Sidharth Kaushal
Introduction
Combating insurgencies with conventional forces has long been regarded every bit being, to paraphrase T.E Lawrence’s colorful formulation, comparable to eating soup with a knife (Lawrence, 1922, 53). Indeed, the inutility of forcefulness with regards to combating a phenomenon that primarily exists inwards the minds of a target population has been noted past times figures from General Rupert Smith to General David Petraeus, the latter articulating this regulation every bit a fundamental premise upon which he built his population centric theory of counterinsurgency inwards FM-3-24 (Petraeus, 2006, 60-100) (Smith, 2005, 40). Within the context of this argument, whatsoever sweat to destroy an insurgent militarily past times a policy of attrition or annihilation ignores the insurgents innate capacity to merchandise infinite for time, avoiding the strengths of a conventional forcefulness too eroding both its domestic volition too its command over the target public (over which the insurgent too counterinsurgent forcefulness are fighting) past times policies of assassination, intimidation of the counterinsurgency’s local supporters too dispersed attacks on occupying troops. The powerfulness of an insurgency, fifty-fifty i which has held territory for a pregnant menses to revert to what T.X. Hammes dubs stage I of an insurgent strategy (whereby it resorts to asymmetrical warfare) is fundamental to the declaration regarding the inutility of an enemy-centric Clausewitzian approach to combating insurgencies (Hammes, 2006, 50).
Rather, it has been contended, counterinsurgent forces must focus on seizing territory, clearing it temporarily, too using the fourth dimension bought to create the institutional structures that offering long term legitimacy to the counterinsurgency (Petraeus, 2006, 6-10, 77). This approach, sometimes coupled with intimidation of the local public (an alternative to winning hearts too minds that nonetheless acknowledges the centrality on an insurgencies links to the population) are collectively dubbed indirect counterinsurgency strategies past times scholars such every bit I.A. Toft (Toft, 2005, 12). If a counterinsurgent meets an indirect strategy with a direct i based on either attrition or annihilation, it is doomed to neglect patch efforts to resolve the inherent asymmetry of the conflict past times the adoption of an indirect approach that mirrors that of the insurgent inwards its emphasis on population control. Within this framework, scholars such every bit Toft offering falsifiable predictions regarding the prospects for success or failure inwards 3 plausible contingencies- i inwards which a direct strategy past times a counterinsurgent confronts an indirect insurgent strategy too i inwards which both parties adopt an indirect approach. While non disputing the importance of these arguments, I scrap that this vein of research, with its implicit supposition regarding the static nature of an insurgent’s strategy, has overlooked a tertiary contingency inwards which insurgents opt to adopt a direct defence forcefulness too an attendant empirical puzzle - namely the high occurrence of instances inwards which the insurgent has adopted this approach, despite its clearly suboptimal nature.
While scholars since David Galula take hold acknowledged the axiomatic betoken that when an insurgent, invariably the weaker actor, adopts a strategy of conventional defence forcefulness the greater powerfulness of the solid reason tin live on brought to conduct decisively against it, at that spot has been precious picayune inquiry into why those insurgents who take hold adopted these strategies take hold done so despite the obvious risks (Galula, 1967, 55). Specifically, the interrogation of whether the counterinsurgency’s ain strategy tin incentivize the adoption of a clearly suboptimal policy past times the weaker political party inwards the dyad has non been systematically explored. If indeed a counterinsurgency tin shape the way its opponent fights too number a strategic interaction betwixt 2 direct strategies, it would follow that perchance i tin indeed “eat soup with a knife”. It is just this disceptation that this article makes.
Building on Daniel Kahneman too Amos Tverskey’s prospect theory, which contends that actors brand jeopardy acceptant deviations from rationality when placed inwards a frame of losses, I volition scrap that the counterinsurgents actions at the grand strategic too operational levels tin accomplish just this framing effect- placing the leadership of the insurgency inwards a frame of losses too thereby leveraging the insurgency into fighting on the stronger actors terms. In company to examine this thesis, I recollect to utilize an in-depth instance study of a state of war which demonstrated the outcome of involvement (the adoption of a conventional defence forcefulness past times an outgunned insurgent force). The instance study I take hold chosen is Eelam War IV, which saw the regime of Sri Lanka accomplish a resounding too rapid victory over the LTTE. While a unmarried instance study-based methodology has drawbacks, the study of the procedure past times which an outcome occurred, which involves complex causal mechanisms, requires a depth typically provided past times procedure tracing too absent inwards to a greater extent than experimental methods (Davidson, 2011, 20). Additionally, given that the LTTE had enjoyed substantial success against the Sri Lankan the world forces past times utilizing an indirect strategy inwards the 3 preceding Eelam wars, it had every incentive to adhere to an approach that had served it so well- rendering this a to the lowest degree probable instance for my argument, insofar every bit the LTTE had strong demonstrated incentives to adhere to its existing approach too implying that a model applicable to this instance volition live on fifty-fifty to a greater extent than readily applicable inwards other circumstances. As such, at that spot seems non to process the Eelam War IV every bit existence sui generis too nongeneralizable. Finally, the findings of a unmarried case-oriented study existence used for theory edifice (the emphasis of this paper) tin live on treated every bit diagnostic too used every bit a footing for farther experimental inquiry (Bennett, George, 2005, 13). In the adjacent section, I volition lay out my theoretical framework too hypothesis. Following this, I volition examine the functioning of my hypothesis inside the context of Eelam state of war IV using procedure tracing too the congruence method. Finally, the article volition introduce my quantitative analysis of the correlation betwixt sure types of solid reason activity too the adoption of suboptimal armed forces strategies past times an insurgency. The finally part of the newspaper volition too then bargain with the possible conclusions that tin live on derived from this research.
Theory too Hypothesis
The theoretical underpinnings of this article take hold their origins inwards Kahnemann too Tverskey’s exposition of jeopardy aversion too credence every bit articulated inwards prospect theory. Prospect theory postulates that the floor of jeopardy that an musician is willing to take hold depends on whether the game is framed to him or her every bit i that entails prospective losses or every bit i entailing prospective gains. Specifically, if the musician frames the game every bit i of gains (where he or she is mediating betwixt several positive prospects) the musician tends to live on jeopardy averse, whereas a game framed inwards damage of losses tends to have jeopardy acceptance. The authors illustrate this through an experiment whereby a laid of actors are, inwards i instance offered a certainty of winning a pocket-size amount of money versus the possibility of winning a larger sum, whilst inwards the other they are offered the certainty of losing a pocket-size amount of money versus the probability of losing an fifty-fifty larger sum. What they find, with relative regularity is that actors inwards the starting fourth dimension experiment pick out the certainty of winning a pocket-size amount (the jeopardy averse option) whilst inwards the latter they pick out the probability of losing a larger amount (the jeopardy acceptant option). Risk acceptant deviations from rationality, then, correspond the actions of an musician who is inwards a frame of prospective losses (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979, 264-273). This may explain, for example, the observed style of jeopardy averse actors that tin live on deterred from conquest to present a willingness to run enormous risks to retain conquests i time they take hold already occurred (Morgan, 2003, 20-22). It is my disceptation that conceiving of the adoption of a direct defence forcefulness every bit a jeopardy acceptant strategy adopted past times an musician inwards a frame of losses offers us a amount insight into how an insurgent tin live on compelled to adopt a conventional defense.
The ancient Chinese strategist Lord's Day Tzu famously stipulated that an onset on an opponent’s strategy rather than his the world forces amounted to the altitude of science inwards warfare (The Art of War, 20). Interpreting this somewhat cryptic statement, M. Handel argues that Lord's Day Tzu effectively argued that the utilisation of grand strategic tools to alter the strategic environs prior to a conflict allows an musician to shape the psychology of one’s adversary and, past times extension, the nature of the conflict (Handel, 2000, 160).
Success for an insurgent depends, every bit Mao Zedong noted inwards 1937, on publicly visible victories over the solid reason that effectively problematizes the states potency over a contested area. These victories may amount to pocket-size but visible acts (such every bit the assassination of officials) or large tactical victories (such every bit the devastation of a trunk of the state’s conventional forces) (Zedong, 2012 ,68-70). Central to this strategy, however, is the contested nature of command over a specific geographical area. Consequently, my hypothesis is that past times establishing a cordon sanitaire over a contested expanse too withdrawing the states troops beyond this point, the solid reason reframes the competition inwards the eyes of the insurgency’s leadership shifting them from a frame of gains to i of losses. While counterintuitive, the efficacy of this approach stems from the fact that withdrawing tactically to positions of strength deprives the insurgent of the powerfulness to accomplish visible victories over the solid reason inwards the contested area- an deed that underpins its powerfulness to create a feel of edifice momentum. Secondly, however, past times transforming the contested zone into i of insurgent control, it ceases to live on framed every bit a prospective gain too is instead conceived past times the insurgent every bit the world already held (a prospective loss). Crucially, I do non debate for the acknowledgement of insurgent command but rather a tactical withdrawal leaving the insurgent facing the prospect of hereafter regime incursions. Secondly, I hypothesize that the establishment of a cordon sanitaire at both the operational floor too the grand strategic floor (by cutting off external sources of finance too supply) places the insurgent farther into a frame of losses, insofar every bit the insurgent is faced with the prospect of having a diminishing powerfulness to handgrip its territory every bit fourth dimension wears on. Consequently, my starting fourth dimension hypothesis is that past times a policy of tactical withdrawal too containment at the grand strategic level, the counterinsurgent tin steadily shift an insurgency from a frame of gains to i of losses.
Secondly, the contours too cohesion of intra-elite ties inside insurgencies are often a part of distributional politics inside the grouping (Staniland, 2010, 55-60). It follows, then, that a policy of containment imposes scarcities too distributional conflicts that exacerbate nascent intra elite friction-allowing the counterinsurgent to leverage away sections of the insurgent’s elite base of operations past times economical too political inducements. Simultaneously, the removal of a direct counterinsurgent presence inwards the insurgencies territory removes whatsoever feel of immediate danger that may take hold lent an insurgency cohesion despite distributional disputes. This farther places the insurgent inwards a frame of losses, less because potentially dissatisfied elites are necessarily vital to the insurgencies functioning, than because the specter of defections reinforces the frame of losses through which the insurgencies amount leadership is placed when it is transformed from a challenger to an incumbent. Collectively, I hypothesize that the twin policies of containment too wedge politics at the grand strategic floor house an insurgent inwards a frame of losses that volition ensure that when the solid reason chooses to terminate its policy of containment too onset insurgent held territory, the insurgent volition answer with a direct defence forcefulness (a jeopardy acceptant strategy).
The fundamental prediction made past times this declaration is that if a counterinsurgent transitions to the offensive after a menses of containment, it volition live on confronted past times a jeopardy acceptant insurgency which volition human face it conventionally. Within this context, contra the predictions of an emphasis on maneuver too firepower volition probable to testify highly effective against an insurgency that has effectively evolved into a weak conventional force. Despite the demonstrably piteous tape of such forces against insurgencies, their efficacy tin live on radically improved if the insurgent leaderships psychological milieu lends itself to the adoption of suboptimal strategies- an outcome that the counterinsurgent tin homecoming to a greater extent than probable past times the adoption of a temporary strategy of containment.
Two plausible counterarguments be regarding this hypothesis. The starting fourth dimension is that having assumed the role of a governing trunk inwards the territory it occupies, an insurgency cannot readily transition dorsum to guerilla tactics. If indeed this is the case, too then the utilisation of prospect theory is superfluous to explaining the adoption of suboptimal strategies past times insurgent leaders. This objection powerfulness live on countered past times noting a litany of cases inwards which insurgent leaders, having seized territory, reverted to Mao’s “Phase I” strategies when they deemed doing so t live on efficacious or necessary. Examples of this include the leadership of the fledgling Indonesian democracy who, during the Dutch Police Action of 1948, abandoned their too then uppercase of Yogyakarta, along with other cities that they held to revert to the utilisation of guerilla tactics, the Chechen leadership during the starting fourth dimension Chechen state of war too the Taliban inwards Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan who oft revert to guerilla warfare after periods of de facto governance over an expanse (Vickers, 2005, 111).
A 2d potential objection is that the utilisation of conventional burn powerfulness centric armed forces strategies is often, though non always, accompanied past times the utilisation of punitive strategies against civilians- too that it is the latter strategy that is fundamental to the brevity of conflicts inwards which conventional forces do defeat insurgencies inwards curt order. However, the empirical tape of the success of civilian targeting is mixed at best, with some studies demonstrating its efficacy patch others debate that it is, if anything, counterproductive. Moreover, the plausibility of this potential alternative hypothesis tin live on reduced past times selecting a longitudinal instance inwards which the state’s COIN strategy varies fifty-fifty every bit its willingness to engage inwards civilian penalization is invariant.
Having articulated my hypotheses, I volition forthwith displace on to my instance study, where I hope to demonstrate that containment too wedge politics at the grand strategic level, coupled with an operational strategy that allowed the GOSL (Government of Sri Lanka) to operate inside its insurgent opponents decision-making loop i time hostilities had been resumed allowed the Sri Lankan Government to effectively predetermine LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran’s fatal determination to adopt a conventional strategy of massing firepower roughly entrenched positions inwards a scenario where he was hopelessly outgunned- leading to the rare outcome of an insurgency existence militarily defeated.
Case Study-Eelam War IV
The Eelam War IV, which saw the utter rout of the LTTE insurgents who had held the Sri Lankan regime at bay for 3 decades was remarkable for the fact that it seemingly obviated long held nostrums regarding the invincibility of insurgencies inwards the human face of kinetic conventional operations. Indeed, before long prior to the outbreak of hostilities, analysts such every bit N. Manoharan of India’s Centre for Land Warfare Studies were offering dire prognoses of the GOSL’s chances of victory inwards whatsoever onset on LTTE held territories inwards the due north too E of the isle (Manoharan, 2007, 1). Yet the conflict saw the what has been dubbed the world’s premier insurgency, which maintained networks spanning upward to 44 countries too had the distinction of existence the sole insurgency able to wage asymmetrical warfare both at solid reason too at body of body of water (via its naval wing the body of body of water tigers) effectively routed past times what A. S. Khan dubs an “enemy centric COIN strategy (Khan, 2015, 128) (Roseneau, 2007, 12). It is my disceptation that the GOSL’s victory tin effectively live on explained through the application of prospect theory. Specifically, I offering 3 hypotheses
The credence of a ceasefire past times the GOSL inwards 2002, which allowed it to withdraw its forces to areas firmly nether its command deprived the LTTE of a foe inside striking distance patch forcing it to see the areas inwards which it operated every bit territories held rather than contested-changing the way Prabhakaran framed the scenario.
The GOSL’s efforts to contain the LTTE, centered roughly garnering international back upward inwards swell downwards on the LTTE’s overseas fiscal networks, edifice a navy capable of interdicting the LTTE’s overseas arms provide too establishing positions along the juncture betwixt the due north too E of the isle had the effects both of placing Prabhakaran farther inwards a frame of losses too making the establishment of potency too redistribution of resources to the E of the isle difficult- encouraging factionalism inwards this part of the isle too the eventual defection of Prabhakarans subordinate Colonel Karuna-which inwards plow farther entrenched Prabhakaran inwards a frame of losses
That i time the finally onset on the LTTE began, the operational determination to ship out simultaneous attacks along a wide front, coupled with the tactical utilisation of 8-12-man SIOT squads allowed the Sri Lankan the world forces to operate inside Prabhakaran’s decision-making loop-precluding a reversal of class after the LTTE’s initial failures.
Before delving into my theory, however, I volition briefly scrap with the two-alternative hypothesis that powerfulness problematize my argument. The starting fourth dimension declaration centers roughly what has been dubbed the Manwaring paradigm. This paradigm, articulated past times the armed forces theorist Max Manwaring contends that the success of a counterinsurgency sweat rests on half-dozen factors that create upward one's heed whether the counterinsurgent volition substantively weaken the insurgency (Manwaring, Joes, 2000, 100-110). The factors are
Legitimacy
Unity of effort
Discipline too capability of the military
Type too consistency of unusual back upward for the counterinsurgent
The counterinsurgents powerfulness to cutting back upward to the insurgency
The availability of reliable intelligence
My starting fourth dimension qualm with this epitome too similar approaches is that, every bit W.C. Fuller notes, they conflate the underpinnings of a strategy with the strategy itself. For example, edifice competent forces too ensuring the availability of intelligence are for sure axiomatic prerequisites to the execution of a strategy, but they cannot live on conflated with the strategy itself (which, stride Clausewitz, entails the management of these means) (Fuller, 1998, 228) (On War II, 90-99). There is i seeming expanse of overlap betwixt my hypothesis too Manwaring’s, however- namely the emphasis placed on securing external back upward to the host regime too depriving the insurgency of its sources of external support. However, a crucial distinction betwixt my theory too Manwaring’s lies inwards our respective assessments of the conduct on of these actions. As per Manwaring’s thesis, these actions substantively weaken the insurgency to a betoken where its capacity to resist is seriously debilitated. By contrast, my disceptation is that these actions do non deprive an insurgency of the capacity to scrap a protracted state of war inwards the close to medium term, but rather alter its innovation of its long-term prospects too past times extension its alternative of strategy- a fundamentally psychological effect. H5N1 cursory exam of the Sri Lankan insurgency does seem to lend credence to the declaration that the LTTE was non left substantively bereft of agency next the Sri Lankan governments efforts to rally international back upward to its cause. For example, it is noteworthy that much of the external back upward lent to the GOSL past times actors such every bit India, the United States of America too Islamic Republic of Pakistan inwards damage of armed forces assist (either covertly or otherwise) was broadly available during the tertiary Eelam state of war waged at the plow of the millennium- a state of war which had drastically dissimilar outcomes (Mathur, 2013, 128). Admittedly, obtaining the back upward of actors such every bit the U.S too E.U inwards shutting downwards LTTE fiscal networks was a coup that the GOSL only achieved inwards the interregnum betwixt the 2 wars. Crucially, however, B.C. Tan too J. Solomon guess that roughly seventy percentage of the LTTE’s arms provide consisted of weapons expropriated locally from the Sri Lankan army, patch sections of the LTTE’s state of war sweat (such every bit its seagoing craft) were existence produced inside LTTE held areas of Sri Lanka (Tan Soloman, 2007, 12). Furthermore, a 2006 study past times human rights sentinel highlighted the fact that the LTTE was at the fourth dimension able to solicit or extract finances from the Tamil diaspora on a pregnant scale inside the E.U despite ongoing sanctions (Human Rights Watch, 2006). While it seems plausible to assume that the cumulative number of Sri Lanka’s diverse efforts at containment powerfulness piece of cake emaciate the LTTE’s fiscal capabilities over the long term, it does non appear, stride Manwaring, that the scheme was precluded from fighting a guerilla state of war inwards the close term.
A 2d hypothesis, raised past times figures such every bit N. Bizouras, postulates that past times Eelam state of war IV, the brutality of the LTTE (particularly evident inwards practices such every bit the impressment of kid soldiers) had lost it the legitimacy that it had i time enjoyed alongside its Tamil constituents, rendering it an insurgent forcefulness alienated from its constituency –veritable suicide every bit Mao would take hold noted (Bizouras, 2014, 80). While it is inherently hard to mensurate the floor of popularity enjoyed past times an insurgency accurately, it is worth noting that many of the practices that Bizouras associates with the LTTE’s loss of legitimacy were really much a part of its policies during the 1990’s- the halcyon menses of the LTTE’s legitimacy every bit Bizouras would take hold it. Both the impressment of children for the infamous “baby brigades” too the utilisation of kid suicide bombers were an integral part of Eelam state of war III. Indeed, the LTTE’s signal victory of the war, Operation Ceaseless Waves, was achieved inwards no pocket-size part due to the tactical utilisation of underage suicide bombers (Singer, 2006, 80-90). It is unclear, then, that the LTTE became significantly to a greater extent than vicious inwards the interregnum, to the betoken that it alienated constituents who seemed willing to tolerate its vicious dominion inwards the 1990’s.
Having discounted the alternative available hypotheses, then, I volition forthwith offering an interpretation of the conflict through the lens of prospect theory.
At the grand strategic level, the debacle of the tertiary Eelam War seems to take hold forced the GOSL into inadvertently adopting an optimal counterinsurgency strategy. Specifically, the desperate status of the Sri Lankan armed forces too the world forces (the latter had been humiliatingly routed at Mullaitivu) led the Sri Lankan regime to adopt a 2002 ceasefire understanding that effectively saw GOSL forces abstain from entry to de facto LTTE territory (Castellano, 2014, 131). Crucially, however, this determination although non strategic inwards too of itself, allowed the GOSL to abstain from providing Prabhakaran too the LTTE with a conflict that reified the organizations internal cohesion, whilst giving the SLAF (Sri Lankan Armed Forces) too the GOSL fourth dimension to articulate a dual policy of containment too reform. At the grand strategic level, the GOSL was able to convey payoff of the advent of the state of war on terror to to a greater extent than aggressively foyer for unusual (particularly western) countries to scissure downwards on LTTE funding. While a number of unusual governments had proscribed the LTTE past times the plow of the millennium, the scheme had soundless retained the capacity to garner funding nether the auspices of front end organizations posing as, alongside other things, NGO’s. However, inwards the wake of Sri Lanka’s to a greater extent than active diplomatic policy, a number of nations made noun efforts to scissure downwards on LTTE funding. Notable alongside these efforts was Canada’s 2005 determination to unopen a number of NGO’s affiliated with the LTTE too the E.U’s 2006 determination to proscribe the grouping every bit a terrorist organization- a determination that precipitated a slew of investigations of LTTE related assets inwards nations such every bit France, where the caput of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization was arrested with xviii i thou m dollars of illicit money (Clarke, 2012, 45-50) (Ridley, 2012, 28). Similarly, inside Asia, nations such every bit Thailand followed suit inwards proscribing the substantial LTTE affiliate organizations on their soil inwards 2003, patch Bharat agreed to heighten naval supervision of illicit supplies leaving its shores from the coastal solid reason of Tamil Nadu (Bhonsle, 2011, 108). Finally, the Sri Lankan navy was subjected to a tactical too operational overhaul to enable it to interdict the LTTE’s body of body of water lines of communication too supply. At the operational level, the newly appointed commander of the Sri Lankan navy Vice Admiral Karranagoda shifted the emphasis of the navy from interdicting smaller ships carrying arms to the LTTE to a CONOPS centered roughly tackling the large “floating warehouses” from which these ships received their cargo- a shift that required the navy to operate considerably farther from its shores than had been previously countenanced. Secondly, the navy adopted the “small boats concept” at the tactical level-substituting large numbers of pocket-size indigenously made boats for the high value Dvora arts and crafts that had proven especially vulnerable to LTTE swarming tactics. The cumulative number of these reforms was to farther heighten the GOSL’s powerfulness to target the LTTE’s resources base of operations (Mehta, 2010, 128).
Crucially, every bit has been discussed above, none of this substantially compromised the LTTE’s capacity to regulation its territory. Rather, the absence of a armed forces target, coupled with a dull but nonetheless perceptible tightening of a wide fiscal too diplomatic noose had the number of problematizing Prabhakarans long term prospects of either moving frontwards towards de jure independence or retaining his electrical flow handgrip over the due north too E of the island. That the LTTE suffered from no stuff deficit per se is evidenced past times its powerfulness to land a forcefulness comparable to the i it had fielded inwards Eelam War III, combined with the regain of large amounts of previously stockpiled armaments-evidence that the noun number of containment was dull to convey number (Chadha, 2015, 109). Furthermore, every bit A. Hashim notes, the denial of supplies of heavy weaponry (the LTTE’s main unusual dependence) did non forestall the adoption of a guerilla strategy utilizing to a greater extent than locally available pocket-size arms (Hashim, 2013, 128). The conduct on on Prabhakaran’s decision-making, however, was disproportionate. The increasing desperation of Prabhakaran is perchance best demonstrated past times his erratic response to the closing fiscal net- a serial of terrorist attacks on both Sri Lankan political too armed forces figures too (catastrophically) a 2006 onset on several unusual diplomats- actions which only served to entrench the pop icon of the LTTE every bit a terrorist outfit (Hashim, 2013, 24). In a farther deed of erratic decision-making, the LTTE chose inwards 2006 to unopen the sluice gates of a vital dam inwards the Mavil Aru district to the agricultural communities below-providing the direction of president Rajapakse , inwards the president’s ain words, with a political “green light” to resume hostilities (Mehta, 2010, 6). Once fighting began, Prabhakaran showed an close obsessive wish to concentrate his forces at key points such every bit Killonchchi- fifty-fifty going so far every bit to deploy the remnants of the Sea Tigers every bit the world forces- intimating a lack of work concern for the long-term maintenance of provide lines too the supposition that the state of war would live on ended chop-chop too decisively. This stands inwards sudden contrast to Eelam state of war III where the LTTE proved willing to give upward key bases such every bit Jaffna, whilst resorting to asymmetrical strategies of volume suicide bombing against Sri Lankan forces, coupled with decisive assaults on the exposed raise of the Sri Lankan the world forces at Mullaitivu (Pape, Feldman, 2010, 300). Nor was this only a strategy forced upon Prabhakaran too the LTTE. Indeed, prior to the onset of hostilities, a study prepared for the direction of president Rajapakse past times the Sri Lankan articulation chiefs of staff noted pregnant concentrations of forces past times the LTTE-intimating that had Prabhakaran non provoked a response he intended to ship out a conventional onset beyond the confines of his territory- a gambit fifty-fifty to a greater extent than risky than the i he eventually took (Mehta, 2010, 100). It is unclear, then, why Prabhakaran chose to abandon a strategy that, every bit several scholars take hold noted, delivered decisive success (DeSilva-Ranasinghe, 2010, 6) (Jackson, 2007 ,67-70).
An insight into the roots of this shift is provided past times the LTTE’s propaganda, however. Specifically, it has been noted that through the decade, the LTTE’s appeals to overseas financiers took the shape of promising a decisive “final war”. Notably, the occurrence of this rhetoric covaries with the LTTE’s increased isolation. Indeed, inwards his 2006 Heroes Day speech, Prabhakaran explicitly made an appeal to the Tamil diaspora, noting that contributions would larn increasingly hard to make, but promising that a finally force to equip the LTTE would brand possible a decisive terminate to the conflict. Notably, Prabhakaran made specific allusions to the GOSL’s “racist Sinhala elements” misuse of the ceasefire every bit an chance to weaken the LTTE every bit evidence both of the demand for renewed hostilities too a decisive victory (Murari, 2012, 100). Effectively, then, Prabhakarans rhetoric direct conforms to that of an musician inwards a frame of losses, facing what he saw every bit the high probability of debilitation due to containment or the depression possibility of success via a decisive defeat of the SLAF (a jeopardy acceptant alternative which, if it failed, would signal the immediate terminate of his organization). True to the predictions of prospect theory, Prabhakaran chose the jeopardy acceptant strategy.
However, an explication of the GOSL’s success inwards putting Prabhakaran inwards a frame of losses through the lens of the ceasefire too fiscal containment overseas would live on incomplete. H5N1 2d part of the GOSL’s strategy aimed at the Lord's Day Tzunian policy of attacking Prabhakaran’s intra elite alliances-thereby securing political back upward from the Tamil community too placing Prabhakaran farther inwards a frame of losses. Specifically, every bit noted past times Colonel U. Pareira, the LTTE was naturally divided along geographical lines, insofar every bit the insurgents inwards the E were drawn from backgrounds that were economically vastly dissimilar from the to a greater extent than urbane recruits of Prabhakarans urbane northern back upward base of operations (the eastern Tamils had largely migrated to the isle every bit plantation workers) (Pareira, 2012, 55). While these divisions had been nascent inside the organization, the consistent conflict with the Sri Lankan the world forces that characterized the 1990’s largely induced inwards grouping cohesion out of necessity (DeVotta, 2010, 165). The tactical ceasefire, however, removed this source of inwards grouping cohesion. Furthermore, the Sri Lankan Army contributed to the nascent split past times the articulation of its policy of containment at the operational floor inwards the early on years of the decade. Specifically, the Sri Lankan regime fell dorsum upon a string of fortified bases that it had constructed betwixt the due north too E inwards the 1990’s. While the kinetic strategy of the 1990’s had rendered these bases liabilities, the to a greater extent than static policy of the starting fourth dimension one-half of the adjacent decade effectively ensured that the Sri Lankan the world forces straddled all the key routes betwixt the due north too the east- most crucial alongside which was the A11 highway. Furthermore, the movements of supplies (particularly armed forces supplies) past times body of body of water betwixt the E too due north was problematized past times the damage of the ceasefire too Sri Lankas patrolling of body of body of water lanes (Marks, 2007, 51-54). This had the dual number of ensuring that the LTTE could non effectively maintain either centralized command or a steady redistribution of resources to its eastern faction. Consequently, the increasingly pop leader of the eastern faction Colonel Karuna saw his grievances against the due north multiply fifty-fifty every bit his prospects for a successful interruption from the LTTE seemed to live on enhanced past times the cordon sanitaire betwixt him too Prabhakaran’s wrath (Hashim, 2013, 300). This was chop-chop noted past times the too then Sri Lankan regime of C. Kumaratunga, which seems to take hold played a key role inwards offering Karuna the assurances that he needed to defect, which he did inwards 2004. While President Kumaratunga herself strenuously denies this, the fact that Douglas Devananda the leader of the EPDP (which inwards plow was a fellow member of Kumaratunga’s coalition) played a pivotal role inwards integrating Karuna into civilian politics next his defection seems to imply that Kumaratunga’s protestations were calibrated towards the sentiments of her domestic audience (Mukarji, 2005, 29). To live on sure, the seeds of the split existed independent of the Sri Lankan governments actions but, every bit Z. Mamphily points out, the centrality of the lack of resources allotment to Karuna’s defection (itself a part of GOSL strategy) is the fundamental qualm cited past times leaders of the defecting faction (Mamphily, 2011, 222). At the really least, the GOSL provided the occasion, if non the cause, for the split.
The policy of attacking intra elite alliances, much similar that of containment writ large, is notable non for its stuff number on Prabhakaran but its conduct on on the way inwards which he framed the conflict. As Rabasa et al, commenting at the fourth dimension noted, Karuna’s forcefulness was non large plenty to correspond a debilitating loss of manpower for the LTTE. This was especially truthful every bit the LTTE’s largest units the Black Tigers too the Leopards sectionalization were both based inwards the due north too extremely loyal to Prabhakaran (Rabasa et al, 2006, 26). Indeed, fifty-fifty inwards the E Prabhakaran retained sufficient numbers of loyal troops to decimate Karuna’s forces inwards a serial of pitched battles (Dissanayaka, 2005, 271). Rather, the conduct on of the defection seems to take hold been overwhelmingly psychological. As Swamy (2010, 253) notes, dissent inwards the E was met with frenetic attempts at centralization, including the assassination of competitor leaders inside the LTTE – a policy which only served to weaken Prabhakarans handgrip on the east. Simultaneously, every bit noted past times C. Clarke, the defection of Karuna seems to take hold coincided direct with efforts to concentrate forces inwards the E inwards strongholds such every bit Thoppigala too Batticoloa to come across the needs of a conventional warfare strategy (Clarke, 2015, 100). This strategy is a far scream from the what powerfulness live on dubbed a Phase I Maoist strategy that had been followed inwards the east, which centered roughly pocket-size decentralized guerillas that exerted influence on urban areas only through infiltration too informal “taxation” past times plainclothes agents (Gunaratna, 1997, 98). It appears, prima facie, that the Sri Lankan governments success inwards driving a wedge betwixt the 2 regional centers of the LTTE placed the LTTE’s leadership inwards a frame of losses-whereby it felt its powerfulness to sustain its displace inwards the long term was eroding. Crucially, this coincides with the adoption of significantly to a greater extent than jeopardy acceptant strategies past times the LTTE inwards the east- a fatty that meant that when they confronted the Sri Lankan the world forces it was every bit a conventional force, with predictable results. Most importantly, however, the conduct on on the LTTE’s capacity to command the E was to a greater extent than perceptual than existent too mattered insofar every bit it served to shape the LTTE’s strategy inwards the forthcoming war.
Finally, nosotros must plow to the operational strategies adopted past times the Sri Lankan army. Even if prospect theory explains why inwards the buildup to Eelam War IV Prabhakaran adopted a suboptimal strategy, it is unclear why he did non recalibrate his strategy after initial armed forces setbacks. At this point, I debate that a useful corrective is Colonel John Boyd’s celebrated theory of the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act loop. Specifically, Boyd argued that whatsoever actors reaction to a changing scenario during armed forces actions tin live on disaggregated into these fairly self-explanatory components. Consequently, Boyd contended that an operational policy that centered roughly stride too the utilisation of multiple fronts rendered both orientation too reaction problematic (Osinga, 2005, 2). This effectively represents the synthesis of principles articulated by, alongside others, Liddell Hart, who stressed the importance both of calculated dispersion too obscuring one’s possible axis of advance (Liddell-Hart, 1991, 94). Consequently, Boyd made a instance for maneuver centric state of war along multiple fronts that effectively paralyzed an opponent’s reaction capacity. Typically, every bit R. Jervis notes, when an actor’s capacity for perception too reaction is hobbled past times doubtfulness too the stride at which a province of affairs changes, it reflexively adheres to its master plans (Jervis,1976,195). Consequently, I debate that past times examining Sri Lanka’s operational strategy during Eelam War IV, nosotros tin sympathise how a conventional forcefulness could ensure that the gains of grand strategy (in damage of compelling its insurgent foe to scrap with a direct defense) were retained. Below, I volition speak over the armed forces reforms that allowed the Sri Lankan the world forces to operate inside the LLTE’s decision-making loop, along with the operational strategy that pose these reforms to use.
The GOSL utilized the ceasefire menses to brand several reforms to its armed forces forcefulness construction too doctrine. Firstly, the creation of the paramilitary CDF (Ceylon Defence Force) to secure the army’s raise ensured that the Sri Lankan regime would non take hold to attenuate its armed forces forces due to garrisoning duties or larn out itself vulnerable to attacks on its raise every bit had occurred during Eelam War III (Rajapakse, 2010, 1). Simultaneously, the the world forces was increased inwards size, with recruitment inwards 2006 amounting to 36,000 fresh troops (DaSilva, 2009, 1). Most vital, however, were changes to the Sri Lankan army’s forcefulness structure. Noting the difficulties faced past times large bodies of troops inwards clearing the heavily forested terrain of the island, infantry reformers such every bit too then Major General Sarath Fonseka pushed for the induction of 12-man SIOT’s (special infantry operating teams) to operate inwards conjunction with regular forces. As Fonseka noted, the powerfulness of the Sri Lankan the world forces to insert SIOT’s on the flanks too raise of the LTTE’s positions induced a grade of doubtfulness into the LTTE’s commanders- inducing them to adopt the tactical expedient of positioning all of their forces behind fortified bunds (trenches too mounds)- leaving themselves vulnerable to the firepower of regular forces (Glenn, 2015, 28). By 2006, the Sri Lankan the world forces had 6,000 troops serving inwards SIOTs (almost treble the number it had a decade earlier). With the twenty-four hours of the month of Fonseka every bit Commandant of the Sri Lankan Army past times M. Rajapakse’s regime midway through the decade, this transformation would intensify. The conduct on of these efforts was to create a forcefulness that was simultaneously capable of concentrating large levels of volume too achieving pregnant tactical too operational mobility. Simultaneously, every bit has been noted earlier, the Sri Lankan navy underwent pregnant doctrinal changes nether Vice Admiral Karannagods, coupled with the introduction of indigenous pocket-size boats inwards line with the eponymous pocket-size boats concept which allowed the navy to counter the Sea Tigers swarm tactics. While the significance of this alter at the grand strategic floor has already been discussed, it also bore relevance to the Sri Lankan operational strategy. Specifically, command of the body of body of water made it possible for the Sri Lankan navy to conduct amphibious landings too provide sea-based burn to troops operating on the coast. To this end, several indigenous fiberglass landing arts and crafts were added to the navy’s arsenal inwards the war. The conduct on of this naval overhaul was, too then , to heighten the mobility of Sri Lankan forces which could live on landed to the raise or flanks of opposing LTTE formations with a rapidity that has been noted past times body of body of water powerfulness theorists since Mahan (Mehta, 2010, 10) (Mahan, 1918 ,100).
Following Fullers injunction, however, these changes represented the foundations of an operational strategy but were non the strategy itself. The operational strategy enabled past times these changes effectively centered roughly 3 tenets. Firstly, the objective of the campaigns of Eelam War IV was the LTTE’s armed forces rather than seizing too belongings territory, every bit traditional COIN theory would advise. Secondly, operations inwards dissimilar theaters would live on carried out either simultaneously or inwards quick succession. Finally, inside each private theater, the Sri Lankan the world forces would advance upon multiple fronts, attempting where possible to pick out axes of advance to the flanks too raise of the LTTE’s forces, thereby unbalancing the LTTE’s reaction procedure past times leaving its commanders, every bit William Tecumseh Sherman had it, “on the horns of a dilemma”. Consequently, the eastern crusade began with the Sri Lankan army, which had broken the Tigers siege of mavil aru, turning the flank of the LTTE’s seat inwards the E with an amphibious landing inwards Muttur (which was controlled past times a s mall detachment of SLA forces) supported past times naval gunfire, allowing it to advance to too capture the major base of operations at Sampur, inflicting heavy casualties on the LTTE along the way. Simultaneously, SLA forces advanced overland to LTTE bases at Thoppigala too Batticoloa. At the tactical level, the utilisation of SIOT’s guided past times intelligence furnished past times Colonel Karuna allowed the SLA to target the lines of communication too provide to each base. The conjunction of multiple simultaneous advances too the utilisation of SIOT’s at the tactical floor left the LTTE unclear every bit to the main objective of the SLA too induced its commanders to seek tranquillity inwards the strategy that they had pursued so far-concentrating forces close strongpoints inwards the hope of inflicting a decisive defeat on i of the Sri Lankan forces every bit a prelude to negotiations-with predictably fatal results.
The eastern crusade was followed upward inwards curt company past times an advance into the northern theatre of the war-indeed the northern offensive coincided with the autumn of Thoppigala inwards July 2007. Crucially, patch the Sri Lankan regime had made efforts to stress the demand to ship out the operations inwards rapid succession, past times the fourth dimension the offensive on Prabhakaran’s holdings inwards the due north had begun, the LTTE had suffered a string of defeats that powerfulness have him to recalibrate his strategy. However, consistent with the predictions of prospect theory, Prabhakaran’s aides solid reason that their leader adhered to the hope that a decisive victory would homecoming the GOSL’s crusade politically unviable (Singh, 2010, 52). Furthermore, consistent with the broader operational principles it had adopted, the GOSL’s northern onset was geared towards operating inside the LTTE’s decision-making loop too paralyzing its capacity for recalibration. Specifically, the the world forces advanced across multiple fronts, threatening multiple objectives simultaneously. Consequently, it was non clear until tardily inwards the crusade that the armys main thrusts were against Mannar to the westward too Mullaitivu inwards the E (Mehta, 2010, 12). In add-on to the main thrust of the offensive along the A32 highway, which served to link Jaffna to the mainland, the Sri Lankan the world forces launched attacks from Jaffna inwards the due north along the Kandy Jaffna highway, patch columns moved against Omanthai from the south- advances that pinned the LTTE to Killonchchi past times rendering an onset on this stronghold plausible. Simultaneously, the 59thinfantry sectionalization moved against Mullaitivu from Wali Oya inwards the S (Mehta, 2010, 8). At the same time, SIOT’s backed past times airpower effected deep penetrations along the route links that served al LTTE lines of communication-effecting the paralysis cited every bit fundamental past times RMA theorists who, inwards no pocket-size part, are inspired past times Boyd. As i analyst pose it, the inability of the LTTE to perceive the main axis of advance led the LTTE to concentrate its forces inwards Killonchchi too Mullaitivu, fifty-fifty every bit the Sri Lankan regime dispersed its forces- leading to a unusual inversion of roles where the insurgent was to a greater extent than static than the conventional forcefulness (Mehta,2010,8-12). This demeanour is inwards keeping with organizational theorists who stipulate that groups tend to adhere scrupulously to “plan A” to brand feel of a rapidly changing situation. In Prabhakarans case, this meant adhering to a fatal policy of concentrating large formations of forces at key points. This concentration of forces along with leadership assets left the LTTE vulnerable to rapid disintegration inwards the trial that these forces were destroyed, every bit indeed they were when Mullaitivu too Killonchchi, both left surrounded past times the initial SLA thrusts, fell inwards the wake of the dual pincer movements on these strongholds that constituted the finally deed of the crusade (Bandarage,2009,50-52). Indeed, Parabhakaran is later on said to take hold confided inwards his intelligence main Pottu Amman that over 75 percentage of the LTTE’s strength had been concentrated inwards the hope of defending these assets, too that the loss of this forcefulness had effectively doomed the movement. (Mehta, 2010, 12).
Importantly, this approach stands inwards sudden contrast to the tertiary Eelam war, which saw the LTTE, nether Prabhakarans leadership, abandon its prized Jaffna base of operations to prosecute attacks on the Sri Lankan army’s raise at elephant move past times too Mullaitivu (Manage, 2010, 18). If the LTTE adopted a flawed conventional strategy, then, this tin live on attributed to the Sri Lankan governments grand strategy of containment, coupled with its operational strategy of operating inside Prabhakaran’s OODA loop past times operating across multiple fronts, with multiple prospective objectives, at a really high tempo.
Conclusion too Implications
The successful application of prospect theory to insurgent demeanour demonstrates that the alternative of a strategy past times an insurgent is non exogenously given, every bit much counterinsurgency presumes every bit a starting point, but is opened upward to existence shaped past times the counterinsurgent state. This allows us to add together a progressive hypothesis to the theory of asymmetrical warfare developed past times scholars such every bit Toft (2005) who contends that a same strategy interaction (in which both actors adopt a direct strategy aimed at each other’s forces) is probable to termination inwards a short, decisive wars patch contrary strategy interactions protract a conflict. Building on the insights offered past times Kahneman too Tversky, I hope to take hold proven that past times the apposite application of diplomatic too political pressure, the counterinsurgent tin have the insurgent to jeopardy acceptant behavior, leading it to adopt a direct strategy too number a curt decisive interaction.
A major implication of this would live on the implied reversion of the commonplace doctrine of “clear, hold, build” that characterizes territory too population-centric theories of counterinsurgency. Indeed, past times eschewing this doctrine (which it had previously practiced) the GOSL caused the insurgency to coagulate into something approximating to a conventional forcefulness fifty-fifty every bit it fractured internally. This was achieved non past times clearing territory but past times temporarily eschewing command over it too effecting an increasingly effective policy of containment too isolation both locally (by controlling body of body of water lanes too key highways) too internationally (by linking its state of war to the broader state of war on terror). Additionally, the counterinsurgency strategy of Eelam state of war IV explicitly eschewed population centric theories of counterinsurgency, focusing instead on an eminently Clausewitzian enemy-centric approach that threated the insurgents armed forces every bit his optic of gravity.
At the operational level, the key implication is that the theories of Boyd, long incorporated into conventional warfare, are applicable too fifty-fifty fundamental to the devastation of an opponent inside an enemy centric context. By attacking on multiple fronts, the GOSL effectively precluded whatsoever inside conflict recalibration of strategy past times Prabhakaran- ensuring that the strategic gains of placing the LTTE inwards a frame of losses did non wither away. The devastation of the LTTE’s concentrated forces, then, followed a designing familiar to whatsoever conventional engagement betwixt 2 mismatched foes- a remarkable achievement for a counterinsurgency.
Collectively, then, the implication of this study would live on the potential for “clear, hold, build” to live on replaced with a strategy of retrenching, containing too and then effecting armed forces destruction. In this epitome the enemy, rather than infinite or population, becomes salient inwards a style familiar to traditional practitioners of war.
Finally, I greenback that at that spot remains room for farther inquiry on the topic inwards company to better the generalizability of my findings. That said, the variation of the LTTE’s strategy betwixt the starting fourth dimension 3 Eelam wars too the quaternary fifty-fifty every bit Prabhakaran remained at the organizations helm should allow us to eliminate the alternative hypotheses built on grouping too leader idiosyncrasies. Furthermore, I hope to take hold eliminated alternative hypotheses built roughly insurgent legitimacy too solid reason strength before inwards the paper.
Conclusively, then, the application of prospect theory too Boyd’s OODA loop offering rich insights into the existence of alternative ways of prosecuting a COIN strategy.
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