.S. strategy during that time, when nosotros had 100,000 U.S. troops in-country as well as truly were focused on the surge, as well as receive got the response be: I think that’s when nosotros were trying to diplomatically goal the state of war past times talking to the Taliban. So I think at that topographic point were efforts underway, but I wouldn’t say that that equally a priority. I think that they were earnest. But equally you lot saw inward Steve Coll’s book, at that topographic point were a lot of shortcomings to those efforts. So without using our actual leverage, because—which is troops—because nosotros had already announced the drawdown, I think nosotros missed out on truly leveraging that moment.
Two, I think it’s of import to think most the fact that starting a peace procedure isn’t going to larn whatever easier amongst time. I mean, all of the safety reports call for that safety is continuing to deteriorate. Even the Department of Defense inspector full general just latterly announced that since the strategy we’ve yet seen a deterioration of security, fifty-fifty amidst this truly great uptick inward U.S. armed services efforts as well as targeting. We also receive got growing ISIS presence as well as recruiting inward Afghanistan. We also receive got upcoming elections, which volition really, truly challenge the province politically as well as the internal dynamics inward Afghanistan, which could weaken the Afghan government’s negotiating seat fifty-fifty further.
And so I think ultimately a negotiated settlement is to a greater extent than plausible than whatever battlefield win. And it’s to a greater extent than desirable than an endless armed services stalemate. And if nosotros tin flaming take away hold on that point, so that’s something nosotros should truly essay to force forward. And so lastly, on the Taliban piece—though, equally Ron did mention, I don’t think it’s prudent to opened upwards up dissever channels of negotiations, but at that topographic point is some rationale, I think, on the Taliban part, inward thinking that at that topographic point are things it needs to verbalize over amongst the United States. One could imagine that the Taliban perceive that it was the U.S.A. who truly forced them from power, it was the U.S.A. who truly negotiated the National Unity Government. So at that topographic point was a lot of U.S. intervention there.
SHINN: That’s paragraphs three, four, as well as five.
COOPER: And the armed services strategy that’s underway inward Afghanistan, heavy U.S. involvement. So at that topographic point are things that nosotros receive got to verbalize about, assurances that nosotros could offering most our ultimate troop disposition that we’ve never truly position on the tabular array before. And I think it’s just that engagement that could truly assist jumpstart the centre of the discussion, which is the inter-Afghan portion.
SHINN: This is—this is extremely—this is a real sophisticated give-and-take of a real complex work that nosotros would straight off similar to engage the members—
NEUMANN: Now that we’ve made it uncomplicated for you. (Laughter.)
SHINN: You know, after I left government, inward 2010 as well as ’11, piece you lot were negotiating amongst the Taliban, I was trotting around Islamic Republic of Pakistan as well as Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan amongst Lakhdar Brahimi, inward a Carnegie Century Foundation-funded study. But nosotros talked to a lot of the Taliban leaders that I had been trying to kill inward my previous job. (Laughter.) And at each meeting, Lakhdar Brahimi would say: Thank you lot real much. I’m yet confused, but I’m confused inward a much to a greater extent than sophisticated way. (Laughter.)
So due to the fact that it is a confusing topic, if nosotros could delight go around the room. I would inquire you—first of all, I’d remind you lot that this is on the record, both what the panelists say as well as what you lot ask. Secondly, I would ask, please, that it live a question. And, third, if you’d live form plenty to seat your affiliation, it would assist position the interrogation inward context. And delight inquire for a microphone, which I believe volition live floating around—floating around the room. There’s a gentleman inward a dark turtleneck, I think.
Q: Thank you. Sorry, is this on?
SHINN: And delight exercise speak up.
Q: Thank you, Jim. I’m Craig Charney, caput of Charney Research. We took the firstly poll inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan after the autumn of the Taliban as well as to a greater extent than than a dozen to a greater extent than since.
Look, it seems to me that Courtney is right, that what we’re doing straight off is basically lose slowly. And doing to a greater extent than of the same thing seems to me to live a prescription for to a greater extent than of the same thing. What I’m wondering is perhaps nosotros should essay to alter both the incentives as well as the minuses quite substantially. For example, on the plus side, past times guaranteeing substantial increases inward assist to Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan as well as Pakistan, if at that topographic point is a settlement, as well as perhaps fifty-fifty an alliance amongst the Taliban, on the Earth against the Islamic State. On the other hand, rather than trying to punish an ally who happens to receive got their feet on the windpipe of our forces, nosotros could brand it known that if at that topographic point is no accord nosotros would back upwards the launching of 100,000 Indian troops inward Afghanistan, who receive got a considerably lighter render prepare than ours, who nosotros would live able to maintain as well as assist at considerably lower cost, as well as who could live resupplied both past times air as well as through Russian Federation or the northern countries.
SHINN: So is that—is the interrogation is that a feasible strategy?
Q: Yes, my interrogation is, shouldn’t nosotros live thinking most these kinds of things, most finding ways to alter the plus as well as the minus factors inward form of out-of-the-box ways, rather than just doing a footling scrap to a greater extent than of the same?
SEDLEY: Well, allow me start off past times truly thanking you, Craig. We’ve worked together inward the past. Your polling was real useful inward devising some—in some of the discussions nosotros had inward that 2010, ’11, ’12 period. And so give thank you lot you for your piece of work inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan there.
However, inward terms of both your analysis as well as your suggestions, I’ll receive got to respectfully disagree. I exercise non believe—and I’m non fifty-fifty for certain Courtney said this was a lose like shooting fish in a barrel strategy. I think the—it is to a greater extent than an travail inward some areas, such equally the armed services grooming effort, to rectify the mistakes nosotros made inward the past, equally Ambassador Neumann said. And I think that—whether nosotros tin flaming exercise that or non is an opened upwards question. The troops that President Trump has asked to go to Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan are just arriving now. Most of them receive got non fifty-fifty set human foot inward Afghanistan. Their comport upon won’t live felt for a year. So nosotros won’t live able to jurist the effectiveness of the additional troops until nosotros sit down hither a twelvemonth from now, take away a look, as well as regard what they mightiness receive got achieved.
But inward the meantime, the province of affairs is truly dissimilar than—I think my view, anyway, is dissimilar than what Courtney described. I would non pay whatever attending to the reports of the special inspector full general on Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan reconstruction. It’s an organisation that had made a lot of real bad predictions as well as produced a lot of bad analysis. The facts on the ground—
COURTNEY: DNI said that too, on the safety situation.
SEDNEY: OK. Then I would live happy to dispute DNI on that equally well. The fact is 2 years agone at the goal of the Obama administration, the Taliban was able to capture a provincial uppercase as well as threaten several others. It was taking to a greater extent than as well as to a greater extent than districts. In the in conclusion 12 months the Taliban did non capture whatever district—any provincial capitals for whatever menstruation of fourth dimension at all. Its threat to those provincial capitals was reduced. The number of districts that the Taliban—every twelvemonth for the in conclusion iv years of the Obama administration, every twelvemonth the Taliban’s command increased. And that’s what the special inspector full general is reporting, non what’s happened inward the in conclusion year.
But over the in conclusion year, inward fact, the Afghan regime has made advances, specially inward the expanse of Helmand, which a twelvemonth as well as a one-half agone was most ready to autumn to the Taliban. And the Afghan regime has recovered several districts inward the in conclusion year. So inward a number of areas, the Afghan regime as well as the introduce Afghan forces, without U.S.—a form of U.S. support, has made—has been making progress inward the in conclusion year. And I would hold back when nosotros sit down hither a twelvemonth from straight off we’ll regard that they’ll brand fifty-fifty to a greater extent than progress on the Earth militarily.
But fifty-fifty to a greater extent than than that, when you lot say lose slowly, I volition acknowledge to existence personally invested. I spent most of in conclusion twelvemonth as well as the twelvemonth before equally the acting president to the American University of Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan inward Kabul, Afghanistan. We receive got at the university, as well as you lot receive got equally i of your members Professor Ishaq Nadiri, who’s also on the board of trustees at the academy amongst me, nosotros receive got the time to come leaders of Afghanistan. We interacted amongst them. I interacted amongst them on a daily basis.
These immature people, as well as the vast bulk of the polling that I’ve seen recent, Craig, shows that somewhere betwixt 85 as well as ninety per centum of Afghans are opposed to the Taliban. So if you’re talking most a lose province of affairs where you lot give portion of Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan to the Taliban, equally I think I understood portion of what you lot were saying, you’re proverb that 5 or 10 per centum of the population that’s willing to utilisation extreme violence should live allowed to take away over ninety per centum of the residuum of the people. I don’t think that’s going to take away seat inward Afghanistan. I don’t think the Afghan people volition exercise it. And I don’t think nosotros should live portion of anything of the kind.
Finally, on your thing of—on your thought most India, I think Republic of Republic of India should play a to a greater extent than active role, but I think it should non live on the armed services side. An active role by—any endeavor past times the Indians to go active inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan militarily would set forth a chain of consequences amongst Islamic Republic of Pakistan that could Pb to a nuclear state of war as well as the deaths of hundreds of millions of people. And I think that’s much also high a endangerment to take.
NEUMANN: Could I just add together a brief farther complexity? By the way, I totally take away hold on the younger generation of Afghans. I oft experience similar Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan has a brilliant long-term future, if it tin flaming only live its short-term leaders. (Laughter.) That said, on this military—we’re going to go endlessly—probably equally long equally we’re inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan most how exercise you lot jurist this?
SHINN: About how you lot what?
NEUMANN: About how you lot jurist whether you’re making progress. I would say, firstly of all, at that topographic point is—there is a confusion now. And Craig’s comment, I think, hits right on the confusion, because the direction is non inward fact, as well as has not, explained what it expects to hit inward what length of fourth dimension amongst the military. You receive got 2 dissimilar things going on simultaneously, which nosotros are absolutely non explaining to the public. One is an travail to alter long-term grooming as well as lineament of the Afghan army. And equally David said, that is just beginning. The other is a short-term sort of take away hold the line amongst dissimilar authorities as well as a few additional people on the ground. And it’s a patchwork. And, you lot know, so it’s—some places go forward, some places go backwards. And Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan is so complex that if you lot receive got a truly potent view most what’s happening, you lot tin flaming dorsum it up. And if you lot receive got a potent view that’s 180 degrees out, you lot tin flaming dorsum it up, which is almost meaningless.
I would say over the longer term, non the brusk term, at that topographic point are going to live some things nosotros should facial expression at to tell whether your security’s getting better. One is going to be, exercise the regular army as well as the law piece of work together? They don’t right now. It’s a horrible mismatch. Second volition live when you lot receive got small-scale forces, whether they’re law or local hamlet safety that are nether threat, volition the regular army as well as the law come upwards as well as reinforce them? Which they exercise a terrible chore of right now. Will you lot cutting downwardly the flat of politically motivated generals who, inward add-on to existence corrupt—you tin flaming alive amongst some of that—are completely inefficient? There’s belike some others, but there’s iii large standards right there.
If those things are looking ameliorate inward a year, twelvemonth as well as a half, 2 years, I would experience fairly confident most where this goes. If they are non looking better, if the politicizing as well as the powerfulness networks of Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan proceed to defeat cooperation betwixt leaders of armed services as well as safety units, so I would say the strategy is non working. It’s on a path to failure. It won’t affair how much nosotros position into it, unless they tin flaming larn past times that form of stuff. But those are the things—kind of things, at to the lowest degree examples, that nosotros demand to facial expression at. There’s non much dot inward trying to micro-measure them now. You’re going to receive got to facial expression at them a twelvemonth from now, which brings me dorsum to my master point, as well as so I’ll quit, which is this truly isn’t a fourth dimension to struggle most policy.
You receive got no thought if this policy is working or not. And the desperate travail to alter policy every 6 months or twelvemonth is a huge debilitating failure. You can’t carry out anything inward this form of complex surround if you lot are constantly examining the policy. You are going to receive got to—you got i now. It may non live the perfect one, but what it needs straight off is—frankly, it needs a couplet of years of serious effort. And what nosotros do, as well as what the Obama direction did iv or 5 times, which is to reexamine policy, is a gross mistake, because it stops all sorts of things, undercut everything you lot were doing piece everybody wonders where you’re going to go, so you lot essay to realign people as well as you lot essay to realign money, as well as you lot displace things around. That’s to a greater extent than fourth dimension wasted. And so eventually, you lot start upwards again. And so inside a twelvemonth or something you’re bellybutton gazing as well as wondering whether you lot ought to displace the policy again.
SHINN: This is true. Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 lot of administrations receive got a high discount charge per unit of measurement for time. The gentleman inward the orangish tie. I know I audio similar a Sotheby’s auctioneer here. But right there.
Q: Oh, it is me. I didn’t know if that was my tie. My call is Roland Paul. I’m a lawyer. I’ve been inward the U.S. regime twice inward national safety positions. One inward OSD as well as the other on the Hill.
I’d similar to inquire briefly, form of at that topographic point are maybe iii interreacting, underlying issues that receive got been mentioned, but non truly dealt with. And inward this unclassified forum we’re in, could you lot say what the gild of magnitude of the Taliban over inward the Islamic Republic of Pakistan hills is? And second, our overarching number amongst Pakistan, past times far than anything else maybe, is to just to maintain their nuclear weapons out of the incorrect hands. And related to this is, what’s the—what would live the prospect of cross-border operations, which I know we’ve conducted some at to the lowest degree inward the air, into Islamic Republic of Pakistan against the Taliban, where their sanctuaries are allowed? Thank you.
SHINN: Courtney.
COOPER: I’ll just comment on the firstly piece. I think there’s some—I think the wide assessment is that Taliban senior leaders relish some flat of sanctuary inward Pakistan. But I think at that topographic point is a deviation inward thought of how much Islamic Republic of Pakistan has influence to assist straight the insurgency. Broadly, I think the Taliban is an Afghan domestic political insurgency. And so you lot receive got attacks as well as efforts that are being—that are existence perpetrated throughout the country, inward a sense that it’s non clear that somebody inward Islamic Republic of Pakistan is truly pulling the strings for that.
So I don’t receive got a number for you. I think having the command as well as command of the Taliban leadership inward Islamic Republic of Pakistan patently truly lends to the Taliban’s staying power. But I think at that topographic point is local grievances inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan that are fueling the conflict. And, you lot know, the volume of Taliban fighters are inward Afghanistan. And there’s truly indications publicly that there’s a growing rubber haven inward Afghanistan, given the amount of territory that the Taliban has, you lot know, brought its influence over inward recent years. I’ll defer the Islamic Republic of Pakistan questions to you lot all.
NEUMANN: There was cross-border as well as what was the 3rd element?
COOPER: Nuclear security.
SHINN: Cross-border ops.
NEUMANN: Oh, the nuclear. You know, it’s not—I was willing to allow David take away this one—it’s non all i thing or another. The bulk of fighters are local, there’s no question. The majority—to the extent nosotros know who is captured as well as killed, most of them are inside a fairly brusk distance of their ain abode villages. But the leadership is inward Pakistan. The powerfulness to take away wounded casualties dorsum to Islamic Republic of Pakistan to refit inward Pakistan, to build upwards supplies inward Pakistan, as well as the back upwards of the Haqqani Network, which is portion of the Taliban, which is the most lethal as well as effective inward the large-scale bombs as well as the small-scale suicide bombs, that is an manufacture that is located inward Pakistan. That’s pretty important. So it’s non a be-all as well as end-all. But it would for certain live a heck of a lot easier to bargain amongst this thing if you lot cutting downwardly on that.
Cross border, I would say—if you lot exercise cross border—you’re non going to provide a knock-out blow. You know, you lot don’t have—we didn’t care that inward the Laotian as well as Cambodian operations inward Vietnam, because those were—well, I fought inward that war, so I yet call back it. There are selective uses for cross-border operations. You know, nosotros had a couple, similar taking out—taking out Osama bin Laden, killing Taliban leader Mansour, which may or may non receive got been a goodness idea. What I would say is cross-border operations should live done firstly of all of—they’re going to get political friction.
But you lot ought to exercise them when it is, one, truly important and, two, when you lot think to create the political friction that you’re going to cause. One of the problems nosotros receive got is nosotros tend to exercise these things—we tend to think most them also oft only inward armed services terms, which is a goodness starting point. There are times when nosotros ought to—that doesn’t hateful e'er restraint. There are times when nosotros ought to exercise to a greater extent than cross border because you lot desire to upwards the political pressure. But you lot desire to pick a target that is politically sensitive, that’s carrying out a message you lot want. And nosotros don’t connect the pieces also well.
SHINN: Gentleman amongst the dark glasses.
Q: My call is Stephen Blank. I am non an expert. But I am interested.
The implementation of the strategy also requires resources that are political resources. The strategy that you’ve begun to regard emerge here—longer term, a lot of U.S. troops—without the political markers that the fourth dimension strategy provided, which suggested that at that topographic point was low-cal at the goal of the tunnel, long-term force per unit of measurement area on Pakistan. Do you lot think that this government, or whatever U.S. regime conceivable could back upwards this form of a strategy seriously?
NEUMANN: Yes. But I’ll—you may desire to talk.
SEDNEY: Let me just say that I think you, inward a sense, receive got hitting upon a centre dichotomy inward the American approach to this—to this—to the travail inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan that has bedeviled us from the real beginning. We are inward Afghanistan—we are inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan real clearly because of what happened hither inward New York on September 11th, the set on on the United States. That is why—that’s why nosotros are there, fifty-fifty xv years later. However, the way we’ve been there, equally a result, has—our objective has been to kill as well as capture all the terrorists involved. And nosotros receive got tried that. We’ve been real successful. We’ve killed a lot of people. But nosotros haven’t eliminated the terrorist threat.
But the American people, at the same time, receive got elected iii presidents inward a row who receive got been real explicit that they are non interested inward nation-building inward general, as well as non interested inward nation-building inward Afghanistan. You go dorsum as well as facial expression at what George Bush during the drive as well as equally president, he didn’t desire to nation-build inward Afghanistan. President Obama was real clear. He didn’t desire to nation-build inward Afghanistan. The tape is clear. President Trump was elected, proverb he didn’t desire to exercise nation-building inward Afghanistan, or anywhere else.
But I would submit that to address the centre number of how exercise you lot forestall terrorism from becoming—from continuing to live a recurring problem, nations exercise receive got to live built. Nations are going to live built anyway. And the interrogation is, what role is the U.S.A. going to play inward that? And nosotros receive got been dorsum as well as forth on that. Sometimes we’ve been real active inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan inward what you lot would consider nation-building as well as assisting efforts. Other times, we’ve pulled back. And you lot could struggle the same inward a number of other areas, from Republic of Yemen as well as Syrian Arab Republic as well as elsewhere. But that’s a centre conflict inward the American political consciousness. Are nosotros going to live active inward a large way abroad? Or exercise nosotros just punch back, give people a bloody nose, as well as think that that’s going to solve all our problems? Obviously, I don’t. I don’t receive got an response for you. And I think it’s at the real centre of why people don’t empathize our strategy inward Afghanistan.
NEUMANN: Well, yeah. You raised—the 2nd portion of that question, though, is it sustainable. And I’m going to say it is. I would say, firstly of all, people normally—I’m non proverb you lot did—but it is oft posed equally though there’s sort of a finite boundary to populace patience, as well as when you lot receive got passed that limit, it’s similar a waterfall as well as you lot so receive got gone over the border as well as descend. But inward fact, what nosotros regard is firstly of all it’s dynamic, so that if inward a twelvemonth or 2 you lot are showing some mensurate that tin flaming live called existent success, you lot larn to a greater extent than time. If inward a twelvemonth or 2 it looks worse, you lot larn less time. Secondly, when you lot don’t receive got a lot of people dying—you know, it’s form of crass—but inward fact, if you lot don’t receive got a lot of people—
COOPER: Americans.
NEUMANN: If you lot don’t receive got a lot of Americans. Yeah, nosotros don’t much attention most who else dies. But, you lot know, I’m sorry, but that’s the reality of our politics. It’s non the reality of our heart. But if you lot don’t receive got a lot of Americans dying, it doesn’t larn a lot of attention. And people forget that nosotros had—effective, nosotros had 2 years inward Republic of Iraq where nosotros had 100,000 troops on the ground. And at that topographic point were hardly whatever paper articles most Iraq. It wasn’t a large issue. The primary argue the Obama direction insisted on getting out was its ain excogitation of its role, non because at that topographic point was large political pressure. So the president truly has a great bargain of flexibility if he wants to exercise this, if he wants to say.
Also, finally, I would say that the congressional mood fluctuates. The congressional mood on Afghanistan, equally I’ve talked to people, upwards until into belike 2011 to ’12ish was commencement to force to a greater extent than as well as to a greater extent than on it’s fourth dimension to larn out of Afghanistan. After the autumn of Mosul as well as the upsurge of the Islamic State, the congressional mood had a major change. And it was a sort of oh my God, nosotros don’t desire that to take away seat inward Afghanistan. You say that’s right or wrong, but the fact was the events inward i seat influenced the thinking inward another. So there’s a dynamic. There’s a lot of room for presidential initiatory if the president wants to utilisation it. This president mightiness pick out non to.
SHINN: Well, actually, you lot tin flaming examine that past times the tenor of the questions nosotros hear from this audience of thought makers.
NEUMANN: Which I’m for certain is a—
SHINN: In fact, there’s some other one. The immature lady adjacent to the wall.
Q: Hi. Brooke Goldstein from The Lawfare Project.
I’m wondering, just because it hasn’t been mentioned at all, if our regime has completely given upwards on formulating whatever type of policy to bargain amongst the theology behind theologically motivated terrorism, Taliban existence an Islamist movement. And then, relatedly, what the status was of the didactics scheme inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan right now, both inward the Taliban as well as inward the U.S.-backed system, let’s say? Are nosotros yet seeing the type of incitement to violence based on Islamic teachings inward both areas equally well?
SHINN: Could I brand a—I mean, inward the involvement of focus of this—I mean, those are both real interesting topics, but they’re a little—slightly tangential of the interrogation of strategy inward Afghanistan.
NEUMANN: But the interrogation of focusing on their narrative is real much a portion of what exercise you lot do. It’s a real fair question. It’s i which nosotros receive got worked at assiduously as well as poorly. We spent a for certain amount of money. There’s a novel volume that just came out. And unfortunately I don’t call back the championship exactly, but it contrasts Taliban propaganda amongst American. And it’s real lamentable reading. They receive got a clear narrative. We, for all the reasons you lot heard, don’t. Let me maintain it short.
The biggest issues of countering both the Taliban narrative as well as much to a greater extent than broadly jihadist narratives of diverse dissimilar ilks, is going to receive got to live fought out betwixt Muslims. It’s non i on which the foreigners are going to live definitive dispositive. It is i where nosotros tin flaming exercise much better, because when nosotros exercise so badly you’ve got to live able to exercise better. But it is most of import that nosotros reinforce the voices inside the Muslim world—both Afghan, Arab, as well as others—who are disputation against these views rather than trying to, I don’t know, the atheist Christians volition straight off tell you lot what existence a goodness Muslim means, which usually falls somewhat short.
SEDNEY: I would say that the unmarried biggest thing nosotros tin flaming exercise to address that interrogation is to receive got a successful Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan that is a moderate, peaceful, Islamic democracy, which is what President Ghani as well as the vast bulk of Afghans want, including the students that I taught.
SHINN: And delight weigh inward on these questions.
Other questions. Steve, you lot had one? The gentleman right there. He’s closer to the microphone. Actually, the gentleman amongst the tie who I—who I was pointing to. (Laughter.)
Q: I’m John Washburn at Columbia University.
There is some other musician inward the Afghan confusion now. The International Criminal Court is most to determine to authorize the prosecutor to conduct a formal investigation into state of war crimes inward Afghanistan. All parties volition live nether the mandate of this investigation. But equally far equally the U.S.A. is concerned, this authorization volition constitute a determination past times the judges that at that topographic point is reasonable ground to believe that Americans receive got committed extensive state of war crimes inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan as well as inward the iii dark sites inward Eastern Europe. The U.S. response has been to hunker downwardly as well as say that the U.S.—that the courtroom has no jurisdiction, a seat which is non shared past times the 123 members of the court. How does—how should—in low-cal of the strategy, which seems to live dimly emerging amid all of you, how should—how should the U.S.A. respond to this? Is hunkering downwardly as well as continuing to ignore it the right way exercise it? Or is at that topographic point some other reaction which would live to a greater extent than positive inward terms of sustaining the strategy you’ll have?
NEUMANN: I’m happy to verbalize most it, but I’ve been overshadowing others.
COOPER: Oh, no, please.
NEUMANN: Why don’t nosotros essay to response crisply amongst an optic on the clock, since nosotros only receive got 5 minutes. And I demand to give—we demand to give each participant the in conclusion word perhaps.
NEUMANN: Well, I’ll give the in conclusion word inward deference to my colleagues then. But, one, I think this is a thoroughly bad—this international courtroom approach is a thoroughly bad thought if you lot receive got whatever promise of a negotiated peace inward Afghanistan. If you lot are going to say, firstly of all, to our allies that we’re fighting amongst on the ground, past times the way, nosotros are taking you lot to courtroom sometime soon. And then, fifty-fifty worse, nosotros desire to negotiate amongst you, the Taliban, but when—you know, in i lawsuit you lot negotiate as well as nosotros receive got peace as well as you lot lay downwardly your arms, nosotros may take away you lot to courtroom as well as essay you lot for your crimes. You merely are trying to go forrad as well as backward at the same time. And that’s a recipe for immobilism.
SHINN: What exercise you lot think, Courtney?
NEUMANN: The residuum of the interrogation is tactical.
SHINN: Hot potato?
COOPER: Yeah, hot potato.
SEDNEY: I think it’s a real hard thing for the International Criminal Court to receive got taken this stair because, equally you lot said, it’s all parties. And your focus, as well as the focus from the U.S., volition of class live on the dark sites as well as the role of the U.S. inward torture during the early on years of the Bush administration. That’s history, unfortunately. It’s horrible, tragic history, but it’s history. But taking aim at Islamic Republic of Pakistan as well as the Taliban, which volition also take away seat nether this thing, volition receive got just the form of consequences that Ron said, of making it harder to truly hit peace. But I think, equally you lot said, the International Criminal Court is apparently determined to go ahead inward this way. And I think it’s going to brand things to a greater extent than complicated as well as brand peace less likely.
SHINN: Jeff—oh, go ahead.
COOPER: Just a truly quick point. I think, if cipher else, to me it underscores the fact that at that topographic point is a role for the U.S.A. equally a political party to the conflict, equally portion of the negotiations, because we’ve had a role. And if we’re named inward this—with the ICC, it shows that, I mean, the Taliban does receive got some legitimate points when they dot to grievances most U.S. involvement—U.S. armed services involvement inward Afghanistan. So I think just recognizing that at that topographic point are grievances on all sides. And I think that that is a necessary element to getting all sides to the tabular array for a process. There’s no just i side that is at fault hither for what has been a long conflict, that nosotros should all piece of work to resolve.
SHINN: Jeff Laurenti. Though, I would dot out that the Taliban are the people who slaughtered, past times my count, 67,000 Afghan civilians in conclusion year.
COOPER: Sure. Yeah.
Q: Thank you, Jim. Jeff Laurenti, a co-conspirator amongst Jim seven, 8 years agone on that international taskforce on Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan as well as its multilateral dimensions.
I think that Ron Neumann has correctly set before us why, amongst a express armed services footprint, the U.S. tin flaming live open-ended sustainably. But David has already indicated that what nosotros thought were fixed pieces internationally are rapidly changing—the Iranians, the Russians. This had been an international squad response. To the extent that this becomes just the U.S., as well as nosotros haven’t spoken most where the Europeans are. They gave at the business office already. They can—and we’re straight off non just cozying upwards to them inward other fields either amongst the electrical current administration. The Japanese receive got been major bankrollers also of Afghan reconstruction. And fifty-fifty the capacity of both the Afghan regime as well as the Taliban to proceed to recruit novel human foot soldiers—how sustainable is an open-ended conflict at whatever of these levels going forward? Or are nosotros going to live the only ones open-ended?
SHINN: You know, I think—again, amongst the involvement of time—and, past times the way, that the—we may receive got all the watches as well as the Taliban may receive got all the time, but the Council on Foreign Relations does not. And nosotros receive got to goal at 2:00 sharp. And it’s usually a courtesy to the panelists to give you lot the in conclusion word. To response Jeff’s question, would you lot coil it into your broader comments? So maybe, again, start amongst Courtney, so Ambassador Neumann, as well as so a concluding word to David.
COOPER: Sure. I would say on sustainability, at the electrical current levels of U.S. investment, that the United States, at least, could sustain this electrical current approach. But I would flag that at that topographic point is a important cost. Maybe it isn’t inward U.S. lives, but in conclusion twelvemonth it was $25 billion a year, as well as it’s going to live more. That comes as—that’s an chance terms for other projects as well as things that nosotros could live doing hither inward the United States, or elsewhere around the world. There’s a terms for the Afghan people. As you lot noted, 10,000 Afghans were either killed or injured in conclusion year. Recent estimates I saw puts totals at upwards to 140,000 people killed since the start of this conflict. That’s a huge, important cost. So that’s something that I don’t think nosotros should overlook.
In terms of—I wanted to circle dorsum truly quick on what Craig had said. Craig, I agree. I think it’s truly of import that nosotros think creatively most how to overcome challenges to a peace process. One is the number of financing. You could assume a globe inward which at that topographic point is a drawdown of international troops. It’ll live far reduced appetite to proceed to invest the form of resources we’re investing now. I think whatever sustainable peace procedure volition demand to come upwards amongst wide assurances from the U.S.A. as well as the international community of continued funding inward gild to assure all of the players, including the electrical current Afghan polity, that they should invest inward this peace process, as well as they don’t stand upwards to lose economically as well as politically past times seeing, you lot know, their piece of political influence inward this—in this pie farther reduced.
A comment just to David inward terms of turning over the reins dorsum to the Taliban, I don’t think—I don’t think anybody would advise that negotiation way the Taliban is taking over. Negotiation isn’t capitulation. And I think that that’s a mistaken alternative that is presented oft inward discussions most negotiations as well as a negotiated settlement to say, well, nosotros shouldn’t exercise that, because past times negotiating amongst the Taliban way that we’re going to homecoming to a terrorist rubber haven inward Afghanistan. And that’s a mistaken choice. It’s an supposition that isn’t truly well-founded. And so I think—
SEDNEY: And I take away hold 100 per centum amongst you, so.
COOPER: OK. (Laughs.) So I think inward terms of perpetuating the conflict, sure, nosotros maybe could exercise so sustainably at our electrical current cost, but at that topographic point is a existent human cost, there’s a terms for U.S. interests, for regional stability, as well as that’s something that nosotros truly demand to focus on.
NEUMANN: You raised several points. I’m going to allow David verbalize most the Afghan intro part. On the external, I think it’s of import to notice that NATO has been remarkably solid. They’re non e'er effective, but they’re solid. During the 6 months or 7 months inward which the Obama direction was conducting a review of some form as well as trying to figure out where it was going, you lot truly had the Italians as well as the Germans pushing for a to a greater extent than active presence. Now, when the Italians as well as the Germans are ahead of us inward thinking nosotros ought to rest involved inward war, I would submit that you lot receive got some fairly venture support. NATO has—members of NATO nations receive got straight off increased the personnel they’re putting in. I don’t know how long it volition last. But it already defies all expectations of a decade ago. But for the moment, the principal European—and I think Japanese involvement equally well—is real well-sustained, despite all the frictions nosotros receive got inward other places.
SEDNEY: I would take away hold amongst that. And I think what you’ll discovery is those who have—who receive got the most experience inward Afghanistan, the people who’ve lived there, worked there, are the strongest supporters because of what they’ve seen of the time to come of Afghanistan. The most recent—it was a couplet weeks ago, a see of immature Afghan women leaders, people who are at the deputy government minister level, people who just didn’t be 10 or xv years ago. They weren’t talking most this existence a continually losing war. They weren’t talking most giving upwards the rights that they’ve achieved to ascendancy past times Taliban rulers. They were talking most a time to come of Afghanistan, that they are putting their lives on the line every twenty-four hours for, that is a vision that I think most Americans as well as most of our allies wanted from the real twenty-four hours nosotros went into Afghanistan.
We haven’t position the right resources in. We’ve engaged inward our—in activities as well as many things that receive got been counterproductive. But the goal outcome inward Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan straight off is nosotros receive got an emerging set of leaders—of immature leaders. Over 50 per centum of Afghans are nether the historic menstruation of 25. Afghan—emerging set of Afghan leaders who desire peace, who desire an goal to the war. But fifty-fifty more, they desire to stand upwards up as well as live non equally goodness equally but ameliorate than the residuum of the countries inward the globe as well as their region. The vision that these—that these people have—and American—the American people, as well as our assistance, amongst our armed services as well as civilian assistance—can take away credit for helping them emerge. But the biggest credit belongs to them. I truly urge you, if you lot are interested inward this area, to run across amongst those immature Afghans, because the time to come of Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan is upwards to the Afghans. We tin flaming as well as should enable that future. But nosotros demand to hear to the Afghans, piece of work amongst them, assist them hit what they want. Thank you.
SHINN: Well, give thank you lot you for joining us inward this What to Do About… Series. If you’re yet confused I promise you’re confused inward a to a greater extent than sophisticated way. Thank you. (Applause.)
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