By Ian T. Brown
Carl von Clausewitz together with John Boyd are familiar to the Strategy Bridge crowd. Serious students of strategy know that both men left their marks on military machine policy, theory, together with discussions on the nature together with grapheme of state of war itself. Yet exterior the sparsely populated halls of professional person strategy, ane finds an imbalance. Whether inward the pages of joint doctrine, American state of war colleges where “the respond is ever Clausewitz,” or fifty-fifty a Google search of pundits applying classical wisdom to modern crises, Clausewitz reigns supreme. As a mental framework for analyzing warfare, at to the lowest degree amid Western thinkers, Clausewitz has outlasted all others every bit the enduring gilt standard.
Thus it was alongside roughly fascination that, inward a split project, this writer discovered extensive comments which John Boyd proffered close the Prussian theorist. While enterprising individuals have got edited together with uploaded a video version of Boyd presenting his seminal “Patterns of Conflict” briefing to a civilian audience, the Archives Branch of the Marine Corps History Division holds roughly other version which is non publicly available. In this lecture, dated a few years after the YouTube edition, Boyd addressed a Marine Corps Command together with Staff College audience, together with spent much to a greater extent than fourth dimension exploring military machine theory than he did alongside civilians.[1] Of all the theorists Boyd examined inward “Patterns of Conflict,” Clausewitz received the most commentary—more thence fifty-fifty than Sunday Tzu, whose ideas Boyd mostly gravitated toward. The extent of Boyd’s critique struck this writer every bit a stair out of how seriously Boyd took Clausewitz’s work. Any theorist who made it into “Patterns of Conflict” was someone whom Boyd industrial plant life useful every bit a whetstone for sharpening his ain ideas.
The destination of the next article is twofold. First, this writer believes that illuminating obscure historical cloth is worthwhile inward itself. Second, together with perchance to a greater extent than importantly, is to offering it every bit whetstone to assist hone the “Clausewitz says X” approach to contemporary conflict. Overlaying a Clausewitzian framework on the adversary du jour tin give the sack live problematic, every bit said adversaries create non ever portion that strategic perspective.[2] Dealing alongside various threats way agreement the frameworks through which adversaries view themselves together with the world. This inward plow requires that the strategist possess a rich repertoire of theories—and an agreement of their weaknesses—from which to draw. As volition live seen below, it seems clear that expanding his audience’s repertoire, along alongside refining his ain ideas, was Boyd’s destination inward critiquing Clausewitz.
John Boyd delivering a lecture on "Patterns of Conflict" (YouTube)
In opening “Patterns of Conflict,” Boyd stated that he analyzed military machine history “from Sunday Tzu to the present” to run across “what kinds of things all the same handgrip together.”[3] History held many valuable lessons for the military machine thinker, but he warned against the uncritical job of ancient strategists every bit modern templates. Be it Sunday Tzu, Jomini, or Clausewitz, if ane thought that “we’re only going to job Clausewitz every bit the lens filter to await at the problem, you’re going to brand a horrible mistake…because all you’ve told me is your thinking hasn’t proceeded beyond 1832, together with a lot of things have got happened since 1832.”[4]
After surveying ancient together with medieval military machine history, Boyd came to the Napoleonic era together with Clausewitz. Here he began exploring internal contradictions he industrial plant life inside On War. One such contradiction was Clausewitz’s seat on concentration together with speed: “[Clausewitz] didn’t sympathise it himself. He says deed alongside the utmost concentration, together with afterwards on he says it’s the highest possible principle…but together with thence when he goes into the discussion, he shows 4 exceptions on the thought of concentration. Four exceptions!”[5] This raised the question, “If it’s the highest principle, together with thence why create yous have got an exception?”[6] Beyond that, Boyd observed when Clausewitz “talks close speed, there’s no exceptions…but concentration’s the highest principle. And together with thence when yous read betwixt the lines of concentration, if yous tin give the sack operate fast yous don’t postulate to live concentrated [sic].”[7] Clausewitz, then, despite his ain assertions, believed “the premier idea’s speed, non concentration.”[8]
Boyd noted roughly other contradiction inward Clausewitz’s comparing betwixt the strength of the criminal offense together with defense. First, Clausewitz “gets inward the mountains, which is fossil oil terrain. Then he says criminal offense is the stronger form.”[9] The news together with thence moved to forested terrain; here, Boyd said, “he’s a trivial flake to a greater extent than clever…he’s sort of proverb the criminal offense is the stronger form, but he couldn’t say it.”[10] And afterwards on, Clausewitz comments on morale, arguing that “if yous got to a greater extent than morale together with the other guy’s got less, it also may live the criminal offense may live stronger.”[11] From these apparent contradictions, Boyd determined that what Clausewitz was “really proverb then, the criminal offense or defense, whether one’s stronger than the other depends upon the situation, whether it live terrain or people together with that.”[12] Boyd for sure agreed alongside this implication; his job alongside Clausewitz was that “he had to have got an absolute notion.”[13] While the many exceptions to his ain rules propose Clausewitz himself realized an inherent job alongside such rigidity, he did non limited that realization inward his book. Hence, flexibility came across every bit contradiction.
Karl von Clausewitz past times Karl Wilhelm Wach (Wikimedia)
Boyd industrial plant life that Clausewitz transferred his absolutist vogue to the concepts of friction together with centers of gravity. In general, Boyd agreed alongside how Clausewitz characterized friction. Clausewitz labeled state of war every bit a “duel or deed of human interaction directed against an animate object that reacts.”[14] One could non predict exactly how an opponent would react, together with this led to a larger news of the many physical, mental, together with moral forces introduce inward war, the interactions of which—on both the friendly together with enemy sides—were also unpredictable. Clausewitz rolled these interactions into the concept of friction, which “tends to…impede activity.”[15] Boyd reminded his audience of Clausewitz’s disputation on friction: “Friction is the exclusively concept…that to a greater extent than or less corresponds alongside those factors that distinguish existent state of war from state of war on paper.”[16] On this, Boyd agreed: “If yous haven’t accounted for friction, you’re non talking close existent war. And he’s quite right, if yous recollect close it.”[17]
The job of absolutes came into play when Clausewitz discussed reducing friction on the friendly side. To create this, Clausewitz tried to brand things every bit uncomplicated every bit possible. One had to:
...seek out those centers of gravity upon which all powerfulness together with motility depend together with if possible delineate them dorsum to a unmarried one… together with thence [Clausewitz] squeezed it ane to a greater extent than time. He said inward that effort, compress all endeavour against those centers into the fewest possible actions. Still non satisfied, he gives it roughly other squeeze. He says, subordinate all kid together with secondary actions every bit much every bit possible inward all this activity…and displace alongside the utmost speed.[18]
All this simplification together with compression emphasized “method together with routine at the tactical level” to mitigate internal friction.[19] Boyd took number alongside this intense focus on reducing friendly friction to the lowest absolute level. As he saw it, this inward await “failed to address if yous wishing to test to magnify [your] adversary’s friction together with uncertainty.”[20] Moreover, internal simplification could truly brand an adversary’s chore easier, since “if yous have got routine inward your ain services together with move predictable, you’ve also lowered your adversary’s friction relative to you.”[21] Additionally, Clausewitz’s destination of moving alongside utmost speed was meaningless absent roughly role likewise speed for its ain sake: “Why create yous wishing to displace alongside the utmost speed?... Just to larn at that topographic point first? He should’ve said he wanted to displace faster than the adversary. What’s utmost? The other guy’s moving alongside utmost, he powerfulness live faster than you.”[22] As he did alongside friction, Boyd viewed speed every bit a relative, or relational, factor, rather than an absolute.
IN HIS TIME, CLAUSEWITZ WAS NOT ALONE IN FOISTING SCIENTIFIC RULES ONTO NON-SCIENTIFIC DOMAINS; BUT BOYD WANTED TO HIGHLIGHT THE DANGER OF DOING SO, SINCE AN ERRONEOUS UNDERSTANDING OF CENTERS OF GRAVITY CLOUDED THEIR SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION.
Boyd also deconstructed Clausewitz’s view of the see of gravity (COG). As roughly strategists have got noted, critiques of the COG oft stalk from poor translations of On War. However, other critics have got successfully worked past times translation issues together with analyzed the see of gravity’s overly mechanistic nature, together with Boyd savage inward this category. As Clausewitz saw it, the see of gravity “is ever industrial plant life where the majority is concentrated most densely.”[23] Yet Boyd observed, “that’s non ever true. In a donut, the see of gravity [is where] at that topographic point is no mass. In a hollow steel ball, it’s where the steel isn’t. In a dumbbell, it’s inward the connectedness betwixt the mass.”[24] Boyd argued inward a unlike unpublished critique that Clausewitz’s fault hither was using “center of gravity inward a scientific sense—then said it applied to state of war every bit an analogy.”[25] In his time, Clausewitz was non lonely inward foisting scientific rules onto non-scientific domains; but Boyd wanted to highlight the danger of doing so, since an erroneous agreement of centers of gravityclouded their subsequent application.
The job alongside Clausewitz’s characterization of the see of gravity linked dorsum to his wishing to simplify things internally. Clausewitz wanted to seat a unmarried see of gravity together with and thence maximize one’s ain efforts straight against it. “If yous convey that,” warned Boyd, “that [the see of gravity is] where majority concentrates most densely, together with thence yous move after that, together with thence you’ve got strength against strength.”[26] Though Clausewitz noted that the see of gravity could live something likewise an enemy’s army—such every bit a national capital, a rebellion’s leadership, or the community of involvement inward an alliance—his examples were mostly physical objects valuable plenty to an enemy that they would live well-protected. Add inward Clausewitz’s admonition that “the defeat of the enemy consists inward overcoming the resistance concentrated inward his see of gravity,” together with ane begins to run across how overmatching an adversary’s majority alongside one’s ain risked a high volume of devastation together with blood-letting.[27]
Boyd replaced Clausewitz’s materialistic Definition of the see of gravity alongside his own: “those things that permit an organic whole to rest together, whatever they are, moral, mental, physical.”[28] Rather than seeking the densest concentration of physical mass, Boyd wanted to “find that thing that allows [the organic whole] to retain [its] connectivity;” together with ane time identified, “break downwardly those connections together with larn everything flight off inward unlike directions, [and] instantly you’ve got many what I telephone phone non-cooperatives. Each one’s a trivial see of gravity non connected upward alongside the other one…then yous scarf them up.”[29] By broadening the characterization of the see of gravity, Boyd offered the friendly forcefulness a larger target set, together with expanded its options beyond throwing physical strength against physical strength. Boyd elaborated on this broader excogitation of state of war inward the latter business office of “Patterns of Conflict;” but that story is exterior the range of this discussion.
Clausewitz was non the exclusively theorist Boyd critiqued, together with Boyd past times no way dismissed Clausewitz’s ideas wholesale. Boyd’s indicate was that picking ane item framework every bit the definitive model was dangerously self-limiting—especially if that framework had observable weaknesses—and potentially self-destructive if one’s adversary did non house himself nether similar restrictions. He compared this to using ii unlike types of radios:
If yous have got a narrowband radio, yous can’t examine the other bands, tin give the sack you? If [the enemy]’s got a wideband, he tin give the sack examine yours, summation he tin give the sack operate the other stuff together with live hosing yous together with yous don’t fifty-fifty know it…you wishing the wideband filter. And if you’re exclusively using Clausewitz, yous got [sic] a narrowband filter through which you’re looking at the basis of conflict.[30]
Boyd made this indicate myriad ways, alongside the destination of pushing his audience to educate a deep repertoire of noesis from which to describe inward times of crisis. Widening the aperture to await beyond whatever unmarried theory or theorist was a critical showtime stair inward achieving that goal.
BOYD SOUGHT NOT SO MUCH TO CIRCUMVENT CLAUSEWITZ AS TO USE THE PRUSSIAN’S CONCEPTS AS FUEL IN HIS OWN MENTAL REFINERY.
The writer hopes this curt discourse on ane strategic hear assessing roughly other has met the ii goals set out above. To live clear on the minute goal: Boyd sought non thence much to circumvent Clausewitz every bit to job the Prussian’s concepts every bit fuel inward his ain mental refinery. And Boyd’s message to his audience was that the procedure of mental refinement could non stop, nor live confined to the ideas of whatever ane individual, no affair how insightful they powerfulness be.[31] What powerfulness Clausewitz have got made of such a critique? Judging past times his ain words, he would probable have got been of the same mind: “Any…discipline…must ever live capable of growth, of constant accretion. In whatever effect it is non all that tardily to prepare limits to the human intellect.”[32] As a tragic witness to the Prussian collapse at Jena-Auerstedt, Clausewitz saw first-hand the failure of self-limiting mental models. Whatever their other differences inward grapheme together with experience, he would likely handgrip alongside Boyd on the importance of making brand one’s lens filter every bit broad every bit possible.
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